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This study examines three central themes within the MF literature, within the context of the 
current drive and efforts by governments in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to improve institutional 
and governance quality, whilst implementing Microfinance as a blanket development policy 
tool. First, within an institutional context, we test for the institutional and firm specific 
determinants of the funding structure of MFIs. Secondly, we examine the impact of 
funding/capital structure on MFI financial and social performance. Finally, within the context 
of unfavourable financial exclusion level in SSA, we question just how much important MFIs 
are in improving the drive towards financial inclusion on the continent (by examining the 
impact of MFIs on financial inclusion in SSA). In order to achieve the above aims, this research 
project utilizes a comprehensive panel dataset for 38 countries in SSA, for the period 2004-
2016. A database (MIX Market) specially purposed for MFI reporting and data bank was 
implemented in collecting the data employed for this research. In addition, World Bank data 
was employed in collecting country specific, and macro-economic data, whilst data from the 
heritage index, ease of doing business index, and corruption index were employed as 
explanatory variables. 
 
This analysis examines key capital structure variables unique to MFIs namely; Leverage 
and Deposits. The leverage measure for MFIs captures total borrowing (as well as short and 
long tenure financing), in addition to donated equity, capturing the donations made to MFIs by 
donors by way of equity, finally, deposits are MFI clients timed deposits. In order to achieve 
the aims, we utilize a fixed-effect panel data estimation technique for analysis of the obtained 
data (which includes 778 MFIs with 3,338 data points), in addition to employing dummy 
variables to further enhance the analysis. The institutional and firm specific variables include; 
creditor rights, corruption indicators, governance quality, and MFI characteristics variables 
such as; size, risk and age. The second analysis utilizes MFI social and financial performance 
dependent variables, against capital structure variables. Finally, the third empirical analysis 
employs financial inclusion index, in addition to a broad set of independent variables which 
capture MFI penetration, technology utilization (mobile subscription), geography (population 
density), institutional quality (public credit registry, and corruption control), macroeconomic 
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(inflation, gross income), and financial development variables (deposit interest rate, and 
domestic credit to private sector). 
 
The results for the impacts of the institutional determinants of the capital structure of MFIs 
reveal that (for both leverage the deposit models) institutional measures are important in 
determining the capital structure of MFIs. In particular, the measure for investor protection is 
significant in determining the leverage of MFIs. This is a new finding within the Microfinance 
literature within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. This confirms the importance of a strong 
institutional environment in attracting funding for the sector. Further confirming this position 
are the measures of economic freedom, which appear to be significant in determining the 
donated equity for MFIs. Specifically, financial freedom is positive and significant, whilst the 
measure of income GNI per capita is relevant in determining the donated equity of MFIs.  
 
The second analysis examines the influence of capital structure on a comprehensive set of 
MFI performance. These include financial performance measure such as; sustainability, return 
on asset, risk and MFI efficiency. On the other hand, social performance captures the outreach 
of MFIs (measured by percent of female borrowers). In addition the outreach measure is split 
into two measures capturing both the breadth (number of active borrowers) and depth (average 
loan balance per borrower) of MFI outreach. Two Major findings are observed here. Firstly, 
the measure for financial performance MFI sustainability reveal that short-term leverage is 
significant in explaining MFI sustainability. On the other hand, the measure for social 
performance (percent of female borrowers), is negatively influenced by short-term leverage, 
suggesting MFIs operating principally with short-term leverage are less likely to achieve their 
social performance (often because of the pressure attached to the utilisation of short-term 
leverage). However, the measure for long-term leverage significantly influences the measure 
of social performance. 
 
The final analysis utilises a financial inclusion index, with the key regressor variable 
identified as a measure of MFI activity (MFI penetration rate). Key findings reveal that: MFIs 
(as measured by their penetration rates) appear to be insignificant in influencing financial 
inclusion in SSA. More specifically, the relationship appear to be in an inversely related with 
the measure for financial inclusion. This finding is telling, and a significant new finding within 
the literature. Perhaps expected, given the operational preferences of MFIs in Africa to focus 
on urban clients as opposed to rural penetration. Secondly, institutional measures such as; 
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corruption control, appear to be positive in influencing financial inclusion, reiterating the need 
for good governance and strong institutions. Worthy of note however is the measure for the 
information environment as measured by public credit registry. For instance, the results of the 
analysis showed that the existence of a public credit registry plays a significant role in 
influencing the financial inclusion in SSA. 
 
Fortunately, the policy implications are somewhat evident. Creating an enabling 
environment for funders to come into the sector and feel protected should be apriority. Policies 
that strengthen financial reporting practices, transparency in government, and embracing the 
absolute power of the rule of law are important for the continent in the short and longer term. 
From a macro-environment standpoint improving national income via increased productivity 
of local institutions, is a positive signal to international funders. Governments in SSA and 
policy makers, are required to create suitable local capital markets and healthy ways of 
providing long-term favourable financing to MFIs within the SSA region. It is clear from the 
various models of analysis that long-term leverage on favourable terms on average is crucial 
for the long-term sustainability and performance of MFIs within the SSA region. Therefore, 
Implementing a long-term funding strategy via affordable local currency denominated markets 
will tremendously improve the sector in SSA, and hence, should be the priority for policy 
makers.. The rationale being that with long-term funding MFIs are able to operate with more 
scope to expand operations without the pressure of meeting foreign denominated funding 
repayment obligations. 
 
A key finding for this research is the revelation that MFIs are less impactful in aiding the 
financial inclusion drive in SSA, as anecdotal evidence would suggest. Conversely, we find 
that the measure for mobile penetration is highly significant in influencing financial inclusion 
in SSA. Despite the findings for MFIs, the use of MFIs to achieve this goal could indeed still 
be attainable, however in their current capacity this is not possible. Therefore, re-tooling MFIs 
to meet such demands is crucial, and should be of high priority for policy makers and funders 
of the MFI sector. One of such ways to achieve deeper rural coverage could be an 
implementation of mobile banking technology in executing financial services. Some of the 
more important findings indicate that –with some hope- the implementation of financial 
technology such as mobile money could be of benefit to countries in SSA. Policy makers are 
therefore better off putting in place sound institutional framework such as strengthening and 
localising public credit registries. This research analysis indicates that this is significant in 
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aiding/impacting financial inclusion in SSA. Establishment of functional and efficient public 
credit registries, will greatly improve the processing of financial information and aid 
information asymmetry. In addition to this MFIs can then be trimmed down in their operative 
capacities, so as to aid agility in their operations, to better enable them reach the bottom of the 
pyramid competently.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
In the most recent white paper publication (Akkerhuys et al. 2009) of the Department for 
International Development (DFID), a concurrent narrative thread echoes along the lines of 
‘Eliminating World Poverty’
1
. According to Manji (2010), the 2002 International Development 
Act forms the basis of commitment to utilize international development aid from Britain, and 
indeed most developed economies, for the purpose of poverty reduction. Within this white 
paper, in addition to other aid agenda (such as; sustaining a common future, building peaceful 
states and societies and acting together through the international system), emphasis is placed 
on a commitment to support attempts to increase access to financial services
2
 to the poor, in 
order to create sustainable economic opportunities. The sustainable agenda, according to the 
DFID, aims to enable developing countries rely less on aid by supporting economic growth in 
local institutional strengthening, whilst improving their infrastructure through private sector 
initiatives (Akkerhuys et al. 2009).  
 
Similarly, a 2008 World-Bank (WB) policy research report (World Bank 2008) identifies 
the need for ‘well-functioning financial services’ as essential pillars to economic development 
in the global south, placing this at the core of its development agenda. Specifically pointing to 
the need for financial sector reforms
3
 in order to achieve broader access to financial services. 
Most importantly, this report links access to financial services to poverty alleviation and 
economic development, referring to the need for ‘financial inclusion’ and broadening access to 
credit for ‘the poor’ and ‘non-poor’ in order to reduce income inequalities. In addition, the G-
20 (under the leadership of the Chinese) group of economies (under the Global Partnership for 
Financial inclusion (GPFI), recently endorsed a set of High-Level principles for (encouraging) 
financial inclusion. Furthermore, a recent publication by The Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP)
4
, empowered by the (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2017) Findex database, suggests that 




 It is worth noting that since becoming a fully-fledged ministry, all 4 DFID white-paper publications have the 
title ‘Eliminating World Poverty’. With subtitles; ‘A Challenge for the 21st Century’; ‘Making Globalisation 
Work for the Poor’; ‘Making Governance Work for the Poor’. The most recent publication in 2009 is titled; 
Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future. As is evident, the concurrent thread of poverty 
alleviation has dominated the DFIDs agenda since formal inception (yet poverty and inequality remains rife 
around the world, most especially in developing countries). 
2
 This includes credit. 
3
 As part of a general drive towards a concerted approach to improving institutions in Africa. 
4
 CGAP is an organisation with a mandate that works to ensure universal access to financial services for all, by 
building/enabling inclusive financial systems. 
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of unbanked adults in the poorest of households.
5
 Although South East Asia and the Pacific 
account for a large portion of unbanked adults, it is evident that the most poor, and unbanked 
form a large concentration in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth SSA), with SSA having 
17% (350 million) of the total unbanked adult population (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2014). 
 
It is within this context that the Universal Financial Access 2020 (UFA 2020) agenda has 
been heavily paraded by WB (and its partner institutions), UK policy (DFID), the G-7, and G-
20 leaders. In this agenda, the key policy of enabling universal financial access (through 
financial inclusion) for all by 2020 is at the forefront. Central to the actualisation of these goals 
is Microfinance Institutions (henceforth MFIs), of whom have been identified as a key 
conveners in facilitating this agenda (Morduch 1999). The UFA 2020 is a project of the WB 
conceived in 2014. The goal set out to integrate underserved adults into the financial system, 
largely through improving financial inclusion. This initiative placed focus on 25 countries 
where 73% of all financially excluded people reside, namely; Bangladesh, Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Vietnam, 
Tanzania, Turkey, and Zambia. of the countries in this sample, an overwhelming 48% are in 
Africa. South Asia 12%, Latin America 16%, and East Asia Pacific countries 20%. 
 
This ambitious target was to enable 1 billion of these adults gain access to financial services, 
through partners and targeted intervention policies such as Microfinance. Although there has 
been questions about WB’s metrics for measuring financial inclusion (bank account ownership) 
(Milgram, 2005; Barr, 2005), it is clear that Africa is a major point of inflection for much of 
these policies. The current data suggest that of the 400m adults committed to be reached by the 
WB, 397.8m was projected to be reached by end of 2020. On the other hand of the 600m 
projected to be reached by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), only 451.4m are 
projected to be reached by the end of the period, a shortage of 150.8m adults. Whilst these are 
projections, the actual numbers from 2011 – 2017 suggest that these projections are unlikely to 
be met, considering the state of the global economy at the turn of the year (see Table 3.1 figures). 




 In more detail South Asia is home to 31% of the total unbanked adult population, while East Asia & Pacific 
equates to 24%. Sub-Saharan Africa has 17% of the total unbanked world adult population, 10 % in Latin 
America & Carribean, Europe & Central Asia 5%, Middle East & Other economies are home to 4% each, whilst 
High-Income OECD economies equates to 3% (World Bank 2014). 
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target. We have the sense that in Africa, MF is not quite tooled-up to deliver the type of change 
required from it by multilateral institutions, and therefore, steps taken to address key issues 
acting as deterrents to this efforts 
 
The remainder of this research thus follows: the next section (Background and motivation) 
introduces the context and motivation behind this research project. This is followed by the 
research questions, aims and objectives. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 presents the literature review, 
observing the 3 major strands of interest of this study. First, we introduce the literature for 
Microfinance; which explores the current issues in MF. We examine the institutional 
environment theory, for use in anchoring the institutional change and upheaval in the current 
MF industry, and its relationship with funding. This section also goes on to address the 
literature of MFI performance within the context of MFI funding, with considerable focus on 
two key areas of MF performance namely; MFI sustainability and MFI outreach. Finally, this 
section rounds up with the review of the literature on financial inclusion and recent 
developments in the literature on the role of development financial institutions such as MFIs 
in this regard. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the methodology, data and develops the hypothesis for analysis for this 
research project. Whilst chapters 6, 7 and 8 presents the empirical analysis of this project: 
chapter 3 examines the institutional determinants of MFI funding. Chapter 4 addresses the 
relationship between MFI funding structure and its financial and social performance. Finally, 
chapter 5 examines the relationship between MFIs and financial inclusion within the SSA 
context. The preceding chapter 6 summarises the results observed in the analysis and presents 
the discussions and conclusions, in addition to the robustness checks. This is followed by the 
bibliography and appendices.  
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
The UN resolution declaring 2005 the International year of Microcredit
6
, was met with 
generous international acceptance, with the recognition that at least western governments 
(through development institutions) are beginning to take note of the deplorable levels of 
poverty and socio-economic depletion and financial exclusion in Africa (especially in SSA
7
) 
(UN 2006). In this distinct event, special attention was given to Microfinance, highlighting this 
as an instrument for socio-economic development, with particular reference to sustainable 
development, in areas such as; access to credit, growth of local financial markets, poverty 
reduction, eradicating financial exclusion through inclusive financial sectors, and ending 
extreme hunger. This concerted push towards inclusiveness
8
, led by the UN, The World Bank, 
IMF and other development agencies, is evident by multilateral support of the Sustainable 
Development agenda (SDGs). Within this agenda, eradicating financial exclusion forms a 
major core of the SDGs. So intent on tackling this issue that some within the UN have 
further/actually coined the term financial inclusion as a “right for all” (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Much of the strategy that has been put forward by multilateral development finance 
institutions
9
, have been largely unanimous; the need to improve financial inclusion by 
empowering low-income excluded persons, through grassroots-led policy programs, such as 
MF (Milgram 2005, Nations 2006, Njegomir and Stojić 2010, Rahman 2010, Fardoust et al. 
2011, Banerjee et al. 2015). Whilst there has been general praise of the adoption of MF as a 
key tool for the UN in proffering solutions to the African continent (Battilana and Dorado 2010, 
Banerjee et al. 2015), critics on the other hand highlight the shortcomings of this strategy 




 Specifically, five goals were associated with “The Year” namely: 
- Assess and promote the contribution of microfinance and Microcredit to the MDGs 
- Increase public awareness and understanding of Microfinance and Microcredit as vital parts of the 
development equation. 
- Promote inclusive financial sectors 
- Support sustainable access to financial services, and  
- Encourage innovation and new partnerships by promoting and supporting strategic partnerships to build 
and expand the outreach and success of Microcredit and Microfinance. 
7
 Sub-Saharan Africa 
8
 Some of the areas of inclusiveness of interest to development institutions such as the UN/EU/WB and IMF 
include: Social inclusion of the poor, political inclusion of women in decision making, increasing women 
participation and minority participation in the global development efforts, and financial inclusion of peoples 
discriminated against from traditional financing. 
9
 Including the UN, WB, and USAID 
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tiny spurts of microcredit will spur-on sustainable economic and social development
10
. 
Furthermore, questions still remain. For example, more than 10 years on from the declaration, 
poverty levels and the general socio-economic and economic development levels of countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth SSA) remain dire, in comparison to other regions like LAC 
and SA etc. Where the above universal declaration of MFIs has long been in implementation, 
this has yet to be backed up by empirical data, especially in Africa. Pertinent questions still 
remain unanswered. Most importantly, is the implementation of MFIs as a policy strategy for 
improving financial inclusion in the continent
11
 coherent, considering the level of development 
accrued to the region? Second, with the funding shortage for MFI financing, can MFIs -by the 
examination of their capital structure, through the transmission loop of the institutional 
environment- hold any answers towards determining the funding formula for these cash starved 
organisations? And finally, if the capital structure is important in the funding of MFIs, can we 
further explain the sustainability and performance of MFIs through their capital structure 
formations? These questions appear to be timely when considering the increasing drive towards 
achieving universal financial inclusion, and also within the broader lens of poverty reduction 
(eradication). Therefore, providing answers to these questions through empirical enquiry will 
enrich the literature on MF and financial inclusion. 
 
Despite the obvious problems of governance, corruption, poor institutional quality, and 
weak institutional framework of many of the countries in SSA, the idea of a universal 
implementation of Microfinance as a tool for fighting financial exclusion (Aguera 2015, 
Cătălin and Voica 2017) remains questionable. A policy tool largely bellied on the transactional 
foundations of banking, of which requires adequate and quality functioning institutional 
systems, in order to have the desired impact. (Armendariz and Morduch 2010)  Even though 
this strategy has been largely adopted uniformly in SSA (Beck, Demirgüç-kunt, et al. 2007), 
questions remain on the viability and effectiveness of this (Bateman 2014). These concerns 
have been further exacerbated by recent collapses in MFIs around the globe. For instance, in 
Bolivia, between 1999-2000, the microfinance industry experienced a near  meltdown, as a 
result of unfair  competition by imposing Chilean MFIs in Bolivia (Rhyne 2001). Subsequently 




 An argument based on the stance that the main actors are the poor acting as micro-entrepreneurs, getting 
involved in tiny income generating activities. This in itself is argues to be an ineffective strategy.  
11
 This is considered to be a first step towards real financial integration by all peoples with potential to unlock 
pockets of economic activity and productive levels 
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caused as a result of large swathes of client over-indebtedness, growing client defaults, massive 
client’s withdrawal, leading to vital MFI loss making and closures (Chen et al., 2010; Milford, 
2010). Following this, the overblown MF sector in Bosnia preceded the near-collapse of the 
MF sector (Milford 2010), which then preceded the popular collapse of the MF sector in Andra 
Pradesh India (Milford 2010).  
 
More saliently, the almost universal adaptation of MFIs in the SSA region throws up some 
questions on the application of this policy, when data reveals that MFIs often suffer from 
mission drift, this occurs when MFIs abandon their dual (mostly social) mission to pursue a 
purely financial reward and/or compensation, as a result of neglect of their core users –those at 
the bottom of the pyramid- (Fehr and Hishigsuren 2006, Augsburg et al. 2010, Armendariz et 
al. 2012, Bateman and Chang 2012a, Kipesha and Zhang 2013). This is clearly evident in the 
continent, where the urban presence of MFIs far outweighs those in the situated in rural areas 
(Martinez and Krauss 2015). Exacerbating this phenomenon is the relative expense associated 
to operational mandate of MFIs in the rural areas, research puts this as outweighing in 
comparison to MFIs in urban areas (Bateman, 2012; Dehem and Hudon, 2013). This therefore 
implies that the penetration of MFIs in the continent is lower than levels needed to really push 
the needle and advance financial inclusion. 
 
In addition, MFI as a policy instrument seems to have been implemented in SSA without 
rigorous analysis of the terrain and heterogeneous characteristics unique to the countries in 
SSA. Therefore, the question remains on why this policy initiative is being favoured and 
implemented by various governments in SSA. For instance, differences in regional 
characteristics of developmental financial institutions and make-up legal and institutional 
environment, all make for a blanket application of MF as a policy tool absurd. For instance, 
western African development financial institutions largely make-up of cooperatives, in the east 
of Africa NBFIs are dominant, and in the south unions are credit unions are largely dominant. 
Furthermore, the differences in financial market
12
 characteristics further make for a 
complicated cocktail, requiring specific solutions to the sustainable development and economic 




 For instance, financial market depth, profile and other characteristics 
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contextual region so as to proffer unique solutions to an ever increasing development 
challenges in SSA. 
 
1.2 MOTIVATIONS 
Access to finance is regarded as one of the key roadblocks facing businesses as well as 
individuals in need of finance (financial services) to improve livelihood.  In order to enable 
inclusive finance permeate developing market economies, MF has been touted as a tool, not 
only to enable inclusive finance, but also, to attain a long-term goal of poverty alleviation. The 
UN development goals of 2020 places considerable effort on MF, and its implementation in 
order to meet its goals of financial inclusion for all by 2020. In order to meet this lofty target, 
(Morduch 1999), observes that MFIs have to do more, in order to reach the recipients of these 
funds by improving their performance. By improving aspects of MFI performance, it is argued 
that MFIs are likely to impose a wider and deeper reach into sections of society needing its 
services (Morduch 1999, Charitonenko and Campion 2003, Hamada 2010, Hoque et al. 2011). 
Finance theory suggests that capital structure can play a role in improving the performance of 
firms. Hence, this research project seeks to shed much needed light on the impacts of capital 
structure as related to MFIs and how, this aspect of MFI development could help in improving 
its performance. 
 
Microfinance has emerged as an important strategic instrument for fighting financial 
exclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa. About three-quarters of the adult population in SSA lack 
access to formal banking services (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2014). Against the backdrop of this, 
Microfinance institutions are promoting financial inclusion through provision of financial 
services to the poor. Since inception, microfinance industry has evolved and so are its products. 
The new innovative products besides microcredit and micro-savings includes: Micro-
Consignment, Micro-Franchise, Micro-Insurance, Micro-Leasing and Mobile Money Transfer 
(Van Kirk 2010). Despite, the enormous effort achieved by the MFIs in the past two decades, 
many MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa underperform and struggle to survive.  The collapse of Pride 
Zambia
13
 in 2009, and the failures of over 30 microfinance institutions in 2013, in Ghana, 
brought the topic of financial sustainability of microfinance industry to a broader public debate. 




 Pride Zambia was the largest donor funded MFIs in Zambia operating under the project agreement of Pride  
Africa sponsored by Swedish International Development  Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
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donor funding to survive, which means they are not financially sustainable (Schreiner, 2000; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2011a). It has been argued that failing MFIs are harmful to the industry 
has a whole. 
 
The above events have further brought the performance of MFIs into glaring view. For 
instance, Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX)
14
 data reveal that MFIs in SSA are 
empirically the least sustainable, and least efficient. Whilst the existing literature suggest that 
MFI financial sustainability is the prerequisite of institutional sustainability (Hollis and 
Sweetman 1998), evidence remains scant. For instance, empirical literature on factors affecting 
performance of microfinance institution in SSA is still limited. This is due to the youth of the 
microfinance industry itself, which started making significant process in the early 2000s. There 
are few available studies focusing on the performance of MFIs in SSA, for example; Tehulu, 
(2013) investigates the determinants of financial sustainability of microfinance institutions in 
East Africa
15
 from period covering 2004 to 2009 using ordered and binary probit regression 
models, Kinde, (2012) investigates factors affecting the financial sustainability of  14 MFIs in 
Ethiopia for period 2002 to 2010 applying a  random effect regression technique in estimating 
the balanced panel data. Finally, Ayayi and Maty, (2010) use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression technique to estimate MFI performance. 
 
The three studies by Tehulu (2013), Kinde (2012), Ayayi and Sene (2010) suffers from two 
methodological weakness. Firstly, they use a very narrow range of variables that could lead to 
omitted variables bias. For instance Tehulu (2013), Kinde (2012) omit key variables like age 
of MFIs and return on asset, whilst Ayayi and Sene (2010) omitted deposits and return on asset. 
These omitted variables could undoubtedly influence the financial sustainability of 
microfinance institutions.  Secondly, these studies did not apply econometrically coherent 
regression techniques, which could have addressed the endogeneity concern. Additionally, 
Tehulu (2013) and Kinde (2012), did not perform further tests to establish the robustness of 
their results. If MFIs are to attain their goals, it is therefore vital to investigate what influences 





 For further information about MIX  visit http://www.themix.org 
15
 The East African countries consist of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
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This research project -in line with the wider view of the current debates and issues in 
developing finance literature in sub-Saharan Africa-, aims to fill the gaps observed from current 
MFI literature by examining the determinants of the capital structure of MFIs through an 
institutional framework, its links with MFI performance, and its impacts on financial inclusion. 
More specifically, we addresses the question of how adequately MFIs help in breaking down 
barriers to financial inclusion. More succinctly three lines of question emerge to address this. 
First, secondary data on microfinance penetration in SSA was analysed to examine the 
institutional determinants of the funding of MFIs. Secondly, we ask the question of the impacts 
of funding choices on the performance of MFIs. Finally, from a policy perspective, we examine 
the impacts of MFIs on Financial Inclusion (FI) in the SSA region, so as to ascertain whether 
in areas of MFI operation, they address barriers to access by serving financially excluded 
persons. 
 
We argue that an appropriate way to tackle the problem would be to focus on institutional 
strength and according governance for the framework of MFIs. For the financial inclusion 
debate, we indicate that much of the financial inclusion problem can be improved when 
technology is embraced in order to aid financial policy input. This is because, with much lower 
need for cash-based transaction, the entire cost of sustaining an inclusive financial system is 
cheaper, less cumbersome and readily available to all, especially through the help of mobile 
technology. 
 
The next section provides insight into the aims and objectives identified for the purpose of this 
research project.  
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1.3 RESEARCH AIMS, QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
This research project is aimed at unfolding the relationship between MFIs and financial 
inclusion; MFI capital structure funding, and its institutional determinants, and finally, impacts 
of capital structure on MFI performance within the sub-Saharan African region 
This opens up three lines of enquiry: 
 
Firstly, what are the institutional determinants of the capital structure of MFIs in SSA?  
• Do firm specific characteristics influence the capital structure of MFIs in SSA? 
• Do institutional factors; the institutional environment, Macro-economic, and external 
factors (such as the level of financial development) influence the capital structure of 
MFIS in SSA?  
• Do the theories of MFI financing (life-cycle theory and profit incentive theory) play a 
determining role in the ability of MFIs to attract robust funding?   
 
Secondly, are there any significant influences of capital structure on the social and financial 
performance of MFIs in SSA?  
• What are the directional influences of funding choices, such as; grants, debt, equity and 
deposits on the financial performance (including sustainability, efficiency and MFI 
portfolio risk) of MFIs in SSA? 
• What are the directional influences of funding choices, such as; grants, debt, equity and 
deposits on the Social performance (including depth and breadth of MFI outreach) of 
MFIs in SSA? 
 
Finally, has the penetration of Microfinance Institutions in SSA influenced Financial Inclusion 
amongst countries in SSA?  
• What is the directional influence of MF in improving financial inclusion in SSA? 
• Do other factors help in improving/aiding financial inclusion in SSA other than MFIs?  
• If so, are these more efficient than MFIs in meeting the target of Financial Inclusion for 
all by 2020 (UFA 2020)? 
• How important is the role of other local financial institutions such as; having an 
efficient public credit registry in improving Financial Inclusion in SSA? 
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• How effective is MFI as a policy tool implemented in improving Financial Inclusion 
levels amongst countries in SSA.  
 
1.3.2 Objectives 
To achieve the above aim, the following objectives will help to satisfy the question of this 
research project: 
• Perform a comprehensive review of the existing literature on MFI funding choices, the 
changing landscape of funding capital available for MFIs, capital structure decisions 
for MFIs and MFI performance in the sub-Saharan African region. 
 
• Document available evidence and literature surrounding the area of financial and social 
performance of MF in the region. Discussions of the current state of financial and social 
performance of MF as a whole within SSA region. 
 
• The life-cycle theory posits that age (of an MFI) is the key factor responsible for an 
MFIs ability to acquire attractive funding. We examine the relevance of this theory in 
the SSA context. If this holds true; how does more attractive funding alter the capital 
structure of MFIs, and what are the implications of this on performance of MFIs within 
the region.  
 
• Using descriptive analysis of the available data to shed light on the various capital 
structure forms prevalent amongst MFIs in the SSA region, further enhancing 
knowledge on available funding sources robustly utilised by MFIs in the SSA region.  
 
• Employ econometric analysis on collected data, to perform tests for each of the outlined 
MFI capital structure (leverage) variables against selected institutional, macro-
economic and firm-specific determinants (gleaned from theoretical and empirical 
studies) of MFI capital structure, so as to ascertain the critical institutional factors that 
influence MFI capital structure decisions. 
 
• Employ econometric analysis on collected data, to perform tests for each of the outlined 
MFI performance indicators against explanatory capital structure variables, MFI 
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characteristics variables and macro-economic variables, to determine the impacts of 
financial leverage on each of the four facets of microfinance performance (Efficiency, 
Sustainability, Portfolio Quality, and Outreach). 
 
• Employ econometric analysis on collected data, to perform tests on the penetration rate 
of MFIs against the Financial Inclusion index for countries within SSA.  
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 MICROFINANCE, FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND SUSTAINABILITY 
The history of microfinance can be traced back to early African developments in rotating 
savings and credit associations (such as; susu), (Seibel 1984). However, recent history of the 
practice existed in 18th and 19th century in European mercantile system/practice/development. 
Early characterisation of this practice was characterised with charities and cooperatives 
administering credit to poor farmers and agricultural labourers (Seibel 2005). The charities and 
cooperatives were entirely funded by donations and interest free loans, from altruistic 
individuals (Hollis and Sweetman 1998). In spite of the substantial evolution of the 
microfinance industry, its core principle of credit provision in addition to providing other 
essential financial services to the very poor in society has been preserved. 
 
The modern microfinance movement re-emerged in the 1970s in Bangladesh as a small local 
experiment undertaken by Grameen Bank and its founder Dr Muhammad Yunus. The idea 
pioneered by Yunus of funding small amounts of un-collaterised loans to microenterprises 
quickly attracted global audience. By early 1990s the concept of microfinance was the centre 
of discussion in many gathering of the international development communities. The founding 
role of microfinance was to alleviate poverty via financial inclusion and advancing economic 
needs of the low-income households. Recent empirical studies confirm that microfinance 
services enhance household savings, help diversify household income and allow consumption 
smoothing (Ananya 2010, Banerjee et al. 2015). 
 
Overtime, the microfinance founding principle of poverty alleviation has eroded and slowly 
being replaced with the neoliberal for-profit model. Since the mid-2000s, the for-profit model 
has become dominant in the microfinance industry. For example, Grameen Bank established 
in early 1980 as a not-for-profit microfinance institution converted in 2002 into a profit-
oriented institution. The commercialisation of the microfinance industry reached greater 
heights in 2007 when the Mexican microfinance institution, Compartamos, launched an Initial 
Public Offering (Bateman and Chang 2012a). 
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In the last decade, the microfinance industry has attracted investments not only from 
traditional donor communities but also from venture capitalists and wall street banks
16
 (Janda 
and Svárovská, 2010). The flow of funds has unquestionably amplified the commercialisation 
of the industry (see Figure 1 below). In addition, the majority of newly established MFIs are 
now profit oriented (Roberts 2013). Institutionalists argue that commercialisation of 
microfinance industry cuts the umbilical cord of donor dependence and promote institutional 
sustainability (Woller 2002, Brau and Woller 2004). On the other hand, others argues that 
commercialisation of microfinance industry actually exacerbates the poverty levels of the 




Figure 1: Total MFI Asset Growth across Regions: 2004-2018. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), Latin America & 
the Caribbean (LAC), Easter Europe and Central Asia (EEC), East Asia the Pacific (EAP).  
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
2.1.1 Microfinance Overview 
MFIs provide financial services to low-income and financially excluded households in 
developing countries around the world. In the minds of many, microfinance and microcredit 
are synonymous (Helms 2006). However, microfinance refers to an array of financial services 
that include credit, savings, and insurance, while microcredit is the provision of credit which 




 For example large banks like Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC have separate microfinance divisions 
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governmental organizations (NGOs), credit unions, nonbank financial intermediaries, or 
commercial banks (Milford 2010). Access to finance is therefore crucial, such that; it provides 
the underserved with opportunities to take active roles in the economy (Morduch, 1999a; 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2004). To cushion themselves from perceived repayment 
risks, MFIs therefore charge very high (30%–60%) nominal interest rates (Bogan 2008). In 
addition, the loans are short term, with very small average loan size, and only a few programs 
require borrowers to put up collateral. Furthermore, loans can be as small as $75, repaid over 
one year. Globally there are more than 67 million households served by microfinance programs 
(Dehejia et al. 2012). 
 
Microfinance overtime has transitioned into a useful tool, designed not only to meet the 
financial needs of the poor, but also to engage in non-financial services such as education, 
health and nutrition (Baye 2013). Clearly, microfinance is a long-term process which 
encourages the poor to save and accumulate their small incomes to reduce the impact of 
economic vulnerability (Cull et al., 2014). It is no surprise that financial inclusion, poverty 
reduction and sustainable economic development is the top priorities of governments in most 
developing countries (Lele and Adu-Nyako 1991). Microfinance therefore, is considered a 
policy tool for poverty reduction in developing countries, where most of the world’s 
underserved are located (Christen et al., 2004: Awaworyi Churchill, 2018b). Consequently, in 
order to provide positive social outcomes MFIs often aspire to attain financial independence 
(non-reliance on donor funding to meet operational needs). Therefore, in addition to meeting 
outreach goals, MFIs often aim to be sustainable. In this light, MFIs have been referred to as 
hybrid institutions (Littlefield et al. 2003). This is often as a result of their double bottom 
mandate of financial performance and social outreach goals/missions (Mersland and Strøm 
2010, Kar 2012). Within the literature MFIs who achieve both often go through a 
transformation process (Fernando, 2004; D’Espallier et al., 2017). Transformation generally 
results in an improved governance and ownership structure and is the only way an MFI can 
commercialise or “manage on a business basis” ((Cull et al. 2014). By doing this, MFIs can 
expand their outreach by increasing the number of clients served, improving customer 
satisfaction and loan repayment and stabilising the sources of funds to create a viable business. 
34 
2.1.2 Critiques of Microfinance 
Microfinance is currently considered one of the most important tools for international 
development and poverty alleviation. Despite numerous empirical inquiries, the actual effects 
of microfinance on economic and gender variables relative to poverty remain unclear, and a 
number of critiques have challenged the efficacy of microfinance at promoting women's 
empowerment and alleviating poverty. Moreover, since the 1970s, microfinance has grown and 
transformed into a largely commercial financial sector that connects capital investors with poor 
borrowers at a significant scale. Nonetheless, through its business success, microfinance has 
also engendered a series of over indebtedness crises, most notably the one in India in 2010. 
These crises, as well as the strong critiques levied against microfinance, have prompted the 
sector to search for new methods and a new mission as well as new markets to conquer (Drake 
and Rhyne 2002). 
 
Although, MF is often touted as a possible way to spur economic development in rural areas 
(grassroots’), by affording access to financial services for micro-entrepreneurs. The rate of 
bankarization in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated today at less than 15% of the population (vs. 
over 90% in Europe and vs. 40% in Latin America) (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015, 2017). This 
clearly demonstrates the necessity for more financial services addressing the needs of the lower 
segments of the population, particularly in rural areas. Whilst providing financial services in 
isolation is no panacea for development, it is however an important step to this end. 
 
The usefulness of MF as a tool for providing financial services to the bottom of the pyramid 
is indeed helpful; first in the form of credit delivery to expand businesses, but also for savings, 
money transfers, and payment services (Armendáriz et al. 2010). It is gleaned that this type of 
inclusion is essential to creating more integrative economic development (Demirgüç-Kunt 
2014). Therefore, this relationship with the bottom of the pyramid is the rationale behind the 
proponents of the use of MFIs as a development policy tool (Barr, 2005; UN, 2006). This 
ultimately creates a unique closeness that helps MFIs initiate widespread and regular contact 
with the unbanked poor population. This therefore means that their unique proximity to reach 
and extend to the bottom of the pyramid –by way of their mandate- is second to none. However, 
this is hardly the case in SSA, the profile of most MFIs in SSA suggest the opposite. With a 
large number unable to collect and mobilise deposits, and most operating as NGOs with purely 
a micro-credit delivery function (United-Nations 2013). It is no surprise that these institutions 
are struggling to meet development challenges in SSA.  
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This could be put down to few reasons. Firstly, research indicates that MFs are more likely 
to be situated in the urban areas, in comparison to rural areas (Mader 2016). For instance, within 
SSA, even though most (70% of the population) of the continent resides in rural areas (of which 
more than 80% are poor), MFIs are predominantly known to be situated in urban areas as 
opposed to being in rural areas (Mokaddem 2009). In addition to the above, this is also due to 
the development overtime of a familiarity of lending in urban areas as opposed to rural areas.  
 
Secondly, the issue of mission drift; a form of principal agency problem, which occurs when 
MFIs concentrate focus on clients above the poverty line, thereby neglecting their social 
mission. This ultimately could lead to a sector stagnant, bereft of adequate funding, thus failing 
to attract the right type of funding to meet the needs of its missions. Thirdly, the cost of financial 
services delivery to the poor –in rural areas- in comparison to urban areas could further be a 
deterring factor for MFIs (Mokaddem, 2009; De Haan and Lakwo, 2010)
17
. Finally, funding 
constraints, general investor apathy, and a general poor market and implementation 
infrastructure of the operating environments of MFIs in developing markets (Milford 2010). 
 
The problem however, remains that the global adoption of MF as a tool for improving 
financial inclusion needs a rethink. Various policy initiatives for eliminating the issue of 
exclusion largely involves the use of MFIs (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2017). The effective 
implementation of such, is argued, will be key to alleviating financial exclusion and eventually 
eradicate poverty. However, a closer look at the activities of MFIs –especially in SSA- clearly 
reveals that this strategy is not only incoherent, but not enough
18
, if financial inclusion is to be 
eradicated by 2020
19
. A rethink of the policies for improving financial inclusion levels is 





 The obvious way to reduce these transaction costs is to move towards technology platform that can enable 
banking transactions without the physical presence of the customers. These initiatives have either been towards 
opening and maintaining bank accounts through enhanced technologies (initiatives by Self-Employed Women’s 
Association [SEWA], Indian Bank in Puducherry and Dharavi) or through prepaid instruments (Oxicash) 
(Gangopadhyay et al., 2005). However, all these efforts have focused more on the process (how to make 
banking transactions less costly). 
18
 For instance, the share of the poor served by MFIs have been in a steady declining state. 
19
 According to the World Bank’s UFA 2020 development goals and initiatives. 
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If MF is to be the answer, a radical shake-up of the sector in SSA is needed. For instance 
the operational capability of MFIs is still largely situated in urban areas as opposed to operation 
in rural areas (Mokadem 2009; De Haan and Lakwo, 2010). Secondly, the issue of who MFIs 
serve; largely the literature suggests that MFIs –in SSA- still do not serve those at the bottom 
of the pyramid (Krauss et al. 2015). This has been largely attributed to the cost of credit-
disbursement, and delivery costs, in addition to operating costs in rural areas (Bogan 2008). 
Further, the premise of an entrepreneurial driven economy –as employed in many western 
economies- is one that largely informs the application of MF in SSA (UN, 2006). However, 
the countries in SSA might be ill-equipped for this type of growth. As researchers suggest, this 
is possible in economies that have strong institutions; ones that respect the rule of law, and 
ensures rights of market participants are held-up (Hwang and Powell 2005, Amoros 2009, 
Boettke and Coyne 2009, Estrin et al. 2011, Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2013, Smith 2015, 
Chowdhury et al. 2019, Fuentelsaz et al. 2019). 
 
This line of argument relies on the premise of an entrepreneurial driven economic renewal 
and growth. When we look at the SSA region, an overwhelming majority of these economies 
do not have strong institutions, this is confirmed by the poor ranking in the institutional 
development indexes, and human capital development indexes of many of this nations. If this 
is then the case, why is this policy still being implemented? Perhaps, a policy which supports 
local manufacturing, and affords the rural population the opportunity to work and earn a living 
is more suitable than offering the idea of entrepreneurship through MFIs as a sustainable 
solution. Secondly the lack of infrastructural development in a lot of these countries least 
supports the idea of an entrepreneurial driven growth (Boettke and Coyne 2009, Estrin et al. 
2011). For instance infrastructural deficiencies like power, energy and poor transport/road 
networks largely limits the enterprise of local businesses. This leads to other schools of thought, 
which advocates for the supply of job opportunities through increased implementation of basic 
infrastructural services (such as power, water, gas and healthcare) through a sound institutional 
environment, in addition to investment in human capital, which entrepreneurs can then thrive 
in (Milford 2010). The process of sustained institutional and sound infrastructure path, however 
cannot be circumvented by the use of MF as a equalising strategy to achieve an inclusive 
society. We argue that MF should be one of many enablers of inclusive growth, and not a 
“silver bullet” as thought by many governments in Africa.  
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MFIs can indeed be an effective development tool, however, in its current implementation, 
it is still inefficient in achieving its mission objectives (De Haan and Lakwo 2010, Abdulai and 
Tewari 2016, Azad et al. 2016). A radical shift toward policy making that strengthen the 
institutional environment which could further foster economic sustainability and complement 
development finance efforts such as MFIs could be more appropriate (Bateman 2011). 
However, in the short-term, if MFIs have to play a role –as suggested-, a better understanding 
of these institutions as applies specifically to the SSA region is needed. We aim to achieved 
this through this study. MFI capital structure presents a good initiating point, whilst the 
limitation on funding is becoming a persistent issue for MFIs in SSA, the question remains on 
how can  these institutions be best positioned for a changing funding environment in order to 
stay relevant? Furthermore with the increased clamour for improved institutional environment 
and governance in SSA, what could be the potential impacts of the institutional environment 
on the capital formation of MFIs? A natural follow-on form this is to ask the question; will an 
improved institutional and governance environment improve the capital structure of MFIs? 
How does this also hinge/impact on the social and financial performance of these firms? And 
finally, what does this mean for financial inclusion within the context of MFIs within SSA? 
Microfinance could well be an important tool to address the issue of poverty eradication. 
However, in its current state, little is left to re-assure any hope. Hence, these questions are 
pertinent to improve the debate on the current understanding of Financial Inclusion, MFI 
(sustainability), and the role of the institutional environment in alleviating this phenomenon. 
 
2.1.3 Microfinance Challenges 
Microfinance has come under scrutiny as an appropriate tool for achieving the ambitious target 
of poverty reduction via financial inclusion (Mader 2016) . Mokaddem, (2009) argues that 
simply offering microcredit is a panacea for capital destruction, and is by no means a 
sustainable means of reaching the poor, and even more, reducing poverty in order to reach the 
Millennium goals. One of such criticism is the untenable nature of current MF practices (Mader 
2016). This has been backed by recent studies that reveal that MFIs need to move out of heavily 
subsidized operations and into commercialization to achieve efficiency and financial 
sustainability (Drake and Rhyne 2002, Olivares-Polanco 2005, Bihari 2011). Since donor 
funding is becoming insufficient to meet the continual demand for well-designed financial 
products from new and existing clients, access to commercial funds tends to help MFIs improve 
their performance (Milford 2010). Furthermore, the recent implosion of MFIs across the world 
has received concern (Bateman 2010). For MFIs in SSA, the risk of a breakdown in difficult 
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operating environment is particularly salient in mitigating credit risk. For instance, research 
indicates that one way to mitigate the unfavourable impact of MFI credit risk, would be to 
make improvements in institutional quality, such as improving the quality of regulation. For 
example, Tingbani et al., (2019) examine regulation and the impacts of credit risk of MFIs in 
SSA. They provide evidence that; improved quality and efficient regulation can reduce credit 
risk in MFIs, in regions with low competition (SSA). 
 
2.1.4 Microfinance and Poverty Reduction 
This section provides a review of the literature on the impact of microfinance on poverty 
reduction. This sheds light on the importance of commercial microfinance (commercial funds) 
in the MFI developmental stages. This is achieved by first examining whether or not 
microfinance really helps the poor. Secondly, this literature will ask who benefits from 
microfinance. 
 
2.1.5 Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? 
The literature on the impact of MF on the poor has been mixed. Many studies have been 
conducted and have come to different conclusions concerning the impact of microfinance on 
poverty reduction. Most studies provide evidence supporting the positive effects on increasing 
the income of the poor. For instance, (Ledgerwood and White 2006), Wright (2000), Morduch 
and Haley (2002), Pande et al. (2012). Other strands of literature further propose a reduction 
in the vulnerability of the bottom of the pyramid. For instance, Zaman, (1999), Wright (2000), 
Zaman (2000), McCulloch and Baulch (2000), Develtere and Huybrechts, (2005), and Swain 
and Floro (2012). Finally, a number of studies with largely conclusive and positive evidence 
on health, nutritional and education (Wright 2000). 
 
It is widely accepted that poverty is a social problem one that fuels inequality and other 
social ills in society (Pare and Felson 2014). Poverty reduction, therefore, is ideally a long-
term process integrating numerous financial and non-financial programs for generations of 
poor households (Aigbokhan, 2008). Lack of money, access to financial service, and low 
personal income are basic measures and symptoms of poverty. Therefore, from a theoretical 
standpoint, lending small amounts of money to the bottom of the pyramid should in essence, 
have some positive impact on poverty reduction. According to IFAD (2011), and Roodman 
and Morduch (2013a), , small scale lending could help the vulnerable overcome hunger to 
survive and also provide opportunities to conduct small businesses for future cash flows to 
39 
improve their standards of living. Consequently, studies questioning the motives and impacts 
of MF remain relevant to the sector. For instance, (Aigbokhan 2008) and Mader (2017), 
observe that the implementation of MF is poor at best. Amidst this, it is not clear as to the real 
impact of MF on poverty reduction. This therefore, is a salient point for policymakers in 
implementing poverty reduction strategies. 
 
There have been numerous empirical studies conducted to examine the effects of MF in 
different countries by using the double difference approach or panel data with the fixed effect 
model. The results show that the personal incomes of borrowers are different with or without 
microfinance programs in different areas. Gertler et al. (2009) test for a relation between access 
to finance and consumption shortfalls associated with ill health. Their results show that 
microfinance is likely to reduce vulnerability and access to finance tends to help the poor 
smooth their consumption in the face of a decline in health. In the area of personal income, a 
significant positive impact is found in personal income and consumption, indicating a reduction 
in the vulnerability of the poor. 
 
Despite the success and popularity of microfinance as mentioned above, there is no clear 
evidence that microfinance has a positive impact on poverty reduction. For instance, studies 
that examine the impacts of microfinance using rigorous quantitative techniques often find that 
rigorous quantitative evidence of microfinance impact is still scarce and inconclusive 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2004; Gertler et al., 2009). Furthermore Armendáriz De 
Aghion and Morduch, (2010) show that overall, it is widely acknowledged that no substantial 
study robustly shows any strong impacts of microfinance. Finally, according to Dichter (2007), 
the impact of microfinance seems unrealistic based on the recent experience of developed 
countries, where microfinance might leave some poor people worse off, as in case of credit 
cards and mortgages. 
 
Many studies have found that there was an insignificant and negative effect of MF on 
consumption, and no effect on new business creation, education or women’s empowerment. 
For instance, Karlan and Zinman (2010) and Duflo et al. (2013) find that no evidence of an 
impact from a number of large-scale MFIs. Roodman and Morduch (2013) took a different 
tack, revisiting the works of Pitt and Khandker (1998), and reported that there was very little 
solid evidence which showed the real role of microfinance in poverty reduction in measurable 
ways. Thus on balance, whilst anecdotal evidence of MF impact on the poor exist. Impact 
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studies, reveal that it is extremely difficult to separate and measure the contributions of 
microfinance to poverty reduction, since poverty is a significant social problem that permeates 
every dimension of culture and society (Khandker, 2005; Bateman and Chang, 2012; van 
Rooyen et al., 2012). In addition, there are strong potential synergies between microfinance 
and the provision of other non-financial programs since the benefits derived from these 
programs are interconnected (Milford 2010).  
 
In conclusion, these results tend to suggest that microfinance cannot immediately turn the 
poor into non-poor. The point is that microfinance is a long-term process which tends to support 
the poor financially so that they can combine their skills, knowledge, experience and financial 
capital to break away from poverty and change their lives for a better and brighter future. 
 
2.1.6 Who Benefits from Microfinance? 
In view of the overarching goals of MF as a policy tool, debate has been in the forefront as to 
who benefits from MF. Although proponents argue that the poor at the bottom of the pyramid 
benefit from MF adoption, donor funding is becoming insufficient to meet the continual 
demand for well-designed financial products from new and existing clients. As a result, MFIs 
tend to access commercial funds to improve their performance and also achieve a targeted 
outreach (Morduch and Haley 2002). This therefore elicits an interesting question of the 
recipients of MF services, the poorest or just the poor near the poverty line. Whilst, there has 
been some discussion about the incentives to serve the poorest of the poor. Several MFIs tend 
to serve the poor who are near or just above the poverty line, instead of the poorest. It is 
sometimes argued that whilst MF has contributed positively to the well-being of the poor in 
general, it has however failed to reach the poorest in particular. Although Ledgerwood and 
White (2006), Morduch and Haley (2002), insist that microfinance can be effective for the 
poor, including the poorest. However, well designed financial services are unlikely to have a 
positive effect on the poorest, unless they specifically seek to reach them (Wright 2000). The 
poorest will be missed or they will tend to exclude themselves since they do not see the 
programs as being for them (Navajas et al., 2000). 
 
Microfinance programs in Bangladesh have succeeded in reaching only half of this 
population (Hashemi et al., 1996). Based on a case of BRAC’s Rural Development Programme, 
40% of those eligible did not participate in any development activities, microfinance or 
otherwise (Navajas et al., 2000). Concerning non-financial development services, almost 75% 
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of the poorest did not participate (Rahman and Razzaque 2000). The poorest tend to exclude 
themselves from microfinance activities since they do not have the capacity to be accountable 
for regular, sustained repayments or husbands do not permit their wives to join. 
 
Although microfinance is clearly aimed at helping the poor access financial services and 
taking part in local economic activities to improve their lives, it has become increasingly 
apparent that it rarely serves the poorest. For instance, findings by Morduch and Haley (2002), 
Hammill et al., (2008) and Adjei, J. K. and Arun (2009), Kohn (2011) suggest the unsuitability 
of products, and services aimed at those at the bottom of the pyramid. Other research further 
indicates that microfinance is generally most appropriate where ongoing economic activity and 
sufficient household cash flow already exist (Isern and Porteous, 2005). However, this is hardly 
the case in most rural communities in SSA. Therefore, rather than exclusively reaching the 
poorest, MFIs tend to reach the economically active poor or the non-poor who hover above the 
poverty line based on their participation in economic activities. 
 
2.1.7 Over-indebtedness 
The problem of over-indebtedness has plagued the MF sector over time. Although the ultimate 
aim of an MF policy initiative is aimed at improving the lives of the poor, the converse effect 
of indebtedness bring to question the moral stance of providers in this sector (Armendáriz De 
Aghion and Morduch 2010). Whilst this remains an issue in the sector, the nature of MF loan 
disbursement coupled with weak governance infrastructure often fosters this problem (Ghosh 
2013). For  instance, studies indicate that MF credit disbursement and loan-size depends largely 
on the consumption needs of those at the bottom of the pyramid, which fall into three 
categories: domestic spending, small business operations (working capital), and smoothing 
emergency consumption
20
 (Shetty and Veerashekharappa 2009a). Thus, the relative small loan 
sizes often lead to small and numerous loan applications from borrowers, a possible problem 
of moral hazard therefore exist. Such that, the demand for larger loan sizes exceed the 
repayment ability of MFI clients. Disbursing larger loans could therefore lead to the over-
indebtedness of some borrowers (Schicks 2013; Mader 2017). Conversely, if loan sizes are 
small such that clients’ needs are not met, this could lead to multiple borrowing by MFI clients 




 These include issues of health, and other related emergency expenses.  
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This often lead the poor into considerable debt in many cases unpayable (Kappel et al., 
2010). Over-lending and multiple borrowing are the most important early signs of over-
indebtedness, amongst MFI users (Isern and Porteous 2005). According to (Armendáriz De 
Aghion and Morduch 2010), credit bureaus are suggested as a useful mechanism to track the 
borrowers from other institutions, which share credit data with the bureaus. However, credit 
bureaus provide only a partial answer because it is difficult to gauge the level of indebtedness 
and to judge whether the poor are over indebted. 
 
2.1.8 Microfinance Crisis and Recent Collapses 
The problem of MFI collapses has attracted attention following multiple collapses of MFIs 
across the sector. The first known microfinance crisis, which occurred in Bolivia in 1999, was 
caused by consumer lending and multiple borrowing (Bold et al., 2012). Within the literature, 
factors such as poor consumer lending, relaxed credit policies together with the rapid growth 
of MFIs have often contributed to the crisis in Morocco and the Punjab (Pakistan) (Burki 2009). 
Furthermore, the case of Zambia shows that the relaxing of the standards of loan officers’ 
responsibilities are the main reasons (Dixon et al., 2007). 
 
Based on a cross-country analysis and the crises in microfinance, (Dixon et al., 2007) 
conclude that over-indebtedness is typically caused by many factors, such as: the existence of 
multiple borrowing; the growth targets of MFIs; overstretched MFI systems and controls; an 
erosion of MFI lending discipline; weak policies and practices of assessing customer 
repayment capacities, and the absence of effective credit information systems. In addition, the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008, politically motivated movements and non-repayment 
movements are aggravating factors, but not the root cause of crises, such as in Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Morocco and Bosnia and Herzagovina (Chen et al., 2010). Chief amongst the root 
causes of the recent microfinance crises are multiple borrowing and the poor quality of loans 
provided to the poor as a result of the rapid growth of MFIs (Mader 2017). Finally, the recent 
microfinance crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh was caused by a 
concentrated market, further exacerbated through MFI lofty growth targets, loans were 
provided to the poor who were indebted to other financial organisations (Shetty and 
Veerashekharappa 2009b). While many MFIs have suffered losses and still continue to face 




2.2 MICROFINANCE PERFORMANCE  
2.2.1 Microfinance Performance  
The performance of MFIs is typically measured in four main critical areas: outreach, financial 
sustainability (profitability), efficiency, and portfolio quality. These core indicators are 
categorised into two groups: financial and social performance. Sustainability, efficiency and 
portfolio quality are indicators of financial performance. On the other hand, outreach captures 
the social performance of MFIs. These indicators do not capture all the relevant aspects of 
performance for internal management but they ideally represent the minimum performance 
areas for the basic investigations of external investors (Rosenberg, 2009). 
 
2.2.2 Sustainability 
The hybrid nature of MFIs often implies that they have a dual mission (achieving financial and 
social goals) (Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Financial goals entails meeting financial 
sustainability goals (through improving performance metrics such as ROA, ROE and OSS), 
whilst social goals often entails reaching the poorest of the poor –outreach- (Copestake et al. 
2005, Copestake 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). However, a look at the data suggest that 
this is not often the case. Sustainability generally refers to the ability of MFIs to continuously 
carry out activities and services in pursuit of its objectives, thereby pursuing economic viability 
(Hermes et al., 2011). The most common measure of profitability in commercial institutions is 
return on assets (ROA), which reflects an organisation’s ability to deploy its assets profitably, 
and return on equity (ROE), which measures the returns produced on the owners’ investments 
(Lafourcade et al., 2005). 
 
Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) measures operating revenue as a percentage of operating 
and financial expenses, including loan loss provision expense. It generally includes all the cash 
costs of running a MFI, depreciation and the loan loss reserve. Therefore, it becomes one of 
the major goals for MFIs to achieve in order to maintain viability and further grow their 
operations. OSS is calculated as follows: 
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#$$ = &'()*	,-)../-)*	0121.31&'()*	<61;)(-.=	4561.717  (Equation 2.2) 
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On the other hand, financial self-sufficiency (FSS) is the ability to cover all costs on an adjusted 
basis and indicates the ability to operate without ongoing subsidy or losses. This ratio is 
calculated as in equation 2.3 below. According to (Lafourcade et al. 2005) out of the 
approximately 10,000 MFIs worldwide, it is estimated that only 3 to 5% have achieved full 
financial sustainability. Therefore, OSS is preferred by several studies when investigating the 
effects of financial structure on the financial performance of MFIs. 
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This research focuses on the OSS of MFIs as a performance measure. This is because, for MFIs, 
attaining operational self-sufficiency is the first step in attaining sustainability. Secondly, the 
data reveals that financial self-sustainability has not been widely achievable by MFIs in SSA 
so far. The MIX data suggest that only a small fraction of MFIs worldwide have been 
financially sustainable (D’Espallier et al., 2013). 
 
The issue of MFI sustainability and the importance of this on the ability to improve financial 
inclusion is still a talking point within the literature. According to Hermes and Lensink (2011), 
providing microfinance services is a costly business due to high transaction and information 
cost. Thus, the combination of high transaction cost, and operational cost poses a unique 
challenge for MFIs. Furthermore, a large number of MF programs are still reliant on some form 
of donor subsidies to meet operating costs (D’Espallier et al., 2013), indicating that largely 
MFIs are not financially sustainable. Within the context of continual reliance on donors, the 
issue of sustainability of MFIs is therefore important to consider. According to the 2011 state 
of microcredit summit campaign report (Maes and Reed 2012), MFIs are playing an 
increasingly important role in the financial system in developing countries, although results of 
impact studies are controversial in determining the effectiveness of MF in alleviating poverty 
and fighting financial inclusion (van Rooyen etal., 2012; Roodman and Morduch, 2013). 
However, there is some consensus that, large-scale outreach to the bottom of the pyramid on a 
long-term sustainable basis cannot be guaranteed if MFIs are not sustainable (Quayes 2015). 
 
Microfinance is at the core of this transmission mechanism at the bottom of the pyramid, 
although the evidence suggests a mixed picture. For instance, Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
(2008b), Becchetti and Castriota (2011), and Rai and Ravi (2011) show evidence of MFIs 
ability improve the welfare of population and alleviate small business financing constraints. 
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However, these research papers only examine mature MFI markets within a global context. 
Conversely, Banerjee et al., (2015), find heterogeneous effects of MF on financial inclusion. 
Whereas Earne and Nelson (2013) argue that funding is crucial in improving FI. Funding is 
therefore deemed critical for the long-term sustainability of MFIs and their portend hybrid 
goals (Jansson 2003). It is along these (financing/funding) lines that we begin this enquiry. The 
literature suggests that adequate funding ensure MFIs have the resources needed to expand 
through increasing the number of clients served and geographical and product diversification. 
Furthermore, it is also argued that efficient MFIs that have access to cheap external funding 
may thus offer cheap loans to poor borrowers and to income-generating activities and micro 
enterprises, thereby promoting and supporting their development (Ghosh and Van Tassel 
2011). 
 
The capital structure examination of MFIs is important within the context of MFI 
sustainability and financial inclusion goals, because the evolvement of these institutions over 
time require such analysis. MFIs have evolved in recent years as a policy tool for fighting 
poverty, improving financial inclusion, and promoting sustainable financial development. 
However, recent analysis to gauge their efficacy for this has been wanting. Understanding their 
operation is -therefore- critical to examine these claims in addition to procuring solutions to 
improve their operations (Kyereboah-Coleman 2007). Recent developments warrant this 
examination. For instance, MFIs continue to take advantage of an evolving regulatory 
environment, beginning in 2004, which allowed them to transform into regulated deposit taking 
institutions (Wagenaar 2012). 
 
Evidence from Cull et al., (2007), suggest that majority of MFIs operate on a subsidized 
basis. This is especially the case in SSA where majority of MFIs still require subsidies for their 
operations. With the prevalence of a subsidized MFI sector in SSA, the question is whether the 
over-imposing nature of subsidies act as a barrier (undermines) to the emergence of a 
sustainable MF industry. For example, Bogan (2012a) show that MFIs in SSA are the least 
sustainable of all regions. In addition to Morduch (1999) questioning the staying-power of 
subsidies, there is increasing argument that if MF really is the answer, Africa needs more 
sustainable, and efficient MFIs (Morduch 1999), yet this is not the case. For instance, studies 
have shown the reverse/opposite. For instance Bogan (2012) reveals that MFIs in SSA are the 
least sustainable of all the observed regions. 
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The argument for the sustainability of MFIs is ever more important considering the position 
these institutions play in credit smoothening
21
, deposit and savings mobilization
22
 and credit 
provision, in addition to enabling financial inclusion. It is argued that sustainability of MFIs is 
a vital step if indeed these institutions are essential for the goal of UFA 2020
23
. Therefore, the 
sustainability of MFIs
24
 is important in the fight against poverty. However little has been done 
to contribute to this area of the MFI literature in recent years. The handful of papers such as: 
Kyereboah (2007), Tehulu (2013), that examine this phenomenon, all use smaller sample sizes, 
small period spans and relatively no focus on SSA region. Therefore, caution is to be taken on 
findings from existing research in application to SSA. An overview of the sustainability of global 
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MFI outreach is largely concerned with the social mission
25
, measured by the percentage of 
MFI female borrowers (see Figure 3 below) (Rosenberg, 2009). The two most discussed aspects 
of outreach in the literature are its depth and breadth. Depth of outreach refers to the poverty 
level of the clients served, while breadth of outreach refers to the scale of operations of an MFI 
(Rosenberg 2009). Expanding outreach is an ultimate goal of almost all MFIs, but rapid 
expansion sometimes proves to be unsustainable, especially during an MFI’s early years, when 
designing its products and building systems. It has very seldom been useful for funders to 
pressurise MFIs for rapid expansion, as in the case of current MFIs failures. The most common 
indicators recommended to measure outreach are average loan balance per borrower (ALPB) 
and number of active borrowers (NAB), representing the social performance and the depth and 
breadth of outreach (Lafourcade et al., 2005; Rosenberg, 2009; Littlefield and Kneiding, 2009). 
 
The disagreement between the benefits of depth vs breadth of MFIs has been a contentious 
point within the literature (Adams and Tewari 2017). On the one hand, non-profit MFIs would 
rather reach out to the poorest; thereby placing importance on the depth of outreach is more 
important. On the other hand, according to the breadth logic, MFIs should have large-scale 
outreach in order to make a difference to the world’s poverty levels. Some argue that shallow 
depth can be compensated for the breadth of outreach or that it is even more important than 
depth for instance: (Navajas et al. 2000, Robinson 2001a). Therefore, the common approach 










Figure 3: MFI Outreach: Percentage of Female Borrowers. 
Source: Authors Own 
 
This research project adds a further dimension of outreach to the literature, captured by number 
of active borrowers (NAB) (see figure 11 below). The NAB of MFIs indicates the ability of 
MFIs to capture a large rung of the poor in any economic system. Examining this measure will 
provide an insight into the literature of MFIs especially in the often overlooked SSA region. 
 
2.2.4 Efficiency  
Efficiency of MFIs signals the ability of MFIs to meet their objectives goals in an efficient 
manner. There are many indicators recommended to measure whether an MFI is cost effective, 
such as cost per borrower, cost per loan, or operating expense ratio (Rosenberg 2009). MFI 
efficiency ratios allow for comparison between the portfolio yield and its personnel and 
administrative expenses - how much it earns on loans versus how much it spends to make and 
monitor them. Therefore, the chosen indicator (cost per borrower–see Figure 4 below) measures 






Figure 4:MFI Cost per Borrower all Regions 
Source: Authors Own 
 
 
2.2.5 Portfolio Quality  
Repayment of an MFI loan is a crucial indicator if performance, therefore, an MFI must have 
the ability to collect loans for its success: if delinquency is not kept to very low levels, it can 
quickly spin out of control (Rosenberg, 2009). Furthermore, loan collection has proved to be a 
strong proxy for general management competence. Long experience with evaluating 
microfinance has shown that very few successful projects have bad repayment, and very few 
unsuccessful projects have good repayment. More than any other indicator, MFI measure of 
risk, deserves special attention to ensure meaningful and reliable reporting. The standard 
international measurement of portfolio quality in banking literature is the portfolio at risk. For 





Figure 5: MFI Portfolio at Risk >30 days. 
Source: Authors Own 
 
 
2.2.6 Sustainability vs Outreach 
Financial Sustainability in Microfinance ultimately denotes a shift away from donor funding 
of the sector. Whilst this has been a crucial debate in recent years (especially following the 
recent credit squeeze), the move away from donor funding to other forms of financing for MFIs 
have been gaining traction (Armendáriz et al. 2010). This further puts the issue of meeting the 
social mission of MFIs into question (Abrar and Javaid 2014). This is because donor focused 
MFIs often focuses on the underserved. On the other hand, commercially funded MFIs often 
do not reach the poorest of the poor (Arrassen 2017). 
 
The onus on achieving the combined goals of MFIs is therefore often dogged with the 
problem of a trade-off between social performance and financial performance (Kipesha and 
Zhang 2013). Whilst there is some consensus that MFIs can improve their financial 
performance (i.e. achieve sustainability) in order to achieve a targeted outreach (Ngo et al. 
2014).  Consequently, sceptics point to a trade-off between financial sustainability and social 
mission (Wagenaar 2012). The social mission refers to the developmental objective of 
governmental and non governmental players in microfinance (Hossain and Knight, 2010). This 
mission may be achieved by the number of target borrowers from subsidised or non-profit 
programs that focus on using microcredit primarily provided to the poor, particularly to the 
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subsidising interest rate is justified (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995; Morduch, 2000; 
Hossain and Knight, 2010). 
 
Financial sustainability of MFIs places much importance on economic viability. This 
emphasizes the ability of MFIs to cover all administrative costs, loan losses, and financing 
costs from the operating incomes (Arsyad 2005). The importance of sustainability of MFIs 
often stems from the understanding that MFIs need to be economically viable and sustainable 
in the long run in order to meet their social goals. For instance, some studies have found that 
there is a strong link between financial sustainability and the achievement of the social 
objectives of MFIs (Ledgerwood and White 2006). The poor tend to borrow from financially 
viable MFIs (Zeller and Meyer 2002), which seems to suggest a win-win situation in which 
MFIs and the poor can earn profits. For those reasons, MFIs ideally focus on viability by 
reaching the economically active poor with small potential profit businesses instead of focusing 
on the number of borrowers (Hammill et al.2008). However, the social mission of MFIs can 
often lead to over-lending in certain situations (i.e. achieve mass outreach) by not providing 
microfinance to the right people. 
 
The advocates of the social approach would argue that the poorest cannot afford higher 
interest rates; therefore, financial sustainability in microfinance goes against the aim of serving 
large groups (Woller et al., 1999). The empirical evidence neither shows that the poor cannot 
afford higher interest rates, nor that there is a negative correlation between the financial 
sustainability of the institution and the poverty level of the clients (Hermes and Lensink 2007). 
However, the financial approach is focused more on near-bankable people than on non-
bankable people. Clearly, the balance between these approaches is also recognized by 
Charitonenko and Campion (2003) who argue there are still existing profit and non-profit 
programs in microfinance. 
 
Most studies focus on financial sustainability and the effects of sustainability on outreach, 
or more specifically on the number of borrowers (breadth) and the socioeconomic level (depth) 
(Goldberg, 2005). Goldberg (2005) summarize the evidence in Asia and Latin America, while 
Lafourcade et al. (2005) focuses on Africa. They provide mixed evidence regarding depth of 
outreach. The existing studies do not systematically explain differences, nor do they explicitly 
explore whether there is a trade-off between the depths of outreach versus the struggle for 
financial sustainability (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). Cull et al. (2007) provides a new 
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dimension of literature on the financial performance of MFIs based on an extensive comparison 
of 124 MFIs from 49 countries, providing further empirical evidence of a trade-off between 
the depth of outreach and MFI profitability. 
 
In summary, the literature shows that neither financial sustainability nor outreach (social 
mission) is better or more important for MFIs. Rather, it is necessary to have the right mixture 
because they are typically similar to each other. Ultimately, this combination assures that an 
MFI can make profits which are reinvested into the business, so it may operate longer. The 
crucial intention of microfinance is not to have a return on equity but to help the poor to 
alleviate poverty by making them bankable. Nevertheless an MFI has to take many aspects into 
account and decide, even before setting up a business, which goals should be achieved. This 
suggests that good governance is the first step to a sustainable enterprise that can only become 
sustainable with profitable elements. 
 
 
2.3 A FOCUS ON MICROFIANCE IN AFRICA 
This section of the literature commences with an examination of key MFI performance and 
outreach indicators, comparing across world regions and African sub-regions. The growth of 
Microfinance in SSA has been somewhat steady, providing relevance to the sector. For 
instance, whilst the asset growth has largely declined post 2017, prior yearly data indicates a 
steady growth on average (see Figure 6 below). Indicators providing information on MFI 
performance emerge along two main divisions namely; MFI’s financial performance and social 
performance. MFI financial indicators include; Operational self-sufficiency (OSS), Return on 
Asset (ROA), Portfolio at Risk falling within 30days and 90 days (PAR>30, PAR>90). 
Conversely, MFI social performance indicators include: the percentage of borrowers who are 





Figure 6: MFI Asset by Regions in SSA: 2004-2018. 
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
2.3.1 MFI Outreach 
Africa’s microfinance industry has been growing steadily, as evident by the increase in the 
continent’s total asset the last decade. On the whole, MFIs seemed to have weathered the 
financial crisis better than most industries until 2010, when we look at the industries asset 
growth rates. Although, in 2010 asset growth rates not only slumped but also contracted and 
have yet to returned to their pre-crisis growth levels (see Figure 6 above; MIX 2018). However, 
banks, such as Equity Bank in Kenya and Capitec in South Africa, have garnered special 
attention over the last years, holding roughly US$1.7 billion and US$2.1 billion, respectively, 
in 2010. 
 
2.3.2 Outreach to the Bottom of the Pyramid (below National Poverty Lines) 
The data reveals that the total assets of microfinance institutions have been growing, despite 
this, the overall reach of the industry has remained poor in comparison to growth. In the overall 
picture of the worldwide MF sector, MFIs in Africa make up only a small part of total assets 
compared with the MFIs in other world regions (Figure 7 below). The existing data reveals that 
MFIs in Africa currently has just 10million borrowers, from a peak of a peak of nearly 35 
million clients in 2016. In comparison, South Asia (SA), MFIs currently serves over 30 million 



















Figure 7: MFI Active Borrowers by Region. 
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2.3.3 Urban versus Rural Supply of Microfinance 
Microfinance has been applauded for reaching into areas and providing access to customers 
that other financial services have left out. All across Africa, the rural population is vastly 
underserved by financial institutions. Unfortunately, thus far microfinance has not been the 
exception to this trend. According to data from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) and World Bank (2010) on branches across Africa, the distribution of rural 
microfinance services—such as ATMs and POS locations—is rather slim compared with urban 
ones. 
 
In much of SSA, the distinction between the urban and rural poor lies in the nature of 
productive activities both sets engage in. In urban areas, productive activities often comprises 
units of small and large scale organised industrial activity
26
. Whilst, the transactional nature of 
labour offer wage dependency for urban dwellers, Economic activities in urban areas improve 
the purchasing power, and further translates into regularity of income for much of the urban 
dwellers. In contrast, rural dwellers predominantly engage in lower productive subsistence 
agriculture, with less predictable income capacity. This distinction -the unpredictability of 
income- makes this portion of society an ideal target audience for MFIs. However, this same 
distinguishing factor contributes to a general desertion by MFIs from rural to urban markets, 
often competing with commercial banks for clients
27
. The Economic activity and productive 
nature of labour in urban areas translates into increased, and more importantly, sustainable and 
predictable income generating power for urban dwellers. 
 
Rural economies in SSA are generally mixed; with the rural farming and non-farming 
population earning its living form both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. The 
agricultural and non-agricultural labour markets are interdependent, competing with each other 
for available labour resources, especially during peak agricultural season. Therefore, exchange 
of labour in rural areas takers a variety of forms. For example; wage labour, agency contract, 
provision of personalised services, self-employment, and trade. Smallholder production, 





 Such as; Manufacturing and services sectors 
27
 This, in addition to high transaction costs associated with micro-banking activities in rural areas 
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An applicable model of structural economic growth and development offers a coherent path 
towards a sustainable transition from rural to urban markets. For instance, the Lewis 
development model outlines the progress from a traditional economy to an industrialized one. 
Specifically, this model of structural change comprise of a dualistic economy, consisting of 
rural agriculture and urban manufacturing sectors. Initially, the majority of labour is employed 
upon the land, which is fixed resource. Labour is a variable resource and, as more labour is put 
to work on the land, diminishing marginal returns eventually set in. This therefore leads to 
insufficient tasks for the marginal worker to undertake, resulting in reduced marginal product 
and underemployment. Conversely, urban workers engaged in manufacturing tend to produce 
a higher value of output than in comparison to rural workers. The resultant higher urban wages 
might therefore tempt surplus agricultural workers to migrate to cities and engage in 
manufacturing activity. High urban profits would encourage firms to expand and hence result 
in further rural-urban migration. 
 
Reaching out, MFIs face the same costs as banks, in addition, infrastructure deficiencies 
make this effort costlier in Africa than in other world regions. Undoubtedly, MFIs have various 
ways to reach out to their rural clients—not only through extending their branch networks. 
Loan officers can travel to disburse loans or at least make trips to collect payments on loans, 
hence improving access for rural customers. Measuring the number of rural clients rather than 
the rural branch network would thus capture the “real” distribution of MFI services to those 
areas. Unfortunately, the data on MFI rural and urban client distribution, collected and openly 
available on MIX (Microfinance Information Exchange), do not show even these methods of 
outreach to have been outstandingly successful. A look at the median MFI shows that most 
clients are from urban and semi-urban areas; only 37 percent of all clients come from rural 
areas. Although this distribution is not representative—so far only a few MFIs report to this 
relatively new database—it shows that in order to reach more rural clients, new ways have to 
be explored. 
 
2.3.4 A Special Focus on Female Borrowers in Africa 
One of the most obvious reasons why microfinance has focused on women, especially in its 






Figure 8. Number of Active Borrowers Female & Male Comparison. 
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
In Africa overall, the average number of active borrowers of female clients compared to male 
has been constantly higher in comparison to male clients, bar one year in 2007 (see Figure 8 
above). In Figure 9 below, we observe that the number of female active clients in comparison 
to MFI total active borrowers in Africa further reveals commitment to focus on female 
borrowers. 
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Figure 9. Ratio of Women to Total Borrowers, 2004-2018. 
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
Further observation of the data (in Figure 10, below) suggest that West Africa (WA), and East 
Africa (EA), show the highest levels of female participation as a percentage of total MFI active 





Figure 10. Number of Active Borrowers vs MFI Female Participation. 
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2.4 MFI SUSTAINABILITY 
Theoretically sustainability has been defined as permanence (Navajas et al., 2000).  According 
to Navajas et al., (2000) financial sustainability of a microfinance institution is the ability to 
meet its operating cost obligations from its generated revenue without seeking external 
finances.  Dunford (2000) put it plainly that financial sustainability as the “ability to keep on 
going towards microfinance objectives without continuous support from donors.” Barr (2005) 
argues that financial sustainability in the microfinance industry does not seem to be confined 
to a particular lending methodology, legal status of the entity or profit orientation. 
 
Many microfinance institutions are not financially sustainable in spite of the rise in the 
number of commercially oriented institutions. In the last decade alone, there has been series of 
microfinance failures reported in Ghana, India, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Zambia 
(Bateman 2011). Indeed, commercialisation of the microfinance industry has not translated into 
increased financial sustainability of microfinance institutions. This raises questions that 
warrants empirical examination and the very question is the objective of this project – What 
determines the capital structure and what are its impacts on the performance (and thereby 
sustainability) of MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa? Even though, there has been enormous progress 
regarding attaining financial sustainability, for many microfinance institutions in SSA 
achievement that has been elusive. As highlighted, MFIs are still largely unsustainable (Bogan 
2012). This is not surprising due to high transaction costs of managing small uncollateralised 
loans (Morduch 1999). Nevertheless, moving towards financial sustainability improves 
efficiency, discipline and transparency of microfinance institutions, and also the industry’s 
longevity. 
 
The issue of financial sustainability of the MFI sector in SSA is directly linked to financial 
inclusion. This from the rationale that with sustainable institutions, the MF sector will be better 
placed to meet the needs of the underserved in society, without the need for donor interference. 
Thus, the ideal situation for MFIs lie in mobilising deposits, and applying credit creation 
theories of banking, in order to meet/fulfil the demands for credit. This however would rely on 
a good environment of quality regulation, so as to avoid issues of misuse of client’s deposits, 
and ensure long-term health of the sector. However, a look at the institutional environment 
quality, suggest that SSA possesses the least quality institutions for regulatory practices. As 
indicated by the questionably low levels of the sustainability of MFIs in SSA (in comparison 
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to other regions – see Table 2.1 below). In addition to this, financial inclusion levels lag behind 
on all development/measurement scorecards in SSA. 
 
MFI Sustainability Africa 
MFI Average OSS Regions       
Year Africa EAP EECA LAC MENA SA Total 
2004 1.059 1.272 1.324 1.135 1.118 1.106 1.168 
2005 1.020 1.232 1.564 1.186 1.155 1.152 1.223 
2006 1.066 1.269 1.315 1.140 2.915 1.073 1.232 
2007 1.040 1.320 1.287 1.145 1.238 1.091 1.177 
2008 1.075 1.206 1.269 1.139 2.042 1.034 1.190 
2009 1.015 1.201 1.212 1.090 1.375 1.025 1.114 
2010 1.062 1.200 1.333 1.145 1.430 1.106 1.177 
2011 1.151 1.190 1.313 1.101 1.336 1.095 1.165 
2012 1.024 1.263 1.357 1.150 1.472 1.095 1.170 
2013 1.097 1.232 1.313 0.962 1.207 1.143 1.112 
2014 1.058 1.201 1.296 1.115 1.191 1.167 1.149 
2015 1.058 1.174 1.133 1.121 1.080 1.200 1.134 
2016 1.112 1.124 1.013 1.119 1.198 1.233 1.132 
2017 1.095 1.175 1.067 1.119 1.355 1.165 1.135 
2018 1.117 1.145 1.168 1.088 1.404 1.316 1.169 
Grand Total 1.065 1.221 1.291 1.117 1.493 1.119 1.165 
Note: OSS (Operational Self Sufficiency), EAP (East Asia Pacific), EECA (Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia), LAC (Latin America and The Caribbean), MENA (Middle East and North Africa), 
SA (South Asia). 
 
Table 2.1: MFI Operational Self-Sustainability by Regions 
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
The data is further depicted in figure 12, in which the average values of sustainability of the 
global MFI sector is collected. MFIs in SSA appear to be lagging behind in comparison to 




Figure 11. Operational self-sufficiency of MFIs by region. 
Source: MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
2.4.1 MFI Profitability SSA 
MFI profitability measured by return on asset (ROA), and return on equity (ROE), captures the 
average return on assets and capital employed by MFIs (Rosenberg 2009). The data reveals 
that MFIs in SSA are not very efficient in the use of assets and equity offerings. However, the 
data suggests that MFIs in SSA have better utilisation in the use of assets in comparison to 
equity returns (Figure 12 below). MFIs return on average roughly -15% on the equity obtained, 
whilst asset returns move closer to the region of between 5% and -5% see Figure 12. This could 
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MFI SSA Profitability 
 
Figure 12. MFI Profitability SSA Region. 
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
2.4.2 MFI Portfolio at Risk SSA 
The risk component of MFI operations (PAR>30days) amongst operators in SSA is unique. 
The data reveals that on average risky loan portfolios have been on the rise. Although the risk 
profile of all the regions on average largely fall within 5 to 15 percent of MFI total loan book., 
however, we observe recent spikes in the loan portfolio risk for MFIs in the central Africa 
region (CA), whilst in the west African (WA) region, we observe a decline in recent years. 
Whilst a fluctuating figure can be observed in east Africa (EA), southern Africa (SA) region 
risk on average appear subdued overtime (see Figure 13 below). 
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Figure 13. MFI Portfolio at Risk SSA. 
Central Africa (CA), South Africa (SA), East Africa (EA), West Africa (WA).  
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
2.4.3 MFI Efficiency SSA 
According to Rosenberg (2009), measured in terms of costs as a percentage of amounts on 
loan, very small loans are relatively expensive to make than large ones. Only a few extremely 
efficient MFIs have an operating expense ratio below 10%; commercial banks making larger 
loans usually have ratios well below 5%. The median ratio of MFIs reporting to MIX Market 
for 2006 was about 19%. When a microfinance market starts to mature and MFIs have to 
compete for clients, price competition on interest rates will usually push MFIs to become more 
efficient. Observing the data, in Figure 14, we observe that MFIs in  central (CA), and east-
Africa (EA), on average have the highest cost of loan servicing amongst the sample observed. 
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Figure 15: MFI Efficiency
 
Figure 14. MFI Efficiency (Cost Per Borrower) SSA. 
Central Africa (CA), South Africa (SA), East Africa (EA), West Africa (WA). 
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
 
2.4.4 MFI Outreach SSA 
The data on MFI outreach in SSA (see Figures 3, 8 and 9 above) reveal vital information of the 
MFI sector in SSA. Although total borrower and depositor growth rates were recorded at 11 
percent and nearly 20 percent, respectively, in 2009, these rates contracted by 31 percent and 
15 percent, respectively, in 2010. The measure of MFI social performance measured by MFI 
percentage of female borrowers, reveals figures greater than 50% as expected (see Figure 15). 
However, the Central African (CA) on average offers less than 50% of its resource to non-
female borrower.  
 
Consequently, the measure off MFI depth of outreach (see Figure 16 below), captures the 
depth of reach of MFIs in SSA. Specifically, this measure captures just how low to the bottom 
of the pyramid do MFIs lend to. Measured by average loan balance per borrower, the indicators 
supports the idea that the lower the average loan balance, the lower reach MFIs possess. The 
data in Figure 16, reveals that MFIs in southern Africa (SA), perform best in reaching to the 
poorest in society. The remainder of the data reveals that on average MFIs in other regions 
such as; west Africa (WA), central Africa (CA), east Africa (EA), uniformly show increasing 
average loan balance per borrower numbers over time. From an average of between $250-$750 
to more than $1,000 average loan balance per borrower. This suggests that MFIs are 
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increasingly detached from rural lending, preferring to lend and operate in urban areas. This 
action directly impacts on their depth of outreach, thereby directly impacting MFIs lending 
profile in SSA.  
 
 
Figure 15. MFI Percent of Female Borrowers SSA. 
Central Africa (CA), South Africa (SA), East Africa (EA), West Africa (WA).  
Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
Figure 17: MFI Average Loan Balance per Borrower
 
Figure 16. MFI Average Loan Balance per Borrower SSA. 
Central Africa (CA), South Africa (SA), East Africa (EA), West Africa (WA).  
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Source: Authors own. Data collected from MIX Market database 2018. 
 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
Microfinance has yet to be proven to be an appropriate, effective, and powerful tool for the 
poor, poverty reduction and financial inclusion, in line with the recently revised Millennium 
Development Goals (especially for Africa-SSA). The review of MF literature has raised some 
important issues. 
 
First, microfinance clearly cannot immediately turn the poor into non-poor. Whilst MF is 
praised as a long-term policy tool of support for the underserved and excluded, as implemented 
in SSA, it is largely inefficient. An effective implementation of this policy would/should work 
in concert with vital processes such as an active industrialisation drive (within an enabling 
institutional environment and good governance framework), in tandem with improving human 
capital development, and sustaining stable macro-economic conditions (Vanroose 2010). 
 
Second, donor funding tends to become insufficient to meet the continual demand for well-
designed financial products from new and existing clients (Fernando 2004, De Haan and 
Lakwo 2010). Therefore, access to commercial funds is likely to encourage MFIs to move out 
of heavily subsidised operations and enter into commercialisation in order to achieve efficiency 
and sustainability (Drake and Rhyne 2002, Armendáriz et al. 2010, Abrar and Javaid 2014). 
Although several studies have focused on investigating the impact of microfinance or the trade-
off between social mission and financial sustainability (Annim 2012), we approach this from 
the viability of MF as a tool for sustainable long-term tool. Which can remain relevant/viable 
through the machinery of quality institutional environment, ultimately culminating in improved 
capital structure, in the delivery of in providing financial services to the poor in the long run. 
 
Third, the funding of microfinance has been identified to play an important role in both the 
economic viability and sustainability of MFIs, in addition to providing a potential relationship 
with the institutional environment in SSA (Fehr and Hishigsuren 2006, Annim 2012, Bogan 
2012).  
 
Fourth, lending methodologies, savings, empowerment of women and the impact of 
microfinance are likely to depend on the legal status, profit status and regulated status of MFIs 
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(Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 2010). This suggest that the institutional environment could play a key 
role in elevating the practice and funding of MFIs in SSA.  
 
Fifth, these studies have shed light on the link between funding and microfinance 
performance as one of the important gaps in the existing literature (i.e. how MFIs choose 
financial structure to improve their performance) (Annim, 2012; Dorfleitner et al., 2016; 
Hermes and Hudon, 2018). Therefore, in the following chapters this study attempts to fill these 
gaps in the literature by investigating the funding of microfinance and establishing the effects 
of the institutional environment on financial structure and the diverse aspects of MFI 
performance. 
 
The next section explores financial inclusion and the role of MF within the context of 
eliminating financial exclusion in SSA. And questions if MF in its current state of play in Africa 
is really a solution for achieving universal financial inclusion for all in 2020.
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Chapter 3 FINANCIAL INCLUSION and MFI INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
In the wake of heightened attention on poverty eradication, much attention has been accorded 
financial inclusion. Major international development organisations28, have a view that the 
provision of financial services to the un-bankable and financially excluded is key in delivering 
social stability, economic opportunities, and sustainable development. 
 
Microfinance has been frequently celebrated as a panacea for sustainable remedy of poverty, 
though improved financial inclusion amongst the poor in SSA. Since their appearance, MFIs 
have been credited with the promise of decreasing the levels of financially excluded people on 
the continent. Current levels of exclusion in SSA suggest the need for an intervention. For 
instance, according to Finscope (2010) South Africa has an exclusion level of 23.5 percent, 
whilst at the other end of the spectrum, Mozambique is 78 percent, with many other countries 
in between (see Figure 17 below). 
 
Figure 18: Financial Exclusion Africa (Peer Comparison) 
 
Figure 17: Peer Comparison of Access to Financial Services in Africa 
Source: Finscope Financial Access Africa Survey. 
 
This section explores the literature on the question of MFIs supposed contribution on the promise of 
financial inclusion, with aims to provide an overview of the actions of MFIs in SSA. 
 
 
28 This includes: The World Bank Group, The European Union in co-alliance with the G-20 group of nations, and 
the WB partner institutions.  
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In view of the growing trend of financial exclusion, amongst the world’s poor and vulnerable, 
the WB Group set a goal of achieving Universal Financial Access (UFA) by the year 2020 
(WB 2015). Following this, unanimously, the G-20 governments in collaboration with 
international development institutions have highlighted financial inclusion as a key 
development target, with pledges to support UFA 2020. More notably; as one of its key 
principles, the consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)29 highlights financial inclusion 
and the integration of MF with the formal system in developing nations as a key economic 
empowerment policy. Despite efforts to turbo charge financial inclusion amongst developing 
economies, financial inclusion growth rates in much of SSA is at snail pace (Chibba 2009). For 
example according to Klapper and Oudheusden (2015), whilst inclusion rates have increased, 
half of the world’s adult population still lack access to financial services30. Hence, in-order for 
MFIs to be effective in enabling financial inclusion and improving the welfare of the world’s 
poor, MFIs have to be sustainable, and efficient in managing its resource base. 
 
The question of MFI performance, therefore comes into question. If MFI performance is 
improved, can they be more efficient in meeting their mandate? Research suggest31 that one 
way to achieve this is to improve the quality of the institutional environment in which these 
institutions operate in. Barry and Tacneng (2014), Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2014) Ajide and 
Raheem (2016) highlight the important role the institutional environment plays in enabling a 
conducive environment to enhance MFI performance. Furthermore, Chadee and Roxas (2013), 
argue that efficient institutional frameworks reduce transaction costs and the cost of enforcing 
contracts, thereby promoting business development and growth, whilst Aidis (2005), Eifert et 
al. (2008) show that sluggish economic development and poor financial performance of many 
firms in developing countries can be attributed to poor institutional environment. 
 
Although microfinance has progressively become a policy tool in combatting financial 
exclusion in SSA32, the challenges facing the industry remain rife. In addition to 
 
 
29 CGAP is a multi-donor organisation dedicated to advancing microfinance in its goal of universal access to 
finance, and poverty eradication. 
30 World Bank estimates this figure to be 2billion adults world-wide, with one third from SSA region. 
31 Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Booth et al (2001), (Bogan 2008), Ahlin et al., (2011), Fan et al. 
(2012), Tchuigoua (2014), Barry and Tanceng (2014). 
32 Banerjee and Duflo, (2011), Morduch and Armendariz (2010), Baye (2013), Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2008), 
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unsustainability, MFIs face institutional challenges. For example Earne and Nelson (2013) 
suggest that the regulatory framework, openness, and the level of development of the financial 
system impacts on MFIs and in-turn promotes economic growth33. However this has not been 
tested on an appropriate sample of MFIs in SSA. Furthermore, in the area of regulation, quality 
institutional, governance and transparency, the SSA region still falls behind in enabling a 
conducive environment for development efforts (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016). In addition, 
the institutional environment in SSA is characterised by high corruption levels, weak rule of 
law, and weak regulatory environment for MFIs. Consequently, laws that govern creditor and 
shareholders rights are either weak, or seldom enforced (Bräutigam and Knack 2004). All the 
above could impact on the ability of MFIs to attract attractive quality capital, thereby 
influencing their capital structure. It can therefore be argued that rife corruption and 
government bureaucracy creates an unfavourable business environment for MFIs. Schicks 
(2013), observe that the insurmountable procedural and administrative difficulties often 
hinders setting up an MFI to tackle financial exclusion in rural areas. Furthermore, Justesen 
and Bjørnskov (2014), show that weak institutional environments often encourages fraudulent 
activities, whilst (Barry and Tacneng 2014), observe that inadequate consumer protection 
policies and weak rule of law encourages over-borrowing and loan delinquencies. The above 
bottlenecks could therefore be a hinderance not only to MFI efficiency in meeting their 
mandates, but also deprive the sector of much needed growth, often accrued through the 
benefits and gains from transparency and good governance. 
 
 
3.1 FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Financial exclusion has long been present in societies across the world, from 12th century 
western societies to present day unique communities in the most remote areas of Africa. It is a 
phenomenon that affects a cross section of society, in what is documented to be deprived 
communities. The occurrence of FI begins form the problem of financial exclusion; a 
phenomenon used to describe the exclusion of sections of individuals from core/basic financial 
services such as; credit, savings and insurance services. The idea of exclusion does not 
exclusively associate with financial services, this phenomenon cuts across a larger spectrum of 
the financial world. The  Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) report suggests that this phenomenon includes 
 
 
33 Rodrik et al. (2004), Kinda and Loening (2010), Ahlin et al. (2011), Tchuigoa (2014), and Ajide and Raheem 
(2016). 
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a multitude of dimensions, reflecting the variety of possible financial services, from payments 
and savings accounts to credit, insurance, pensions, and the securities markets. In addition this 
can also be viewed differently for individuals and firms. 
 
The issue of financial exclusion has become important in world economics. This comes as 
a result of research which identifies with the availability of financial services which allows 
individuals and firms to take advantage of business opportunities, increase prospects of human 
capital development34, save for retirement, pursue leisure, and insure against risks (Beck et al. 
2008). While this may not be obtainable in some parts of the world, as a result of financial 
exclusion, efforts have currently been made to root-out the issue of exclusion and bring-in 
increased levels of financial inclusion to drive grassroots development in areas of the world; 
one of such area is sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the difficulty for policy makers is often 
implementing differentiating policies catering to the segment of the population –of the- 
financially segregated as a result of involuntary segregation. 
 
3.1.1 Access vs Non-Access 
The literature on FI often congregates the use-of and access-to financial services 
interchangeably, for instance; Kumar and Mishra (2011), and Egbide et al., (2015). However, 
it is important to distinguish the two dimensions. The actual use of financial services and access 
to financial service are two separate issues, albeit overlapping in areas. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
(2017) raises the issue/point of voluntary exclusion35. On the other hand, access to financial 
services denotes the accessibility of finance to anyone in need of it. In addition to voluntary 
addition, some users of financial services could also be involuntary excluded. This could be or 
several reasons; firstly, individuals or micro-small firms could be un-bankable from the 
perspective of commercial financial institutions and markets because they have insufficient 
income or represent an excessive lending risk. In some instances, discriminatory practices, lack 
of information, shortcomings in contract enforcement, poor information environment, price 
barriers as a result of market imperfections, ill-informed regulations, or the political capture of 
 
 
34 Such as; Investment in education and other necessary knowledge required for the advancement of an 
individual’s competencies and other attributes required to produce goods, services or form ideas in market 
circumstances. Human capital of the economy, largely equates to the aggregate human capital of an economy. 
Which will be determined by national education standards. 
35 A type of exclusion of which is self-imposed on by individuals. For instance, due to cultural, religious and 
indirect access to financial service. Individuals and firms may chose not to use financial services even when they 
have access to it. Indirect reasons could be the ability to use someone else’s account. 
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regulators (Annim 2012). Many of the recent drive towards increased financial inclusion 
particularly focuses on the involuntary excluded persons in largely developing countries of the 
world. The argument for this stance assumes that, as more individuals have access to MFI 
services, this leads to improved access to finance, enabling individuals and firms to take 
advantage of business opportunities, increase prospects of human capital development36, save 
for retirement, pursue leisure, and insure against risks (Beck et al., 2006). 
 
3.1.2 Exclusion Theory 
Financial markets are markedly different from the markets for other goods and services 
(Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer 2017). For example, credit markets often encounter problems 
that restrict and/or reduce the appetite for participation by market participants, for instance, 
liquidity. However, this may not necessarily equate to an access problem that might be 
obtainable in a market for cell-phonies for example. Economic theory asserts that prices adjust 
such that, at any point of a market equilibrium, supply must always equal demand (Varian, 
1992). Therefore, in a market for cell-phones; as the demand for cell phone increases (exceeds 
supply), the price of cell-phones will then rise until demand and supply are equated at a new 
equilibrium price-level. Hence, those willing to pay the price are then able to buy a cell-phone. 
Consequently a higher price could alienate unwilling consumers out of the market. Hence, if 
the price-level functions as expected, the problem of access should not exist. 
 
Varian (1992) however show why financial markets, particularly credit and insurance 
markets are different. A theoretical explanation put forward on the problem of exclusion from 
financial services emanates from the phenomenon of moral hazard and information asymmetry. 
Particularly, they show that information problems can lead to credit rationing and exclusion 
from financial markets even in a state of equilibrium. Credit and insurance markets are often 
characterised by serious principal agent problems, which includes adverse selection37 and moral 
hazard38. The issue of rationing may also arise in a competitive credit market because interest 
rates and bank charges affect not only demand, but also the risk profile of a bank’s customers: 
 
 
36 Such as; Investment in education and other necessary knowledge required for the advancement of an 
individual’s competencies and other attributes required to produce goods, services or form ideas in market 
circumstances. Human capital of the economy, largely equates to the aggregate human capital of an economy. 
Which will be determined by national education standards. 
37 Adverse selection in this relationship characterises the fact that borrower’s les seriously intent on repaying loans 
are more willing to seek-out external finance.  
38 This constructs/illustrates the behaviour of the loan recipient. Once loan is received, the borrower of the loan 
may use the funds in ways that are inconsistent with the interest of the lenders. 
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higher interest rates tend to attract riskier borrowers (adverse selection and change repayment 
incentives (moral hazard). Hence, the expected rate of return on a loan will increase less rapidly 
than the interest rate and, beyond a point, may actually decrease because banks do not have 
perfect information about the credit worthiness of prospective borrowers, financial exclusion 
will persist at market equilibrium. Furthermore, because it is not possible to supply more loans 
if the bank faces excess demand for credit the bank will deny loans to borrowers who are 
observationally indistinguishable from those who receive loans. Rejected loan applicants 
would not receive a loan if offered to pay a higher rate and are thus denied access. In other 
words, they may be bankable, but are involuntary excluded. In SSA the data reveals that the 
majority of excluded are involuntarily exclude from financial services. In addition to 
information asymmetry and moral hazard problems, this could also be the case of lack of 
institutional infrastructure fracturing the market for financial services. Martinez and Krauss 
(2015) show that technological advancement can improve the access to financial services to 
those at the bottom of the pyramid. However, an examination of the current state of 
infrastructural enablement for the pick-up (increased usage) of finance -by those in dire need 
for it- is still plagued by bottlenecks. 
 
Moral hazard and adverse selection issues have been well documented in insurance markets. 
For instance Chiappori and Salanie (2000), test for, and establish the existence of asymmetric 
information in insurance markets,  whilst Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) accesses the impact of 
moral hazard on health insurance markets, and finally, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) show 
evidence from the UK in insurance annuity markets. Although, this is to a lesser extent 
represented/affected in other financial products or markets such as; deposits and payments. 
However, the agency conundrum could also occur from the perspective of depositors, in 
particular small depositors, who entrust their financial resources to intermediaries who are not 
easy to oversee (Benston 1994). In other cases, poor (or complex) institutional procedures 
governing financial services could exacerbate this process. For instance the documentation 
requirements for opening an account, such as the existence of a formal address or a formal 
sector employment (Demirgüç-kunt and Klapper 2012). In the institutional sense, high fixed 
costs and prices associated with deposit or payment services make it impossible for large 
segments of the population (especially in rural areas) to use these basic services (Litt et al., 
1990; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Demirguc-kunt and Klapper, 2012; Diniz, Birochi and 
Pozzebon, 2012; Tchouassi, 2012). 
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This failure reflects a lack of competition or underdeveloped physical or institutional 
infrastructures, in resolving which government effectiveness (institutions) can play a key role. 
The challenge therefore is disentangling whether the non-use of financial services is voluntary 
or involuntary. 
 
3.1.3 Barriers to Financial Inclusion 
The accessibility to financial services for individuals and firms, is predicated by supply and 
demand side pressures (Swain 2007). However, a breakdown in the market infrastructure can 
lead to permanent exclusion of both individuals and small firms from the use of financial 
services (Swain and Floro 2007). Similarly, other factors contribute to creating barriers to the 
accessibility of financial services. The global findex survey (conducted for 70,000 adults) 
reveals some of the pertinent reason to some of the barriers of access to financial services. Not 
enough money (30%), family member already owning an account (25%), too expensive (23%), 
distance (too far away) (20%), lack of documentation (18%), lack of trust (13%), and religious 
reasons (5%). For SSA however, the results reveal that factors such as; distance, cost, 
documentation, and lack of money, all count for the main barriers preventing individuals and 
firms from accessing finance. Adults in developing markets are more likely to cite distance, 
cost, documentation, and lack of money in comparison to adults in developed countries. 
 
Women and adults living in high-income and upper middle-income economies (where 
relatives are most likely to have an account) were substantially more likely to be deterred from 
accessing financial service. (Litt et al. 1990, Collier and Gunning 1999, Demirgüç-kunt and 
Klapper 2012, Diniz et al. 2012, Tchouassi 2012) show that lack of account ownership and 
personal asset accumulation limits women’s ability to pursue self-employment opportunities. 
Hence, while such voluntary exclusion may be linked to individual preferences or cultural 
norms, it may also indicate a lack of awareness of financial products or a lack of financial 
literacy more generally. Chikalipah (2017), supports this view. On a study to understand the 
determinants of financial exclusion in SSA, an important finding was that literacy was a key 
determinant to financial exclusion in SSA –although the study failed to include other measures 
that could be important in explaining the financial exclusion, such as, income and distance to 
access. 
 
Affordability in SSA is a key barrier to account ownership. High costs are cited by a quarter 
of global unbanked respondents, and by 32% of unbanked respondents in low-income 
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economies. Fixed transaction costs and annual fees tend to make small transactions 
unaffordable for large parts of the population. For policy purposes therefore, FI crucially 
requires a suitable measurement, so as to create significant scope for researchers to find 
solutions to problems prevailing in society, and also enable impact evaluation of policies 
created for tackling the issue of exclusion in societies. 
 
 
3.2 FINANCIAL INCLUSION MEASUREMENT AND IMPACT 
3.2.1 Measuring Financial Inclusion 
Indicators used in accessing and/or measuring FI differs widely. Until recently, the 
measurement of financial inclusion around the world was focused purely on density indicators 
such as; number of bank branches or automated teller machines (ATMs) per capita (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007; Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce, 2010). Through the 
financial access survey39, financial service providers (FSPs) now tally supply-side data on the 
use of financial services. However, up until recently, relatively little has been known about the 
global reach of the financial sector, particularly, the extent to which financial inclusion is 
permeable and the degree to which the poor, women, and other population segments are 
excluded/segregated40 form the formal financial sector. This was especially the case in the sub-
Saharan African region (see table below).
 
 
39 The Financial Access Survey is a database of data collection which comprises of supply-side data from 
providers of financial services. In this annual survey, data from 187 jurisdictions from 2001 to 2011.  
40 The demand-side constraints of financial services. 
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Adults with a Transactional Account Worldwide 
 2011 2014 2017 
Percentage of Adults That Own a Bank Account  % % % 
Developing Countries 42 54 N/A 
East Asia & Pacific 55 68 73 
Europe & Central Asia 45 60 68 
Latin America and Caribbean 39 52 55 
Middle East & North Africa 20 32 54 
South Asia 33 46 69 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 34 43 
    
Table 3.1: Percentage of Adults with a Transactional Account. 
 
The Global Findex Database measures how adults in 148 countries access and use financial 
services. Constructed from interviews with more than 150,000 nationally representative and 
randomly selected adults over the 2011 calendar year. The Global Findex Database includes 
over 40 indicators related to account ownership, payments, savings, borrowing, and risk 
management in a comprehensive survey. For example the 2011 maiden year data showed that 
the usage of financial services by 97% of the world’s adult population indicates that; the share 
of adults in developed economies with an account at a formal financial institution is more than 
twice the corresponding share in developing economies (Demirgüç-kunt and Klapper 2012). 
There is also a substantial variation in financial inclusion within countries across individual 
characteristics such as income and gender. While the disparities are less sizable in the access 
of firms to finance, considerable differences exist across countries and by certain 
characteristics, such as firm age and firm size (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. 2007, Kendall et 
al. 2010). According to the WB 2012 report, the core measurement indicators include; use of 
bank accounts, savings, borrowing, payments, and insurance. As observed, these measures 
encompass the key product offerings by financial service providers. However, this only 
incorporates demand-side measures for accessing financial services, and hence, provides a 
nuanced view into the measurement of financial inclusion levels amongst its sample size (see 
Table 3.1 above). 
 
Approaches utilised in accessing financial inclusion have been few and far between. 
However, a few approaches are worth a mention/review. A first approach places more emphasis 
on measuring the clients of basic financial services, whilst a second approach centres on 
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measuring the quality of the financial services that the households and firms obtain. Finally, a 
third approach examines the physical and cost barriers to access (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. 
2007, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012, Allen et al. 2018). Early research by Beck et al., 
(2007) explored cross-country banking outreach indicators in order to examine base usage of 
financial services using eight commercial bank-based outreach and usage indicators from 99 
countries between 2003 and 2004. Their results suggest that higher rates of banking outreach 
associated with financial development and economic growth. Furthermore, they found that 
transport infrastructure, well-organised communication, and well-developed governance are 
also correlated with higher rates of banking outreach. 
 
Subsequently, Beck et al., (2007) examines the access to financial services using financial 
access indicators separately to test and compare impacts of financial access on the penetration 
of credit and deposit facilities of banks and non-bank financial institutions. Using 14 outreach, 
usage, ease and cost indicators from 154 countries for 2008 and 2009. Their main contribution 
to the literature has been to compare credit and deposit penetrations from banks and non-bank 
institutions. They only consider credit and deposit services in this study and compared bank 
and non-bank institutions in terms of credit and deposit penetrations with the limited data of 
non-bank financial institutions. However, the limitations of data prevented them from making 
robust comparisons across countries. For instance, credit penetrations data is available from 
specialised state financial institutions of 15 countries and the microfinance institutions of seven 
countries. Furthermore, this paper separately ran regressions with 14 different financial access 
indicators on various financial, infrastructural and economic country variables using OLS and 
Tobit estimation models. 
 
Finally, Kumar (2013) explores the determinants of financial inclusion in India using six 
banking outreach and usage indicators from 1995 to 2008. This research employed indicators 
of financial access variables, along with other country-specific factors, to explore the 
determinants of financial inclusion. Panel-fixed effects and GMM estimation was employed to 
test research hypothesis of financial inclusion and control for the dynamic endogeneity of the 
variables. The findings suggested that a branch network has a positive impact on financial 
inclusion. 
 
All the above research separately analyse these indicators and their impacts on various set 
of country-specific factors. However, these studies have some limitations in terms of data for 
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banking outreach indicators, such as lack of time trends, the variety of financial services that 
are used, using commercial bank-based indicators only, and, finally, using quantity unit 
indicators, so the price dimension of the outreach is not provided. This research project differs 
markedly, such that, in order to establish the impact of MFIs on financial inclusion, the 
indicator of financial inclusion proposed for this analysis is that of a developed financial 
inclusion index by Yorulmaz (2016). The indicator is based on numerous measures of financial 
inclusion from commercial banks and other financial institutions. Unlike other financial 
inclusion measures (mainly commercial banking indicators, often supply-side indicators), the 
utilised index, incorporates both demand-side and supply-side indicators in developing a 
concise measure of financial inclusion scores, across developed and developing market 
economies across the world. This indicator is based on data obtained from The-MIX and the 
World Banks FINDEX compilation, in addition to the Financial Access survey of 2009. 
 
 
3.3 DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
3.3.1 Inclusion and Exclusion (Income, Geography, Financial Development) 
In analysing the problem, it is important to examine some of the stated links between the 
concept of inclusion and financial exclusion. Within the defined context financial exclusion 
precedes the need for financial inclusion. Research suggests that country-level income, 
(approximated by GDP per capita), seems to account for much of the massive variation in 
account penetration worldwide. For example in most countries with GDP per capita above 
$15,000, account penetration is essentially universal, explaining 73% of the variation around 
the world. Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012) show that within-country inequality in the use 
of formal accounts is correlates with the country’s income inequality. They find a relatively 
high correlation between account penetration and the Gini coefficient as a proxy for income 
inequality. This association seems to hold even if one controls for national income and other 
variables. The income- demographics across Africa certainly reflect this position. With 
majority of the economies in SSA under a low-income economic disposition, income inequality 
is exacerbated by the extremely wealth as a result of increasing corruption and disregard for 
rule of law in appropriating contracts and managing the wealth of the economies involved. 
However although the story mirrors a similar enactment above, the correlations postulated by 
the above study needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. In-depth analysis suggests that other 
factors, especially the quality of institutions in an economy, drive account penetration as well 
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as income level and income inequality. Therefore looking beyond basic factors and explaining 
FI through the lens of the institutional quality and environment could provide more of a unique 
insight into a key sector. 
 
3.3.2 Geography  
The geographical differences in the use of financial services is also rather uneven, suggesting 
that the geographical landscape could play a role in the financial exclusion of certain 
marginalised segments of society –societies in SSA-. Densely populated urban areas show a 
much higher density in retail access points (such as bank branches, ATMs, and agents) and a 
greater use of financial services than rural areas. Although natural barrier disruptors such as 
mobile money have been in operation in SSA (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2017). However, despite 
the growth in mobile money and other recent technologies, being near a retail access point is 
still important for the use of financial services by individuals, especially for the poor who are 
less mobile and have less access to modern technologies. The trade-off however, for advocates 
and practitioners remain at a standstill. Whilst advocates want a broad coverage –of the 
population- for financial access, and would also like to see certain segments of the population 
(such as the poor) also have access, this concern is not always shared by providers. The extreme 
commercialisation of financial services, the location of financial services in the urban and not 
rural areas (reality on ground), the drive for profits, and the cost of delivery are all key incessant 
barriers points to the reality for practitioners. These factors further limit the disbursement of 
financial services from a geographical standpoint. The question of how to break this deadlock 
points to the establishment and implementation of well-functioning quality institutions. This is 
argued, could enable penetration by mandating MFIs to operate in rural areas with the enabling 
use of technology to deliver robust services. 
 
3.3.3 Financial Sector Depth, Efficiency and Stability 
The depth of the financial system has often been anecdotally linked to the relative use of 
financial services within an economy. The rationale here is that the deeper the markets, the 
more it is of use to users of the financial system (Beck et al., 2007). However large amounts of 
credit in a financial system –both commercial and consumer credit- as research has shown- do 
not always translate to the broad use of financial services, especially in developing markets in 
SSA. According to Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2014), this could be as a result of credit 
concentration amongst larger firms operating in the bourses of these countries. This in addition 
to the concentration amongst wealthy individuals could give an appearance of depth of use, but 
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on the surface is not really the case. A common measure of depth of the financial system within 
the literature is; domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (WB, 2014), recent 
research suggest that the use of formal accounts is imperfectly correlated with this measure. 
However some variation to the norm exists. For example, a look at some country data reveals 
that in some cases a large percentage of domestic credit to the private sector exist, however 
only a relatively small percentage of the adults have access to financial services (are financially 
included). Examples include; Vietnam, where domestic credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP is 125%, whilst only 21% of the adults in the country report they have a 
formal account. Conversely, the Czech Republic, with relatively modest financial depth (with 
domestic credit to the private sector at 56% of GDP), has relatively high account penetration 
(81%). This suggest that financial depth and financial inclusion are distinct dimensions of 
financial development and that financial systems can become deep while showing low degrees 
of inclusion. On the other hand the efficiency of financial institutions can be linked with the 
use of formal accounts (the more the number of population with accounts, the lower is the 
lending minus deposit rate percentage). Country level data also reveal similar picture: financial 
inclusion is associated positively with depth and efficiency, whilst having no significant 
association with stability. 
 
 
3.4 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE POOR  
Finance influences not only the efficiency of resource allocation throughout the economy but 
also the comparative economic opportunities of individuals from relatively rich or poor 
households. Financial institutions exist to serve as intermediaries in a market with high 
information asymmetries and transaction and information costs. As the bridges between the 
firms and the households, financial institutions live up to the primary function of being able to 
spur growth and development. Though this may be the case, there exists a divide within the 
financial system in itself. As it is at present, a considerable number of people are excluded in 
the financial system. Financially excluded, as they are defined to be, there is a seen need for 
them to be included in the financial sector. 
 
The evidence for the impact of MF on financial inclusion levels is still nascent. Although 
the general causes of financial exclusions are illustrated from a theoretical perspective, 
consensus is still to be reached on the evidence driving financial inclusion. Furthermore, if 
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MFIs are seen as a general/overall policy to improving the state of FI in developing countries, 
what is the role of MFI in alleviating the problem of FI in SSA? Studies have yet to examine 
this line of questioning (area of research) carefully and in a robust manner. 
 
3.4.1 MFI and Financial Inclusion: Empirical Evidence from SSA 
Financial inclusion has been a recurring issue for countries in SSA, this has led to concerted 
efforts amongst governments within SSA to adopt several initiatives and policies designed to 
improve access to individuals excluded from traditional financing (commercial banks). One of 
such initiatives adopted, in SSA has been Microfinance. The evidence for the impact of MF on 
financial inclusion levels is still nascent. Although the general causes of financial exclusions 
are illustrated from a theoretical perspective, consensus is still to be reached on the evidence 
driving financial inclusion. Furthermore, if MFIs are seen as a general/overall policy to 
improving the state of FI in developing countries, what is the role of MFI in alleviating the 
problem of FI in SSA? Studies have yet to examine this line of questioning carefully and in a 
robust manner. 
 
Despite the universally adopted use of MF in SSA, there is yet absolute evidence of the 
suitability and impact of MF on the financial inclusion efforts of countries in SSA. Amidst the 
backdrop of several initiatives to improve the financial inclusion situation in SSA, measures 
still fall short of the intended effect. Take for instance Nigeria (the most populous country in 
Africa), efforts to improve access to lending –over the years- include policies such as; The 
Commercial Bill Financing Scheme (1962) and the Microfinance Policy of 2005. Despite these 
interventions, the financial inclusion landscape still lags in comparison to other regions such 
as; LAC and Asia Pacific. According to Adeyemi (2008) factors such as; bribery and 
corruption, wrong channelling of credit facilities, poor management wherewithal and 
ineffective supervision continuously stall these efforts. The broader literature in the region 
reveals a growing number of studies focused on examining the empirical links between 
financial inclusion and a variety of economic, institutional and political factors (Fuller, 1998; 
Sarma and Pais, 2008; Hannig and Jansen, 2010; Andrianaivo, Kpodar and Allum, 2011; Beck, 
DemirgüÇ-Kunt and Singer, 2013). Majority of the studies accessing the financial inclusion 
have employed primary data collection methods in examining the significance of the 
relationship between financial inclusion and specific variables of interest. For example (Fuller 
1998, Sarma and Pais 2008, Hannig and Jansen 2010, Andrianaivo et al. 2011, Beck et al. 
2013). Regardless of the unique challenges that face the SSA region, only a handful of studies 
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have examined the African context (Mbutor, 2013; Babajide, Adegboye and Omankhanlen, 
2015; Bayero, 2015; David-West, 2015; Egbide et al., 2015; Ene and Inemesit, 2015). Amongst 
these only a few really examine the impacts of MF initiatives on financial inclusion (Mbutor 
2013, Babajide et al. 2015, Bayero 2015, David-West 2015, Egbide et al. 2015, Ene and 
Inemesit 2015), Ali (2015), Martinez and Krauss (2015). 
 
Allen et al. (2012) use the 2011 findex report to highlight the drivers of FI. Using dependent 
variables of financial indicators such as; Ownership of account, use of accounts to save, and 
frequent use of the account, defined as three or more withdrawals per month. They find that 
these indicators are associated with a better enabling environment for accessing financial 
services, such as lower banking costs, greater proximity to financial providers, and fewer 
documentation requirements to open an account. However, young, poor and unemployed, out 
of the workforce, or less well educated, living in rural areas are relatively less likely to have an 
account. Subsequently, Chikalipah (2016) using WB data analyse the determinants of FI in 
SSA. The results reveal that illiteracy forms one of the key drivers of exclusion in SSA. 
However, of all the above research however, only one study reflects the MFIs on the African 
continent. Ene and Inemesit (2015), examined the impact of MF on financial inclusion within 
the Nigerian context, however their findings cannot be regarded as conclusive for a number of 
reasons. Firstly: the measure of financial inclusion employed is un-supported by the literature. 




3.5 EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES ON POOR MORE EVIDENCE  
The scope of current research have focused on defining financial inclusion, measuring it, 
determining its drivers, and examining the barriers that limit it in addition to framing the 
importance of financial inclusion for development in economic theory. All this has helped in 
elevating the issue of FI to the forefront of development thought. However, the empirical 
evidence and effects on the lives of the world’s poor has had less emphasis. This is because, 
recent empirical evidence on the impact of financial inclusion on economic development and 
poverty varies by the type of financial services in question. For instance, earlier research on 
the impact of the financial sector on economic development highlighted the contributions of 
aggregate financial depth on economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
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Maksimovic, 1998a; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Zervos, 1998), and on poverty reduction and 
income inequality (Beck et al., 2007). However, (as discussed earlier), deep financial sectors 
are not necessarily inclusive ones. Hence, more recent and ongoing research have focused on 
examining financial inclusion and the access to and use of different types of financial services 
separately from financial depth. 
 
In the access to basic payments and savings, the evidence on benefits, especially among 
poor households, is quite supportive. In insurance products, there is also some evidence of a 
positive impact. However, in access to microcredit, the data on dozens of microcredit 
experiments and from other cross-country research paint a rather mixed picture, for instance, 
(King and Levine 1993, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, Rajan and Zingales 1998, 
Zervos 1998). More specifically, Karlan and Zinman (2010), based on an innovative 
experiment in the Philippines, find that access to credit led to a decline in the number of 
business activities and employees in the treatment group relative to controls, and subjective 
well-being declined slightly. However, they did find that microloans increase the ability to cope 
with risk, strengthen community ties, and boost the access to informal credit. These findings 
suggest that microcredit has a positive impact, but that the channels may not necessarily be 
those hypothesized by proponents. Specific areas of financial services access are addressed in 
the following sections. 
 
3.5.1 Effects of Microcredit 
Economic theory suggests that improved access to credit can have positive implications for 
poverty alleviation and entrepreneurial activity. Better access to credit makes it easier for 
households to smooth out consumption over time and provides a de-facto insurance against 
many of the common risks facing households and small enterprises in the developing world.  
In the same vein, improved access to credit can also encourage entrepreneurial activity by 
attenuating investment constraints and making it easier for small businesses to grow beyond 
subsistence. 
 
In many parts of the world, substantial improvements in access to credit among house -holds 
and small businesses in recent decades have occurred through the rapid expansion of 
microcredit. The original narrative emphasized that microcredit could serve not only as a tool 
to alleviate extreme poverty, but also as a means to unleash the entrepreneurship potential of 
the poor. Recent evidence has, however, highlighted some of the limitations of microcredit and 
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suggests a more nuanced narrative. Although microcredit can have significantly positive 
welfare effects if used as a means for consumption smoothing and risk management, most 
studies have found that the effects of microfinance on investment and entrepreneurship are 
relatively small. 
 
Many studies have documented the effects of microfinance on household welfare and 
income. This includes positive effects on consumption, economic self-sufficiency, and some 
aspects of mental health and well-being (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 2005; Kaboski 
and Townsend, 2009, 2012; Karlan and Zinman, 2010). By contrast, studies that explore the 
impact of microfinance on entrepreneurship find relatively modest effects (Pitt and Khandker 
1998, Khandker 2005, Kaboski and Townsend 2009, 2012, Karlan and Zinman 2010). In a 
study that experimentally varies access to microcredit, (Giné et al. 2010, Karlan and Morduch 
2010) find a large effect of access to microfinance on investment in fixed assets, but also note 
that this effect is concentrated among wealthier households that already own a business, while 
households with a low initial probability to transition into entrepreneurship use credit to 
consume rather than invest. Many of the limitations of microcredit as a tool to finance 
entrepreneurship are likely to be the result of the rigidity of microcredit, including the lack of 
grace periods, frequent payments, and joint liability that may prevent risk taking (Field and 
others, forthcoming; Giné et al., 2010). While joint liability contracts have made the extension 
of credit to marginal clients possible, such contracts may be poorly suited for loans to 
businesses for which the cash flows and risks are difficult to observe. 
 
There is also ample evidence that limited access to credit poses a substantial obstacle to 
entrepreneurship and firm growth, especially among small and young firms (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Beck et al., 2006). Cross-country  
research analysing 10,000 firms in 80 countries shows that financing constraints are  associated 
with slower output growth, while  other reported constraints are not as robustly associated with 
growth (Beck et al. 2005, 2006; Banerjee and Duflo 2006; De Mel et al. 2012). Therefore, 
improving access to finance for potential entrepreneurs therefore promises significant welfare 
gains not only for the entrepreneurs, but also for society as a whole. Other evidence suggests 
that access to credit is associated with a decline in observable measures of poverty. For 
example, Burgess and Pande (2005) suggest that bank branching regulation in India has had a 
substantial impact on poverty reduction.  
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At the macroeconomic level, however, the impact of broader access to microcredit may be 
mostly redistributive and not without risks for financial stability. For example, Kaboski and 
Townsend (2012) offer a quantitative evaluation of the aggregate and distributional impact of 
microfinance and find that, if general equilibrium effects are accounted for, scaling up 
microfinance programs has only a small impact on per capita income because increases in total 
factor productivity are counterbalanced by the lower capital accumulation resulting from the 
distribution of income from high savers to low savers. The benefits occur largely through wage 
increases and greater access to finance by poorer entrepreneurs. 
 
The evidence on the overall impact of increased microcredit access on economic 
development and poverty alleviation is weak at best. Kaboski and Townsend (2012) use data 
from the Townsend Thai Survey to evaluate the Thai Million Baht Village fund program, which 
involved the transfer of 1.5 percent of the Thai GDP to the nearly 80,000 villages in Thailand 
to start village banks and was one of the largest government microfinance initiatives of its 
kind.41 The evaluation finds that some households valued the program at much more than the 
per-household cost, but, overall, the program cost 30 percent more than the sum of the benefits. 
Overall, there is plenty of evidence that access to finance is important for firms, especially for 
the smaller and younger ones. Economic growth would come to a halt if firms could not get 
credit. But there are major ongoing debates on the pros and cons of microcredit, which are 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 
3.5.2 Savings and Payments 
Available global data point to a strong correlation between income inequality and inequality in 
the use of bank accounts. For example, in Sweden—a country with one of the most even income 
distributions in the world—the share of people having bank accounts is the same for the rich 
and the poor (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2017). On the other end of the spectrum are countries such 
as Haiti, where income inequality is very high and where the richest 20 percent are about 14 
times more likely to have a bank account than the poorest 20 percent (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
2017). More importantly, data from a broad spectrum of countries indicates that the measure 
of inequality in account penetration (financial inequality) is closely correlated with income 
inequality (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). 
 
 
41 For the survey, see “The Townsend Thai Project: Baseline Survey (‘The Big Survey’),” National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, http://cier.uchicago.edu /data/baseline-survey.shtml.  
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Field experiments provide more direct evidence about the causal linkages between access 
to savings and payments services and real-economy variables. For example, a range of 
randomized controlled experiments finds that providing individuals with access to savings 
accounts or simple informal savings technologies increases savings (Aportela, 1999; Ashraf et 
al., 2006), women’s empowerment (Aportela, 1999; Ashraf et al., 2006), productive 
investment (Ashraf et al., 2010), consumption, investment in preventive health, productivity, 
and income (Ashraf et al. 2010; Dupas and Robinson 2013). Lastly, a reduced vulnerability to 
illness and other unexpected events (Dupas and Robinson 2013). 
 
These findings are in line with those of several other studies. For example, an in-depth 
examination of the effect of bank deregulation in the United States shows that greater financial 
inclusion accelerates economic growth, intensifies competition, and boosts the demand for 
labour. It is also usually associated with relatively bigger benefits to those people at the lower 
end of the income distribution, thus contributing to inclusive growth (Ashraf et al., 2011). 
Together, these studies provide robust justification for policies that encourage the provision of 
basic accounts for savings and payments.42 Increasing financial inclusion in terms of savings 
and payments, if done well, can both help reduce extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity. 
 
3.5.3 Effects of Insurance 
For insurance products, the evidence on the impact on economic development is slightly more 
nuanced, but, on balance, still positive.  Evidence based on total volumes of written insurance 
premiums casts doubts on the aggregate impact. Beck et al., (2010), using co-integration 
analysis for nine countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) from the 1960s to the 1990s, find that, in some countries, the insurance industry 
Granger causes economic growth, while, in other countries, the reverse is true. They conclude 
that the relationship between insurance and growth is nation specific. Previously, Ward and 
Zurbruegg (2000) have pointed out that it is possible to have co-integration at the aggregate 
level but not at the disaggregate level, and vice versa; so, looking more closely at the 
disaggregated data is important. Recent evidence from disaggregated data is encouraging. In 
 
 
42 For brevity, the focus in this section is on savings and transactions related to savings accounts. Nonetheless, 
there is also evidence of the strong impact of access to payment services. One aspect of this is the benefits of 
international remittances on the incomes and living standards of the families of migrants, on which there is some 
evidence. 
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particular, (Kugler and Ofoghi 2005) have conducted a large randomized experiment in south-
western China to assess the impact of insurance on sows. They find that providing access to 
formal insurance significantly increases the propensity of farmers to raise sows. In another 
study, Cole et al. (2011) examine how the availability of rainfall insurance affects the 
investment and production decisions of small- and medium-scale Indian farmers. They observe 
little effect on total expenditures. However, they find that increased insurance induces farmers 
to substitute production activities toward high-return high-risk cash crops. Finally, Shapiro 
(2012) evaluates the effects of a Mexican government disaster relief program with insurance-
like features. Specifically, the program provides fixed indemnity payments to rural households 
the crops or assets of which have been damaged by a natural disaster. The evaluation finds that 
the availability of insurance against losses from natural disasters changes how rural households 
invest in their farms. In particular, insured farmers utilize more expensive capital inputs and 
purchase better seeds. 
 
 
3.6 MFI FINANCING: INCLUSION, SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
3.6.1 Financial Inclusion And MFI Capital Structure Funding 
The role of MFIs on the impact of financial inclusion relies heavily on the ability of MFIs to 
sustain themselves financially (Porkodi and Aravazhi 2013). The role played by capital 
structure in this process is crucial. For instance, a capital structure comprising of simply 
donations and grants are less likely to enable MFIs sustainably provide the operations needed 
to improve the welfare of the bottom of the pyramid. Partly as a result of the moral hazard 
attached to the offer of grants and donations, in addition to the near non-attachment of terms 
on debt (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Therefore, the onus on debt as a disciplining 
mechanism/function in this sense is eroded. The reasoning here is that donations and grants are 
a constant source regardless of MFI performance. Donors often give grants to MFIs with no 
financial obligation as donors often derive a social return on these investments. However, on 
the other hand a capital structure comprising of debt and equity is more likely to induce superior 
performance of MFIs, this is because of the disciplining and monitoring nature of debt (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981), and its ability to demand superior performance, so as to secure favourable 
terms in the next funding round. 
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The use of competitive funding terms is therefore assumed to directly induce MFIs to 
perform better in their mission. The cascading effect further leads to creating economic 
efficiency and operational efficiencies amongst MFIs, of which then leads to the overall 
sustainability of the MFI sector. For instance, when an MFI is able to be operationally efficient, 
this is an attractive prospect for favourable market competitive debt terms. The disciplining 
nature of debt will enable MFIs to perform well, with positive implications on financial 
sustainability and efficiency in improving financial inclusion43. The feed-through effect could 
therefore improve an MFIs ability to sustain levels of operation in underserved rural 
communities. 
 
Capital structure theories indicate the possibility of the survival of firms when the right 
mixture of debt and equity is employed. The capital structure therefore plays a key role in this 
process, the better the combination of debt and equity in MFIs can therefore lead to the 
efficiency of these institutions, leading to improved sustainability amongst these firms (Bogan 
2012). This could then lead to improved financial inclusion levels amongst those at the bottom 
of the pyramid in SSA. Other such theories exists within the western context (as regarding 
various industries, contexts and sectors), however for firms like MFIs, little evidence exists to 
suggest such. Furthermore, the role of the institutional environment (macro environment, 
financial environment and other institutional factors) will be considered within the SSA 
context, in order to assess the importance of capital structure for MFIs in improving financial 
inclusion levels in SSA. 
 
3.7 MFI FINANCING AND SUSTAINABILITY: A CONCEPTUAL VIEW 
The widespread failure of MFIs around the world, most specifically in Africa have prompted 
recommendations about structuring financial rescue packages for ailing MFIs (Karim 2011). 
Paradoxically, these recommendations fail to indicate a way forward for a sustainable financing 
structure that would ensure financial sustainability in the long-term for MFIs. Much of which 
has since been a revolving door of rescues and series of collapses of MFIs. For instance, MFI 
failures in India, Ghana, Pakistan and South Africa. Calls for providing the right financing 
option that can proffer much needed sustainability for MFIs given the need to ensure a 
 
 
43 The positive impact on financial inclusion stems from the continual accumulation of experience of operation 
and expertise in these communities, in addition to the trust accumulation through the combination of local trust  
relationship building (local expertise). A combination of these factors would improve MFIs efficiency in 
improving financial inclusion in rural communities. 
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continued outreach to the poor has been therefore unavoidable. Despite the burgeoning interest 
in microfinance, research has shied away from addressing the relationship between financing 
and financial sustainability. This area of research is highly relevant, because informing the 
structuring of MFI financing along the context of sustainability is not only a theoretical exercise 
(in light of the views of capital structure and firm activities), the relevance of this helps to guide 
practitioners on observing best practices in order to ensure the long-term sustainability and 
existence of, as solution providing institutions in the development process of much of Africa. 
 
This section explores the literature, of the various financing options available to MFIs and 
their implications for financial sustainability. With a general aim to consolidate the theory and 
empirical evidence on MFI financing and financial sustainability. The understanding is that 
financing of MFIs continues to evolve with an increased inclination towards commercial 
financing (Cull et al., 2011; Johnson, 2015). Given the limited information available on this 
subject for MFIs, most of which is implied, this chapter fuses the theory and evidence on the 
relationship between financing and MFI sustainability.  
 
3.7.1 Financial Sustainability  
Much of the literature on MFI sustainability have been explored in preceding chapters, 
however, a brief consideration of the literature and issues surrounding sustainability as relates 
to MFI financing will be reviewed. Even though the provision of financial services to the poor 
hinges on the assumption that MFIs exist eternally to solve social ills such as poverty, 
unemployment and low living standards (Bogan, 2012). Sustainability as relates to MFIs thus 
ensures an uninterrupted delivery of financial services. Furthermore, (Adams 2002) deem 
sustainability as a strong stabilizer to MFI efficiency and distinct outreach. Despite pursuing a 
double bottom mandate, it is often acknowledged that MFI sustainability, is a first step towards 
ensuring it meets its long term target (Mersland and Strøm, 2010). 
 
The theoretical understanding of the nexus between financing and sustainability, draws from 
the notion that; financially sustainable MFIs often capitalise on scale, exercise cost 
consciousness, promote innovation, reduce administrative and information asymmetry costs, 
and therefore, mostly lower adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Thus, advancing 
outreach whilst suffering the least amount of losses (Mersland and Strøm 2010). The drive 
towards sustainability have often led to a move away from donor funded MFIs towards 
commercial (for-profit) oriented MFIs. For instance, some governments have privatised 
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subsidised, inefficient and loss-making credit programmes and parastatals (Hoque et al. 2011, 
Quayes 2012). Whilst many argue for the case of mission drift in this concerted shift (Mersland 
and Strøm 2010, Hermes and Lensink 2011), evidence remains conflicted (Amin et al., 2003; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Hoque, Chishty and Halloway, 2011), and inconclusive (Quayes 
2012). Proponents however, argue that the shift has brought with it much needed 
accountability, transparency, efficiency, economic interest rate setting, capital mobilisation and 
appropriate management remuneration within the MF sector (Robinson 2001b). 
 
It is however clear that on both sides of the divide on which Morduch (2000) calls a “schism” 
-the old paradigm of pro-social mission and the new paradigm of financial sustainability-, the 
binding factor remains to be funding, playing a key role in the process. In light of the key role 
of (both donor and commercial) funding in the sector, it is imperative to examine MFI funding 
within the context of MFI sustainability within SSA. 
 
3.7.2 MFI Funding and Performance 
The Link between Funding and Performance Economic profit (or loss) refers to the difference 
between total revenues and all expenses. Responding to profit incentives, firms tend to try to 
increase total revenues and decrease total expenses (including costs of capital). In the case of 
a financial institution, financial expenses (costs of funding) usually represent a large part of 
total costs, but this part is more difficult to control by the financial institution, while the 
revenues depend mostly on the interest on loans provided to borrowers (De Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005). Therefore, financial structure in terms of funding has become one of the 
important issues for MFIs in gaining efficiency and sustainability. The effects of funding 
sources can be positive or negative due to their positive contributions to total financial revenue 
(i.e. the predicted effects are indeterminate and depend on the specific circumstances of each 
MFI). However, the increase in financial expenses is always expected to be lower than the 
increase in financial revenues.
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3.8 OTHER FINANCING DETERMINANTS 
3.8.1 Role of institutional Environment 
Amongst other key determinants of the financing structure of MFIs as noted by Fehr and 
Hishigsuren (2006) are the regulatory provisions. Regulated MFIs are normally allowed to 
attract deposits. Hence, regulation enables MFIs access and gain a benefit from low cost 
savings (Fehr & Hishigsuren 2006). Thus, countries whose regulation outlaws deposit 
collection tend to consider more debt and equity financing compared to countries that allow 
attraction of savings. The incredible trend of surging deposits in Africa is attributable to several 
African countries passing laws that de-criminalise deposit collection (Lafourcade et al., 2006). 
Whilst deposits can be a source of cheap financing, regulation and supervision present a cost 
to MFIs (Cull et al. 2011). Cull et al. (2011) found that regulation negatively affected outreach, 
the same as female borrowers. Regulation thus poses additional cost to MFIs that may force 
them to cut back on smaller loans meant for the poor and female clients and issue more lager 
loans. 
 
Microfinance funding trends are also subject to localised characteristics that have a bearing 
on the development of institutions (Bogan 2012). These characteristics include historical 
legacies of both saving and lending as well as legal provisions defining the operations and the 
raising of capital. This explains why Latin America has many regulated MFIs compared to the 
Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Moreover, various microfinance 
charters mean different players with different/varying missions, hence the difference in funding 
and funding patterns and transitions. 
 
 
3.9 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A conceptual framework identifying the gaps in the literature has been employed in developing 
suitable hypothesis applicable to the study context (SSA), specifically those related to capital 
structure determinants among MFIs within the context of SSA. The research is focused on 
establishing the institutional environment determinants quality of the capital structure of MFIs. 
Specifically, this research proposes a model of capital structure determinants inspired by 
LaPorta et al. (1999), and Tchuigoua (2014), in order to predict and explain the institutional 
determinants of capital structure and the consequences of quality institutions on the capital 
93 
structure to MFIs performance in SSA. This conceptual framework, extends this line of enquiry 
by further examining the impact of MFIs on financial inclusion in SSA. 
 
Previous research has established that standard firm-level characteristics acts as 
determinants of the capital structure of firms (Kyereboah 2007). Additionally, institutional 
environment is deemed to have a determinant effect on the funding of firms in developing 
countries. Although this has been seldom analysed by empirical studies, existing literature 
suggest that this could undoubtedly influence capital structure choices within the SSA region. 
Hence, variables capturing the institutional framework within SSA will be employed in order 
to determine its mediating effects on capital structure, and its impacts on MFI performance. 
 
There is still a lack of literature in the MF industry specifically exploring the impacts of 
institutional environment on the capital structure choices of MFIs in SSA. Of the few that 
examine the determinants of capital structure for MFIs, Kyerboah (2007), employs governance 
variables such as Board size, Board independence, CEO duality and CEO tenure. Whilst these 
are important variables in a governance context, it fails to capture the broader institutional 
framework of the sampled country (in this case Ghana). On the contrary, Tchuigoua (2014), 
employs three country-level institutional variables namely; Creditor rights index, Development 
level of the financial sector, and country’s legal tradition. However, this was applied on a 
sample of MFIs situated around the world, the differences in institutional contexts in Latin 
America and SSA are unaccounted for. For example, variables relating to corruption; a more 
relevant variable for the SSA context is omitted. 
 
Although standard capital structure determinants follow assumed key variables for analysis 
in a western context. However, the context is different in SSA. Therefore, in order to capture 
relevant variables in examining the SSA context, institutional framework variables deemed 
suitable for SSA have been identified and represented within the conceptual framework. 
Leverage determinants deemed unsuitable to the study context (SSA region) will not be 
employed in examining the capital structure of MFIs. Rather, variables deemed applicable to 
the SSA context will be employed within the analysis. For example, the institutional 
environment’s in developed and developing economies are divergent. Therefore, where there 
exist strong institutional frameworks in developed economies, in developing countries within 
SSA, this is not the case. For instance, Webster and Piesse (2018), show that whilst foreign 
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firms prefer FDI destinations with transparency, foreign firms will often alter behaviours 
negatively in an institutional environment that supports corrupt practices. 
 
Two models, of capital structure was employed in this research. On the one hand, the general 
measures of capital structure employed in general studies are measured. In addition, capital 
structure variables directly employable/suitable to the hybrid structure of MFIs are also 
considered. MFIs, have interesting capital funding, for instance, MFIs employ the use of 
subsidized debt, grants, and donations, in addition to equity funding. These types of funding 
present unique challenges for MFIs, and further act as limiting and/or enabling impediments to 
their mission. By combining all variables affecting the determination of capital structure, this 
research will be able to ascertain how changes in the institutional environment impacts on the 
ability of MFI in obtaining capital. Implementation of the above capital structure measures will 
further reveal the impact of these types of capital on the ability of MFIs to perform its functions 
effectively. The framework that guided this research therefore reflects a multifaceted lens 
comprising of three relationships, which have been identified for testing in this study. 
 
The first set of hypothesis represents the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and leverage, capital structure measures represent the dependent variable, whilst the 
institutional, macro-economic, financial development, firm-specific determinants and control 
variables form the independent variables. Secondly, a subsequent litter-of hypothesis 
investigates the relationship between leverage and MFI performance. The capital structure 
measures identified act as the explanatory variables in addition to macro-economic and firm 
specific control variables. The idea being that the capital structure aids in the performance of 
MFIs in their ability to reach their mission. Finally, in the third relationship, the conceptual 
framework (identifies a set of hypothesis which) takes into consideration the feed-through 
effects of the performance of MFIs on the financial inclusion levels of countries within the 
sample size. Specifically, this relationship examines the impact of MFI (using MFI penetration 
rate) as independent variables and financial inclusion as a dependent variable. 
 
The consideration from Hypothesis 1 generalises that the quality of the institutional 
environment impacts positively on the capital structure of MFIs in SSA. Secondly, the 
consideration from Hypothesis II generalises that MFI leverage components are important for 
MFI financial and social performance, and finally, consideration from Hypothesis III 
generalises that MFIs are important enablers of financial inclusion.
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PhD Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 18. Conceptual Framework. 
Source: Authors Own 
 
 
The continent of Africa through efforts aided by the WB, IMF, G20 and other multilateral 
finance institutions have pushed for efforts in tackling the issue of financial inclusion. Financial 
inclusion, as defined by WB is “the process of ensuring access to financial services and timely 
and adequate credit where needed by vulnerable groups such as weaker sections and low 
income groups at an affordable cost.” Whilst the WB and other development agencies identify 
MF as a tool to improve financial inclusion, a gap in the literature exists. In that, till date, there 
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financial inclusion. In addition to this, existing studies are yet to measure the impacts of various 
policy interventions to eliminate financial inclusion. Hence, using a financial index employed 
by Yorulmaz (2016), and a measure of MF penetration, this study aims to establish the effects 
of MF on financial inclusion in the SSA region. 
 
The World Bank usually measures the level of financial inclusion through certain banking 
measures. These include number of bank branches, number of accounts, and domestic credit as 
percentage of GDP and domestic deposit as percentage of GDP. These indicators for financial 
inclusion however, as Sarma (2008) argues, are not enough because it only identifies one 
dimension of banking outreach. The general consideration of the conceptual framework 
captures first the link between the institutional environment, macro factors and financial 
development on MFI capital structure, the capital structure then impacts on MFI financial and 




Chapter 4 MFI FUNDING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNIGNS 
The relationship between capital structure and firm value has engaged the attention of both 
academics and practitioners (Kyereboah 2007). According to Glen and Pinto (1994), 
Demirguc-kunt et al., (2011), Awunyo-vitor and Badu (2012), one of the important decisions 
confronting a firm is the choice between debt and equity. Hence, the position of theory to 
provide an understanding about corporate issues and the relationships that occur within an 
organisation cannot be overlooked. Several theoretical frameworks have been employed to 
study the relationship between capital structure and firm performance, as well as the 
determinants of the capital structure of firms. The famous Miller Modigliani (1958) paper set 
the stage for numerous propositions, developed to provide the theoretical underpinnings of this 
crucial concept of finance (with an irrelevance position achieved in concert with the existence 
of perfect capital markets). The theoretical advancements with emphasis on shaping capital 
structure models based on tax balancing and information asymmetry, and various elements of 
a firms capital structure have (has over-time,) in times-past, aided in understanding the 
financing behaviour of corporate entities. The various arguments have centred on an optimal 
capital structure for specific firms, and the extent to which the quantum of debt usage (in 
relation to equity) is irrelevant to a firm’s worth/value. According to Cotei and Farhat (2009), 
three prevailing theories are often used to explain firms capital structure choices namely; 
Trade-off theory, Pecking order theory, and the Market-timing theory of capital structure. 
Whilst, Jensen and Meckling (1976), propose a trade-off between utilizing the benefits of debt, 
and the adverse costs related to debt, Myers and Majluf (1984), suggest a hierarchy of firm 
preferences in financing firm’s investments. On the other hand, the market-timing theory 
suggests that firms time equity issues when company shares are overvalued and buy-back 
shares when undervalued. 
 
According to the above theories, a certain level of leverage can lead to performance gains 
through various benefits of leverage, thereby concluding that leverage influences performance 
of firms. It is worth noting that, whilst these theories explain capital structure, for corporate 
firms, no such theory has been employed to explain MFI financing choices, and its effects on 
how MFIs perform. Post Miller and Modiigliani (1958) irrelevance theory, Miller and 
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Modigliani (1963) incorporate tax benefits as determinants of capital structure, thereby, 
recognising the importance of tax-deductible interest (as a tax-shield) on the use of leverage 
within the capital structure of firms (via payment of lower taxes). They thus state that firms 
should employ as much debt as possible, in order to maximize firm value. This therefore is a 
tacit admission that the capital structure of a firm, influences firm value. Subsequent to this, 
several studies have looked at the linkage between capital structure and firm performance, 
leading to several competing theories44 on the role of capital structure in determining the 
financing choices, and performance of firms. 
 
Fama and Miller (1972), examine the possibility of different utility functions between 
managers and shareholders. Building on this, Jensen and Meckling (1976), argue that greater 
financial leverage possess the ability to affect manager’s performance (through the threat of 
liquidation), which causes personal loss to manager’s salaries, reputation and perquisites45 
thereby reducing (agency) cost associated with disconnect between managers and owners. 
Myers and Majluf (1984), and Myers (1984), indicate a position of support for the 
unavailability of a well-defined target debt ratio, suggesting the existence of a hierarchy with 
regards to the financing of investment by firms; pecking order theory of firm financing. Finally, 
the market-timing theory of capital structure, suggest that firms time new equity issuances 
when stock prices are perceived to be overvalued, and buy back stick when prices are perceived 
to be undervalued. 
 
A glaring conclusion emerging from the debate suggest that; the capital structure of a firm 
indeed has implications for its operations, as well as impacts on its performance. Although 
much of the debate on capital structure centres on the determination of an optimal capital 
structure, observing capital structure dynamics from the perspective of the institutional 
environment lacks evidence from an MFI perspective. Particularly pertinent due to the 
importance of these institutions and key institutional changes within the MFI context (increased 
calls for; improved institutional quality and governance amongst donor recipients, 
sustainability drive and commercialisation calls). In view of the increased clamour for 
commercialisation within the MFIs sector, this research project aims to fill this void; by 
 
 
44 These include, Agency cost theory, The trade-off theory, Pecking order theory, and the Market timing theory 
of debt. 
45 Grossman and Hart (1982), and Williams (1987), expand on this area of the literature. 
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establishing through empirical analysis the institutional drivers of MFI financing choices 
(capital structure), and its impact on the performance of MFIs. 
 
 
4.2 MFI FINANCING  
Existing theories have been developed to describe under what circumstances an MFI should 
use a particular type of funding instrument. The prevailing theories of MFI funding processes 
can be categorized into two main frameworks: Life-Cycle Theory (LCT) and Profit-Incentive 
Theory (PIT). 
 
Kapper (2007) estimates that 80% of the world’s population is financially excluded thus the 
demand for microfinance is high. Paul (2010) estimates that the demand for microfinance 
currently outstrips supply by $300 billion and in order to reach those without access, MFIs 
need to expand. Capital constraints and high operating costs in developing countries limit 
access to financial services by the poor (Kumar, 2012). The aggregate portfolio for MFIs across 
the world approximates $15 billion whilst the anticipated growth rate ranges between 15 and 
30% per year, translating into $2.5 - $5 billion additional capital required annually. Conversely, 
donors are able to inject nearly $400 million annually, falling short of the sector’s need. 
Donations are used for microfinance developmental issues especially information 
dissemination, capacitation of MFI associations and regulatory support (CGAP, 2004). It is 
therefore apparent that a high prevalence of financial exclusion is caused by the lack of strong 
financial intermediation backed by sound financing (Kapper, 2007). The literature clearly 
identifies that adequately financing MFIs is critical if the needs of the poor are to be fully 
addressed. Thus, the financing options assumed by MFIs in part determine the financial 
services that they can provide and at what cost.  
 
Myers and Majluf, (1984) highlights the noticeable increase in the transition of NGOs and 
non-bank MFIs into regulated microfinance banks as the search for suitable financing increases 
for MFIs (for instance Compartamos in Mexico). Subsequently, de Sousa-Shields and 
Frankiewicz (2004) observe that the MF sector in most countries has proven commercial 
viability and an ability to serve the market profitably when applying best practise asset 
management. It is no surprise that; given that MFIs are being weaned off donors and 
governments, new innovative financing methods are being instituted (Hoque et al. (2011a). 
However, the debate on the right financing of microfinance that ensures extended outreach and 
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sustainability of MFIs remains open. Furthermore, establishing how best to attract optimum 
financing for MFIs especially in SSA remains scant. It is in this prism/gap that we examine 
current MFI financing theories and explore if they explain much of MFI financing within the 
context of SSA. Therefore, in view of the important role of financing for MFIs, the next section 
explores the literature on MF funding theories, and relationship with value, and performance. 




4.2.1 Microfinance Funding & Capital Structure 
The positive returns of several MFIs around the world have continued to attract new investment 
funds, whilst MF continues to evolve, with consistent emphasis on (sustainability,) efficiency 
and growth in outreach. The gradual increase in MF activities have ultimately meant that MFIs 
now more than ever, are increasingly reliant on commercial financing to fund this potential 
growth, whether through debt or equity investments (Ming-yee, 2007; Hermes and Lensink, 
2011). A review of the literature suggest/indicates that the link between the funding and 
performance of MFIs is one of the important gaps in the existing literature (i.e. how funders 
determine financing decision based on the key performance indicators of MFIs) (Ming-yee 
2007, Hermes and Lensink 2011). Amidst this, there has been a concerted drive amongst 
governments/countries in SSA to improve governance, and institutional quality in hopes to 
attract foreign capital and improve the quality of institutions. Whilst researchers suggest this 
could be a determining factor in improving funding (attracting funding from foreign agents), 
empirical evidence is yet to confirm this is really the case for MFIs in SSA. With the growth 
and clear funding gaps within the MF sector in SSA, the importance of determining the 
institutional factors that influence the sector would be useful for policy makers, MFI 
practitioners, and researchers in the area of MF. 
 
This section of the literature reviews the literature on MFI funding; starting with the review 
of the early stage funding, growth and current trends within the MFI sector. We then examine 
MFI funding theories in context with long existing capital structure theories. Finally, we place 
the literature on MFI funding the context of (institutional upheaval through the institutional 
environment prism) the institutional environment in view of the current institutional upheaval 
of commercialisation of the MF sector. 
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4.2.2 Evolution of MFI Funding Sources 
MFIs services impact on the bottom of the pyramid in developing countries around the world. 
Despite the successes of many MFIs, millions of low-income individuals in developing 
countries still lack access to financial services. High operating costs and capital constraints 
within the MFI industry have prevented MFIs from meeting the enormous demand. 
Additionally, (Bogan et al. 2007, Imai et al. 2011) show that the demand for credit by the poor 
is not inelastic. The high interest rates charged may be limiting the ability of MFIs to serve 
poorer potential clients. Donor agencies, local governments, and others are promoting 
competition and stressing financial sustainability as ways to maximize the breadth of outreach 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2004). As an added level of complexity, MFIs are a 
unique type of lending institution with risk and return characteristics different from those of 
standard lending operations. MFIs also have a mission of reducing poverty, not just maximizing 
firm value. Thus, institutional structure and capital flows to MFIs have become much more 
critical issues. Focusing on funding sources, this research project investigates the determinants 
of the institutional of the funding of MFIs. Secondly, we establish the impact/relationship 
between capital structure, MFI sustainability, efficiency, and outreach to identify opportunities 
for increasing the sustainability and growth of MFIs46. 
 
Although microfinance has existed for centuries in various forms, the development of 
distinct MFIs came into prominence in the 1980s after the emergence of the Grameen Bank, 
which developed strategies and lending techniques that influenced MF organizations all over 
the world. In its initial stages, MF employed the use of social capital to overcome the problems 
of lack of collateral, and limitations in creditworthiness information. Much of the applied 
economics literature in this area addresses the MFI lending mechanisms (Morduch, 1999), the 
social worth of microfinance organizations (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2004), or the 
performance of MFIs (Navajas et al. 2000, 2003). 
 
In recent years, there has been increasing internal and external pressure for MFIs to decrease 
dependence on subsidies and grant funding. For example, ACCION International, an 
organization designed to support MFIs, helps MFIs obtain equity financing, debt financing, 
 
 
46 Table of funding summarizes how each of the four primary funding sources can affect MFI 
efficiency (Helms, 2006).  
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and other commercial funding instruments. By enabling MFIs to link directly with investors 
and commercial banks47. Over the past decade, ACCION has been highly influential in 
encouraging donors to subsidize start-up costs only and pushing for MFIs to have a commercial 
focus (Armend´ariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004). 
 
Subsidized external debts, also called soft loans or concessionary borrowings, are contracted 
at favourable conditions, that is, below market rates. They are often provided by government 
aid agencies (United States Agency for International Development: USAID), multilateral 
banks (World Bank), or apex organizations and foundations. Soft equity or subsidized equity 
is a financial instrument that is channelled mainly through micro investment vehicles (Lapenu 
and Zeller 2002). Returns expected by donors in this case are under the market rate. Finally, 
MFIs receive subsidies in the form of donations and cash, and donors in this case are not 
expecting any returns. Subsidized equity is part of equity. Whilst some question the ability of 
donor funds to continue to pour into the sector –especially post the credit shocks- (Murdoch 
(1999), the clamour for domestic solutions for MFI financing has been on the discourse of 
current debate. Even when the local constitutions/make-up in many of the developing nations 
–who really need MF services- are dire (poor institutions, governance and high levels of 
corruption remain rampant), the strategy of a continual subsidising of MFIs increasingly looks 
bleak. For instance, Bateman and Chang (2009) identifies this strategy as poor implementation 
and exploitation of the vulnerability of those involved in funding and benefiting from the ills 
of MF as is. 
 
Since donor funds are limited in amount, reliance on this source of funding limits the ability 
of MFIs to expand to meet rising demand for services. There is also a question as to whether 
reliance on donor funds allows MFIs to avoid pressures to operate efficiently. Commercially-
funded MFIs respond to the profit incentive, working to increase revenues and decrease 
expenses so that they can have revenues sufficient to cover all operating expenses. MFIs with 
access to donor funds may not respond to these pressures to operate efficiently or may 
deliberately choose outreach over efficiency by serving poorer or rural clients with higher 
delivery costs (Hudon and Traca 2011a). 
 
 
47 One of such institutions favouring the independence of MFIs is ACCION. ACCION strives to help MFIs 
become independent of donor funds, through a transformation process from NGO to commercialised MFI 
operations. The ACCION Gateway Fund LLC invests in MFIs with a proven track record of financial viability.  
103 
 
  MFI FUNDING STAGES  
Instrument Benefits Challenges 
Grants/Donations 
Best for start-up or risky institutions 
when  
Money perceived as "too easy" so no 
efficiency incentives 
 commercial sources unavailable.  
   
Equity   
 Quasi-equity 
Source of low-cost funding (similar to 
concessional debt)  





Governance role could improve overall 
management and 
Only licensed financial institutions are 
eligible. Stockholder 
 thus efficiency. demands can cause mission drift that allows 
  inefficient practices. 
   
Traditional equity 
capital  
Allows financial institutions to tap into 
capital markets. 
Only licensed financial institutions are 
eligible to sell 
 
Governance role could improve overall 
management and 
shares on the market. Stockholder demands 
and diluted 
 thus efficiency. 
ownership can cause long-term inefficiencies 
due to 
  short-term focus. 
   
Deposits 
Over time is a low-cost source of 
funding. Creates 
Only for regulated institutions. Some 
institutions may 
 independence from external funding. 
need support to develop products and 
systems to lower 
  costs and manage growth of deposits. 
   
Debt   
 
Concessional 
loans   Source of low-cost funding.  
If commercial alternatives exist, can distort 
domestic 
  





 Source of funds that encourages 
efficient operations. None. 
 Bonds 
Allows financial institutions to tap into 
domestic capital 
Requires sufficiently developed secondary 
market. Dependent 
 markets, encouraging efficiency. 
on local shocks. May require initial 
incentives to 
    get started in some markets. 
      
Table 4.1: MFI Funding Instruments and MFI Sustainability. 
Source: Authors Own. Coined from Helms (2006).
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4.3 MIFI FINANCING THEORIES 
4.3.1 Life Cycle Theory 
Existing research places the evolution of MFI funding sources within the context of an 
institutional life cycle theory of MFI development (de Sousa-Shields, 2004). According to this 
framework of analysis, most MFIs start out as NGOs with a social vision, funding operations 
with grants and concessional loans from donors and international financial institutions that 
effectively serve as the primary sources of risk capital for the microfinance sector. Thus, the 
literature on microfinance devotes considerable attention to this process of “NGO 
transformation” as a life cycle model outlining the evolution of a microfinance institution 
(Armendáriz De Aghion and Morduch 2010) (see “MFI Funding Table 4.1). Generally the life 
cycle theory posits that the sources of financing are linked to the stages of MFI development. 
Donor grants and soft loans48 comprise the majority of the funding in the formative stages of 
the organization. As the MFI matures, private debt capital becomes available, but the debt 
structures have restrictive covenants or guarantees. In the last stage of MFI evolution, 
traditional equity financing becomes available (Helms 2006). 
 
The Life-Cycle Theory (LCT) of MFI financing situates MFI financing as a product of MFI 
life-cycle. Fehr and Hishigsuren (2006) posit that the capital structure of MFIs changes with 
the LCT phases of an MFI. Hoque and Chishty (2011) concur by writing that the LCT explains 
the financing of MFIs as they evolve into financially sustainable institutions. Despite the 
popularity of the LCT, evidence of it remains scant as little work has been done on it. In an 
effort to answer the question: Do MFIs develop towards financial sustainability, Bogan (2012) 
used cross-sectional data on the top 300 MFIs. The results did not support the LCT but 
underscored the importance of capital in determining financial sustainability. This is because 
capital constraints and costs limit the expansion of microfinance. (Fehr and Hishigsuren 2006) 
note that the shift to private capital has already begun and some MFIs are being established on 
full private capital financing. The authors emphasised that, the ability of an MFI to survive any 




48 Soft loans are loans with subsidized interest rates obtained from multi-lateral banks (e.g., the world-bank, Inter-
American Development Bank), government aid agencies (e.g., U.S. Agency for international Development, U.K. 
Department for International Development), foundations (e.g., Ford Foundation, ill and Melinda Gates 
foundation), and apex organisations (e.g., Women’s World Banking ACCION).  
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Farrington and Abrams (2002) provide evidence that supports the life cycle theory, noting 
an increase in competition in MFIs as they increase in number and documenting a spread in 
regulation facilitating a change in the capital structure of the industry. They discuss several key 
trends that have emerged: (a) the tendency toward increased leveraging of capital, (b) the rise 
in the practice of accepting public deposits, and (c) a shift away from subsidized donor money 
toward commercial funding. However, Fehr and Hishigsuren (2006) notes that whilst market-
oriented financing for MFIs is noticeable, there is still evidence of non-commercial financing 
that opposes the LCT evolution style. Financing programmes linking MFIs with investors and 
commercial banks through credit enhancement lowers financing costs for MFIs as they turn 
into commercially viable entities, thus challenging the LCT. 
 
Despite the support for the life cycle approach, there is also evidence that countervailing 
factors shape the funding sources and instruments available to MFIs. MFIs therefore face 
limitations in financing options, especially MFIs constrained with no license for taking public 
deposits and no shareholder structure for attracting equity other than donations. In addition, 
Banerjee et al. (2003) have shown that the maturity of the capital markets within a country can 
affect the allocation of funding or other resources. 
 
4.3.2 MFI Profit Incentive Theory 
In contrast to the life cycle theory, the profit-incentive theory (PIT) posits that MFI use of 
commercial funding sources (at any stage of development) will enable MFIs meet the 
“microfinance promise” (Bogan 2012). The use of commercial funding raises cost 
consciousness, efficiency and outreach. In concurrence with the institutionalist paradigm, the 
PIT maintains that donor funding is limited in amount, thus cannot fund microfinance on a 
mega scale given the increasing demand for microfinance. Reliance on commercial funding is 
therefore beneficial along two dimensions: outreach and efficiency. Since donor funds are 
limited in amount, reliance on donor funding limits the ability of MFIs to expand to meet rising 
demand for services (Jansen 2003). 
 
Commercially funded MFIs respond to the profit incentive, thus, the profit incentive theory 
maintains that MFIs pursuing profits strive to maximise revenue whilst minimising operational 
costs to cover expenses and build surpluses. Increased revenues and decreased expenses 
therefore enables MFIs to amass revenues sufficient to cover all operating expenses. 
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Conversely, MFIs with access to donor funds may not respond to these pressures to operate 
efficiently or may deliberately choose outreach over efficiency by serving poorer or rural 
clients with higher delivery costs (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). 
 
Evidence on the PIT as furnished by Bogan (2012) shows the increasing international and 
internal pressure on MFIs to shed subsidies and grant financing. Institutions such as ACCION 
International have made frantic efforts to link MFIs with equity financiers, debt financing as 
well as other commercial funding sources. This has provided an avenue for MFIs to seek 
independence from grants and subsidies’. But how effective is this theory in explaining the 
financing of MFIs? Concerns over the dangers of excessive subsidization in microfinance have 
been prevalent since the 1980s, and as a result, the goal of serving the poor has been twinned 
with the goal of long-term financial self-sufficiency for some time (Morduch, 2005). In recent 
years, there has been increasing internal and external pressure for the MFIs to decrease 
dependence on subsidized or grant funding. For example, some non-profit organizations like 
ACCION International have been helping MFIs obtain equity financing, debt financing, and 
other commercial funding instruments (CGAP 2004). By enabling MFIs to link directly with 
investors and commercial banks, these types of organizations strive to help MFIs become 
independent of donor funds49. For example, over the past decade, ACCION has been highly 
influential in encouraging donors to subsidize start-up costs only and pushing for MFIs to have 
a commercial focus (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004). 
 
 
4.4 MFI FINANCING SOURCES AND INSTRUMENTS  
Current literature places the financing structure of MFIs as closely-mirroring that of 
commercial banks (Karim 2011). However, differences in orientation of MFIs means that the 
variation of funding amongst these institutions are different within groups. For instance, profit-
motivated MFIs employ debt, equity and savings whilst grants, subsidies and donations are 
used by NGOs (Tor 2003; Rosenberg 2009). Debt is mainly supplied by private investors (non-
commercial), commercial banks and multilateral organisations, whilst equity is owned by 
national and international non-profit institutions and development banks. CGAP (2004) 
estimates that 25-35% of MFIs are financed through deposit/savings financing. A further 35-
 
 
49 The ACCION Gateway Fund, LLC invests in MFIs with a proven track record of financial viability, with an 
estimated $19.5 million in committed capital through its subsidiary ACCION Investments.  
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40% are debt financed with 30-40% being equity financed. Hermes and Lensink (2011) 
emphasise that commercialisation of microfinance, competition, technology, financial 
liberalisation and regulation explain the change in the financing structure of MFIs. This chimes 
with the institutional change theory, which suggest that institutional upheaval (in this case, 
changes in technology, institutional environment like policy, governance and regulation), 
impacts organisational resources. If this is the case, the need to examine the funding pattern for 
MFIs in SSA within the context of institutional change is imminent (Tchuigoua 2014). 
 
Other commercial funding sources include commercial banks (Johnson 2015). Despite this, 
there is still a shortage of funding for MFIs. For instance, this has led to other MFIs have turned 
public to raise capital. Compartamos went public in 2007 whilst SKS Microfinance managed 
to raise $358 million after going public (Hoque & Chisty, 2011). This has marked a transition 
in the thinking behind funding of microfinance as it has become acceptable that MFIs can 
source financing in competitive markets just like any other corporate. MFIs can also attract 
deposits and use such deposits to fund outreach only upon meeting regulatory requirements. 
Deposits are considered stable and can fund MFIs over a long period of time thus MFIs can 
attain solid growth (Kapper, 2007). 
 
 
4.5 MFI FUNDING TYPES 
The financial structures of MFIs resemble many business entities; a combination of two 
elements/instruments: liabilities and equity (see funding Table 4.1 above). However, the hybrid 
nature of MFIs implies that the spectrums of funding instruments are unique to these 
institutions, and not readily applicable in many business entities. Total liabilities, sometimes 
called total debts, typically include voluntary deposits, compulsory savings, debts and other 
liabilities (Isern and Porteous 2005). Total equity, on the other hand, generally refers to the 
total money the owners have invested. Hence, two main separate categories of financing 
instruments are available to MFIs: liabilities financing and equity financing (Wisniwski 1999, 
Ming-yee 2007, TheMIX 2009, Sapundzhieva et al. 2010, Hermes and Lensink 2011). Recent 
debate has moved to investigate the best option for financing MFIs from a choice of debt or 
equity financing (Sapundzhieva et al. 2010). However, of the studies reviewed, none of these 
focus on the SSA region, despite the fact that in deciding the optimum choice of debt and 
equity, considerations of MFI characteristics (such as; Size, profitability, mission goals, MFI 
orientation, financial capital trade-offs/opportunity costs, portfolio risk/quality, MFI age and 
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institutional and macro-environmental factors) is crucial (Bogan 2012). Regional 
characteristics and the quality of the institutional environment in SSA suggest that all these 
factors are uniquely different for MFIs especially within the SSA region. Therefore, in the 
choice between liabilities and equity financing, the heterogeneity of these factors within the 
continent needs to be taken into consideration in order to procure SSA specific solutions. This 
therefore, requires a unique study for the MFIs in SSA. 
 
4.5.1 Equity Financing  
Equity financing for MFIs refers to an instrument of MFI financing which in exchange for 
capital, requests some equity from MFIs (Janson 2003). According to the LCT, this type of 
financing for MFIs usually comes in the later stages of MFI development (mature stage). Equity 
offerings for MFIs therefore create a liability in the shape of capital (Delloite, 2010). The 
literature on MFI financing suggests that three main methods exist for raising equity financing 
for MFIs. These include; employing retained profits, rights issues and new issues of shares to 
the public. Although these means of raising finance is not new to other business segments, the 
hybrid nature of MFIs suggest that advantages accrue to some of these methods. For instance, 
the investment funds from owners do not necessarily have to be repaid since investors expect 
a share of the profits via dividends. If the MFI does not make any profit or fails, the MFI will 
not have to make any repayment. Secondly, MFIs absorbs debt liability in the event of 
bankruptcy. Finally, owners can employ raised equity to cover operational costs, of operations 
without the burden of debt. 
 
However, equity financing has some disadvantages. First, MFIs often have to meet superior 
regulatory and governance structures in order to obtain these funds, these regulatory 
impingements are often blockades and expensive for MFIs to implement. Secondly the 
increased risk and pressure on MFIs to perform (when not ready), could lead to a quick 
collapse. Thirdly, investors always require a very well-detailed and convincing business plan 
(or board guarantees, which is not often available for MFIs-expertise-). 
 
4.5.2 Liabilities Financing  
Liabilities financing, represents various maturity dated debt financing employed by MFIs, 
which have (often favourable) repayment terms to issuers of these liabilities. Due to lack of 
sufficient funds (equity), MFIs often rely on debt financing to fund their business operations 
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and loan portfolios. The main advantages of debt for MFI include:  Owners can maintain 
maximum control over their business without sharing control and profit with lenders. Secondly, 
the firm has no other obligations apart from the repayment of the loans (the principal and 
interest) to the lenders. Finally, interest on debts is tax-deductible to corporate income tax. This 
means that it shields a part of the income from taxes and lowers tax liability every year. 
Conversely, there are also a number of disadvantages of debt financing. MFIs often have to 
meet certain criteria to attract favourable financing, which often is unachievable. For instance, 
MFIs have to suddenly improve on their social and financial performance KPIs in order to 
attract favourable financing. Secondly, information sharing is crucial to obtaining liability 
financing; however, MFI reporting is not always premium, because of the various regulatory 
requirements across regions. Finally, liabilities financing could come with high repayment 
rates. This could lead to MFI collapse. Thus, whenever they use debt financing they run the 
risk of bankruptcy. Debt financing can clearly have positive benefits to MFIs. However, over-
reliance on this financing instrument creates a negative impact on their credit ratings and makes 
it difficult to raise funds in the future. 
 
4.5.3 Deposits  
An emerging source of funding for MFIs is deposit financing. The literature indicates that a 
growing number of MFIs have formalized and sought to fund growth through public deposits 
and thus became willing to accept banking regulation and the concomitant standards of 
transparency and prudential management (Janson et al. 2003, MIX 2011). As these institutions 
mature and expand, the gradual transition to include commercial funding is crucial. This 
ultimately increases MFIs range of risk and liquidity profiles and thus could be adjusted to 
match the capital structure requirements at different stages of the institutional life cycle. Some 
observers view these changes as a general shift toward capital structures more typical of 
commercial financial institutions. Deposits therefore represents a sustainable means of 
financing MFI activity. However, the regulatory framework in much of SSA serves as a 
limiting factor to this source of financing. Establishing the usefulness of the institutional 
environment by examining the institutional determinants of this source of funding could direct 
policymakers in creating an environment conducive for effective deposit mobilisation amongst 
MFIs in SSA 
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Voluntary deposits are characterised by convenience and return: the ability to deposit and 
withdraw at will and earn interest at the market-driven rates (Branch and Klaehn 2008). This 
form of financing is relatively stable and of low-cost. They help MFIs to achieve independence 
from donors and investors, which is particularly important in periods of liquidity constraints 
(Morduch and Haley, 2002). Deposits are more than half of the total assets reported by financial 
institutions that have deposit mobilisations because depositors enjoy certain benefits, such as 
access to loans (Marsh 1982, Gombola and Marciukaityte 2007). 
 
Research suggest that other reasons affect the reluctance of MFIs to adopt deposit financing. 
First, the poor were thought not to have enough money to make voluntary savings (Adams 
2002). Second, most of the institutions involved in microfinance were NGOs or small financial 
institutions, which were not legally licensed to collect savings from the public. Due to their 
own lack of capacity, such as limited services and branches, the public prefer to deposit their 
savings in local commercial banks rather than MFIs. Thus, deposits appear to be too costly50 
for MFI implementation, when compared to concessionary funds from governments and 
donors, or even commercial loans with interest at the market rates (Elser et al. 1999, Wright 
1999). 
 
4.5.4 Borrowing and other Liabilities 
Borrowings are sums of capital borrowed from other financial institutions for short and/or long-
term periods. MFIs often borrow from local commercial banks or international financial 
organisations (MIX Market, 2009). Foreign capital obtained by MFIs often through debt 
preferment terms are also a source of liabilities for MFIs, obtained through MIVs; who are 
becoming an increasing source of liquidity for MFIs. MIVs are vehicles utilised by 
international investors who often want exposure to superior returns in the MFI sector. These 
usually is in the form of capital investment in MFIs directly or indirectly through microfinance 
investment vehicles (MIVs), known as intermediaries between global investors and local MFIs. 
Even though debts are the commercial funds generally priced at the market rate and may be 
expensive for new or small MFIs, they are currently the most popular funding source for 
lending when MFIs have limited ability to obtain savings from the public (Sapundzhieva, 
2011). MIVs therefore play an important role in mobilising commercial funds to MFIs to fund 
 
 
50 Costs here include; transaction costs, advertising cost, employee incentivisation, volatility of funding, liquidity 
management and reserve requirements (Giehler 1999; Adams 2002). 
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their loan portfolios and operations. Soft loans and grants also are often utilised as other/further 
type of liabilities used by MFIs. This source of this funding usually consist of investment funds 
from other external sources from local and/or international donors. Furthermore, commercial 
debt consists of debt maturities constituted at market rates. MFIs often use a combination of 
all of these types of financing to achieve a rate of interest generally lower than the market rate 
for debt (MIX Market, 2009). 
 
In summary, the literature identifies three main sources of financing for MFIs to fund their 
potential growth. Each type of funding therefore has unique qualities which offer different 
utility for MFIs, with unique implications for capital structure and the performance. The varied 
nature of the capital employed by MFIs mean that these institutions will behave differently 
from other financial institutions, therefore, examining MFI funding structure within the context 
of the institutional environment presents a unique opportunity to proscribe useful policy 
directions for MFIs within the SSA environment. 
 
 
4.6 MFI FUNDING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
A unique feature of MFI funding is the variety of funding available to these institutions. 
However, despite the existence of various types of funding methods available for MFIs, 
research still show that a large number of MFIs are still dependent on donor subsidy to meet 
their costs (Fehr and Hishigsuren 2006). For instance. Foreign donors, charities, and socially 
responsible investors still continue to fund many MFIs in the world (Bogan 2008). In addition, 
to this, Hermes and Lensink (2011) observe that 70 % of MFIs still receive subsidies from 
donor organisations and governments. Furthermore, D’Espallier et al. (2013) find that only 
23% of the world’s MFIs survive without subsidies. 
 
This statistic is particularly pressing when viewed within the context of the recent liquidity 
squeeze and the inherently scarce nature of capital and resource. The reliance on subsidies 
could therefore pose a distant danger in cases of extreme shock to financial and capital markets. 
Areas such as MF donations particularly become areas of less importance for funders and 
donors (Morduch 1999). Many have signalled that this is an unsustainable way to practice 
development. For instance, Mader (2017) argues that MFIs current level of reliance on 
subsidised donor funding is at odds with its goal of long-term sustainable development and 
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improving financial inclusion. Amidst this, demand for funding (MFIs) has been increasing, 
and funding instruments are growing within the sector. 
 
A CGAP (2010) report indicates that more than US$2 billion per year of public fund is being 
disbursed globally to the microfinance sector through apex funds. Disbursements51 through 
apex funds –to MFIs- come in the form of subsidized loans and grants. In addition to subsidized 
loans and grants, debt funding instruments like soft-equity (subsidized equity) are also used to 
fund MFI commitments globally. However, in the case of soft-equity, this is particularly 
channelled through microfinance investment vehicles (Hudon and Traca 2011). This funding 
type has over the years acted as the premier source of funding for MFIs wishing to attract 
external investor funding. Hence, the promulgation of a sound institutional environment sits at 
a higher agenda for MIVs in lending to MFIs as portfolio companies. With the increasing influx 
of commercial funding into the sector, the role played by institutional environment increases 
in importance, this further creates implications for MFIs. 
 
4.6.1 Commercialisation Drive (New Funding Landscape of MIVs) 
This lack of short-term resource, coupled with the fact that domestic credit markets are 
underdeveloped in some countries, limit MFI financing opportunities. Moreover, MFIs that 
rely on subsidies are financially constrained (Tchuiugoua 2015). To overcome this constraint 
of access to external funding, MFIs seek commercial sources of funding, local or cross-border, 
in order to meet the promise of microfinance to alleviate poverty. Commercialisation (or 
commercial funding) has been proposed by researchers as one way to improve the funding 
options of MFIs and thereby reduce dependence on subsidy and grant funding (Hoque et al., 
2011; Bogan 2012). Furthermore, Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, (2010) argue that 
moving toward commercialization may increase the ability of MFIs to expand their scale by 
leveraging assets. Commercialization thus gives an opportunity to MFIs to diversify their 
funding sources and to be less dependent on subsidies. 
 
It is no coincident that a CGAP (2011) report indicated that between the period of 2007 – 
2010, the move by MFIs from donor-dependent funding to sustainable financial service 
providers, the corresponding foreign investment in microfinance (including debt and equity) 
 
 
51 This is public money contributed from developed market economies to developing markets in order to improve 
development efforts. According to CGAP (2010) more than $2bn/year of public money is being disbursed to 
MFIs globally. 
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quadrupled to reach US$24 billion. Mainly disbursed by MIVs, MIVs —the intermediaries 
between MFIs and investors—have therefore become an important facilitator of access to 
capital markets by offering several types of financial instruments to MFIs. Microrate (2011), 
particularly highlight this importance. Their survey indicates that for more than five years, debt 
instruments have been the main financing tools for investors in microfinance. They represent 
about 82% of the invested assets of MIVs, followed by equities (18%). Europe and Central 
Asia (EECA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), respectively with 38% and 35%, 
are the two regions that concentrate the majority of microfinance investments. Most notably 
the region of SSA have been largely left behind in the broad development of the sector. 
 
Concensus point to the quality of the institutional environment in LAC and EECA as 
contributory factors to the advancement of the MF sector in those regions in comparison to 
SSA (Cuevas, 1996; Arnone et al., 2012; Veronica et al., 2014). If this is the case, the question 
remains to be answered on the potential lessons to be learned by the MF sector in SSA form 
the quality of the institutional environment in attracting quality funds to the sector. For 
instance, the Forster et al., (2011) survey shows that the share of MIV investment held by 
private institutions is 43%, public institutional investors is 35%, private individuals is 12%, 
and not-for-profit investors is 5%. According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) (2011) debt instruments represent 50% of total commitments. In addition, some MFIs 
are funded directly through financial markets (e.g., Equity Bank in Kenya and Compartamos 
Banco in Mexico). The implications of the advancement of the sector in other regions suggest 
that it is vital to cultivate a conducive ecosystem for capital flow to allocative resources. 
 
We therefore propose that MFIs in countries with a better institutional framework will thus 
benefit from greater access to external funding on attractive conditions as better institutions 
result in loan availability and better loan contract terms. Furthermore, MFIs in countries with 
better institutional framework will thus benefit from greater access to external funding on 
attractive conditions as better institutions result in loan availability and better contract 
(Tchuigoua 2014). 
 
4.6.2 MFI Challenges of Transition into Commercialised and/or Regulated Entities 
More recently, deposit financing and the implementation of commercial debt has been 
increasingly utilised amongst ambitious MFIs as essential elements of funding future growth 
in the microfinance sector (de Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 2004). Commercial debt has 
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therefore become an important financing tool in both short-term as well as longer-term MFI 
debt financing and management. However, access to these sources of funding requires 
transition to a regulated entity (Jansson 2003). The process of transition can therefore be 
challenging and expensive in the short run because of the management, capital, and technical 
requirements for a regulated entity. Research indicates that this has been a deterring factor for 
MFIs (Jansson 2003). Although, in some cases, MFIs receive grants and subsidized loans from 
development agencies to finance the transition into deposit-taking institutions, however, the 
fraction of these recipients are trivial compared to the overall MFI sector (Helms 2006). It is in 
this vein that it is suggested that robust funding instruments for MFIs are crucial for the 
effectiveness of the sector (Tchuigoua 2014). 
 
Funds from development agencies or NGOs may also be deployed as financial instruments 
designed to improve access for newly regulated entities. These instruments, such as guarantees 
for capital market issuances or bank loans, have newly regulated MFIs to prove 
creditworthiness and borrow at cheaper rates (Jansson 2003). Thus, the analytical framework 
of an MFI life cycle funding pattern may be altered by the ongoing supply of non-commercial 
funds attracted to MFIs by the social objectives of a sector that aims to serve poor populations. 
Some research suggest that, these changes to the “analytical framework” has led to a change in 
the outlook of these institutions. Capturing this changes through observing the capital structure 
of MFIs suddenly become very useful in further understanding the performance of these 
institutions especially in SSA (an under researched region). 
 
This has been evident in SSA. For instance, in some countries, a significant number of MFIs 
grew out of credit unions that traditionally focused on mobilizing savings from members. 
Whilst some of these institutions may choose to become regulated entities through institutional 
upheaval (and other factors such as: improved regulation that allows MFIs to accept deposits, 
improved quality institutional environment such as; improvement in the rule of law, and 
enforcing creditor rights, and governance framework. These changes could lead to an attraction 
of the sector from investors, thereby gradually coaxing MFIs to change as they receive 
international funding with preference terms), others may be more likely to stay unchanged52 
 
 
52 Whilst some MFIs may choose to transform due to institutional factors such as a change in regulatory 
environment, or an improvement in indicators of business ease, others may well choose a savings bank model 
rather than a model that is based on commercial banking.  
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(Sekabira 2013). Hence, this process of change could therefore suggests that institutional 
changes/upheaval could play a role in the formation of the funding patterns of MFIs across the 
SSA region. However, this crucial area of the evolution of MFIs has largely been uncaptured 
so far by the literature (Tchuigoua 2015). The importance of asserting the level of change in 
funding, in view of the quality of institutional upheaval is well stated in the literature. 
 
Despite keen interest in possible links between the institutional environment, MFI funding 
sources and operational sustainability, there have been no systematic studies that provide robust 
evidence of how variations in the institutional environment affects the capital structure and 
thereafter sustainability for a larger/specific group of MFIs. In addition to empirical support 
for the impact of institutional environment on the funding of firms, there is also evidence that 
countervailing factors shape the funding sources and instruments available to MFIs. These 
factors show through in considerable regional variation in MFI funding patterns; regional 
variations that have been influenced by historical factors, including traditional patterns of 
savings and lending, and variations in regulatory environment. Whereas MFIs in several Latin 
American countries have made progress in the transition to regulation and market funding 
(Jansson, 2003), unregulated and NGO structures still predominate in the Middle East, North 
Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Such institutions face limitations in financing 
options, with no license for taking public deposits and no shareholder structure for attracting 
equity other than donations. It is therefore important to capture these changes in view of the 
increasing importance of MFIs mandate. 
 
Further research that situates MF funding options in connection with capital market 
instruments suggests that an extension of MFI funding to include capital market instruments 
could benefit the sector in achieving its long-term goals. For instance, in the broader context 
of addressing the challenges of varied and robust funding options in delivering financial 
services to the poor, Basu et al. (2004) explores the evolution of financing models from 
traditional lending to asset backed securitization, credit derivatives, and mezzanine financing53. 
The findings suggest that Indian MFIs have had limited avenues to raise on-balance sheet 
funds. Thus, in moving towards a capital market based funding structure, the overall regulatory 
environment could play a role in national and regional variations in funding patterns, since 
 
 
53 Mezzanine financing is a hybrid form of capital, structurally junior in priority of payment to senior debt, but 
senior to equity. 
116 
some countries benefit from a more balanced and informed regulatory structure that facilitates 
the transfer to a regulated entity while still assuring essential prudential oversight. 
 
 
4.7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MFI INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
FUNDING. 
The empirical literature on microfinance institutional framework and capital structure is still 
growing. The nascent MFI literature that focus on institutions still largely focuses on the 
institutional and performance direction. For instance,  Patten et al., (2001), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999), Booth et al., (2001), Antoniou et al., (2008), Li and Ferreira (2011), Fan 
et al., 2012), Patten et al. (2001), &; Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013), examine the observed 
differences between MFIs in terms of performance and efficiency by macroeconomic and 
macro-institutional features. On the other hand, Vanroose and D'Espallier (2013) investigate 
the relationship between financial sector development and MFI outreach and provide evidence 
that MFIs flourish and act as a substitute when the formal financial sector fails. 
 
Studies that examine capital structure in microfinance can be categorized in at least four 
ways. Firstly. A strand of the literature asks whether capital structure improves MFI efficiency 
and financial sustainability (Bogan, 2012; Hoque, Chishty, & Halloway, 2011; Hudon & Traca, 
2011; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). A second category of the literature investigates the role of 
ratings in the reduction of the price of financing, and whether ratings help MFIs raise funds 
(Garmaise & Natividad, 2010; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2008a). Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2008a). Findings from this strand of the literature reveal that rating agencies differ greatly in 
their impact on MFIs' ability to raise funds. Their evidence further suggests that subsidizing 
rating does not help MFIs raise more funds. Specifically, Garmaise and Natividad (2010) show 
that rating significantly reduces the price of financing while having a mixed impact on the 
quantity. They find that being rated does not significantly increase the amount of loans that 
MFIs receive from outside creditors. The third category describes MFI financing practices and 
links sources of financing to the stage of MFI development (De Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 
2004; Fernando, 2004; Ledgerwood & White, 2006). The fourth category examines the firm 
determinants of the international funding of microfinance and provides evidence that 
profitability and better outreach are more likely to increase an MFI's chance of attracting 
international commercial debt (Mersland and Urgeghe 2013). 
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Despite of the importance of this topic for development purposes, identified studies seem to 
overlook the impact of the institutional environment on the capital structure of MFIs. This 
analysis intends to fill the gap; by examining the relevance of the quality of the institutional 
environment on the funding practices of MFIs in SSA. The article thus attempts to answer the 




Even though this topic is crucial for development purposes, identified studies seem to overlook 
the impact of the institutional environment on the capital structure of MFIs. The association 
between institutional framework and capital structure has not yet been subject to thorough 
investigation in the field of MF. This article intends to fill the gap by examining whether 
institutional frameworks account for MFI funding policies. The article thus attempts to answer 
the question of whether institutional framework variables have an effect on the capital structure 
of MFIs. 
 
Considering the growing importance of development financial institutions like MFIs for 
developing markets, and its implications on improving financial inclusion, empirical analysis 
is needed to advance current knowledge in this field. Furthermore, the quality institutional 
environment in SSA has come under renewed scrutiny, and has been identified as a conduit for 
international investor appetite in the development process of countries within SSA (Miller and 
Holmes 2011). More saliently is the dearth of solid evidence on the impacts of the institutional 
environment on the funding of MFIS. Cohen (2003), Bogan (2008), Ebaid (2009) all argue that 
a firm’s financing decision is influenced by many factors, and explaining this important 
decision, by one theory (trade-off or pecking order theories) may be short of providing a 
complete diagnosis of that decision. 
 
To the researcher’s knowledge, this research project is thus the first to analyse whether 
institutional frameworks matter for the capital structure of hybrid organizations such as MFIs 
in SSA. We thus borrow extensively from general law and finance literature, which examines 
the link between institutional environment and capital structure. This research project relates 
to those that previously examined the relationship between the institutional environment and 
firm financing in the nonfinancial sector. MFIs are hybrid organizations insofar as they 
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combine banking logic (profitability, clients as customers) and development logic (poverty 
alleviation, clients as beneficiaries) (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Kent and Dacin, 2013). 
 
We commence the examination of the funding of MFIs within an institutional framework 
basis. Within this context, the argument denotes that quality facilitating institutions are really 
what’s needed for MFIs to achieve robust performance, meet its double mandate, and finally 
help to improve sustainable development in SSA. 
 
We pay specific focus to the institutional environment in SSA because, considerable efforts 
have been directed towards strengthening the institutional environment, in order to improve 
governance, open up markets, and therefore attract foreign investment. For instance in the 
country with the largest economy and population (Nigeria), the government has had a concerted 
drive towards improving its ranking in the ease of doing business index. Other such efforts 
have manifested across other parts (in the key powerhouses in regions of the continent) of the 
continent in South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Angola. Within this context, it is therefore 
important to examine the importance of these changes to the operating institutional 
environment in SSA and the ability of MFIs to attract financing. 
 
Research examining capital structure as it applies to firms in developed markets exists. 
Although a fraction of these go on to examine the impacts of the institutional environment and 
its relationship with capital structure. Many argue that this relationship is vitally important. 
However, as they apply to MFIs within the SSA context, there are only a few. Of this crop, 
only one examines the impacts of the institutional environment on the capital structure of MFIs. 
Of the few that look into the SSA region, majority/all of these examine capital structure form 
the context/lens of western capital structure paradigm. Although relevant to the literature, 
however, this as it applies to SSA seems/is inefficient, this is because SSA as a regional context 
within the continent of Africa possesses its own unique challenges, most of which has been 
touched upon above. Others include; the similarity of countries within the regions (culturally, 
and population demographics of west, east, central and South), in addition to the collective 
increased drive to improve lives through improved governance and the institutional 
environment in this region54. These have hardly been examined in the above studies. Therefore, 
 
 
54 Through the improvement in doing business index, transparency and other governance index measures. 
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it is within this context that we examine the capital structure and MFI sustainability, through 
the institutional framework context of the countries in SSA. More importantly, this aim is to 
be achieved whilst incorporating key characteristics of the region. 
 
More overarching is the financial inclusion debate, through the intervention of MF. 
Anecdotal evidence point to the importance of MFIs in combatting financial exclusion in SSA 
(Morduch and Armendariz, 2010; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Baye, 2013). Whilst MF has also 
been unilaterally implemented as a tool for poverty alleviation, and as a policy tool to fight 
financial exclusion by many governments in SSA, empirical evidence is still lacking on the 
efficacy (and the role of)  of MFIs in this process. Therefore, this research project aims to 
establish the impact of MFIs on the financial inclusion amongst countries (in SSA) 
implementing this policy initiative. 
 
 There is –further- recognition that in countries at all income levels, there are population 
groups that are not adequately serviced by the formal financial system. Financial inclusion 
involves expanding their access to the financial system at an affordable cost (Kempson, 2006). 
In developing countries, the growth of microfinance institutions (MFIs) which specifically 
target low income individuals are viewed as potentially useful for promotion of financial 
inclusion. Even though MFIs at present, mainly offer only credit products; as they grow, they 
are likely to expand their product range to include other financial services. 
 
Credit is one of the critical inputs for economic development. Its timely availability in the 
right quantity and at an affordable cost goes a long way in contributing to the well-being of the 
people especially in the lower rungs of society. It is one of the three main challenges to input 
management in agriculture, the other two being physical and human (Hans, 2006). Thus access 
to finance, especially by the poor and vulnerable groups is a prerequisite for employment, 
economic growth, poverty reduction and social cohesion. Further, access to finance will 
empower the vulnerable groups by giving them an opportunity to have a bank account, to save 
and invest, to insure their homes or to partake of credit, thereby facilitating them to break the 
chain of poverty. But SSA is lagging behind in this respect, hence, it is a matter of grave of 
concern. 
 
In particular, we are interested in the question: what has been the role of MFIs in promoting 
financial inclusion among the section of the population that does not have any access to formal 
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financing? This question is particularly important given that: (i) MFIs have a widespread 
network where they target a significant poor population; and (ii) they are often in direct 
competition to banking. We therefore hope to answer the question on how MFIs, -if at all-, fit 
into the overall scheme of financial inclusion. 
 
In the context of a concerted drive in SSA to improve institutional arrangement/quality, we 
first examine how the institutional environment influences the funding of MFIs in SSA, 
secondly, we then observe how the funding impacts on the performance (sustainability) of 
MFIs, and finally, we examine how the implementation of MFIs in SSA influences the financial 
inclusion on the region. 
 
Three broad areas of institutional environment are of interest to this research project. Firstly, 
the index of legal rights as it relates to investors rights (these include: application of the rule of 
law, strength of investor protection and strength of legal rights). Secondly, the world 
governance index, with focus on corruptions index (a component of index measures) which 
measures the level of corruption, in addition to political stability, government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality). Thirdly, we examine the freedoms index, which measures the economic 
freedoms of countries in SSA. Finally, we examine the financial development indicators in 
tandem with the macro environmental factors. 
 
 
4.8 DEVELOPMENT OF STUDY VARIABLES 
4.8.1 Theoretical Development & Foundation 
How important are institutional frameworks for microfinance funding? With the continuous 
drive towards commercialisation, of MFIs, the question of the role of institutions in the drive 
towards better funding of MFIs become pertinent. A unique feature of MFI funding is the 
variety of funding available to these institutions (Jansson 2003). However, despite various 
funding sources available to MFIs, research still show that a large number of MFIs are still 
dependent on donor subsidy to meet their costs (Fehr and Hishigsuren 2006). For instance, 
whilst some of MFIs external financing is subsidized, a large portion of MFI funding is still 
reliant on donor financing (Hassan et al 2016). Foreign donors, charities, and socially 
responsible investors still continue to fund many MFIs in the world (Armendáriz De Aghion 
and Morduch 2010). In addition, to this, Lensink et al (2011) observe that 70% of MFIs still 
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receive subsidies from donor organisations and governments. Furthermore, D’Espallier et al., 
2013) find that only 23% of the world’s MFIs survive without subsidies.  
 
This statistic is particularly pressing, especially when viewed within the context of the near-
recent liquidity squeeze and inherent scarce nature of capital resources. Substantial reliance on 
subsidies could therefore pose a distant danger to MFI funding. Furthermore, in cases of 
extreme shock to financial and capital markets donations to MFIs particularly become areas of 
less importance for funders and donors (Morduch 1999). Many have signalled that this is an 
unsustainable way to practice development. For instance, Mader (2018) argues that MFIs 
current level of reliance on subsidised donor funding is at odds with its goal of long-term 
sustainable development and improving financial inclusion. Amidst this, demand for funding 
(MFIs) has been increasing, and funding instruments are growing within the sector.  
 
This section of the literature explores the importance of the institutional environment within 
the context of MFI external financing. We tackle this by highlighting some important issues in 
microfinance funding to shed new light on previously unstudied topics, such as; examining the 
institutional determinants of funding of MFIs. Using the information asymmetry theory of 
Banking, within the context of a continuous drive towards MFI commercialisation, the question 
of the role of institutions in the drive towards better funding of MFIs become pertinent. 
 
The theoretical foundations of information asymmetry as relates to banking, can shed more 
light on the inability of MFIs to access capital in instances of scarcity. Information asymmetry 
occurs when the information filtering in to market participants is fractured (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1992). For MFIs, this is more pronounced. For instance, Hudon and Traca (2011b) observe that 
this could be heightened, given the geographical distance between donors and MFI 
operations55. In addition, MFIs often possess local market information that donors simply do 
not have access to. Hence, information asymmetry problems are bound to manifest between 
donors and MFIs. The MFI market is further characterized by a deficiency of reliable client-
monitoring information coupled with insufficient disclosure56. Regulation and minimal-to-no 
 
 
55 MFI donors are often non domicile. 
56 In recent years however, a number of institutions have set-out to improve the quality and lessen the information 
dearth of MFIs. For instance, The MIX is an organisation that collet information on the performance of MFIs. 
In addition, a slew of rating agencies have helped to strengthen information disclosure in the sector and to 
improve the reliability of the financial information disclosed by MFIs. 
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reporting requirements in the sector further accentuates the problem of information asymmetry. 
Therefore, the dearth of information also makes it difficult to better inform donors about MFI 
performance, and their ability to efficiently utilize subsidies. The role of the institutional 
environment therefore lies in supporting policy that fosters good institutions (Lu & Liu, 2009; 
Fiss, 2012; Kumar & Zattoni, 2016). The availability/existence of better institutions can act to 
improve the information asymmetry between MFIs and donors who decide to support MFIs. 
Hence, the amount of subsidies tend to be more important in countries with better creditor 
protection and better law enforcement. It is therefore hypothesized that better institutional 
quality could overcome the problem of information asymmetry, and therefore play a key role 
in the funding of the MF sector. 
 
In addition to delegated monitoring, financial intermediation theory indicates that deposit-
taking forms the bedrock of a banks activity (Allen & Santomero, 1997). The ability to accept 
timed deposits enables financial intermediaries channel funds from units in surplus to units in 
deficit. For (commercial) banks, this forms the main source of income. In banks, deposits are 
often then invested in loans, other investments and fixed assets such as; buildings. For MFIs 
however, this holds several functions: The advocates for deposit funding for MFIs as a 
sustainable way of financing the sector is not new. For instance, Cull et al., (2009) and CGAP 
(2011), observe that from a financial intermediation point of view, deposits can be seen as a 
resource used by MFIs to fund their projects and to make loans. Although (Armendáriz De 
Aghion and Morduch 2010) suggest that around the world, the vast majority of MFIs are non-
deposits-taken, this indicates that the utility of deposit (as a financing option) is still at 
unexpectedly low levels in comparison to the banking sector, further improvements in the 
institutional environment (through regulation and stronger creditor protections) could improve 
the ability of MFIs in accessing deposit funding. For instance, in countries with better creditor 
protections and better law enforcement, there is an expectation of deposits to be less important. 
Consequently, MFI deposits would thus be more significant in countries with weaker 
institutions. Furthermore, with stronger institutions, deposit could be used as financial 
collateral provided by borrowers to secure a loan (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004, 
2010). Thus, this could be used by MFIs as a tool to reinforce contracts, and ultimately a 
prerequisite tool to be qualified for a loan. MFI deposits would thus be more sensitive to 




4.8.2 Corporate Financial (Theory) Structure and Institutional Environment.  
Access to the right type of funding is crucial for firm’s operations. According to corporate 
finance literature, access to external funding sources (on attractive terms) is determined not 
only by firm-level characteristics but also by the institutional environment (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1999). It is therefore expected that empirical studies review the relationship 
between institutions and corporate finance decisions in both developing and developed 
economies. For instance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999), Houston et al. (2010), and 
Acharya et al. (2011), find that differences in legal and financial systems seem to be responsible 
for differences in investment policies in firms. Brockman and Unlu (2009), Byrne and 
O’Connor (2012), suggest that country legal systems appear to be responsible for firm’s 
dividend policies. Further research by Allen et al. (2012), Bae and Goyal (2009), Haselmann 
et al. (2010), and Ge et al. (2012) indicates that institutional environment impacts on bank 
lending policies. Finally La Porta et al., (1997), Giannetti (2003), González & González (2008), 
Fan et al. (2012), and Öztekin and Flannery (2012) all suggest that institutional environment 
impacts on the capital structure of firms. 
 
The main convergence on the relationship between institutional environment and capital 
structure settles on the idea that firms operating in a better institutional environment (stand to) 
may benefit from easier access to external funding with attractive conditions (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, 2008; Li and 
Ferreira, 2011; Fan, Titman and Twite, 2012). The central argument of these studies suggest 
that, better institutional environments can overcome information asymmetries in credit markets 
and consequently affect firms' funding policies. A similar conclusion could also apply to MFIs 
within the context of the impacts on the institutional environment on capital structure. For 
instance, Garmaise and Natividad (2010), argue that information asymmetries likely contribute 
to raising the cost of finance in less developed and emerging markets where MFIs operate. 
Therefore, in credit markets with weaker institutions, information frictions will make it difficult 
and expensive for MFIs to raise funds and may even appear to constrain their growth (Garmaise 
& Natividad, 2010). This is confirmed in further research by Earne & Sherk, (2013), who test 
the regulatory framework, openness and level of development of the financial system, and finds 
that these factors affect MFI funding policies, as relates to performance and financial inclusion 
performance. This research project thus assumes that institutional environment and financial 




4.9 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT (STUDY I) 
4.9.1 MFI Capital Structure Variables 
 
Studies on the determinants of the capital structures of firms employ various measures to test 
the predictions of prevailing capital structure theories on their influences on leverage, and the 
choices of these on a firm’s capital structure. The dependent variable employed within this 
study captures the debt equity ratio as suggested in the literature (Delcoure 2007, Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua 2010). Given that MFIs are primarily not publicly traded, variables relating to their 
capital structure and their financial performance are measured through the use of accounting 
indicators (Tchuigoua 2015). Shadowing the observed literature on MF, this study employs 
central funding measures of MFI capital structure observed in the literature. These comprise 
of; Leverage and Deposit. However, as a result of the peculiarity of MFI funding and mission, 
this study further dissipates the leverage measure further into two components: Borrowing and 
Donated Equity (donations), and Deposits. 
 
Following the work of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), this 
study will also employ three leverage measures, calculated by finding the ratio of book value 
of; short-term debt to total assets (short-term leverage), long-term debt to total assets (long-
term leverage) and total debt to total assets (total leverage). This specification will be employed 
in the second empirical study examining MF performance and its relationship with capital 
structure. The utilisation of these measures, relate closely to the MFI specific capital structure 
variables identified above. For instance, the Leverage component translates into short term 
leverage (STL), Long-term leverage (LTL) and Total Leverage (TL), whilst deposits also fall 
under short-term MFI funding. This mix of capital structure variables provides a robust 
understanding of the issue on capital structure for MFIs in SSA. 
 
We estimate borrowings of MFI by tabulating all MFI donations (donated equity), and 
external and internal borrowing for a robust analysis. This direction specifically examines the 
direct impacts of institutional environment on specific MFI capital structure funding 
components. In reviewing the literature, we ascertain that other studies only use the main 
measures of leverage as a wholesome measure, although this gives a useful direction in the 
impact literature on MFI Capital structure determinants, this does not provide a detailed picture 
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of the MFI funding components and how this is impacted upon by the institutional 
environment. This particularly is useful for MFIs in SSA, whom desperately need varied 
funding. Ascertaining specific impacts further enables policy makers and practitioners make 
decisions which enable MFIs function/perform efficiently. 
 
This therefore, is a novel analysis within the MFI literature for SSA. By separating 
borrowing as a detailed sum of its components parts, we contribute to the knowledge richly by 
establishing specific effects of the institutional environmental factors, on specific/detailed MFI 
funding instruments. Finally, we use the deposit measure to marry all our funding suite of 
dependent variables. These variables will be regressed against selected 
explanatory/independent variables collected from both theoretical and empirical literature, both 
of which identify these variables as important in determining the leverage level of MFIs.
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4.10 INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES FOR CONSIDERATION 
4.10.1 Institutional Quality 
In addition to the impact of macroeconomic factors in determining leverage choices of firms, 
the quality of institutions in the country has been affirmed to affect the capital structure decision 
of firms (Belkhir et al., 2016, Santarelli and Tran 2018). Countries with poor institutional 
quality promote corruption, increase information asymmetry, and law enforcement would be 
ineffective in such economies. Hence, a negative relationship is predicted by the agency theory. 
However, this relationship is expected to be positive in economies with better quality 
institutions. 
 
Studies conducted to examine this relationship reveal mixed results. La Porta et al. (1999), 
provide a positive relationship between institutional quality and leverage. While a negative 
relationship was reported by; Mutenheri and Green (2003). Although these studies have been 
applied in a developed economy context, the institutional quality within the SSA region 
requires relevant variables, appropriate for the region. In measuring institutional quality, this 
study employs Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law as measurement variables, in 
addition to utilising creditor’s rights index, government effectiveness and corruption index. 
According to Barry and Tacneng (2014), government effectiveness captures the credibility of 
government in enforcing contracts, and the quality of public services. On the other hand, The 
Rule of Law captures the degree to which economic agents abide by the rules and regulations. 
Creditor’s rights index includes variables which measure the strength of creditor rights within 
SSA, whilst corruption index identifies the weakness of governance measures within the SSA 
context. This study therefore hypothesized that: 
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4.10.2 Governance Indicators 
The implementation of WGI measures as part of the measures of the institutional environment 
measures for this study is predicated on a few reasons. Firstly, the literature largely ignores the 
role and quality of governance and its impacts on funding for development financial institutions 
(hybrid institutions like MFIs). Secondly, the sub-continent relies on enormous inflows of 
foreign investment, aid and portfolio investment to encourage growth and development. 
Thirdly, now more than ever, there is a growing need for sustainable development fostered by 
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foreign partnership and expertise in SSA. Finally, the –almost universal- drive to improve 
financial inclusion within the sub-continent has meant that the quality of institutions could –
play a key role in- facilitate inflows of needed funds (shortfalls) and more importantly establish 
a solid framework for enabling local institutions mobilize funds in an efficient manner. To this 
end, it is deemed that the quality of governance is of importance plays a pivotal role. 
 
Research has established that resource allocation is predicated on a quality operating and 
governance framework. Thus, capital and investment thrives in an environment enabled by 
governance, this is further enhanced by the quality of governance prevalent. However, within 
the literature of financial inclusion, the failure of existing research to articulate the role played 
by the quality of governance in the ability of MFIs to attract vital capital needed to finance 
their operations is unbecoming. 
 
Governance within the context of Microfinance, applies to the mechanisms through which 
donors, equity investors, and other fund providers ensure their funds will be used according to 
their intended purpose. This directly suggests that governance and the quality -thereof of- could 
directly impact on the ability of MFIs to obtain investors/donor funding. Whilst some research 
has been conducted to examine the impact of firm-level characteristics on the performance of 
MFIs, existing research has yet to determine/establish the impact of country-level governance 
on the ability of MFIs to obtain external capital. This research aims to fill this gap by employing 
measures of the institutional environment to identify the institutional determinants of the 
funding structure of MFIs. 
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is a cross-country measure and indicator of 
governance. These measures consist of six composite dimensions of governance covering 200 
countries. These include; Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Corruption. Relevant indicators selected from the toolkit of the WGI dataset are based on the 
relevance to the context of the sub-region of Africa. These measures particularly reveal the 
overall governance perception of countries in the sub-region. Of the measures observed, the 
selection includes; Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Political Stability, Rule of 
Law, and Corruption Control, largely captures the political/legal dimension of the institutional 
environment.  
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H: This research, therefore hypothesize that the quality of institutional environment is 
positive for the funding of MFIs. 
 
4.10.3 Rule of Law, Creditor Rights and Contract Enforcements 
The rule of law characterizes the hallmarks of which surrounds; respect for the law, separation 
of powers of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary; freedom of the electorate in 
political decision making process, regular free and fair elections; independent and impartial 
judiciary system. Extension of the key tennets further includes a vibrant and fearless legal 
profession; free and independent media institutions; and finally, the equality of people before 
the law. 
 
Theoretical and empirical studies provide strong evidence that the strength of creditor and 
investor rights matter in loan contracting and firm financing choices. Aghion and Bolton (1992) 
developed a theory of capital structure based on transaction costs and contractual 
incompleteness. They showed that control rights attached to financial instruments such as debt 
and equity explain the choice of firm capital structure. Indeed, to the extent that raising more 
debt funding increases the risk of bankruptcy, lenders should benefit from bargaining power, 
which is the ability to seize collateral or to control borrower firms. Thus, firms in countries that 
strengthen the ability of lenders to force borrower repayment by seizing collateral and increase 
lender ability to take control of these firms are financed on favourable terms. Consequently, 
Giannetti (2003) studies a sample of unlisted firms and shows that a strong protection of 
creditor rights is associated with leverage and debt maturity. Further studies by González and 
González (2008) also document that creditor protection reduces agency cost of debt. 
 
Thus, firms with higher agency cost of debt may find it difficult to get loans in countries where 
creditor rights are not sufficiently protected. In these countries, external finance seems to be costly, so 
firms preferably resort to internal financing. Qian and Strahan (2007) show that in countries with better 
investors and creditor protection rights, banks charge lower interest rates, improving credit availability. 
If the cost of credit is cheaper, firms will be more leveraged. We expect that leverage and the amount 
of subsidies will be more important in MFIs that operate in countries where creditor rights are better 
protected. However, a strict enforcement of creditor rights can be associated with low leverage (Rajan 
& Zingales, 1995), therefore, strengthening creditor rights can influence manager (borrower) behaviour. 
Two main arguments justify this relationship. On the one hand, managers who are disciplined by the 
event of bankruptcy and the control by their creditors may choose to maintain a low level of debt. On 
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the other hand, if the enforcement of creditor rights entails a bankruptcy, then managers will maintain 
low leverage. 
 
Concomitant levels of, and respect for the rule of law varies across SSA. However, a clear 
view is that of a gradual progress towards an absolute respect for the rule of law across SSA. 
Within the international community and indeed the SSA, the two main international human 
rights instruments that are most relevant to the rule of law are the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Of the 46 nations in the sample, all are members. This implies that 
countries in SSA are alive to their international obligation to promote the rule of law at home 
and abroad. 
 
Research however indicates that in SSA, the hallmarks deemed to characterize a thriving 
system of the rule of law, is not at appropriate standards. For example, the separation of the 
powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary is a concept in writing –and not 
practice- in SSA. Whilst systems of government on paper have structures that purport to 
separate powers form the executive, and legislature, this is certainly not the case in practice. 
We see examples of this in states like Zimbabwe, where the incumbent president routinely 
circumnavigated the legislature through veto orders, and including in Gambia (President Yahya 
Jameh), and DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 
Other salient areas of deliberate disregard for the hallmarks of the rule of law include; lack 
of free and fair elections57, moreover the electorate are often coerced into voting for strong-
men (individual party politics as opposed to a coherent policy based party system of 
government). Examples of this include paying the electorate sums for votes, and using scare 
tactics such as; threatening and in some cases public beatings so as to inflict fear as a means to 
garner support). In such instances the rule of law is likely to be very weak (and hence, could 
be a detrimental factor in attracting capital). 
 
Additionally, the impartiality of the judiciary, countries within SSA are known to be lacking 
in such light. For example, it has been widely reported about the ability of head of states to 
 
 
57 only a handful of countries in the last elections observed by international organizations have been deemed to 
be free and fair, this is in comparison to a much better picture in Latin America. 
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influence or circumnavigate/evade the legal arm of the law, when found to be in breach of 
duties. Finally, impunity of the ruling elite in SSA means that two level of rules will likely 
exist in these societies, which further negates the equality of all people before the law. It suffice 
to say that in SSA the institutional environment is characterized by a general weak rule of law, 
in comparison to other regions of the world. Hence, this could also lead to a general 
unwillingness by investors to rent their capital in these nations, and hence, negatively affect 
development institutions like MFIs. 
 
According to Horn and Bösl (2008) the rule of law is the notion that the powers of state and 
government can be exercised legitimately only in accordance with the applicable laws and 
according to laid down procedures. Thus, the legitimacy of all systems of state and its 
institutions must have roots in the law. This further implies that, the quality of which lies in the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and (efficiency in) the enforceability of 
contracts. 
 
Consensus within the foreign investment literature, posits that foreign capital is sensitive to 
complex and opaque regulatory structures. According to Anyanwu (2006) in a study of Foreign 
investment finds that the opaque structures of regulatory processes undermine the flow of 
foreign investment in developing markets. High levels of sophistication of the legal and judicial 
systems could therefore precipitate an increase in investment in host countries. Foreign 
investors are therefore likely to value countries with sophisticated legal/judicial systems, so as 
to ensure the safety of capital investments (Dupasquier and Osakwe 2003, Cleeve 2012). 
Consequently, a weak legal system comprising of poor property rights, and greater government 
participation in the economy is likely to lead to weak foreign investment and investor 
participation in host countries (La-Porta et al 1997). 
 
The detriments of a weak legal system are articulated by Hallward-Driemeier and Hasan 
(2005) who indicates that weak law enforcement and lack of credible property protection 
mechanisms are significant obstacles to foreign investment in Africa. This particularly could 
be the case for foreign investment in development initiatives like MFIs, as these institutions 
rely heavily on foreign capital to fund operations in Africa (Morduch 1999). The risks accrued 
to investors according to (Kinoshita et al., 2007) could be a further deterrent. Risks such as 
expropriation, including difficulty in resolving contracts with partners using the judicial 
system(Henisz and Zelner 2001, Li and Ferreira 2011). 
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Efforts in improving the implementation of the ROL in Africa exists and haven’t gone 
unnoticed. For example, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) initiative, which 
encourages the exchange and sharing of resources and ideas between member states, is one of 
such efforts. In addition, the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
is another such initiative. There is certainly not a shortage of efforts to increase the 
institutionalization of the culture of democracy, human rights, rule of law, social justice and 
economic development. However, the phenomenon within countries in SSA is in need of 
improvement.  
H: This research project therefore surmise that a positive relationship exists between 
high-quality legal environment and the use of foreign capital by MFIs.  
 
4.10.4 Government Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of governments often signals to foreign investors, the efficiency of 
government in meeting its key role within the business environment of the country. This is 
often used by investors to determine entry into business environments in potential host 
countries (WB 2011). Government effectiveness thus entails; the bureaucratic quality, 
competence of civil servants, quality of public service, and governments credibility in meeting 
its commitment to policies (Kaufmann et al., 1996). Governments often influence firms 
decisions through policies regulating sensitive areas of the business environment such as; 
foreign capital, mergers and acquisition activity, employment, wages, dividends, tax policies, 
in addition to defining and enforcing quality standards (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008). This implies 
that government policies can either create an enabling environment or create an unconducive 
environment for foreign investment in MFIs within SSA (Okafor et al. 2015). Therefore, by 
protracting an efficient government, through efficient use of financial/government resources 
helps to improve investor confidence. Furthermore, by the distortion of private incentives 
through taxes and specific regulations that create inefficiencies (North 1990, Delios and Henisz 
2000). 
 
Governments within SSA fall within this category (Levine and Renelt 1992). The lax nature 
and inefficiencies characterize the landscape of government efficiency in SSA. Furthermore, 
government intervention is often is often unpredictable and arbitrary, characterized by solely 
seeking to satisfy voters and win popular support, with unclear/vague policies for 
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implementation. North (1990) remarks that governments often have the legal monopoly on 
coercion and are often present in every economic transaction. Hence, changes to regulatory or 
fiscal policies are likely to have either a negative or positive impact on firms (Delios and Henisz 
2000). 
 
Good governance encourages the influx of foreign investment into a country, this 
consequently could raise the possibility of profitable business activities through effective 
government policies (Globerman and Shapiro 2002, Shapiro and Globerman 2003). 
Furthermore, effective government policies have been established, as positive facilitators to 
improve the chances of an MFI ability to obtain capital funding. A survey of funders reveal 
that good governance plays a positive significant role in the decision of foreign capital 
investment in host countries.  
H: A system of effective governance is hypothesized to be influential in the ability of 
MFIs to obtain debt funding. 
 
4.10.5 Financial Sector Development Market Failure and MFI Financing 
The importance of the financial sector in development has received ample attention from 
researchers (Collier and Gunning 1999). Although there has been critical discussions on the 
causal relationship between financial sector and economic growth58. However, much still 
remains to be identified on the impacts of financial development on the MF sector. Financial 
sector development is seen as important, because it fosters economic growth (King and Levine 
1993, Beck and Levine 2004).  
 
The level of financial development in a country, influences the financing decisions of firms. 
Economies that are well developed tend to have higher levels of financial development in both the 
money and capital markets, often leading to an efficient flow of financial resources from the financial 
sector to the private sector (Yinusa 2013). This emanates from the idea that limited access to 
capital/financial services, often leads to major bottlenecks for individuals with a desire to 




58 A summary of the debate indicates that financial sector development could help spur economic growth, on the 
other hand, economic growth could also spur financial development.  
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Additionally, Jalilian and Kirkpatric (2005) show that financial sector development plays 
an important role in poverty reduction. However, as a result of market failure stemming from 
imperfect information and informational asymmetries (Kono and Takahashi 2010), formal 
financial institutions do not serve a significant fraction of the population in developing 
countries. Hence, an important aspect of development policy is concerned with developing 
financial markets for the poor as a means to enhance livelihoods and thus, economic prosperity  
(Beck et al. 2008). 
 
Theoretical understanding places financial development at the heart of sustainable economic 
expanse. For instance, as countries in SSA consider ways to promote sustained and long-lasting 
growth, onus is often placed on financial development. Thus, the ability of local financial 
markets in allocating resources to pressing needs of society is a fundamental aspect of this 
(Creane et al. 2007). Theory emphasizes that policies aimed at enhancing financial sector 
performance will result in lower information, transaction, and monitoring costs, thus improving 
allocative efficiency and increasing output (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Barham et al. 1996). The 
Intermediation theory suggests that the lack of information and the existence of information 
asymmetries on market participants generally leads to a phenomenon of market failure. In 
societies where the informal economy is thriving and existing, this is likely to be the case. 
Consequently, in an efficiently managed –policy effective financial environment- theory 
suggests that this can also lead to eliminating the constraints currently faced by MFIs in 
obtaining capital (Beck and Levine 2002). 
 
Financial development comprises a multifaceted concept, encompassing not only monetary 
aggregates and interest rates, but also regulation and supervision, degree of competition, 
financial openness, institutional capacity such as the strength of property rights, and the variety 
of markets and financial products that constitute a nations financial structure (Levine 1997, 
Khan and Senhadji Semlali 2014). Whilst the composite structure of the financial development 
mentioned in the above research may not be as robust as initiated in SSA, the pace of 
development is increasing. For instance financial deepening is now more profound in countries 
like South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana and Seychelles. 
 
Financial sector development and MFI capital structure Studies in non-financial firm’s 
document that the development of the banking sector does matter in firms' financing choices 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Antoniou et al., 
134 
2008; Beck et al., 2008). The banking literature suggests that banks overcome information 
asymmetries by producing information on borrowers and using it for capital allocation 
(Diamond 1984)(Diamond, 1984). Given that the banking sector is an economy that produces 
and uses information to monitor the behaviour of borrowers, it is expected that its development 
will facilitate access to external financing sources. According to Giannetti (2003), firms tend 
to be more leveraged in countries where the banking sector is more developed. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) show that in developed economies, there is little difference in terms of firm 
leverage between bank-oriented economies and market-oriented ones. 
 
On the other hand, Fan et al., (2012) do not find any significant relationships between 
leverage and the level of the banking sector development, measured by the ratio of deposits 
over the GDP. As noted by Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013), MFIs are directly affected by the 
state of the development of the banking sector. They investigate whether the microfinance 
sector and the commercial banking sector substitute for each other. They provide evidence that 
MFIs flourish where the formal financial sector fails. Pervaded with numerous market 
imperfections and inefficiencies, low levels of financial development still permeate many 
developing economies. 
 
The expansion and implementation of MFIs has received increased attention as a promising 
development tool, able to address the market failures in the formal banking system in 
developing markets. However, with increased interest by international investors and Banks in 
the funding of MFIs, an important aspect of development policy therefore is concerned with 
developing financial markets for the poor as a way to enhance economic growth (Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2008). Research has shown that over a 10 year period, international and local 
funding of MFIs have more than doubled. Foreign investors certainly see this as an asset to 
diversify their portfolio holdings, and also contribute to a social cause, amongst many other 
things (Creane et al. 2007). 
 
Microfinance unique monitoring techniques and group contract structures adequately 
diffuses the need for information on potential participants, thereby circumnavigating the issue 
of information asymmetry in banking mediation theory (Morduch 1999). It is no surprised that 
also amongst scholars MFIs have received increased attention as a tool for poverty reduction 
(Isern and Porteous 2005, Krauss and Walter 2009) Although some sceptics remain (Murdoch 
1999), the growth of MFIs have been remarkable in the last 3 decades, and many such 
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initiatives have been initiated in developing countries –with a distinct lack of access to financial 
services- around the world (Vanroose and Espallier 2009). 
 
Vanroose and Espallier (2009) examine the relationship between financial sector (banking 
sector) and MFIs. The results suggest that MFIs reach more profitability in countries where the 
formal banking sector is less developed. Suggesting that MFIs serve a different niche market 
and fulfil a need that the formal banking sector does not address, in line with the market-failure 
hypothesis. Meanwhile, Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) highlight the impacts of financial 
development on poverty reduction, whilst Levine (2004) points to improved financial 
development as an enabler of economic growth. 
 
The changing nature of the MFI landscape (from NGO as start-up to commercial as they 
develop) suggests that MFIs also changes with financial development of the local financial 
markets. Such that, the more sophisticated the financial market sector, the less need for MFIs 
and vice versa. A sophisticated and efficient financial sector can also foster MFI growth. Such 
that; MFIs have better access to financial instruments and capital enabling a more robust and 
sustainable operating environment. The idea here is that with improved financial sector, MFIs 
are able to operate locally in capital markets and therefore offer a complementary role to banks. 
On the contrary in a less developed capital market, MFIs are often forced to seek external funds 
(often donations or subsidized debt), this often leads to good social performance, but unsuitable 
financial performance. This is because MFIs are unable to utilize breadth of outreach as a result 
of often paltry donated sums.  
 
In this project, we assume that MFIs and the commercial banking sector complement each 
other. In line with the arguments in favour of commercialization, we claim that a large banking 
sector enables MFIs to access commercial loans and therefore reduce their dependence on 
subsidies. Given that the vast majority of MFIs are non-listed and use the domestic credit 
market as a funding source, we can deduce that the development of the banking sector 
influences their capital structure. Thus, we deduce that: Financial sector development can be 
seen as a positive and/or complimentary measure in influencing the capital structure of MFIs. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that: 
H: Leverage is positively associated with the size of the banking sector, whilst 
Donations are negatively associated with the size of the banking sector.
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4.10.6 Corruption Control 
It is not news that corruption is endemic in SSA, in addition, corruption in developing countries 
has been a salient issue amongst researchers and governments in SSA. Despite the UN 
convention against corruption (the most comprehensive corruption convention to date) entering 
into force at the end of 2005, corruption still remains a pressing issue in the politics and 
economics of developing markets.  This is highlighted, with the WB president in 2013 
describing this phenomenon as “Public enemy number one” in developing countries. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that corruption is endemic in developing countries (Svensson 2005). This is 
evident in the corruptions perceptions index, which places SSA amongst the worst perpetrators 
of corruption (CPI 2017). The WB policy committee describes this practice as the abuse of 
power, to obtain private benefits and includes paying or receiving bribes, embezzlement, 
transactions for personal gain and favouritism, misuse of influence or irregular payments in 
public procurement, amongst others. 
 
Developing countries particularly exhibit a leaning towards corrupt practices, this could be 
as a result of weak institutions to check this practice. More importantly, much more attention 
is now being paid to the problem of corruption especially in SSA than was the case in the past. 
Three reasons predicate this; firstly, in recent times it has become less necessary to tolerate 
governance-challenged regimes (both in the Middle East and Africa). For example recently 
toppled regimes in North Africa, the middle-east and Zimbabwe, caused as a result of a 
culmination of a long-standing need to reform. Consequently, increased economic 
interdependence and globalization means that a given level of corruption has become much 
more costly59. An IMF survey of six hundred global and emerging market mutual funds found 
that fund managers tend to overweight less corrupt countries. This influences the movement of 
capital into developing markets in SSA, further constricting capital inflows and affecting the 
ability of MFIs to obtain funds (Kyereboah 2007). Finally, the trend towards democratization 
has made developing country governments subject to greater scrutiny and accountability from 




59 Wei (1997) estimates that moving from a relatively “clean” government like that of Singapore to that of Mexico 
–for example- would have the same effect on foreign direct investment as an increase in the marginal corporation 
tax of 50%. Hence, rendering corrupt countries to vulnerabilities in financial crises, as they are forced to rely on 
short-term offshore loans, which are known to flow out faster than FDI following a shock. 
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Within the existing institutional apparatus, the effects of corruption are particularly 
impactful.  It not only increases the hazards of operating in certain countries (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993, Cuervo-Cazurra 2008) it also heightens the uncertainties and costs of having to 
pay to get things done (Brewer et al., 2003). Thus decreasing needed inflow of capital into the 
most needed areas of economies sensitive to the impacts of corruption such as MFIs. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that MFIs in these instances; are unable to attract much needed 
funding to meet their operating mandates, thereby constraining their performance (social and 
financial), and stifling their capital structure. In an instance where local and regional 
banking/capital markets are ill-equipped to deal with the demand, as a result of lack of 
knowledge, or implementation skill to support cross-border funding and local market funding 
of MFIs, this creates further problems for MFIs. Many are simply forced to shut (Bateman and 
Chang 2009), or simply cease to exist. Thereby causing a slowdown in development efforts 
and creating poor performance amongst MFIs, through a constrained capital structure. 
However, more salient is the liquidity conditions in developed countries. Tight fiscal situations 
at home –in donor countries- have made donor countries focus more on the impact of their aid 
to developing countries, raising concerns among bilateral and multilateral aid agencies over the 
effects of corruption on economic performance. 
 
Consensus amongst Economists suggest that efficient government institutions foster 
economic growth (Okafor et al. 2015, Webster and Piesse 2018). Therefore, theoretical 
positions further propose that one of the most effective ways to tackle corruption is to build 
institutions with greater integrity. However, despite the publicized nature of the detriments of 
corruption, empirical evidence in the Microfinance literature is yet un-met with received 
knowledge, the current disconnect is even more salient in the MFI literature. Therefore, from 
a policy perspective, there remains a significant degree of ambivalence amongst policy makers 
about the real impact of corruption on the MFI operating environment. This perhaps could be 
due to the phenomenon of the East Asian puzzle:60 Inconsistent with theory that weak 
institutions of governance (characterized by corruption) discourage investments and thus 
 
 
60 During the early 90’s in a number of East Asian countries, high rates of growth had been sustained over a long 
period despite high levels of corruption. A survey –of business men- conducted by Transparency international 
(TI) China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand ranked amongst the most corrupt countries. Yet, until the recent 
financial crisis, these countries have had phenomenal growth rates, and attracted significant flow of private 
capital.  
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constrict growth. Outside the development finance sphere, many scholars61 have sought to 
understand better the complexities that underbelly the issue of the existence and persistence of 
corruption. However –where previously-, much of the scholarship lies in the implications of 
rent-seeking activities62 and the role of institutions63 -on the potential impacts- of economic 
performance. 
 
Empirically, Mauro (1995), uses economic data and econometric techniques to document 
the negative impact of corruption on investment and growth. In broad terms Knack and Keefer 
(1995) empirically demonstrate that weak institutions –manifested trough the extent of existing 
corruption- impedes economic growth. Furthermore, in a different light, Paul (1995) and Stone 
et al (1996) employ the use of surveys on high transactions costs that accompany activities 
commonly believed to be associated with corruption. For example, customs. However, this 
research fails to explain the persistence of East Asian countries as outliers. 
 
A seminal paper by Wei (2000) sought to shed more light on the East Asian puzzle, by using 
bilateral investment information from 12 source countries to 45 host countries. Controlling for 
other important factors such as; GDP per capita, an important finding suggests that the impact 
of corruption on the flow of capital is no different in East Asia, relative to other countries. The 
implications lay in the theorizing that other factors swamp the negative effects that corruption 
has on foreign investment. Furthermore, in relation to investment practices, this study’s 
findings also suggest that American investors are more averse to corruption in host countries 
in comparison to their European counterparts (average OECD investors). However, the study 
suffers from the fact that the inflows and outflows of foreign investment are dominated by 
countries belonging to the OECD group of nations, Results might however be different if the 
OECD countries were excluded from the sample, and perhaps a dependent variable measure 
such as domestic and foreign private investments. Notwithstanding, this study highlights a 




61 Rose-Ackerman (1978) highlights increasing corruption as the menace of economic performance, Klitgaard 
(1988), Wade (1982) 
62 See Kreuger (1974), Bhagwati (1982), Tullock et al., (1988), Murphy et al (1993). 
63 See North (1981, 1990). 
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What seems clear however, is that focus has been predominantly focused on the impacts of 
corruption on FDI inflows. For instance, Uhlenbruck et al., (2006), builds on institutional 
theory and examine how firms adjust their strategy for entering foreign markets in corrupt 
environments and its effect of corruption on firms’ choices, from a managerial theory and 
practice perspective. Using a data sample of 220 telecommunications development projects in 
64 emerging economies. The findings indicate that –in addition to the overall level of 
corruption, the arbitrariness surrounding corrupt transactions significantly impacts on firm’s 
decisions. Such that, firms adjust their capital formation (types of equity, and non-equity 
models of entry) according to the level of pervasive, and arbitrary corruption. Furthermore, the 
use of short-term contracting and entry into markets via the use of joint ventures. 
 
Webster and Piesse (2018), observe that local levels of corruption can often influence 
foreign owned firms operating in emerging markets. Employing firm level data from 41 
emerging countries. This study finds that there is often no difference in behaviours of foreign 
owned firms and domestic firms. Which suggest that although foreign firms (or foreign capital) 
will ideally locate destinations with the appearance of less corrupt practices. However, this 
“appearance” may not be the case in reality. For instance, whilst an FDI destination country 
could present an appearance of corruption control, local practices fail to reflect this. Within the 
MFI landscape; MFI funders often advocate for transparency in destination countries, however, 
the transparency levels of these countries do not often approach the required standards. Further 
research also find that strengthening the efficiency of corruption control in addition to 
improving human capital development id beneficial for improved FDI inflow (see Okafor et 
al. (2015). 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), examines the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment. 
Specifically, this paper analyses how the relationship between corruption and FDI varies 
depending on the characteristics of the country of origin of FDI. This analysis, tests the 
hypothesis using data on bilateral FDI inflows from 183 home economies to 106 host 
economies. Results reveal that corruption directly reflect/impact lower receipts of FDI from 
countries that have signed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in international Business 
Transactions, and further impacts on the change in the composition of country of origin FDI. 
Therefore laws against bribery abroad may act as a deterrent against engaging in corruption in 
foreign countries. Furthermore, corruption results in relatively higher FDI from countries with 
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high levels of corruption. This further suggests that investors who have been exposed to bribery 
at home may not be deterred by corruption abroad, but instead seek countries where corruption 
is prevalent. 
 
The type and nature of corruption often has deterrent effects on capital inflows. For instance, 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) identify that types of corruption exhibits a deterrent effect on the levels 
of FDI inflows, using data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), in addition to  OECD FDI inflows. Results show that type of corruption is more 
significant than the level of corruption amongst the sample size. Specifically, results indicate 
that in transitional economies, pervasive corruption, or corruption that is widely present, acts 
as a deterrent to FDI because it increases the known costs of investment inflows. On the other 
hand, arbitrary corruption, or corruption that is uncertain, does not have a similar deterrent 
influence because it becomes part of the uncertainty of operating in transition economies. This 
findings therefore, suggests that arbitrary corruption is more suitable to investors in comparison 
to pervasive corruption. Other empirical findings from work of Schleifer and Vishny (1993) 
who analyze different types of corruption regimes –monopolistic versus independent suppliers 
of bribe-generating products (as in Kaufmann et al., 1996). Findings suggest that different 
corruption regimes have different effects on investment. 
H: This study hypothesized that lower corruption perception positively determines the 
capital structure of MFIs. 
 
 
4.11 MFI FIRM LEVEL DETERMINANTS 
4.11.1 Asset Composition/Structure 
In the financial literature, collateral is used to secure loans and to minimize information 
asymmetries in the contractual relationship between lenders and borrowers (Njegomir and 
Stojić 2010, Berger and Black 2011, Hall 2012). A stream of thought considers collateral as a 
signalling tool that helps to avoid adverse selection, that is, the ex-ante asymmetric 
information. In this case, collateral is driven by the ex-ante private information from borrowers. 
Collateral could also act as a solution to moral hazard problems that are part of debt contracts 
if creditors need to use them in the event of borrowers’ defaulting. Thus, MFIs can put their 
fixed assets as collateral in the borrowing agreement. Given that tangible assets mitigate 
contract problems, firms with more tangible assets can sustain more external financing 
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(Almeida and Campello 2007). The costs associated with external financing seem to be lower 
for firms with higher collateral. In this study, we consider that MFIs pledge collateral to raise 
capital. 
 
Prevailing capital structure theories predict a positive theoretical relationship between asset 
tangibility and the leverage employed by firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Lasfer 1995; 
Drobetz and Fix 2003). Empirical studies that have sought to establish the validity of the above 
theoretical predictions generally found a positive relationship between leverage and asset 
tangibility, whilst other studies refute the positive predictions. Amongst those studies that find 
a positive relationship between asset tangibility and financial leverage include Bradley et al., 
(1984), Hovakimian et al., ( 2004), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Chen (2004), Huang and Song 
(2006),  Zou and Xiao (2006), Salawu (2007), Salawu and Agboola (2008), Abor and Biekpe 
(2009), Qian et al. (2009), Chandrasekharan (2012), Drobetz et al., (2013). On the other hand, 
studies which have found no positive prediction for the relationship between asset tangibility 
and capital structure include; Vilasuso and Minkler (2001), Karadeniz et al. (2009), and Sheikh 
and Wang (2013). 
 
Many empirical studies report a positive and significant relation between tangible assets and 
a firm’s ability to leverage (Aktas et al., 2011; Frank and Goyal 2009; Kayo and Kimura 2011; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Hall (2012) finds that the relation between capital structure and 
tangible assets varies depending on a country’s legal and institutional framework. In the 
banking sector, Gropp and Heider (2010) find a strong relation between tangible assets and the 
leverage of large European banks, which supports the results obtained in the nonfinancial 
sector. Given that local credit markets are imperfect and that they are one of the funding source 
for MFIs, I expect local lenders to require from MFIs the provision of fixed assets. The MFIs 
with greater portions of tangible assets have a greater debt capacity. This research thus employs 
the ratio of net total fixed asset to total assets (asset tangibility), and hypothesize that there is a 




Size is considered a measure of risk. Berger et al., (2009) note that large-sized organizations 
(total assets) tend to be more diversified, to be more experienced in risk management, and to 
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benefit more from government guarantees (too big to fail). Gropp and Heider (2010) study a 
sample of European banks and provide evidence that liabilities increase with the size of the 
bank. They also note a negative relation between size and deposits. Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2008) find that size does not help MFIs raise funds. However, they do find that large MFIs in 
Latin America are more leveraged. Because large organizations have a low probability of 
bankruptcy, we expect them to be more leveraged. 
 
In studies on donations, size appears to be a proxy for reputation. Reputation reflects the 
ability of the organization to effectively accomplish its mission and attract funding. Studies 
show that size is useful information for donors. Trussel and Parsons (2007) provide strong 
evidence about the positive impact of reputation on the amount of donations. Prevailing capital 
structure theories predicts a dual role for the relationship between a firm’s size and financial 
leverage. Firstly, a positive relationship is identified with the use of long-term debt in order to 
mitigate (and control) the excess of managers64. Secondly, as a result of information 
asymmetries, size reflects the amount of information outside investors have, and as a result 
large firms should have more information transparency and disclose more information than 
smaller firms. Hence firms with less asymmetric information problems should have more 
equity and consequently lower debt. This conveys a negative relationship between firm’s size 
and debt level. 
 
The trade-off theory assumes that firms are more diversified, have lower risk, better 
reputation, more stable cash-flows and fewer hazards to be liquidated. This presents a firm with 
easier access to capital markets with negligible debt costs. Thus, the trade-off theory predicts 
a positive relationship between firm size and firm’s financial leverage. Studies examining this 
relationship support both the positive and negative predictions postulated by the above capital 
structure theories. For example, Mutenheri and Green (2003), Deesomsak et al., (2004), 
Hovakimian et al., (2004), Zou and Xiao (2006), Salawu (2007), Karadeniz et al., (2008), 
Haung and Song (2008), Qian et al., (2008), Abor and Biekpe (2009), Qian et al., (2009), Sheik 
and Wang (2011) all report a positive relationship. Conversely, Chen (2004), Chakraborty 
(2010), Hassan (2012) and Chandrasekharan (2012), report a negative assertion between size 
and the capital structure of firms. 
 
 
64 Perks and perquisites, as well as engaging in empire building. 
143 
 
Based on the theoretical position of the above capital structure theories, this research 
assumes a positive relationship between a firm’s size and financial leverage of firms (and a 
positive relation between size and donations). Thus, this study will employ the natural log of 
asset as a measure of firm size for MFIs in the SSA region.  
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4.11.3 Profitability  
With respect to the predictions of the various capital structure theories on the relationship 
between profitability and capital structure, consensus is yet to be reached. The trade-off theory 
assumes that profitable firms are more able to withstand financial distress and bankruptcy cost 
than firms with low profitability, hence this theory predicts a positive relationship between 
profitability and debt-level. 
 
The pecking order theory postulates that firms prefer internal resources for financing 
decisions. Asymmetric information problems between the firm and outside investors lead to 
management’s preferences for internal funding, when credible information cannot be conveyed 
to outside investors. This implies that profitable firms may have less debt, indicating a negative 
relationship between profitability and debt level. The agency theory posits that profitable firms 
prefer not to raise external equity in order to avoid potential dilution of ownership, and 
ultimately retain shareholding dominance. On the other hand, controlling shareholders prefer 
raising the debt level in order to ensure that managers pay out profits rather than build empires. 
This indicates a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. Whilst a number of 
empirical studies have found support for the positive relationship predicted by both the trade-
off and agency theory in regards to the relationship between profitability and leverage65, other 
studies have also found a negative relationship between profitability and leverage66. 
 
The buffer view of the capital structure suggests that financial organizations maintain a level 
of capital adequacy above the regulatory requirements to minimize the costs of equity. These 
 
 
65 See Salawu and Agboola (2008), Chandrasekharan (2011), and Blaine (2012). 
66 See; Al Sakran (2001), Chen (2004), Deesomsak et al., (2004), Xiao (2006), Salawu (2007), Qian et al., (2008), 




costs arise from information asymmetries (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Microfinance institutions with high costs of equity maintain a high level of buffer capital and 
therefore are less levered. Based on the POT framework, profitable MFIs face lower costs in 
raising equity. Higher profits reduce the necessity to raise debt (Degryse et al., 2012). Thus, 
profitable MFIs prefer internal financing to external financing to finance investments. The 
empirical studies on banking (Berger et al., 2009; Gropp and Heider, 2010) seem to confirm 
the hypothesis that a negative relation exists between profitability and leverage. In 
microfinance, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) find a negative but non-significant relation 
between profitability and the financing policy of MFIs. 
 
Hence, following the above discussion, of capital structure theories on the impacts of 
profitability on capital structure decisions, We can thus expect profitable MFIs to be less 
leveraged. Because the financial efficiency of MFIs is a guarantee of their survival, I consider 
that donors might be aware of the MFI’s profitability. The literature on the value relevance of 
accounting information in the decision to make donations supports the positive relation 
between financial stability and donations. Hence, following the above discussion, and the 
duality of the predictions of capital structure theories on the impacts of profitability on capital 
structure decisions, this research assumes a positive relationship between profitability and debt. 
In measuring profitability this research project employs the use of ROA. 
! : There is a positive relationship between Profitability and debt. 
 
4.11.4 Age of Firm 
Older firms with a good track record and better performance are expected to employ more debt 
financing. Goodwill and credibility created over time, enable banks and/or creditors to provide 
them with debt financing (Bogan 2012). This can then be used to mitigate against the 
opportunistic actions by managers. Hence, the agency cost theory predicts a positive 
relationship between age of firm and leverage. Employing firm age as a measurement variable, 
this study therefore hypothesised that: 
! : There is a positive relationship between age and leverage. 
 
4.11.5 Ownership Structure 
Donaldson (1985) assert that as a result of the separation of ownership and control of the firm, 
the dependence of the firm on debt or equity changes as the firm’s stock ownership changes 
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and this separation often shits the firm’s financial goals. This relationship has been found to 
influence the capital structure choices of firms. According to Lasfer (1995), firms that employ 
the use of debt are those who have less managerial ownership in their capital structure. 
 
Capital structure theories predict a dual relationship between the ownership structure and 
leverage. This is as a result of the use of more debt in firms that have low managerial ownership 
in order to mitigate against the opportunistic behaviour of managers created by separation of 
ownership from control. Hence the relationship between leverage and ownership is expected 
to be positive. Conversely in firms where there is a higher level of managerial ownership a 
negative relationship is predicted by the agency theory. Firms with high managerial ownership 
will employ less debt as managers do not want to lose control, ownership, and free cash-flows 
that can be mitigated by debt covenants. 
 
Several studies have examined the predictions of the above capital structure theory on the 
relationship between ownership structure and leverage with varying results. Amongst those 
studies that reveal a positive relationship include: Bradley et al., (1984), Wiwattanakantang, 
(1999), Li et al., (2007), and Qian et al., (2009), whilst Zou and Xiao (2006) document a 
negative relationship. In light of the above arguments, this study hypothesised that there is a 
positive relationship between ownership structure and leverage. Considering that MFIs tend 
towards a low managerial ownership structure, this research project postulates a positive 
relationship between the ownership structures of MFIs and leverage. In line with the 
literature67, this study will employ dummy variables according to MFIs legal status namely: 
NGO, Cooperative, Bank, and Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI). 
! : There is a positive relationship between ownership structure and leverage. 
 
4.11.6 Risk and MFIs’ Capital Structure 
The empirical literature on the relation between risk and the financial structure of nonfinancial 
firms is not conclusive. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) find that risk 
is not a reliable driver of the capital structure. Hence, in a regulated banking industry, the 




67 Barry and Tacneng (2014), Wijesiri (2016), both employ four classifications for MFIs. They include; NGO, 
Cooperative, Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI). 
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Gropp and Heider (2010) find that risk significantly reduces leverage. In addition, the risk 
of default for a financial organization can be important if the quality of the credit portfolio is 
bad or if it is heavily contaminated. Outstanding loans represent a significant portion of the 
total assets of these institutions. As a result, I expect that a highly contaminated portfolio 
increases the risk of default for the institution. Institutions with poor portfolio quality tend to 
avoid the risk of failure by strengthening their equity and thus reducing their leverage. 
According to Berger et al. (2009), banks whose customers are more sensitive to default risks 
should hold additional capital. Furthermore, the quality of the portfolio provides information 
on the effectiveness of the devices for credit risk management implemented by the MFI. We 
therefore deduce that; MFIs with low portfolio risk are perceived as less risky by lenders and 
donors. Thus, MFIs with healthy portfolio quality are more likely to benefit from more 
favourable funding.  
! : There is a positive relationship between MFI Risk and Funding. 
 
4.11.7 MFI Profit Status and Capital Structure 
As in the banking and insurance sectors, different institutional forms coexist in the 
microfinance market. Cooperatives, banks, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and NGOs 
are the main microfinance institutional forms. Banks and NBFIs are shareholder or profit-
oriented MFIs and cooperatives and NGOs are nonprofit MFIs (Gutiérrez Nieto et al. 2009). 
The study of the relation between for-profit status and the capital structure of MFIs can be 
based on the argument raised by the proponents of the transformation thesis (Fernando 2004; 
Ledgerwood and White 2006). Profit-oriented or shareholder-based MFIs are more-able to 
access external funding sources. 
 
According to the transformation thesis, the transformation of an NGO into a shareholding 
company offers new opportunities regarding funding sources. According to Ledgerwood and 
White (2006), the transformation allows MFIs to both diversify and increase their capital 
funding sources. Indeed, one of the main expectations of such a transformation is to provide 
access to equity and commercial borrowing, which are crucial to sustain growth. Not-for-profit 
MFIs have a lower access to external funding sources and have less ability to raise external 
financing. Transformed MFIs can thus attract new sources of capital such as private equities 
and commercial loans.  




4.12 STUDY TWO: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF 
MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS: 
4.12.1 Introduction 
The pervasive failure of MFIs around the world, most specifically in Africa have prompted 
recommendations about structuring financial rescue packages for ailing MFIs (Bateman and 
Chang 2012a, Mader 2013). Paradoxically, recommendations fail to indicate a way forward for 
a sustainable financing structure that would ensure financial sustainability in the long-term for 
MFIs (Karim 2011). Much of which has since been a revolving door of rescues and series of 
collapses of MFIs. For instance, MFI failures in India, Ghana, Pakistan and South Africa. 
Given/with the need to ensure continual outreach to the underserved, calls for MFIs to become 
sustainable has been necessary (Manta 2016).  
 
Despite the burgeoning interest in microfinance, research has shied away from addressing 
the relationship between MFI financing and financial sustainability within the African context. 
We explore the various financing options available to MFIs and their implications for financial 
sustainability. With a general aim to consolidate the theory and empirical evidence on MFI 
financing and financial sustainability. The understanding is that financing of MFIs continues 
to evolve with an increased inclination towards commercial financing (Cull et al., 2009; 
Johnson, 2015). Given the limited information available on this subject for MFIs, most of 
which is implied, this chapter fuses the theory and evidence on the relationship between 
financing and MFI sustainability. The adjoining analysis will aim to establish the impacts of 
financing on MFI performance (social and financial), with the aim to equip both practitioners 
and policy makers with evidence needed to make MFIs solution-providing institutions in the 
development process of much of Africa. 
 
4.12.2 Financial Sustainability  
Much of the literature on MFI sustainability have been explored in the literature in previous 
chapters, however, a brief consideration of the literature on sustainability as relates to MFI 
financing will be reviewed. Although the provision of financial services to the poor hinges on 
the assumption that MFIs exist eternally to solve social ills such as poverty, and unemployment 
(Dunford et al., 1999; Dunford, 2000; Armendáriz De Aghion and Morduch, 2010). Consensus 
suggests that having no MFIs is better than having unsustainable ones (Robinson 2001a, Brau 
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and Woller 2004). Sustainability as relates to MFIs thus ensures an uninterrupted delivery of 
financial services (Hamada 2010). Furthermore, Brau and Woller (2004) deem sustainability 
as a strong stabilizer to MFI efficiency and distinct outreach. Despite pursuing a double bottom 
mandate, it is often acknowledged that MFI sustainability, is a first step towards ensuring it 
meets its long term target (Mersland and Strøm 2010).  
 
The theoretical understanding of the nexus between financing and sustainability, draws from 
the notion that; financially sustainable MFIs often capitalise on scale, exercise cost 
consciousness, promote innovation, reduce administrative and information asymmetry costs, 
and therefore, mostly lower adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Thus, advancing 
outreach whilst suffering the least amount of losses (Hoque et al. 2011, Quayes 2012).  
 
The drive towards sustainability have often led to a move away from donor funded MFIs 
towards commercial (for-profit) oriented MFIs. For instance, some governments have 
privatised subsidised, inefficient and loss-making credit programmes and parastatals (Robinson 
2001b). Whilst many argue for the case of mission drift in this concerted shift (Mersland and 
Strøm 2010, Hermes and Lensink 2011), evidence remains conflicted (Hermes and Lensink 
2007, Hoque et al. 2011), and inconclusive (Haselmann and Wachtel 2010, Quayes 2012). 
Proponents however, argue that the shift has brought with it much needed accountability, 
transparency, efficiency, economic interest rate setting, capital mobilisation and appropriate 
management remuneration within the MF sector (Robinson 2001a).  
 
4.12.3 MFI Funding and Performance 
The nexus between funding and financial structure has become one of the important issues for 
MFIs in gaining efficiency and sustainability (Fehr and Hishigsuren 2006, Maisch et al. 2006, 
Bogan 2012). The effects of funding can be positive or negative due to contributions to total 
financial revenue. In essence, the predicted effects are indeterminate and depend on the specific 
circumstances of each MFI. 
 
The argument for microfinance as an appropriate tool for financial inclusion and poverty 
reduction is still unproven (Milford 2010, Bateman and Chang 2012a). Firstly, microfinance 
cannot immediately turn the poor into the non- poor (Mader 2013). Whilst microfinance -as a 
policy initiative- has often been touted as a long-term strategy, its implementation in SSA 
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appears to be counter intuitive (Basu et al., 2004; Lafourcade et al., 2006; Mader, 2018). For 
instance, the operational quality of MFIs within the SSA context lacks vigour. In addition, the 
quality of institutional and governance frameworks are well below standards (Hartarska, 2005; 
Kiiza et al., 2005; Mersland and Øystein Strøm, 2009; Reille, 2009). 
 
Secondly, donor funding tends to become insufficient in meeting continual demand for well-
designed financial products from new and existing clients (Milford 2010). Thirdly, whilst the 
institutional environment and funding has been shown to play an important role in both the 
economic viability and sustainability of firms, evidence on the SSA context has been an area 
less explored within the existing literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Deesomsak et al., 2004; 
Utrero-González, 2007; Flannery and Öztekin, 2012; Chadee and Roxas, 2013). 
 
Based on the framework of existing evidence which suggest that the institutional 
environment could play a key role in elevating the practice and funding of firms, this analysis, 
aims to fill the gaps in the Microfinance literature. By examining the impact of the funding 
structure of MFIs, in addition to incorporating the potential influence of institutional quality 
on MFI performance, this analysis will document the impact of both capital structure and 
institutional quality on the performance of MFIs in SSA. Although several studies have focused 
on investigating the impact of microfinance or the trade-off between social mission and 
financial sustainability, we approach this from the viability of MF as a tool for long-term 
sustainable  development. Through the efficacy of capital structure management, enabled via 
the quality of the prevailing institutional environment. 
 
 
4.13 STUDY THREE: MICROFINANCE (MFI) AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION  
4.13.1 Introduction 
In the wake of heightened attention on poverty eradication, much attention has been accorded 
financial inclusion. Major international development organisations68, have a view that the 
provision of financial services to the un-bankable and financially excluded is key in delivering 




68 This includes: The World Bank Group, The European Union in co-alliance with the G-20 group of nations, and 
other bilateral global institutions. 
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Microfinance has been frequently celebrated as a panacea for sustainable remedy of poverty, 
through improved financial inclusion amongst the underserved in SSA. Since its appearance, 
MF has been credited with the promise of decreasing the levels of financially excluded people 
on the continent. However, current levels of exclusion in SSA suggest the need for an 
intervention. For instance, according to Finscope, (2010) South Africa has an exclusion level 
of 23.5 percent, whilst at the other end of the spectrum, Mozambique is 78 percent, with many 
other countries in between (Figure 17 above). The question remains to be asked; have MFIs 
delivered on this essential promise of financial inclusion? This analyse provides some insight 
into this question by examining the impact of microfinance on financial inclusion. 
 
In light of the growing trend of financial exclusion, amongst the world’s poor and 
vulnerable, the WB Group set a goal of achieving Universal Financial Access (UFA) by the 
year 2020 (WB 2015). Unanimously following this, the G-20 governments in collaboration 
with international development institutions have highlighted financial inclusion as a key 
development policy target, with pledges to support UFA 2020. More notably; as one of its key 
principles, the consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)69 highlights financial inclusion 
and the integration of MF with the formal financial system in developing nations, through the 
delivery of financial services to the un-bankable. This is said to be a universal key economic 
empowerment policy. However, despite efforts to support financial inclusion amongst 
developing economies, poverty still remains rife, and financial inclusion rates remain unabated. 
For example according to Klapper and Oudheusden (2015), half of the world’s adult population 
still lack access to financial services70 .Hence, in-order for MFIs to be effective in enabling 
financial inclusion and improving the welfare of the world’s poor, MFIs have to be sustainable, 
and efficient in managing its resource base. 
 
Research suggest71 that one way to achieve this is to improve the quality of the institutional 
environment in which these institutions operate in. Barry and Tacneng (2014), Tchakoute 
Tchuigoua (2014) Ajide and Raheem (2016) highlight the important role the institutional 
environment plays in enabling a conducive environment to enhance MFI performance. 
 
 
69 CGAP is a multi-donor organisation dedicated to advancing microfinance in its goal of universal access to 
finance, and poverty eradication. 
70 World Bank estimates this figure to be 2billion adults world-wide, with one third from SSA region. 
71 Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Booth et al (2001), Li and Ferreira (2011), Ahlin et al., (2011), Fan et 
al. (2012), Tchuigoua (2014), Barry and Tanceng (2014). 
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Although microfinance has progressively become an important policy tool in combatting 
financial exclusion in SSA72, the challenges facing the industry remain rife. In addition to 
sustainability, MFIs face institutional challenges. For example Earne and Nelson (2013) 
suggest that the regulatory framework, openness, and the level of development of the financial 
system impacts on MFIs and in-turn promotes economic growth73. However this has not been 
tested on an appropriate sample of MFIs in SSA. For example, in the area of regulation, quality 
institutional governance and transparency, the SSA region still falls behind in enabling a 
conducive environment for business growth. In addition, the institutional environment in SSA 
is characterised by high corruption levels, weak rule of law, and weak regulatory environment 
for MFIs. Furthermore, laws that govern creditor and shareholders rights are either weak, or 
seldom enforced. Furthermore, Chadee and Roxas (2013), argue that efficient institutional 
frameworks reduce transaction costs and the cost of enforcing contracts, thereby promoting 
business development and growth, whilst Aidis (2005), Eifert et al. (2008) show that sluggish 
economic development and poor financial performance of many firms in developing countries 
can be attributed to poor institutional environment. 
 
Therefore all the above could impact on the capital structure of MFIs, in addition to their 
ability to achieve double-bottom objectives of financial sustainability, poverty eradication 
whilst enabling financial inclusion. For example, Barry and Tacneng (2014), observe that a 
lack of adequate consumer protection policies and weak rule of law encourages over-borrowing 
and loan delinquencies, whilst it can be argued that rife corruption and government bureaucracy 
creates an unfavourable business environment for MFIs. Schicks (2013), observe that the 
insurmountable procedural and administrative difficulties often hinders setting up an MFI to 
tackle financial exclusion in rural areas. Furthermore, Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014), show 
that weak institutional environments often encourages fraudulent activities. 
 
4.13.2 MFI and Financial Inclusion 
The literature on financial inclusion measures the use of formal bank accounts as an indication 
of increased financial inclusion, enabled through greater participation and offering of financial 
services (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2017). Within the SSA landscape however, take-up of bank 
 
 
72 Banerjee and Duflo, (2011), Morduch and Armendariz (2010), Baye (2013), Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2008), 
73 Rodrik et al. (2004), Kinda and Loening (2010), Ahlin et al. (2011), Tchuigoa (2014), and Ajide and Raheem 
(2016). 
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accounts has lagged in comparison to other regions, this often is as a result of the rigidity 
frequently involved in this process. The financial inclusion index employed within this context 
follows on from Gupte et al (2012), and Yorulmaz (2016). Where previous attempts at 
developing a robust financial inclusion index have omitted some dimensions of financial 
access, time trends and varieties of institutions within measurements. 
 
The index employed incorporates broader cross-country, time-series data, incorporating not 
only household-based indicators, but also, individual usage of financial services, in addition to 
various indicators of financial access. Employing both demand and supply side indicators of 
financial access, allows for a broader financial inclusion measurement in examining the 
financial inclusion levels of the countries surveyed. Finally, the identified index spans from 
2004 - 2011. In order to present an accurate representation of the level of financial inclusion of 
the countries identified, this index further adopts the OECD's weighting methodology74 in 
achieving the index scores for the countries surveyed. The observed metrics observed in this 
index include; availability, accessibility, usage, and cost dimensions of financial service. In 
addition to, the number of deposit, credit and savings accounts, the bank and ATM branches, 
the volume of deposit and credit accounts, and demand-side indicators, such as households and 
SMEs, base saving, credit and insurance indicators. 
 
4.13.3 Usage in the Literature 
Kumar and Mishra (2000), appeared to use a multidimensional financial inclusion index, using 
both supply and demand side indicators for the year 2002 and 2003 in analysing financial 
inclusion in India. Whilst, Sarma (2008), employs the use of three main dimensions for 
financial access in constructing a financial inclusion index in 2004. These dimensions include 
a measure of banking penetration, number of bank accounts per 1000 adults, and usage-deposits 
plus credits as a percentage of GDP. Using these indicators, this study explored the impacts of 
these on some specific macro factors as has been traditionally done in the literature. 
Subsequently, Arora (2010), uses more dimensions and indicators in comparison to Sarma 
(2008). Geographic penetration and dimension of ease of usage and cost of financial services 
were added to this index. Finally, Gupte et al (2012), use many dimensions in creating an index 
 
 
74 The OECD’s handbook of constructing composite indicators was employed in constructing this index. This 
new methodology contains a principal component analysis to explore the relative importance of indicators used 
in the index construction process and factor analysis to assign different weights according to their relative 
importance. 
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for use in their analysis. This incorporated many dimensions in its construction. However, the 
draw-back of this index lies in the limitations of its length from 2008 - 2009. 
 
4.13.4 Financial Development and Financial Inclusion 
Financial development is a key issue for developing countries, whilst the broader literature 
suggest that an economy transforming unto frontier status requires broader and deeper financial 
development exertions. However, many economies in developing markets, simply lack the 
expertise and human capital needed to structure deeper and broader financial development, this 
is especially the case for SSA. According to research, SSA financial development measures 
lag behind other developing markets. Strides in financial development can also be associated 
to the general welfare of citizens in a country. The rationale being, as individuals have better 
and more robust access to financial services through an efficient financial environment, funding 
opportunities, and wealth creating opportunities become more available to individuals in need 
of financing, and firms in need of capital thus have easy access to capital markets and increased 
investor participation. Hence the development of the financial sector, could hold the key to 
financial inclusion and indeed financial wellbeing of individuals and firms lacking access to 
capital. This project therefore hypothesizes that financial development is a positive influence 
of financial inclusion. 
H: Financial development is a positive influence on financial inclusion. 
 
4.13.5 Macro-Factors and Financial Inclusion 
The macroeconomic environment plays a role in the development of firm’s strategy, capital 
structure and firm decision making process (la Porta et al 1999). Hence the decision to increase 
or decrease economic participation by individuals and firms can be linked to the broader 
performance prospects of the macro-environment in which firms and individuals operate in. 
We therefore sustain that the macro-economic environment exerts a positive influence on 
financial inclusion. 
H: Macroeconomic factors are a positive influence financial inclusion. 
 
4.13.6 Technology, Mobile Banking and Payments  
Increased calls for the adoption of mobile banking solutions for financial inclusion has been 
bellied by the rise in mobile phone usage and coverage by the population of SSA. It is estimated 




In many low and middle-income countries, the share of the population that has access to a 
mobile phone is considerably larger than the share of the population that has a formal bank 
account. For example, in 2011, there were 127 mobile phone subscriptions for every 100 
inhabitants in South Africa, while only 54 percent of the population had a bank account. There 
were 123 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in Brazil, while only 56 percent had 
a bank account. And, in India, 72 of every 100 inhabitants had a mobile phone, while only 35 
percent had a bank account (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). Other modern innovations such as 
the use of new technology through banking correspondents (such as; agency based banking), 
this in addition to; improved technologies for credit reporting, and improved borrower 
identification have improved the ability of banks to offer services where previously cost 
barriers were a preventative measure. While these new interventions are a boon for the future 
of financial services, the adoption and use for financial inclusion have been uneven across 
countries. Whilst countries such as India adopt a financial inclusion strategy led by traditional 
bank branches and technologically based correspondent banking (led by the country’s large 
public sector banks), Kenya on the other hand adopts a popular mobile payment service (M-
PESA), operated by  a telecommunications provider. Whilst it appears that no one universal 
strategy can be adopted for financial inclusion, what is clear however is that the implementation 
of interventions on-ground (as applies/d to the region of focus) in addition to an enabling 
environment can improve financial inclusion. 
 
Recent advances in technology and mobile phone uptake within the sub-continent (SSA) 
indicates that through innovation, financial services can be delivered to the end user in no-time. 
Often cutting down time and the bureaucracy involved with the requirement of paper work, 
such as documentation etc. which often acts as a barrier, deterring potential users from 
participating in financial services delivery and uptake. One of such innovations in the 
implementation of technology and financial services is the advent and growth of technology 
based financial services products. For instance, MPESA is an innovative financial service 
(providing mobile wallet capabilities such as the ability to send and receive money over the 
phone, in addition to paying bills and transacting payment. Innovative technological based 
financial services is gleaned as a having the potential to leapfrog traditional financial 
intermediation channels such as brick-and-mortar banking. Services like MPESA has helped 
large swathes of countries in East-Africa (most especially Kenya) to disburse large scale mobile 
money financial services to end users. 
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A study by Demombynes and Thegeya (2012) show that enrolment in Kenya’s M-PESA 
system increases the likelihood of saving by up to 20 percentage points. Furthermore, they 
assert that users who have only M-PESA save. On average K-Sh 1,305/month. This is in 
comparison to K-Sh 2,282/month amongst users who save with other accounts, and K-Sh 2,959 
amongst those who save with M-PESA and other accounts. Thus, the scope exist for savings 
implementation by financial providers if applied with incentives. While many see the large 
benefits of this technology especially for the 4th revolution of Africa (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
2015), the drawback still remain pertinent. For example, the regulation required to ensure the 
safeguarding of end-users data and personal information, and the depth required to ensure 
adequate cyber security and client data protection are all pertinent issues still to be addressed 
within the continent. This project therefore hypothesizes that technology, measured by the use 
of mobile phone penetration, acts as a positive influence on the financial inclusion in SSA. 
H: Technology penetration is a positive determinant of financial inclusion.
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4.13.7 The Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Legal institutions underpin the development of the financial sector (La Porta et al., 1997b; 
Levine, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Djankov et al., 2007). In particular, the 
protection of private property and the enforcement of shareholder and creditor rights are 
cornerstones of developed financial sectors (Levine 1998, 1999).  In environments with weak 
legal institutions, contract writing and enforcement are problematic. As a result, financial 
institutions tend to resort to more costly business models (such as relationship lending or group 
monitoring) that might limit both the supply and the demand for their services. 
 
Governments have a key role in enhancing financial inclusion by introducing laws that 
protect property and creditor rights and by making sure that these laws are adequately enforced. 
A number of studies find that both the quality of the laws and the efficiency of enforcement of 
creditor rights affect the availability and cost of credit to households. For instance, Meador, 
(1982) finds that interest rates in the U.S. mortgage market are higher in those states in which 
the cost and duration of judicial interventions to repossess collateral are greater. Focusing on 
Europe, (Freixas 1999)shows that the cost and the duration of the judicial process required to 
repossess collateralized assets are inversely related to consumer and home lending. Combining 
data on Italian households and the performance of Italian judicial districts, Fabbri and Padula, 
(2004) find that an increment in the backlog of pending trials has a statistically and 
economically significant positive effect on the probability of loan rejections among 
households. Jappelli et al., (2005) find similar evidence using aggregate credit data across 95 
Italian provinces. Using data on mortgage debt outstanding in 62 countries during 2001–05, 
Cacdac and Warnock (2007) find that countries with stronger protections or legal rights have 
deeper housing finance systems. 
 
The efficiency of the legal system also matters because this can affect the sectoral 
composition of lending. For instance, Costa and de Mello (2006) find that, in Brazil, banks 
provided payroll loans—the repayment of which was deducted from the employee’s payroll 
check—at lower rates than regular consumer loans, which were subject to the inefficient 
procedures of the Brazilian legal system. Using  databank-level survey data for over 20 
transition economies, Haselmann and Wachtel (2010) find that, if bankers have positive 
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perceptions of the legal environment, they tend to  lend more to opaque borrowers such as 
house-holds and small and medium enterprises. 
 
The strength and enforcement of creditor rights can have implications for household debt 
repayment behaviour too. For instance, using data from the European Community Household 
Panel during 1994–2001, Duygan-Bump and Grant (2009) find that, if faced with adverse 
shocks, households in countries with poor protection of creditor rights are more likely to delay 
their loan repayments. Hence, poorly designed and enforced creditor rights discourage lending 
and encourage households to default. 
 
A key component of a modern collateral framework is the existence of collateral registries. 
The extensive research on the use of property rights, land titles, and access to finance suggests 
that property ownership is important in the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours that can have a 
considerable impact on a  variety of social, income, and even environmental factors  (Di Tella 
et al., 2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Jacoby et al., 2016). However, the traditional view of 
the importance of property rights in access to finance arising because property provides solid 
collateral is being challenged by new findings. For example, Deininger and Goyal (2012) 
evaluate the impact of modernizing land title registries in Andhra Pradesh, India, and find 
significant, but modest rises in access to credit only in urban areas. Galiani and Schargrodsky 
(2010) study the impact of the acquisition of clear land titles on access to finance and on other 
measures of well-being in a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires. They find that house -hold 
welfare improves, but not through the credit channel; rather, long-term investments in housing 
and human capital formation made without access to formal credit account for the changes. 
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2011) discuss the difficulty that low-income home owners face in 
maintaining formal land titles over time because of the relatively high cost of the administrative 
procedures, and find evidence of links between long-term investments and stronger property 
rights in rural areas, but none of the links are attributable to the use of land for collateral in 
formal credit markets. These studies point to the importance of strong property rights, but call 
into question policies focused narrowly on providing land titles. 
H: The quality of the institutional environment is positive for financial inclusion.
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4.13.8 The Information Environment 
Information asymmetries between people who demand and people who supply financial 
services can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, in credit markets, adverse 
selection arises when information about the borrower’s characteristics is unknown to the 
lender. Moral hazard refers to a situation whereby the lender’s inability to observe a borrower’s 
actions that affect repayment might lead to opportunistic behaviour on the part of the borrower. 
In both cases, asymmetric information leads to rationing (a situation where the supply falls 
short of the demand). 
 
Theoretical models suggest that information sharing can reduce adverse selection in markets 
in which borrowers approach different lenders sequentially (Pagano and Japelli 1993). 
Moreover, information sharing can also have a strong disciplining effect on borrowers (Padilla 
and Pagano 2000). Governments –through institutions- can therefore enhance financial 
inclusion by facilitating the access of banks to borrower information either by passing laws and 
regulations that enable banks to share information or by directly setting up public credit 
registries. 
 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) and Djankov et al., (2007) investigate the relationship between 
information sharing and credit market performance, and find that bank credit to the private 
sector is more substantial in countries in which information sharing is well developed. 
Furthermore, research on firm-level survey data indicate that access to bank credit is easier in 
countries with credit bureaus or registries (Galindo and Miller, 2001; Love and Mylenko, 2003; 
Brown et al., 2009). On the impact of credit registries on consumer lending, Cheng and Degryse 
(2010), use a unique data set on credit card applications and decisions from a leading bank in 
China to access the impact of information sharing via a public credit registry on bank lending 
decisions. This research shows that additional information on borrowers led to a more 
substantial line of credit than borrowers with less information. 
H: This research therefore hypothesizes that information sharing (captured by the strength of 




4.14 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The manner in which MFIs are financed varies across regions. For instance, data reveals that 
African MFIs are mainly financed through deposits whilst MENA MFIs make use of equity. 
South Asian MFIs heavily depend on debt financing. Therefore, the need to detangle the 
determinants of MFI funding with specific focus on MFI grouping across regions is imperative. 
Furthermore, MFI financing options and sustainability would naturally vary according to the 
region being considered. Variation in the effect of each financing option on sustainability is 
dependent on the study setup, in other words the sample, the area considered, the period and 
the level of financial development. This further calls for the need to focus on regions in order 




Chapter 5 METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
5.1 DATA VARIABLES  
5.1.1 Introduction 
This section sets out the methodology and data profile implemented in answering the research 
questions identified. In order to examine the scope of this research project, three lines of 
enquiries emerge; firstly, how does the institutional environment influence the funding of MFIs 
in SSA. Secondly, how does capital structure decisions affect the performance (financial and 
social) of MFIs in SSA?. Finally, do MFIs (MFI penetration rate) exert a positive influence on 
the financial inclusion levels  amongst countries in SSA.  
 
5.1.2 Data Sources 
This research utilizes a comprehensive panel dataset obtained from Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MIX) database, a web-based microfinance platform providing data on individual 
MFIS. MIX Market has a rich source of MFI data, reported by MFIs (to MIX) from around the 
world. Hence, this represents a stable sample of MFI representation across the selected region. 
Of particular interest for this study is data from the sub-Saharan African region.  
 
Various sets of data exist on the MIX database, some datasets are free student packages for 
researchers and other deep-looking datasets require a paid subscription. At this point in time, 
the researcher possesses a broad and concise (student package) data from the MIX, this includes 
key MF indicators such as; Profitability, outreach indicators, performance and social indicators, 
as well as other standard level MFI indicators appropriate for research. To ensure validity of 
proposed analysis, this project also utilizes other variables external from MFI firm-level data. 
For example, Macroeconomic indicators, and some institutional variables are readily available 
from The World Bank database. Finally, data on the institutional variables proposed for use by 
the researcher is also readily available from reputable transparency indexes, developed by 
international organisations. 
 
The empirical analysis conducted for this research utilises panel data, comprising of 
observations of the same units in several time-periods (Wooldridge 2001). MFIs are known to 
change overtime in addition to changes in their operating environment. The use of panel data 
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is therefore ideal in order to interrogate the lines of enquiry established from the gaps in the 
literature. 
 
The choice of panel data for use with this analysis is predicated on the superiority of panel 
data over other types of data (Baltagi 2001)75. Therefore, given a well-organised panel data, 
models are efficient, as they provide ways of dealing with heterogeneity. A systematic 
approach was employed in identifying the process of analysing the data collected. Firstly, 
organising the panel data collected. Secondly, identifying the modelling process, and finally, 
the interpretation of the data (based on the questions identified for this research). The potential 
pitfalls of poorly organised data, applying panel data techniques to cross-sectional data without 
model consideration, and results interpretation outside the context of the research question have 
been so far avoided. 
 
5.1.3 Summary of Dependent Variable (Study I) 
This analysis utilizes capital structure variables that capture the profile of MFIs operating in 
Africa. These include a spectrum of MFI types such as: NGOs, Rural Bank, NBFI, Bank, Credit 
Union and Cooperatives. The spectrum of these institutions have influenced the choice of 
capital structure utilised in this analysis.  
 
Capital structure variables such as; Leverage (Borrowings, Donated Equity) and Deposits 
are employed. Leverage measure for MFIs includes funding which captures total borrowing 
(as well as short and long tenure financing), donated equity measures the donations made to 
MFIs by donors, which often is utilised as a form of equity with no obligation on returns to the 
donor, and finally deposits are MFI clients timed deposits.
 
 
75 This type of data is more informative, has more variability, less collinearity amongst variables, with more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi 2001). 
162 
 
5.1.4 Summary of Dependent Variable (Study II) 
Panel data consisting of MFI specific data, institutional, macro-economic and country specific 
data was utilised for this study. Data sourced for this analysis includes an unbalanced panel-
data sample for 48 SSA countries with data-points from 2004-2016 (12 years) with over 3,000 
data points. 
 
The objective of the study guided the choice of dependent variable. MFIs are hybrid 
institutions (Morduch 1999), this therefore implies that the performance of MFIs is usually 
characterised along two lines namely; Financial and Social performance (CGAP 2003). The 
financial indicators for measurement includes: Sustainability (measured by OSS), profitability 
(captured by ROA), Efficiency (measured by cost per borrower -CPB-), and Portfolio Quality 
(captured by PAR>30 days). Social performance is measured by the percent of female 
borrowers (PFB). MFI social indicator for outreach is further decomposed to get a deeper 
understanding of MFIs social outreach performance. We decompose MFI social outreach by 
analysing the breadth and depth of outreach, which is captured by number of active borrowers 
(NAB), and active loan balance per borrower (ALPB) (Woller 2006). 
 
The above MFI specific variables represents a comprehensive set of performance measures 
used to capture MFI performance. A comprehensive set of performance measurements was 
chosen for two reasons: Firstly, a robust view of MFIs is required in order to capture the sector 
along its double-bottom line mandate. Secondly, a robust examination of MFI carried out in 
this manner will give invaluable insight into the MFI sector in Africa (one not previously 
examined in such dexterity). Furthermore, where previous performance literature have 
previously been one-sided (focusing primarily on financial performance analysis), this research 
uses a comprehensive set of MFI performance measures in order to satisfy the study objectives. 
This captures one of the contributions to the literature from this study’s point of view. The 
complete list, description and measurement of the utilised performance variables can be seen 
in Table 5.1 below. 
 
In order to determine the effects of capital structure and institutional environment on the 
performance of MFIs, specific interest is placed on the operational self-sustainability (OSS) of 
MFIs, as this is a key area of focus of financial performance of MFIS within the literature. 
MFIs are encouraged to be sustainable in order be less reliant on donor funding. Proponents of 
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this line of argument (Drake and Rhyne 2002, Mersland and Strøm 2010), suggest that 
sustainability better equips MFIs in achieving their double mandate. The OSS measure 








5.1.5 Summary of Dependent Variable (Study III) 
The dependent variable identified as financial inclusion index is a multidimensional-set of 
measures, consisting of commercial banking indicators often employed for use in financial 
inclusion studies. In addition to, demand and supply side measures of financial inclusion. This 
culminates in a comprehensive measure/index of financial inclusion, relatively new to the 
financial inclusion literature, constructed by the work of Yorulmaz (2016). This index was 
chosen because, it comprises a multidimensional financial inclusion composite index, which 
contains aggregate information of different dimensions of financial access for a country (Sarma 
and Borbora 2011). This index further allows researchers and policy makers to make holistic 
comparisons across countries and contexts. Using cross-country minimum-maximum values 
for the index construction further increases the comparability of the analysis. 
 
The literature supports, a multidimensional index as a yardstick for measurement, because 
it explores the trend and relative rankings of countries financial inclusion levels within a sample 
(Arora, 2010; Gupte, et al., 2012; Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015). According to Gupte et al., 
(2012), and Contreras et al., (2014), these measures give feedback and frame policies to target 
the extent of financial exclusion for researches and policymakers. A look into the components 
constituting the chosen financial inclusion index, reveals that it takes into consideration a 
variety of measures for use in accessing financial inclusion levels in SSA76. This is particularly 
pertinent, as research indicates that using individual financial access variables individually may 
cause analysis to ignore important information about the mechanisms of a financial system, 
and a misinterpretation of countries financial inclusion levels for researchers and policymakers 
 
 
76 For instance using the WB’s World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Findex Development Database 
(Global Findex), the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and survey data from Beck et al (2006a). This index 
therefore takes into consideration broader cross-country time series data, providing household-based and 
individual usage of financial services, in addition to other various indicators of financial access. Elements such 
as Cost, usage and outreach indicators are adapted, so as to explain the impacts of microfinance institutions on 
financial access in an aggregate manner. 
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(Sarma 2008). therefore, using single indicators would not be enough to conduct a broader 
financial inclusion analysis. 
 
Previous literature, notable for implementing financial indexes in conducting research –for 
use in financial policy analysis- include; Sarma (2008), Arora, (2010). Gupte et al., (2012), and 
Chakravarty and Pal (2013), who all use measures of a multidimensional index for examining 
financial inclusion. These papers however, do not employ the preferred index used in this 
analysis. Furthermore the length of composed index varies between 1 and 2 years, which is 
unsuitable for the planned analysis for this research project. For instance, Sharma (2008) 
construct a financial index using three main dimensions of financial access for the year 2004. 
Subsequently, Arora (2010) also employs a financial index for the year 2008. Finally, Gupte et 
al (2012), employs an index for the period of 2008-2009, these studies employ financial 
inclusion index, for short periods (of between one and two years).
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Dependent Variable Table 
Variable Description Measure Source 
STUDY I    
Leverage 
MFI Leverage (Leverage is indicated by the MIX as comprising deposits as well as 
borrowings) 
Proportion of TL to TA The MIX 
BORROWING MFI Leverage excluding deposits Total MFI non-deposit liabilities 
ratio of non-deposit liabilities, to BV of 
assets 
The MIX 
DEPOSIT MFI timed deposit liabilities (excluding grants) ratio of dep's to BV of A The MIX 
Donated Equity    
 -Proportion Measures MFI total grants  Proportion of Donated equity (grants) to TA  The MIX 
 -Subsidy 
intensity 
or Donations  (Donated Equity) ratio of donated equity by TE The MIX 
    
STUDY II    
Operational self-
sufficiency 
MFIs ability to cover its cost through operating revenues 
Measured as the ratio of operating revenue to 
expenses (CGAP, 2003) 
The MIX 
Profitability 
Measures MFI ability to utilise shareholder resources and obtain a return on these 
resources 
Return on Asset (ROA) The MIX 
Efficiency Indicates MFI ability to efficiently utilise resources in its core mission Cost Per Borrower (CPB) The MIX 
Portfolio Quality Indicates the health of an MFIs loan books PAR>30 days The MIX 
Social  
Measures the Social performance of MFIs. In particular, MFIs ability to lend to female 
borrowers  
Percentage of Female Borrowers (PFB) The MIX 
Depth  
Measures the depth of MFI borrowing. Specifically, their reach down the poverty ladder 
(down the pyramid) 
Average Loan Balance Per Borrower (ALPB) The MIX 
Breadth 
Measures MFIs breadth of reach. Specifically, how far along the poverty spectrum can 
the MFIs reach 
Number of Active Borrowers (NAB) The MIX 
    
STUDY III    
FINDEX 
A financial inclusion index that takes into consideration outreach, cost, and usage 
indicators of financial services in developing markets 
Percentile rank 1 to 100 
Yorulmaz 
(2016)  
Note: The MIX (Mix Market), MFI (Microfinance Institutions),  




5.1.6 Summary of Independent Variables (Study I) 
In measuring the institutional environment this research paper employs WB’s doing business 
index and World Governance Indicators (WGI); with specific focus on examining measures 
that observe the utilisation of credit information and measures identified to be signalling 
indicators from government institutions on fostering an enabling environment for businesses 
to flourish.  
 
Studies often point to the link between foreign investment and good governance (La Porta 
et al. 1997a, Tchakoute Tchuigoua 2014b). With the prevalence of good governance and stable 
policies, it is assumed that investment flows will follow, potentially improving the economic 
prospects of a recipient country. Although this has been shown to be the case in certain regions, 
an established case is yet to be carried out for SSA, a region in dire need of growth and 
development. Although many empirical studies highlight the impact of firm-level 
characteristics on the capital structure of firms (Kyereboah, 2007; Bogan, 2012). Other studies 
however point to the possible impact of the institutional environment77 (LaPorta et al 1997). 
This line of questioning has yet to be explored within the context of MFIs in SSA, which is 
classified amongst the poorest regions of the world. Capital importation for development 
funding from development financial institutions (WB, DFID, IMF etc). these could all be 
sensitive to the quality of the institutional environment institutional policies. As such, 
Economic freedoms, rule of law, and a stable macro-economic environment, could all play an 
important role in the ability of MFIs in attracting capital, and ultimately diversifying their 
capital structure financing.  
 
Specifically, this research project employs indicators for Corruption Control 
(CRRPTNCTRL), Enforcing Contracts (ENFCON), Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF), 
and the Rule of Law (ROL). These variables measure the strength of governance of public 
institutions in creating an enabling environment for improving capital efficiency. It is expected 
that strong institutional environments creates confidence in a financial ecosystem, thereby 
providing/enabling positively, the access to financial services by individuals and firms. A 
 
 
77 Comprising of the institutional characteristics of the operating environment of MFIs, in addition to 
Macroeconomic factors/indicators such as; growth rate, inflation, interest rate, in addition to financial 
development. 
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strong institutional environment also offers (inspire) confidence to international/outside 
investors and attracts investment in private sector initiatives which could increase market 
participation, create jobs and offer income to individuals, thereby strengthening access to 
finance and financial services by end-users. Indicators are obtained from WB WGI and Doing 
Business Index.  
 
The WB doing business index acts as a signal to foreign investors on the suitability of the 
business environment of the countries of interest. The measure identified for this analysis 
include is a measure of the strength of investor protection (SOIP) as this measure identifies the 
protections level available for foreign investors. A low score could negatively pain a recipient 
country as unsuitable for foreign capital inflows. On the other hand, a strong score signals to 
investor that the role of the rule of law, is sufficient to protect capital. 
 
In corporate finance literature, the role of financial development have been identified to 
foster performance in local banking sector and the non-bank sectors of developing economies. 
Therefore, formal financial development measures have been identified as these could impact 
the increase or uptake of financial services in developing markets in SSA. This indicator has 
been captured using a measure of the Domestic credit to Private Sector (DCTPS), and Deposit 
interest rate (DEPINTR). 
 
Data capturing broader institutional environment and economic freedom includes: Financial 
Freedom (FINF), Trade Freedom (TRADEF), and Monetary Freedom (MONF). These 
indicators were obtained from the Heritage Freedoms Institute. Other macro indicators 
identified for this analysis employs the World Bank (WB) World Governance Indicators 
(WGIs) measure in order to assess the income level and Macro-economic characteristics of the 
countries within the sample. Data on Gross National Income (GNIg), have been employed to 
capture the income level of the countries within the sample; Inflation (INF), Real interest rate 
(REALINT), Deposit interest rate (DEPINTR) have been identified to capture the opportunity 
cost of capital. 
 
Mainstream finance theory suggest key firm level characteristics which are deemed to 
impact the capital structure of a firm (Rajan and Zingales 1995). Hence, specific firm level data 
employed in this analysis include; Firm level data such as; Age, Size, ROA, Risk (PAR>30 
days), Tangible Assets (Net fixed assets). 
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5.1.7 Summary of Independent Variables (Study II) 
In order to access the impacts of capital structure and the institutional environment on the 
performance of MFIs, this research project utilizes measures for capital structure, institutional 
factors, MFI-specific and macro country specific indicators. The capital structure measures 
identified include; short-term leverage (STLEV), long-term leverage (LTLEV), and total 
leverage (TLEV). Within the MF literature however, various measures exists for the funding 
of MFIs, these include a range of capital such as; Grants, Donations, Loans (mezzanine and 
soft-loans), Equity and Donated Equity (Janson et al. 2003, Jansson 2003). These measures 
have been congregated to provide an overarching view of specific short, medium and long term 
financing options available for MFI financing. For instance, grants and donations present long 
term financing, whilst loans (often subsidized) largely are of a short-term tenure for MFI 
financing. 
 
MFI firm characteristics such as; Size, Age and asset tangibility (AT) has been employed to 
identify form moderating influence on MFI performance. Dummy variables for MFI type, 
profit status and regulation status were also employed. Institutional indicators include: 
Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF), Corruption Control (CORRPTNCTRL), Strength of 
Investor Protection (SOIP), Enforcing Contracts (ENFCON), Rule of Law (ROL), Monetary 
Freedom (MONF), Financial Freedom (FINF), and Trade Freedom (TRADEF). Macro 
indicators such as; gross national income (GNIg), real interest rate (REALINTR), and inflation 
(INF) were also employed. Finally, financial development indicators, deposit interest rate 
(DEPINTR), and domestic credit to the private sector (DCTPS), have also been employed. 
Data on institutional quality and macro environment was obtained from the World Bank 
database, and the Heritage Foundation, whilst MFI firm specific data was obtained from MIX. 
 
 
5.1.8 Summary of Independent Variables (Study III) 
This research project utilizes one indicator for the main variable of interest (Microfinance -
MF-). The empirical literature surveyed indicates that the dominant MFI indicator is normally 
the number of MFIs (Adeola and Evans 2017). Other variables include variables that measure 
user consumption of MFI services, for instance, demand side indicators. Finally, recent 
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research have used MFI penetration rate (see equation 11)78. The use of MFPENRATE was 
predicated on for a few reasons. Firstly, this indicator allows for depth of analysis unavailable 
with the use of a single indicator such as the number of microfinance banks as used in (Adeola 
and Evans 2017). Secondly, MF penetration provides insight into the actual usage and reach of 
microfinance within countries in SSA. This is important in comparison to a single indicator, 
which gives no indication of usage. Lastly, this measure captures users most in need of MF 
services within countries in SSA, as indicated by the formula below. 
 
	"#	$%&%'()'*+&	,)'%-,/ = 123	456657869	:,;<56=->?	@?8	A5ABC@/-5>	D8C57	/E8	A5F86/G	C->8	:,; (5.2) 
 
 
MFI Borrowers capture the total number of active borrowers reported by all MFIs in the 
countries within the sample, this is then divided by the share of the adult (age 15 and over) 
population -of the sample countries- below the national poverty line as stated by WDI data. For 
measures of income indicators, this research employs WB WDI data on GNI per capita (GNIk). 
GNIk captures the overall effect on the income of the various individual countries. This was 
chosen to obtain an estimate of the impact on real income changes in the sample observed. 
Macroeconomic variables was measured using WDI data on Inflation (INF). 
 
In order to capture the relevant enabling institutions for microfinance development, this 
research paper employs WB data on doing business data on credit information. Specifically, 
this research project employs two main indicators for measuring the institutional environment; 
Corruption Control (CORRPTNCTRL), and Public Credit Registry (PUBCREGEG). These 
variables measure the strength of governance of public institutions in creating an enabling 
environment for the access of financial services.in addition, the availability of public credit 
registry enables information sharing and therefore encourages deeper financial market 
integration. It is expected that strong institutional environments create confidence in an 
ecosystem,  and improves access to financial services by individuals and firms. A strong 
institutional environment also inspires confidence to outside investors. Indicators are obtained 
from WB’s WGI. Finally, financial development measures comprising of deposit interest rate 
(DEPINTR), lending rate (LENDr) and domestic credit to private sector (DCTPS).  
 
 
78 This ratio is measured by dividing the number of MFI borrowers by the respective population below the poverty 
line. Or simply, the ratio of MFI borrowers to population in poverty. 
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A new addition to the literature for MFIs is the utilisation of a measure of the information 
environment measured by public credit registry (PUBCREDREG). This measure employed to 
capture the efficiency of the information sharing environment is a new addition to the literature 
on MFIs in SSA. It is gleaned that this measure will reveal interesting findings in regions (like 
SSA), which predominantly have less efficient information asymmetry in credit markets.  
 
The recent rise in the use and avocation of technology (especially mobiles) as an effective 
tool to combat financial exclusion has gained traction in recent years, specifically when 
considering the strides made in Kenya and Much of East-Africa with the emergence of mobile 
money as a means to transact financial transactions across end-users. This has also been 
accelerated by the uptake of mobile phones within the sub-Saharan region. It is estimated that 
the mobile penetration rate now is amongst the best (if not the best) in the world. Whilst 
advocates have often championed the take-up of mobile technology in order to increases the 
financial inclusion in Africa, opponents are weary of the un-preparedness of the continent for 
such a technological shift, bearing in mind the potential backlash of such79.  
 
Whist it is clear that mobile money technology has made inroads within societies and 
countries within SSA, the extent of this impact is yet to be captured by empirical data on SSA. 
Therefore, in order to capture the impact of this phenomenon, the use of WB WDI data on 
Mobile Cellular subscription per 100 adults has bene identified to examine this effect. It is 
expected that this will be positive for financial inclusion because the higher the mobile 
subscribers, the ease of reach of financial inclusion in such an environment. Other control 
variables considered include the use of Population Density (POPDENS – people per square km 
of land area, hundreds), which has been found to influence the take-up and use of financial 
services. The rationale being, the more densely populated, the higher the need for financial 
services (Chikalipah 2017). The above two variables cater for Geographical and Technological 
factors. The variable Table 5.2 below presents a detailed description of each of the variables 
that was employed in the model specification for this study.
 
 
79 For instance, mass-big-brother surveillance, cybersecurity concerns, data breaches and general online etiquette, 
regulatory expertise and ethical considerations like misuse of data and non-existent protection of data often 
lacking in the continent. 
171 
 
Table of Variables (Independent Variables) 
Variable Description Measure Source 
    
STUDY I & II FIRM SPECIFIC MEASURES   
    
Profitability Measures MFI ability to utilise shareholder resources and obtain a return on 
these resources Return on Asset (ROA) The MIX 
Efficiency Indicates MFI ability to efficiently utilise resources in its core mission Cost Per Borrower (CPB) The MIX 
Portfolio Quality Indicates the health of an MFIs loan books PAR>30 days The MIX 
Social  Measures the Social performance of MFIs. In particular, MFIs ability to 
lend to female borrowers  
Percentage of Female Borrowers 
(PFB) 
The MIX 
Depth  Measures the depth of MFI borrowing. Specifically, their reach down the 
poverty ladder (down the pyramid) 
Average Loan Balance Per Borrower 
(ALPB) 
The MIX 
Breadth Measures MFIs breadth of reach. Specifically, how far along the poverty 
spectrum can the MFIs reach Number of Active Borrowers (NAB) The MIX 
Asset Tangibility Measures the total tangible assets of MFIs as relates to MFI Total Asset Ratio of Net Total Fixed Asset to TA The MIX 
Size Measures the Size of MFI Natural Log of TA The MIX 
Age Captures MFI Age MFI Age The MIX 
    
 INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES   
    
Strength of Investor 
Protection (SOIP) 
Measures the strength of investor protection by existing governance 
frameworks 
Index score between 1 and 10 
WB Creditor 
Rights Index 
   
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(ENFCON) Measures the strength of contract enforcement by countries in the sample Percentile rank 1 to 100 WB WGI Index 
Political Stability 
(POLSTAB) 
Political Stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the 
likelihood 
Percentile rank 1 to 100 WB WGI Index 
 
of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including 
terrorism.   
Government Effectiveness 
(GOVEFF) 
Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures 
Percentile rank 1 to 100 WB WGI Index 
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The quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of 
governments commitment to such policies   
Rule of Law (ROL) Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have  
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular  Percentile rank 1 to 100 WB WGI Index 
 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.   
Corruption Control 
(CRRPTNCTRL) 
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand  
Percentile rank 1 to 100 WB WGI Index 
 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests.    
    
 ECONOMIC FREEDOMS INDEX   
    
Monetary Freedom (MONF) Captures price stability and the intervention of the micro-economy. Percentile rank 1 to 100 
Heritage 
Freedoms Index 
Trade Freedom (TRADEF) 
Quantifies the extent to which tariff and nontariff barriers affect imports and 
exports of goods and services into and out of the country 
Percentile rank 1 to 100 
Heritage 
Freedoms Index 
Investment Freedom (INVF) 
Analyses how free or constrained is the flow of investment capital of 
individuals and firms. 
Percentile rank 1 to 100 
Heritage 
Freedoms Index 
    
 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS   
    
Deposit Interest Rate Measures Deposit rate for sample countries Deposit Interest rate annualised WB WGI Index 
Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector 
Captures Credit to Private Sector by other financial institutions including 
banks 
Credit to Private Sector including other 
financial institutions 
WB WGI Index 
    
 MACRO INDICATORS   
    
Real Interest rate (nominal) 
Normalized (duration and rolling over method) rate of interest without 
adjusting for inflation, opportunity and transaction costs 
Real interest rate (annualised) WB WGI Index 
Inflation Captures annualised inflation in sample countries  Inflation rate  WB WGI Index 
Income Indicators    
Gross National income 
growth (GNIg) 
Measures National Income growth for sample countries GNI growth WB WGI Index 
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STUDY III FINANCIAL INCLUSION   
MFPENRATE 
Microfinance penetration rate: This measures the penetration of MF.  
MFI Borrowers/Working age 




GNIg Gross National income measures the Income per capital in the sample GNI measure WB WDI 
LENDr Measures the lending rate within the sample countries Prevailing lending rate WB WDI 
DEPr 
Measures the deposit rate for banks and financial institutions within the 
sample countries 
Prevailing deposit interest rate WB WDI 
  
  
MOBSUBP100 Mobile subscription per 100,000  Mobile penetration score IMF FAS 
    
PUBCREDREG 
Financial development indicator, measuring the depth of public credit 
registry, financial and credit information gathering and storing Public registry strength score IMF FAS 
    
POPDENS Measures the population density per sq. km of the sample countries Population density measure WB WDI 
Findex (Financial index), MFPENRATE (microfinance penetration rate), CORRCTRL (corruption control), INF (inflation), GNIg (gross national income growth), LENDr 
(lending rate), DEPr (deposit rate), DCTPS (domestic credit to private sector) MOBSUBP100 (mobile subscription per 100,000), PUBCREDREG (public credit registry), 
POPDENS (population density). IMF FAS (International Monetary Fund Financial Access Survey), WB WDI (World Bank World Development Index). 
Table 5.2: Independent Variable Table Description
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5.2 ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY, ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND MODEL 
SPECIFICATION 
The nature of the data obtained dictates the nature of the analysis to be employed in achieving 
the broad aims and objectives, undertaken by the researcher on this research project. The 
proposed data analysis will be carried out within a panel data framework. This is because, panel 
data provides greater number of data points, and hence, more/additional degrees of freedom 
(Delcoure 2007). Furthermore, panel data models examine group (individual-specific) effects, 
time effects, or both in order to deal with heterogeneity or individual unobserved effects 
(Baltagi 2001). 
 
Panel approaches often involves a range of methods, form the basic estimator such as, a 
pooled OLS estimator to the dynamic models used for analysing panel data (Kyereboah 2007). 
However, the choice of an appropriate technique for estimating the basic model is dependent 
on the structure of the error term, and the correlation between the components of the error term 
and the observed explanatory variables. DiNardo and Johnston (1997) argue that pooled OLS 
estimators ignore the panel nature of the dataset. Thereby, treating observations as being 
uncorrelated for a given firm, leading to homoskedastic errors across individual time periods. 
Hsiao, (2003), suggest two techniques to render these effects negligible and/or unobservable. 
Firstly, reducing the number of parameters for estimation, in order to justify the treatment of 
individual fixed effects (FE) as drawn from some distribution, making the parameters of this 
distribution the parameters for estimation. As the unobservable effects are therefore included 
in the error term, the variance-covariance matrix of the resulting errors transforms to obtain 
consistent estimates of standard error. In this case, the random effects (RE) estimator becomes 
the most appropriate. However, if the unobservable effects included in the error term are 
correlated with some or all of the regressors, the RE estimation becomes inconsistent. 
McManus (2011) suggest employing a FE estimation approach in the case of this eventuality. 
This technique employs the use of dummy variables to be included for each firm (or variables 
within the analysis), and yields consistent estimates regardless of correlation between firm-
specific error components and the employed regressors, however, Hsiao (2003) notes that the 
FE approach is less efficient than the RE estimation approach. 
  
In order to decide an appropriate estimation approach, the Hausman specification test is 
recommended.  Hausman (1978) advocates an approach, which tests whether individual effects 
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are correlated with the regressors. A null hypothesis of orthogonality (no correlation) between 
individual effects and explanatory variables, suggest both RE and FE are consistent, but the 
RE estimator is efficient, while the FE is not. However, under the alternative hypothesis 
(correlation between individual effects and the explanatory variables), the RE estimator is 
inconsistent, and the FE estimator is consistent and efficient.   
																																				" = (%& −	%()*+	,-.(%() − ,-.(%&)/	(%& −	%()	    (5.3) 
In estimating the appropriate model for the proposed analysis, the Hausman specification test 
is carried out and hence, a choice made between the RE and FE methods for estimations, 
 
In addition, the proposed panel data to be employed within this study incorporates 
information from both cross-section and time-series variables, this diminishes the problems 
that arise with omitted-variables, as there is a likelihood that capital structure models will not 
be fully specified. For example, variables related to tax such as; non-debt tax shields, tax 
impact, and dividends80 remains uncaptured, due to the nature of MFIs (Cohen 2003).  It is in 
this light that the basic model follows that of Delcoure (2006). 
 
5.2.1 Model Composition and Selection (Study1) 
In order to estimate the first relationship (determinants of capital structure of MFIs), the model 
employed takes the form of a panel data regression model following the work of Miyajima et 
al. (2004), Delcoure (2006), and Kyereboah-Coleman (2007).  
The general form of the model is specified as: 
Yit = α+βXit +μit      (5.4) 
 
However, specifically for this study the panel regression model, is specified as follows: 
 
																																							012,4
(5) = 	6( +	82,4* 62 + 92,4     (5.5) 
 
 
80 Research by Bhaduri (2002) suggest that if a firm is successfully able to signal its quality to outsiders, it can 
avoid an information premium, and hence, (the firm is able to) gain access to external sources of funds. John 
and John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) further argue that firms with reputations for paying 
constant streams of dividends face less asymmetric information when entering the equity market. Hence if 
dividends presents a signal for sound financial health, this would influence the capital structure choice of firms. 
MFIs are peculiar financial entities with non-issuance of dividends as a result of their structures, hence 
availability of dividend information is non-existent.  
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The subscript i denotes the cross-sectional dimension and t represents the time-series 
dimension of the available dataset. 
 
012,4
(5) is a measure of debt ratios for the :th firm at time t, representing one of three debt 
ratios, as suggested by the literature. Whilst Titman and Wessels (1998) use three main debt 
ratios, this study aims to employ two leverage measures specifically as related to the MFI 
sector. 012,4
(5) represents the dependent variable: in this case, the Capital structure of MFIs, 
measured by Leverage (LEV) and Donated Equity (DONEQ). 
 
According to Tor (2003) MFIs possess unique funding components, applicable only to these 
hybrid institutions. Hence, capturing these variables will shed new light/information on the 
literature of the funding of MFIs especially in SSA. The leverage component (the left side of 
the equation model) will therefore, be further dissipated into Deposits (DEP) and Borrowings 
(BRRWNGS). Deposits represent the obligations by MFIs to pay-out when requested by 
clients, whilst borrowings consists of various dated maturity borrowings used to fund MFIs 
operations. 
 
6( denotes the intercept, 82,4*  is a 1 x K vector of observations on k explanatory variables for 
firm i at time t, 6& is a K x 1 vector of parameters, and 92,4 is the disturbance term defined as: 
																																															92,4 = 	 ;2 +	<2,4       (5.6) 
 
Where ;2	represents the unobservable individual effects and <2,4 the residual. 
The empirical model therefore takes the form: 
 	
012,4
(5) = 	6( + 6&=2,4 + 6>02,4 + 6?82,4 + 6@A2,4 + 6BC2,4 + 6DE2,4 + 6FG2,4 + 92,4 (5.5) 
 
X represents firm level determinants of capital structure namely; Size, Age, ROA, Asset 
Tangibility and Risk. 
D (vector of variables) represents variables from the World Bank’s doing business index. These 
include; Strength of Investor Protection (SOIP), Enforcing Contracts (ENFCON). 
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Z (vector of variables) represents financial development variables form the WBs world 
governance index. These include; Deposit Interest Rate (DEPINTR), and Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (DCTPS). 
 
M (vector of variables) represents macro-economic variables from WBs macroeconomic 
index/list. These measures include; Gross National Income (GNIg), Inflation (INF), and Real 
interest rates (REALINT). 
 
P (vector of variables) represents variables measuring the economic freedoms of countries in 
SSA, obtained from the Heritage foundation. Measures include; Monetary Freedom (MONF), 
Trade Freedom (TRADEF), Financial Freedoms (FINF). 
 
Q (vector of variables) represents variables from the WBs Governance Index. This index 
measures the quality of governance and corruption levels of countries in SSA. Measures for 
the corruption index include; Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF), Rule of Law (ROL), 
Corruption Control (CRPTCTRL). 
 
Finally, K (vector of variables) represents MFI firm level control variables. These include; 
Regulation, MFI Type, MFI Year dummy, and MFIs profit status.  
 
5.2.2 Model Construction (Study II) 
Empirical studies examining the impacts of capital structure on performance often employ 
models of regression of the dependent variable (MFI performance variables) against selected 
explanatory variables. In order to examine the impacts of capital structure on the observed 
dependent variables, this research project utilizes a panel data, and expands on the chosen 
regression specification by including regional variables, and selected dummy variables, to 
achieve the stated aim of this research project. 
The panel data model therefore takes the form below: 
 
H24 = 	I24 +	6JK,24 +	6LMNO24 +	6P024 +	6A-Q.R24 +	6SRTU.RV24 +	924 (5.7) 
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 	W24	represents measures of MFI performance (social and financial), 6( represents the 
intercept, 82,4*  is a vector of observations representing various MFI capital structure variables, 
MFI firm characteristic variables, institutional variables, macro-economic variables, and other 
control variables. 
Where 	W24	represents MFI performance (Financial and Social) calculated using various 
measures of financial and social performance indicators to achieve a robust analysis of MFIs 
performance in SSA. MFI firm-specific characteristic are captured by MFI Size, Age and Asset 
Tangibility; Size is measured by the total assets of MFI, Asset Tangibility is measured by the 
total tangible assets as a measure of total assets. LEV is captured by capital structure variables, 
INST is captured by the institutional environmental and business enabling environment 
measures, FD captures financial development (Deposit rate, Domestic credit to Private Sector 
-DCTPS-), Macro captures the macro environment, with measures such as; Inflation, Real rate, 
annual Gross National Income. Control variables include; MFI type, profit status, regulated 
status, and MFI year specific dummy. 
Furthermore, for the leverage measures, this study aims to employ multiple debt ratios (DR) 
within the proposed model specified above to test the hypothesis set-out. The uniqueness of 
MFI data means that the leverage component of MFI borrowing can be dissipated into short-
term, long-term and total leverage. These variables will be utilized, in order to shed light on 
the impact of various forms of MFI borrowing on MFI performance.  
Hence 6JK, = 1, 2, and 3 denoting the measures of debt identified for the second study 
identified for this research project. Specifically, these measures are: 
Short-term debt to TA  (6JK, =1) 
Long-term debt to TA  (6JK, =2) 
Total debt to TA   (6JK, =3)  
 
The type of data available largely influences the choice of model, in addition to the aims 
and objectives identified for this study. To this end, model 1 is constructed to investigate the 
impact of capital structure and the institutional environment on the performance of MFIs (using 
a measurement of microfinance financial and social performance).
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5.2.3 Model Construction (Study III) 
The type of data available largely influences the choice of model, in addition to the aims and objectives 
identified for this study. To this end, equation model 12 below is constructed to investigate the impact 
of microfinance (using a measurement of microfinance penetration rate) on financial inclusion (using a 
measure of financial inclusion index). 
 
H24 = 	I24 +	6APL24 +	6LMNO24 +	6P024 +	6A-Q.R24 +	6XYR&OYQℎ24 +	6SRTU.RV24 +
	924 (5.8) 
 
Where Yit is the measure of financial inclusion calculated using measures of banking, financial 
services demand and supply indicators to achieve a robust index of financial inclusion across 
countries. MFI is captured by the MFI penetration rate, INST is captured by the institutional 
factors, FD captures financial development indicators, Macro captures the macro environment. 
In addition, income is captured by GNIk. Geographical and Technological factors include 
population density and mobile subscriptions per 100 adults. Finally, CONTROL captures other 
variables deemed to be of impact to financial inclusion. 
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5.3 PANEL DATA: PRE AND POST ESTIMATION TESTS 
This section presents the pre regression tests introduced to access the data’s commonality with 
the methods chosen for modelling the data identified for this analysis. Key tests include the F-
test for Fixed Effect, the Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, the Hausman test, and time 
fixed effects test (Testparm). Other tests such as tests for Multicollinearity and 
Heteroscedasticity in addition to Chow-test for Poolability have also been identified/applied. 
 
5.3.1 Multicollinearity test  
According to Hair (2011), highly correlated values of two or more variables, might affect the 
estimation of the regression parameters. Therefore, in order to identify any instance of 
Multicollinearity, the Variance inflation Factor (VIF), is employed, following the form 
(Wooldridge 2001):  
,LP = 	 &
&\]^_
     (5.9) 
 
Where: 14> is the unadjusted R2 when values of Xi are regressed against all the other 
independent variables in the model. Theory aligns that if the VIF result is bigger than 10, 
collinearity exist (Gujarati 2003) 
 
The tables below summarises the results of the Multicolinerarity test using VIF values for the 
three identified studies. 
 
Study 1 Models Multicolinearity Test (VIF) 
(if VIF<10, there is no Multicolinearity 
problem) 
Model 01 (BORROWING) Mean VIF = 2.10 
Model 02 (LEV) Mean VIF = 2.10 
Model 03 (DEPOSIT) Mean VIF = 2.10 
Model 04 (DONEQ) Mean VIF = 2.10 
 
LEV: Leverage, DONEQ: Donated Equity 
Table 5.3: Multicolinearity Test (Study1) 
 
STUDY II Multicolinearity Test (VIF) 
(if VIF<10, there is no Multicolinearity problem) 
Model 01 (OSS) Mean VIF = 2.08 
Model 02 (ROA) Mean VIF = 2.06 
Model 03 (PAR30) Mean VIF = 2.09 
Model 04 (CPB) Mean VIF = 2.02 
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Model 05 (PFB) Mean VIF = 2.07 
Model 06 (ALBPB) Mean VIF = 2.06 
Model 07 (NAB) Mean VIF = 2.05 
  
OSS: operational Self-Sufficiency, ROA: Return on Asset, PAR30: Portfolio at Risk falling within 
30 days, CPB: Cost per Borrower, PFB: Percent of Female Borrowers, ALBPB: Average Loan 
balance per Borrower, NAB: Number of Active Borrowers 
Table 5.4: Multicolinearity Test (Study II) 
 
STUDY III Multicolinearity Test (VIF) 
(if VIF<10, there is no Multicolinearity 
problem) 
Model 01 (Financial Index) Mean VIF = 1.59 
Table 5.5: Multicolinearity Test (Study III) 
 
The outcome of the above VIF tests suggests that the levels of multicollinearity within the 
models estimated for the analysis appear to be at minor levels. Studies often suggest that values 
above 5 – 10 require that other techniques be applied to the model in order to avert a problem 
of spurious results (Wooldridge 2001). In order to obtain the VIF results for this analysis, 
simple regression analysis was conducted  (with dependent variables as MFI capital structure 
variable, MFI performance variables, and Financial Inclusion variable measure). For the MFI 
capital structure determinants and MFI performance study, the above models representing each 
MFI performance variable was then tested for multicollinearity using the stata implemented 
VIF test to determine the instances of multicollinearity within each of the models estimated. 
 
5.3.2 Heteroscedasticity Test 
As part of the pre-model selection test, heteroscedasticity was tested. According to DiNardo 
and Johnston (1997), on assumption of uncorrelated errors, the presence of heteroscedasticity 
could invalidate statistical tests of significance. An initial post-estimation using stata was 
implemented to identify the existence of heteroscedasticity. The results reveal that the 
regression plots indeed have outliers which may influence the outcome of the estimation 
models employed. A next step was to perform a modified Wald test, which was used to test for 





Study 1 Models Modified Wald Test for Groupwise 
Heteroskedasticity 
(if <0.05, there is no Heteroskedasticity) 
Model 01 (BORROWING) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 02 (LEV) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 03 (DEPOSIT) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 04 (DONEQ) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
  
LEV: Leverage, DONEQ: Donated Equity 
Table 5.6: Heteroscedasticity Test (Study I) 
 
Study II Model Results 
Model Modified Wald Test for Groupwise 
Heteroskedasticity 
(if <0.05, there is no Heteroskedasticity) 
Model 01 (OSS) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 02 (ROA) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 03 (PAR30) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 04 (CPB) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 05 (PFB) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 06 (ALBPB) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Model 07 (NAB) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
  
OSS: operational Self-Sufficiency, ROA: Return on Asset, PAR30: Portfolio at Risk falling within 
30 days, CPB: Cost per Borrower, PFB: Percent of Female Borrowers, ALBPB: Average Loan 
balance per Borrower, NAB: Number of Active Borrowers 
Table 5.7: : Heteroscedasticity Test (Study II) 
 
Study III Model Results 
Model Modified Wald Test for Groupwise 
Heteroskedasticity 
(if <0.05, there is no Heteroskedasticity) 
Model 01 (Financial Inclusion Index) Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Table 5.8: : Heteroscedasticity Test (Study III) 
 
Results above largely indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis in the models estimated, using 
the fixed effect command in Stata. This indicates an existence of heteroscedasticity in the 
estimations modelled above. 
 
One method suggested by the literature involves winsorising or trimming outlier values in 
the variables observed. As suggested by research, winsorising has the effect of altering the data 
to the point of biased conclusions, and alterations beyond recognition. However, the researcher 
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avoided amending the data, so as to preserve the integrity of the data, hence performing a 
winsorise of the data was not pursued. Especially as this data is from SSA, caution has been 
taken to accurately preserve the data as such. In the absence of winsorising, so as to trim 
outliers, research suggest/indicates that a potential remedy for this is to robustify the standard 
errors. For instance, robust standard errors and, trims the standard errors and potentially 
eliminates the impact of the presence of heteroscedasticity. Hence, the regression output will 
include a robust estimation so as to account for this. 
 
Other pre and post-estimation panel-data tests have been carried out, and results are 
displayed in the below tables. For instance, studies indicate that in dealing with panel data, a 
choice of estimation of an appropriate model is necessary in order to obtain efficient results. 
The Hausman test was used in determining the choice of either Fixed Effect, or Random Effects 
for estimation purposes. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test was implemented to 
determine the presence of Random Effects. Finally, the Testparm statistical test for potential 
time (influenced) effect was examined. 
 
5.3.3 Model specification tests (≤≥)  









F-Test for fixed 
effects versus OLS 
(if Prob>F ≤ 0.05 = 
Use Fixed Effects) 
Prob>F=0.2545 Prob>F=0.3485 Prob>F=0.0000 Prob>F=0.0080  
Breusch Pagan LM 
test for random effects 
versus OLS  














Hausman test for 
fixed versus random 
effects model  














Testparm (Test for 
Time-Fixed Effects) 
(if ≤ 0.05 = use time 
fixed effects) 
Prob>F=0.0032 Prob>F=0.0033 Prob>F=0.0000 Prob>F=0.0001 USE  Time 
Fixed 
Effects 
Decision Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect  
LEV: Indicates term for Leverage. DONEQ: indicates a term for Donated Equity.  
 




Study II Model Results 















F-Test for fixed 
effects versus OLS 
(if Prob>F ≤ 0.05 = 















Breusch Pagan LM 
test for random 
effects versus OLS  























Hausman test for 
fixed versus random 
effects model  























Testparm (Test for 
Time-Fixed Effects) 
















Decision FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
OSS: operational Self-Sufficiency, ROA: Return on Asset, PAR30: Portfolio at Risk falling within 
30 days, CPB: Cost per Borrower, PFB: Percent of Female Borrowers, ALBPB: Average Loan 
balance per Borrower, NAB: Number of Active Borrowers, RE: Random Effect, FE: Fixed Effect. 
Table 5.10: Specification Tests (Study II) 
 
Study III Model Results 
Specification Test Model 1 
(FINDEX) 
Outcome 
F-Test for fixed effects versus OLS 




Breusch Pagan LM test for random effects 
versus OLS  
(if ≤ 0.05 = use Random Effect) 
Prob>chibar2= 
0.0000 
Reject Null, presence of 
RE 
Hausman test for fixed versus random 
effects model  
(if ≤ 0.05 = use Fixed Effects) 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.0000 
FE more efficient and 
unbiased 
Testparm (Test for Time-Fixed Effects) 
(if ≤ 0.05 = use time fixed effects) 
Prob>F = 
0.0033 
Reject Null, time FE is 
significant (employ Time 
dummies in regression).  
Decision Fixed Effect  Use Time dummies 
FINDEX: An index of financial inclusion variables for financial inclusion analysis. 
Table 5.11: Specification Tests (Study III).
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5.3.4 Testing Fixed and Random Effects 
In order to determine the existence of FE and RE, standard tests of both methods were 
employed in this research. Breusch and Pagan (1980), recommends an F-test for FE. This 
compares a FE model and OLS to determine how much the FE model can improve the 
goodness-of-fit. On the other hand, a RE is examined by LM test. This contrasts an OLS with 
a RE model. 
 
A random effect model reduces the number of parameters to be estimated but will produce 
inconsistent estimates when individual specific random effect is correlated with regressors 
(Greene 2008). Conversely, FE model examines individual differences in intercepts, assuming 
the same slopes and constant variance across individual group/entity. Since an individual 
specific effect is time invariant and considered a part of the intercept, u the assumption of 
exogeneity (that is disturbance term (u), can be correlated with other regressors) is relaxed. 
Furthermore, FE are tested by the F test, whilst the RE are examined by the Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test (breush Pagan 1980). 
 
5.3.5 F-test for Fixed Effects 
A test for unobserved factors is deemed necessary, in order to determine the existence of 
unobserved factors which may exact an (exogenous) influence on the selected regressors. 
Therefore, in a regression of  b24 = - +	;2 + =24	′6 +	924 , the null hypothesis is that all 
dummy parameters except for one for the dropped are all zero, "( ∶ ;2 = ⋯ =	;f\& = 0.  
 
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one dummy parameter is not zero. This hypothesis 
is tested by an F test, which is based on loss of goodness-of-fit. This test contrasts LSDV 
(robust model) with the pooled OLS (efficient model) and examines the extent that the 
goodness-of-fit measures (SSE or1>) changed.  
 









   (5.10) 
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected (at least one group/time specific intercept ui is not zero), 
we may conclude that there is a significant fixed effect or significant increase in goodness-of-
fit in the fixed effect model; therefore, the fixed effect model is better than the pooled OLS. 
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When the collected data is analysed, the F-test result for study 1 indicates the preference of 
FE over OLS in all but one (LEV model) of the four models identified. An indication of the 
appropriateness of FE over OLS is reflected in three of the models above (Borrowing, Deposit 
and Donated Equity Models). The rejection of the null hypothesis in these models indicate that 
a FE model estimation will be more appropriate than OLS. We therefore conclude that FE 
model surpasses the OLS in estimating the models identified above. Results for the second 
study largely indicates similar results, in addition to the results in the third study. This suggests 
the need for Breusch Pagan Test. 
 
5.3.6 Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 
Pre analysis estimations and tests reveal the existence of (or the violation of condition 2 of the 
OLS assumptions)81 correlation between the unobserved unit effects and the regressors. A 
Hausman test was therefore employed in each of the analysis carried out. The result of which 
rejected the null hypothesis of the Hausman estimation tests. Therefore, the FE model of 
estimation was preferred in this instance. 
 
On analysing the data, a further check for robustness/certainty on the type of data was to 
implement/scrutinise the data for random effects present within the data sample. In order to 
check this, the literature suggests the use of the Breusch-Pagans (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test. According to Baltagi (2001), the LM test examines if individual (or time) specific 
variance components are zero. "( ∶ z{> = 0. The LM statistic follows the chi-squared 
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Where: Y̅ is the T x 1 vector of the group means of pooled regression residuals, and Y*Y is 





81 The conditions forming the foundation of estimating a least squares regression are well documented. The 
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If the null hypothesis is rejected, we conclude that there is a significant random effect in the 
panel data, and that the random effect model is able to deal with heterogeneity better than does 
the pooled OLS.  
 
The Breusch Pagan (LM) tests for the randomality of observations in data, by testing for 
serial correlation in the observed data. The null hypothesis is  
H0: ρ1 = 0  (5.13) 
HA: ρ1 ≠ 0.   (5.14) 
Under the null, pooled OLS regression estimation is appropriate. Conversely, under the 
alternative hypothesis, random-effect model is appropriate. 
 
In the first model, all estimations indicate the rejection of the null, indicting existence the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. We therefore reject the null in most equations, confirming the 
appropriateness of RE estimation technique over OLS. 
 
5.3.7 Hausman Test for Comparing Fixed and Random Effects 
The Hausman specification test compares fixed and random effect models under the null 
hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with any regressor in the model (Hausman, 
1978). If the null hypothesis of no correlation is not violated, LSDV and GLS are consistent, 
but LSDV is inefficient; otherwise, LSDV is consistent but GLS is inconsistent and biased 
(Greene, 2008: 208). The estimates of LSDV and GLS should not differ systematically under 
the null hypothesis. The Hausman test uses that “the covariance of an efficient estimator with 
its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero” (Greene, 2008). 
 
JA{ = (%ÖÜáà −	%âäfãå5)*çé \&(%ÖÜáà −	%âäfãå5)	~		Ä>(i)  (5.15) 
 
Where çé  = ,-.[%ÖÜáà − %âäfãå5] = ,-.(%ÖÜáà) − ,-.(%âäfãå5) is the difference in the 
estimated covariance matrices of LSDV (robust model) and GLS (efficient model). This test 
statistic follows the chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom. 
 
188 
The formula reveals that a Hausman test examines if “the random effects estimate is 
insignificantly different from the unbiased fixed effect estimate” (Kennedy 2008). If the null 
hypothesis of no correlation is rejected, you may conclude that individual effects ui are 
significantly correlated with at least one regressors in the model and thus the random effect 
model is problematic. Therefore, you need to go for a fixed effect model rather than the random 
effect counterpart. Although, a drawback of this Hausman test is, that the difference of 
covariance matrices W may not be positive definite; Then, we may conclude that the null is not 
rejected assuming similarity of the covariance matrices renders such a problem (Greene, 2008). 
 
The Hausman tests is therefore, a choice to decide which effect (fixed effect or random 
effect) is more relevant and significant in the panel data. The two hypothesis for the Hausman 
test are stated in equation 5.16 and 5.17 below.  
"(: SR<(í2, ì24* ) = 0   (5.16) 
"&: SR<(í2, ì24* ) ≠ 0  (5.17) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, fixed effects is consistent and the random effects model is 
efficient, therefore, random effect model is appropriate. Under the alternative hypothesis 
however, fixed effect estimator is also consistent, however, random effect is inconsistent, and 
therefore, the fixed effect model is appropriate. Hence, if we obtain a statistically significant 
P-value, we employ the fixed-effects model, otherwise we employ the random effect model. 
 
As indicated in the results output table, the tests carried out indicates a preference for FE for 
all the models in study I, II and III. 
 
 
5.4 MODEL COMPARISON AND CHOICE 
5.4.1 First Difference, Fixed Effect or Random Effect 
The choice of model for use in attaining the aims and objectives of this project, largely depends 
on the data type and specification of the data collected (Kyereboah 2007). This study utilises 
panel-data for determining the (and identifying) the impact of institutional quality on the capital 
structure MFIs within the SSA region, for the period 2004-2016. This data contains 38 country 
data points and 345 sample data points across sections. Utilising panel data eliminates the need 
for OLS and Pooled OLS (hereafter POLS) for its analysis, as they (OLS and POLS models) 
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suffer from deficient estimates because of its simplicity (Baltagi 2006). However, the presence 
(existence) of unobserved effects in such a high-level data suggest the existence of unobserved 
effects. Furthermore, the use of controls and lags may not fully examine the panel-data 
collected. Therefore, a model accommodating unobserved effects becomes ideal. 
 
5.4.2 Fixed Effect Estimation 
Park (2011) identify two key strategies for estimating a fixed effect model; the within and least 
squares dummy variable models. Whilst the within estimation does not favour the use of 
dummy variables, the least squares dummy variable model (LSDV) employs the use of dummy 
variable in determining the individual group effects in the observed sample. Furthermore, these 
models produce the identical parameter estimates for regressors (non-dummy independent 
variables), whilst the between estimation fits a model using individual or time means of 
dependent and independent variables without dummies. 
 
Research suggest that LSDV with a dummy dropped out of a set of dummies is widely used 
because it is relatively easy to estimate and interpret substantively. This LSDV, however, 
becomes problematic when there are many individuals (or groups) in panel data. If T is fixed 
and n→∞ (n is the number of groups or firms and T is the number of time periods), parameter 
estimates of regressors are consistent but the coefficients of individual effects, α + ui, are not 
(Baltagi, 2001). The panel data observed/collected for this research project comprises of many 
individual samples of MFIs across 48 SSA countries. An estimation using the LSDV, 
therefore/implies that the estimation becomes problematic, because of the shortcomings of the 
LSDV model. According to Baltagi (2001), in a short panel (in essence with a small section of 
individual units), the LSDV model includes a large number of dummy variables. Therefore, 
the number of parameters to be estimated increases as n increases. Under the circumstances of 
a large panel data with large number of individual units, the LSDV loses n degrees of freedom 
and returns less efficient estimators. This shortcoming therefore renders the LSDV inefficient. 
  
Unlike LSDV, the “within” estimation does not need dummy variables, but it uses 
deviations from group (or time period) means. That is, “within” estimation uses variation 
within each individual or entity instead of a large number of dummies. The “within” estimation 
is,17 
(b24 −	bï2•) = (	ó24 −	 ó̅2•)*6 + (924 −	92̅•)	  (5.18) 
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Where bï2• is the mean of dependent variable of individual (group) ὶ, ó̅2• represents the means 
of independent variables of group ὶ, and 92̅• is the mean of errors of group ὶ. 
 
In this “within” estimation, the incidental parameter problem is no longer an issue. The 
parameter estimates of regressors in the “within” estimation are identical to those of LSDV. 
The “within” estimation reports correct the sum of squared errors (SSE). The “within” 
estimation, however, has several disadvantages. 
 
First, data transformation for “within” estimation wipes out all time-invariant variables (e.g., 
gender, citizenship, and ethnic group) that do not vary within an entity (Kennedy, 2008: 284). 
Since deviations of time-invariant variables from their average are all zero, it is not possible to 
estimate coefficients of such variables in “within” estimation. Consequently, we have to fit 
LSDV when a model has time-invariant independent variables. 
 
Secondly, a “within” estimation produces incorrect statistics. Since no dummy is used, the 
within effect model has larger degrees of freedom for errors, accordingly reporting small mean 
squared errors (MSE), standard errors of the estimates (SEE) or square root of mean squared 
errors (SRMSE), and incorrect (smaller) standard errors of parameter estimates. Hence, we 







   (5.19) 
 
Third, 1> of the “within” estimation is not correct because the intercept term is suppressed. 
Finally, the “within” estimation does not report dummy coefficients. We have to compute them, 
if really needed, using the formula. 
¢2∗ = 	bï2• − ó̅2• 6* 	.      (5.20) 
 
Finally, the “between group” estimation, so called the group mean regression, uses variation 
between individual entities (groups). Specifically, this estimation calculates group means of 
the dependent and independent variables and thus reduces the number of observations down to 
n. Then, run OLS on these transformed, aggregated data: 
bï2• = 	- + ó̅2• + 92		.      (5.21) 
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5.4.3 Testing for Time-Fixed Effects (Testparm) 
When implementing a fixed effects model, a joint test to ascertain the impact of year dummies 
is advised (Torres-Reyna 2007). A test for the significance of time when running a fixed model 
determines whether the time dummies for all observed periods are equal to zero. In this 
instance, no time fixed effects are needed. However, if the Prob>F is equal or less than 0.05, 
the null hypothesis is rejected. Yearly coefficients are therefore not jointly equal to zero and, 
thus, time fixed effects have to be included in the model. 
 
 
5.5 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
Pre-analysis observations. 
The data analysis employed follows a quantitative approach. The data summary (Table 6.1) places 
the observable data points at over 3,000 data points. When data is grouped according to MFIs ID, the 
observation indicates 722 groups. This is expected because MFIs have multiple observations within 
the sample of data observed. Finally, the data collected spans from 2004-2016 as shown by the 
descriptive statistics by year (Table 5.12: MFI Summary Statistics (By Year: 2004-2016) 
 below). 
 
According to Baltagi (2001) for use in analysing panel data two techniques can be 
employed: Fixed Effect and Random Effect model. The FE model assumes that 
individual/group effects may impact the explanatory variable, whilst, the RE model assumes a 
random and uncorrelated variation across entities and the explanatory variables employed in 
the model. Where the slope of both FE and RE remains the same, the treatment of the 
unobserved effects are applied to the constant term in the FE model, whilst this is within the 
error variance change of the RE model. However, based on the output of the Hausman test 
specifications, the FE method of estimation was employed to determine the institutional factors 
influencing MFIs capital structure. Furthermore, in order to satisfy the objectives of this 
research, multiple regressions on the observed variable (capital structure) was employed, with 
various assumptions about the relationships of the variables (see hypothesis formation). In 
addition to statistical techniques (measures of central tendency and dispersion), STATA 13 was 
employed to test the relationship between the explanatory variables and the explained variable. 
Measures of central tendency and dispersion such as; frequencies, minimum and maximum 
values, mean and standard deviations were instrumental in painting an initial picture of the 
nature of the data obtained. 
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The output reveals the descriptive statistics of 3,228 MFIs in SSA from the year 2004 to 
2016. The observation reveals some normality in the form of a relative spread across all 
observed years. 
 
SSA MFI data by year 
 Overall Between Within 
Fiscal Year Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Percent 
2004 201 6.23 201 27.84 21.08 
2005 253 7.84 253 35.04 20.06 
2006 265 8.21 265 36.7 19.71 
2007 269 8.33 269 37.26 19.21 
2008 288 8.92 288 39.89 19.5 
2009 342 10.59 342 47.37 21.91 
2010 324 10.04 324 44.88 21.4 
2011 312 9.67 312 43.21 26.52 
2012 307 9.51 307 42.52 32.94 
2013 204 6.32 204 28.25 22.32 
2014 171 5.3 171 23.68 22.32 
2015 174 5.39 174 24.1 20.91 
2016 118 3.66 118 16.34 17.47 
Total 3228 100 3228 447.09 22.37 
  (n=722)    
Table 5.12: MFI Summary Statistics (By Year: 2004-2016) 
 
The statistical analysis initially employed a simple OLS regression, however, this was only 
a first step to accessing the appropriate model for the data. In addition, this helped to give the 
researcher an idea of the properties of the sample population. The results obtained from the 
initial OLS analysis show a deviation from standard theoretical positions of capital structure 
influences on firm characteristics. For instance, Age and Asset tangibility (AT), under the OLS 
model reveals a negative relationship with leverage. Age was also negative and significant. 
However profitability captured by ROA is negative in line with theory. Risk has a positive 
influence, and institutional variables show a mixed result. However, these results are not to be 
taken in serious context, because the OLS regression technique is known to be biased and 
inefficient when analysing panel data. The nature of panel data suggest that the appropriateness 
of OLS presents inefficient estimates when employed with panel data analysis (Baltagi 2001).
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5.5.1 SSA Summary Statistics 
The region of SSA comprises of 4 regions namely; West, East, Central and Southern Africa. 
These regions comprise of a total of 42 countries. However, other islands lay in an around the 
ambits of the SSA region. A breakdown of the territories and countries within the SSA can be 
gleaned from the table below. 
 
SSA by REGIONS 
EAST  WEST CENTRAL  SOUTH 
Burundi Benin Angola Botswana 
Comoros Burkina Faso Cameroon Lesotho 
Djibouti Cape Verde Central African Republic Namibia 
Eritrea Cote d'Ivoire Chad South Africa 
Ethiopia Gambia, The Congo, Dem. Rep. Swaziland 
Kenya Ghana Congo, Rep. Zambia 
Madagascar Guinea Equatorial Guinea Zimbabwe 
Malawi Guinea-Bissau Gabon  
Mauritius Liberia Sao Tome and Principe  
Mozambique Mali   
Rwanda Mauritania   
Seychelles Niger   
Somalia Nigeria   
South Sudan Senegal   
Sudan Sierra Leone   
Tanzania Togo   
Uganda    
    
Table 5.13: SSA Countries by Region 
Source: Authors Own 
 
As evident from the table, some regions of the continent exhibit more countries in 
comparison to other regions. For example, West Africa has a total of 19 countries, followed by 
Southern Africa with 10. East Africa has a total of 9, whilst 5 countries inhabit the central 
region. 
 
Within SSA, 43 countries occupy the mainland, 49 occupy the mainland and island regions, 
whilst 51 countries occupy the mainland, island territories, and other territories. The total 
sample size comprised of 38 countries (including island territories), making the data collected 
representative of 38 out of 49 countries (not including foreign territories), this amounts to 778 
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MFIs within the sample. The individual data points however (without grouping data by 
individual MFI id’s) amount to 3845 observations. However, as a result of missing variables 
and observations for certain variables employed for this analysis, the full observation does not 
apply. For example where the age of MFIs observed in the sample contain the full sample size 
of observations (3845 obs), another variable such as the observed leverage comprises of 3488 
observations. Hence, 357 observations dropped by Stata when employing the above variables 
for analysis.
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Chapter 6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS:MFI FUNDING AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
6.1.1 Objectives of Study 
Specifically: a) To identify the MFI specific characteristics that determines the capital structure 
decisions of MFIs in SSA.  
b) To identify specific institutional environmental influences on the capital structure of MFIs 




Summary Statistics Study 1: Institutional Determinants of MFI capital structure. 
An initial descriptive data summation from STATA reveals that the sample comprises of 778 
individual cross sections (i) with 12 time periods (t). The frequency distribution table is shown 
below with individual variable summary statistics of variables in Table 5.782. 
 
Study Variables Summary Statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Leverage 2,903 0.6705 0.8659 0 40.41 
BRWNGTBVA 2,903 0.3070 0.8890 -4.87 40.41 
Donated Equity 2,903 0.0731 0.2218 -0.57 3.46 
DEPTBVA 2,903 0.3636 0.3716 0 5.70 
Log of Assets 2,903 15.0522 2.1858 2.94 22.18 
Return on Asset 2,555 -0.0170 0.1374 -2.47 0.8429 
Asset Tangibility 2,903 0.0688 0.0837 0 1 
PAR30 2,649 0.0808 0.1867 0 6.84 
Age 3,228 2.2875 0.8947 0 3 
SOIP 3,022 3.5462 2.1157 0 8 
ENFCON 3,225 48.8350 11.6698 0 66.17 
GOVEFF 3,145 -0.6839 0.4569 -2.17 0.6648 
ROL 3,145 -0.6753 0.4484 -1.84 0.3666 
CORRPTNCTRL 3,145 -0.6542 0.4613 -1.71 0.8298 
 
 
82 BRWNGTBVA (Borrowing); DONEQ (Donated Equity); DEPTBVA (Deposit); Lna (Log Natural of Assets); 
ROA (Return on Asset); AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (portfolio at risk falling due in 30days); SOIP (Strength 
of Investor Protection); ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts); GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness); ROL (Rule of 
Law); CORRPTNCTR (Corruption Control); MONF (Monetary Freedom); TRADEF (Trade Freedom); FINF 
(Financial Freedom); GNIg (Gross National Income growth); INF (Inflation); REALINT (Real interest rate); 
DEPINTR (Deposit interest rate); DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector); NonReg (Non-regulated MFI); 
RegD (Regulated); NonP (Non Profit); Prof (For Profit MFIs) CreditU (Credit Union); MNO (Mobine Network 
Operator); NBFI (Non-Bank Financial Institution); NGO (Non-governmental Organisation); RuralB (Rural 
Bank). 
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MONF 3,208 72.3793 13.4292 0 90.4 
TRADEF 3,208 64.9957 11.9889 0 89 
FINF 3,208 43.2793 13.4099 0 70 
GNIg 3,161 5.0271 3.7266 -4.53 19.40 
Inflation 3,160 7.9726 5.5921 0.2336 19.25 
Interest Rate 3,124 4.9067 7.1527 -6.00 22.69 
DEPINTR 3,154 7.4063 3.6399 0 13.63 
DCTPS 3,207 17.6629 16.1012 -6.85 160.12 
New 3,228 0.2066 0.4050 0 1 
Young 3,228 0.2082 0.4061 0 1 
Mature 3,228 0.5548 0.4971 0 1 
Non-Regulated 3,228 0.2144 0.4105 0 1 
Regulated 3,228 0.7856 0.4105 0 1 
Non-Profit 3,228 0.2066 0.4050 0 1 
For Profit 3,228 0.2082 0.4061 0 1 
Bank 3,228 0.1413 0.3483 0 1 
Credit-Union 3,228 0.2928 0.4551 0 1 
MNO 3,228 0.2866 0.4522 0 1 
NBFI 3,228 0.2271 0.4190 0 1 
NGO 3,228 0.0065 0.0804 0 1 
Rural-Bank 3,228 0.0378 0.1907 0 1 
N 3228                  
 
BRWNGTBVA (Borrowing as a ratio of book value of assets), DEPTBVA (Deposits to book value 
of assets), ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), 
SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government 
Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), CORRPTNCTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income 
growth), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). 
 
Control Variables 
Regulation: Non-Regulated (Non Regulated MFIs), Regulated (Regulated MFIs) 
MFI Profit Status: Non-Profit (Non Profit MFIs), For Profit (For Profit MFI) 
MFI Orientation: Credit-Union (Credit Union), MNO (Mobile Network Operator), NBFI (Non Bank 
Financial Institution), NGO (Non Governmental Organisation), Rural-Bank (Rural Bank) 
 
Observation Period: 2004 – 2016. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
In approaching the data analysis for this study, the researcher first performed a correlation 
estimation. According to the literature, performing a correlation analysis, entails obtaining an 
estimation of the correlation coefficient between two or more response variables, or predictor 
variables, and between response and predictor variables) is necessary. A correlation coefficient 
typically defines a range between -1 and +1. Where an estimation/figure closer to 1 denotes a 
positive correlation between the units observed, and an estimation closer to -1 denotes a 
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negative/inverse correlation between the units observed. A correlation analysis therefore 
quantifies the direction and strength of the association between variables employed within the 
study. A simple “correlate” command was employed in STATA to access the correlation of the 
observed variables. 
 
In order to perform the required multiple regression analysis for the sample collected, choice 
of an appropriate estimation methodology was dependent on the structure of the error term (and 
the correlation between the components of the error term and the observed explanatory 
variables). In addition, the nature of the data suggest the type of analysis to perform. The data 
collected for this analysis was of a panel data nature, hence, panel data estimation techniques 
have been employed. 
 
 
6.3 RESULTS DISCUSSION 
6.3.1 Deposit Model 
Deposits as an integral input of the capital structure of MFIs have been regularly documented 
in the literature. For instance, Tor (2003) suggest that deposits improves the capital structure 
of MFIs, in addition to representing a relatively cheap source of financing MFI loan portfolio, 
deposits could also improve long-term sustainability of MFIs. Current consensus indeed 
amongst researchers is of the belief that the ability of MFI to mobilise deposits could be the 
solution to their long-term move away from other types of uncertain funding such as; donor 
and grant funding (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz 2004). However, the ability of MFIs to 
mobilise deposits often depends on the prevailing regulatory environment in their operating 
environment. 
 
Results for the deposit model seems to confirm current literature suggestion on the 
importance of deposit funding. The fixed effect model reveals a highly significant and positive 
impact on the firm-specific MFI variables namely: Size, MFI Age, and the measure of Tangible 
Asset (TA). This is to be expected, because the more deposits an MFI can mobilise, the better 
it’s able to achieve its mission objectives. In addition, this enables the MFI to grow (Size) and 
expand its asset base (TA). Furthermore, the age variable indicates that MFIs past the new age, 
are better suited to benefit from mobilising deposits. This suggest that experience of age is a 
determining factor in the ability of MFIs to mobilise deposits. This could be a screening tool 
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by regulators, in the sense that older MFIs are better trusted to properly manage client’s 
deposits. This is confirmed in the data, that new MFIs are more likely to fall into difficulty in 
comparison to larger MFIs. The sensitivity factor also means that older MFIs are less sensitive 
to operating difficulties, in comparison to smaller newer MFIs. Furthermore, the measure of 
risk (PAR30), also positively influences deposit taking by MFIs. This is in line with previous 
literature which examines the effects of firm-specific factors on the capital structure of MFIs. 
 
The institutional variables further suggest that a good enabling environment is of benefit for 
MFIs in accessing deposit. For instance, the measure for strength of investor protection (SOIP) 
displays a positive and significant relationship with deposits at the 1% level. This is expected, 
as the existence of a robust mechanism in place to protect investors is a positive signal for 
foreign investors. Other institutional factors are largely mixed in results. For instance, the 
measures for freedom mostly indicate negative albeit insignificant outcomes with deposit. 
However, the measure GOVEFF indicate a positive relationship with MFI deposits. 
 
Factors measuring the financial sector development are worth mentioning. The literature 
suggests that the financial sector acts as a complimentary mechanism to MFI efforts (Vanroose 
and Espallier 2009). The results of this analysis re-affirms that, when financial development 
measures are introduced to the equation model, the results obtained indicates that the 
significant FD measure (in this case domestic credit to private sector (DCTPS) is positive and 
highly significant in explaining the use of deposits by MFIs. 
 
Macroeconomic measures on the other hand, indicate mixed results. The measure for 
income show expected results, while the GNIg indicates a positive relationship with the 
mobilisation of deposits, this could be as a result of increased income levels on the aggregate 
level, influences MFIs ability to mobilise deposit. This could imply that when income increases 
individuals are more likely to use MFI services such as deposits. Inflation and real interest rate 
are both negative and significant, indicating that inflation acts as an eroding factor to clients 
wealth, such that; the higher the inflation the less likely clients are able to save. 
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MFI Deposit Model Fixed Effect Results. 
FE regression Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Deposit Model DEPOSIT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT 
LnA 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
ROA -0.089 -0.113* -0.089 -0.092* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
     
AT 0.759*** 0.736*** 0.759*** 0.756*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
     
PAR30 0.063 0.057 0.063 0.060 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
     
SOIP 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
ENFCON 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
GOVEFF 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.013 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) 
     
ROL -0.037 -0.031 -0.037 -0.039 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) 
     
CORRPTNCT
RL 
-0.014 -0.017 -0.014 -0.009 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
     
MONF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
TRADEF 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
FINF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
GNIg 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
INF -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
REALINT -0.002* -0.003* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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DEPINTR 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
DCTPS 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
New  -0.062***   
  (0.018)   
     
Young   0.002  
   (0.012)  
     
Mature    0.053** 
    (0.017) 
     
_cons -0.950*** -0.797*** -0.949*** -0.882*** 
 (0.144) (0.150) (0.144) (0.145) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.228 0.235 0.228 0.234 
adj. R2 -0.092 -0.083 -0.093 -0.085 
F 23.66 23.22 22.33 23.05 
rmse 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 
df_r 1363 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of 
Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule 
of Law), CORRPTNCTR (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), 
FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), REALINT (Real 
Interest Rate), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector) 
 
Control Variables:  
MFI Age: New, Young, Mature 
 
Study Period: 2004 – 2016. 
Table 6.2: Fixed Effect Deposit Model (Deposit Test Results). 
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6.3.2 Donated Equity Model 
The regression model for donated equity reveals some interesting results. For firm-specific 
influences, the measure of Size (LnA) appears to be significant and negative at the 1% level. 
This suggest that MFIs who are increasing in size, have little need for further donor funding as 
they increase in size, donors often are replaced with other types of financing. This confirms the 
life-cycle theory of MFIs stipulated in (Bogan 2012), which suggest that MFIs change 
financing structure as they grow and evolve. Asset tangibility on the other hand appears to be 
positive and significant, whilst profitability measure is negative and significant in explaining 
MFI use of Donated Equity. The measure for risk is positive, however,  insignificant in 
explaining donated equity in MFIs. The results coefficient (dummy) variable for age further 
confirms this, suggesting that mature MFIs are less likely to use donated equity in comparison 
to new MFIs. 
 
Institutional environmental measures reveal that SOIP (the measure for investor protection) 
is positively significant in explaining the donated equity of MFIs in SSA. Institutional 
environments that actively protects investors enables MFIs to attract positive inflows of funds. 
MONF, and TRADEF all indicate negative and significant relationship with donated equity. 
Conversely financial freedom (FINF) indicates a positive and significant relationship with 
donated equity. GOVEFF is shown to have a negative and significant relationship with 
leverage, whilst corruption control also indicates a negative relationship with donated equity. 
Other institutional variables largely indicate negative relationship albeit insignificant with 
donated equity. 
 
Measures for financial development (DCTPS) is positive and insignificant at the 1% level. 




MFI Donated Equity Fixed Effect Model with Age Variables 
Don. Equity  Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Model DONEQ DONEQ DONEQ DONEQ 
Size -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
ROA -0.147** -0.154** -0.159*** -0.144** 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
     
AT 0.247* 0.240* 0.235* 0.250* 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) 
     
PAR30 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.072 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
     
SOIP 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
ENFCON -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
GOVEFF -0.126* -0.127* -0.128* -0.125* 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
     
ROL 0.070 0.072 0.075 0.072 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
     
C-CTRL -0.052 -0.053 -0.057 -0.056 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
     
MONF -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
TRADEF -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
FINF 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
GNIg 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
INF -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
INT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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D-INTR -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
DCTPS 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
New  -0.0170   
  (0.018)   
     
Young   0.036**  
   (0.013)  
     
Mature    -0.051** 
    (0.017) 
     
_cons 0.806*** 0.848*** 0.814*** 0.742*** 
 (0.149) (0.155) (0.148) (0.150) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.086 0.086 0.091 0.091 
adj. R2 -0.293 -0.293 -0.287 -0.286 
F 7.515 7.145 7.572 7.606 
rmse 0.169 0.169 0.168 0.168 
df_r 1363 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Don. Equity, DONEQ (Donated Equity) 
 
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of 
Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule 
of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF 
(Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Real Interest Rate), D-
INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector) 
 
Control Variables:  
MFI Age: New, Young, Mature 
Study Period: 2004 – 2016. 
Table 6.3: Fixed Effect Donated Equity Model with Age Variables 
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6.3.3 Borrowing Model 
Borrowing is measured by the debt acquired by MFIs on their capital structure. Studies suggest 
that firm-specific factors are responsible for influencing borrowing levels amongst MFIs 
(Tchuigoua 2014). The results however, indicates some new findings. Firm specific factors 
such as Size (LnA), is negative and significant with borrowing. MFIs tend to mobilise internal 
resources as they grow in size, and hence, use substantial internal equity to mobilise their 
operations. The measure of tangibility (tangible assets) when regressed against borrowing 
indicates a negative and insignificant relationship with borrowing. The age dummy further 
highlights the life-cycle theory assertion that New MFIs are less likely to use borrowing in their 
capital structure as compared to Young and Mature MFIs. 
 
The measure of Risk is positive albeit insignificant, suggesting that a positive (high quality) 
portfolio loan book (measured by the portfolio at risk due after 30 days) is positive for MFIs 
ability to borrow funds with credibility. Furthermore, profitability (measured by ROA) appears 
to be positively associated with borrowing, however, this effect is insignificant. When 
institutional factors are regressed against borrowing, the results appear to be mixed, whilst 
institutional indicators show mostly positive influence on borrowing. Specific indicators show 
significant impact. For instance, TRADEF is positive and significant at the 5% level. This 
suggest that creditors are incentivised by the ability of business to trade freely, and this is 
positive for MFI borrowing. Finally, the measures of financial development (DCTPS) indicates 
a positive and insignificant relationship with borrowing. 
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MFI Borrowing Model Results with Age Dummies. 
Borrowing Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Model  BRWNGTBVA BRWNGTBVA BRWNGTBVA BRWNGTBVA 
Size -0.330*** -0.360*** -0.332*** -0.341*** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) 
     
ROA 0.254 0.164 0.239 0.246 
 (0.264) (0.267) (0.265) (0.264) 
     
AT -0.755 -0.841 -0.769 -0.764 
 (0.545) (0.546) (0.546) (0.545) 
     
PAR30 0.229 0.205 0.227 0.221 
 (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) 
     
SOIP 0.0262 0.0259 0.0269 0.0240 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
     
ENFCON 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
GOVEFF -0.009 -0.026 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) 
     
ROL 0.282 0.302 0.287 0.278 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) 
     
C-CTRL -0.136 -0.149 -0.142 -0.126 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.211) (0.211) 
     
MONF -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
TRADEF 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
FINF -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
GNIg 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
INF -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
INT 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
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D-INTR 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
     
DCTPS 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
New  -0.224*   
  (0.102)   
     
Young   0.043  
   (0.072)  
     
Mature    0.126 
    (0.097) 
     
_cons 4.513*** 5.067*** 4.522*** 4.672*** 
 (0.832) (0.868) (0.832) (0.841) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.044 0.048 0.045 0.045 
adj. R2 -0.352 -0.348 -0.352 -0.351 
F 3.718 3.791 3.530 3.606 
rmse 0.944 0.942 0.944 0.943 
df_r 1363 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
BRWNGTBVA (Borrowing to Book Value of Asset) 
 
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of 
Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule 
of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF 
(Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Real Interest Rate), D-
INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector) 
 
Control Variables:  
MFI Age: New, Young, Mature 
Study Period: 2004 – 2016. 
Table 6.4: Fixed Effect Borrowing Results (Fixed Effect Borrowing Model with Age Dummies).
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6.3.4 Leverage Model 
MFI leverage measures the total borrowing and donor funds available to MFIs in SSA. Previous 
studies indicate that leverage is sensitive to firm-specific factors such as size, and asset 
tangibility, however, for MFIs in SSA, this is not clear. Whereas, previous research indicates 
that size, tangibility and risk impact on leverage, results of the regression analysis reveal that 
MFI firm-specific measures such as; size is negative and significant in determining the leverage 
levels of MFIs. However, other firm-specific measures such as; profitability, tangibility and 
risk are insignificant in explaining the leverage levels of MFIs in SSA. 
 
The positive influence observed from the dummy variable for age (young and mature MFIs) 
indicate that; as an MFI advances in age, a move towards the use of leverage is expected. This 
is in line with the life-cycle theory of MFI financing (Bogan 2012), which posits that MFI 
financing is attributable to various stages of MFI growth and maturity. As MFIs start out, they 
commence operations using predominantly donor funding, but as they mature, a shift towards 
debt focus funding is expected. 
 
Within the African context, evidence remains scarce. For example, only one study examines 
the determinants of capital structure of MFIs83. Kyereboah (2007) finds a positive and 
significant relationship between the age of MFIs and short-term leverage. For long-term 
leverage this is positive and significant, and for total leverage, a positive and insignificant 
relationship exists. Although the above study employs the use of short-term, long-term and 
total debt in analysing the capital structure determinants of MFIs, leverage employed in this 
study has similar characteristics with STLEV, LTLEV and TLEV. For example, borrowings in 
the model employed for this study -will typically- represent short-term borrowing, whilst 
deposits and donated equity typically signifies long-term debt for MFIs. Modelling specific 
MFI capital structure components (e.g Donated equity, borrowing, and deposits) gives a more 
detailed examination of the responsiveness of the explanatory variables on the capital structure 
of MFIs. 
 
Institutional and macroeconomic measures show little significance, albeit a positive 
influence. Specifically, the measure for trade (TRADEF) is positive and significant in 
 
 
83 This study was carried out by Kyereboah in 2007. In which he examines the determinants of the capital structure 
of MFIs in Ghana. 
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explaining the use of leverage by MFIs in SSA. However, measures of income (GNIg) show a 
positive but insignificant relationship with leverage. This could indicate that as wealth 
permeates through the population, the general clientele base of MFIs shrinks, forcing MFIs to 
use less leverage. In addition, as the society gets wealthier, the banking system captures more 
of these wealthier communities, leaving MFIs to focus on the bottom of the pyramid. This 
therefore indicates that MFIs focus solely on their social mission therefore seeking 
complimentary funding to this end. The measure for inflation and interest rates are both 
negative and insignificant. 
 
In addition to being used as a measure of risk, the size of an MFI provides useful insight 
into the capital structure decisions of various MFIs. Theory suggest that larger firms tend to be 
more diversified, and therefore better able to absorb risks (Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
Furthermore, they are more likely to have easy access to credit and a more diluted ownership. 
However, previous studies have found inconclusive results when it relates to firm size. The 
pecking order theory of capital structure suggest that larger firms exhibit lower information 
asymmetry and are therefore able to issue more equity, this surmises that a negative relationship 
between size and leverage should be in place. 
 
Using the natural logarithm of total assets (LnA), the results of this analysis show a negative 
and significant relationship between leverage and size (in three models examined namely; 
LEV, BORROWING and DONEQ). This follows traditional capital structure theory 
predictions. However in the DEPOSIT model examined, size of MFIs indicate a positive and 
significant relationship. This is a unique finding for MFIs especially in SSA region. This would 
suggest that the size of MFIs do not influence the willingness of local clients to use the deposit 
facilities offered by MFIs in the SSA region. In the study by Kyereboah (2007), although he 
finds a negative significant relationship between MFIs capital structure and size, the specific 
effect on the deposits element of capital structure composition of MFIs was not examined. 
Hence this presents a significant addition to the literature on the MFI sector. 
 
The agency theory of capital structure considers debt to be a disciplining device, which 
implores managers to increase shareholders wealth and discourage empire building (Jensen 
1986). The pecking order theory further indicates that profitable MFIs face lower costs in 
raising equity, This therefore indicates that an inverse relationship should exist between 
profitability and capital structure. An important measure of profitability for the MFI sector is 
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return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). This study employs the use of ROA, as this 
measure depicts the efficiency at which management utilises its available resources. For the 
leverage model, the results reveal a positive and insignificant relationship between ROA and 
leverage choices for MFIs. This indicates that on average, profitability is irrelevant in 
explaining the capital structure choices of MFIs. This is to be expected however, because MFIS 
are hybrid institutions which incorporate a social missions with their operations. Hence, 
investors might not be initially swayed by the opportunity to earn but rather a social impact to 
investing in these institutions. Furthermore, findings indicate that MFIs with higher profits will 
tend to increase financing of projects via internal funding, thereby preferring retained earnings 
to external debt for its financing. 
 
In other models (Deposit and Donated Equity Models), ROA is negative, however this 
measure if significant in the DONEQ model and insignificant in the Deposit model. In addition 
to a negative relationship an interesting finding is observed in the deposit model. In this model 
ROA depicts insignificance although investors do not play a role in financing MFIs with 
deposits, clients do. The results here could indicate that depositors are conscious of MFI 
profitability as measured by ROA. MFIs could therefore be sensitive to their client’s 
perceptions of success as measured by ROA, in order to attract more deposits as a source of 
long-term funding option. In addition, MFIs could improve on their bottom lines in order to 
make deposits more attractive to clients. This could in turn improve their financing constraints. 
Results of this finding is in line with Kyereboah (2007). 
 
Asset tangibility measures the tangible assets employed by a business in its operations. MFIs 
often use this as collateral to secure loans in addition to minimising information asymmetry in 
the contractual relationship between lenders and borrowers (Cohen 2009, Berger and Black 
2011, Hall 2012). According to Almeida and Campello (2007), the collateral dynamics of AT 
(using this measure as collateral in the borrowing agreement to mitigate contract problems) 
means that a firm can sustain more external financing. Therefore, we surmise that the actuality 
of AT implies that MFIs can pledge adequate collateral to raise funds. 
 
The results in the leverage model indicates a positive and insignificant relationship with 
leverage. Largely confirming with the competing theories of capital structure which predict the 
positive relationship between leverage and AT. A closer examination of the components of 
leverage employed by this study, reveals that AT displays a negative and insignificant 
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relationship in our borrowing model, whilst this relationship reveals a positive and significant 
relationship within our deposit (1%) and donated equity (10%) models. 
 
The deposit model indicates that deposits is sensitive to the AT of MFIs in SSA. For 
instance, the positive and significant influence could signal that clients associate physical MFI 
asset holdings (such as; brick-and-mortar buildings) with trust. Clients would therefore, prefer 
to see physical MFI buildings in order to trust MFIs with their deposits. 
 
Similarly, for the donated equity model, this also falls in line with capital structure theory 
of a positive relationship between AT and capital structure. Most donated equity from an MFI 
point of view is  obtained from international development organisations. Hence, these 
organisations want to see MFIs facilities and preferably operational capacity in order to donate 
funds to these MFIs. This result is therefore consistent with capital structure theory, and 
empirical evidence observed in Ghana. 
 
The theoretical position of the relationship between risk and leverage claims that risk should 
have an inverse relationship with leverage. According to the static trade-off theory of capital 
structure, the higher the volatility of earnings, the more likelihood of a financial distress by 
firms (the higher the probability of financial distress by firms). Hence, when bankruptcy costs 
are higher, a firm’s debt ratio falls in the face of high earnings volatility (RISK). This suggests 
that risk has an inverse relationship with leverage (Marsh, 1982; Bradley et al., Jarrell and Kim, 
1984; Mackie-Mason, 1990; de Miguel and Pindado, 2001). 
 
For the leverage model, the regression results show a positive but insignificant relationship, 
in addition to other funding models (BORROWING, DONEQ, and DEPOSITS), the measure 
of risk was positive albeit insignificant. This lines up with earlier research carried out by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) who find that risk is not a reliable driver of 
capital structure. This study findings however, disagrees with Lemmon et al (2008) who finds 
a negative and significant relationship between risk and leverage. Within the capital structure 
debate of MFIs, Kyereboah (2007) using the volatility of earnings, finds a negative relationship 
between the short-term leverage and total leverage of MFIs in Ghana (significant at the 5% 
level for short-term leverage model). However, the same research estimates indicates a positive 
and significant relationship between long-term leverage and earnings volatility.  
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MFI Leverage Model Fixed Effect Result. 
Leverage  Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Model LEV LEV LEV LEV 
Size -0.256*** -0.295*** -0.258*** -0.272*** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) 
     
ROA 0.165 0.0510 0.150 0.154 
 (0.263) (0.265) (0.264) (0.263) 
     
AT 0.004 -0.105 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.542) 
     
PAR30 0.292 0.262 0.290 0.280 
 (0.286) (0.285) (0.286) (0.286) 
     
SOIP 0.036* 0.036* 0.037* 0.033* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
ENFCON 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
GOVEFF 0.006 -0.012 0.004 0.001 
 (0.285) (0.284) (0.285) (0.285) 
     
ROL 0.245 0.271 0.251 0.240 
 (0.268) (0.267) (0.268) (0.267) 
     
C-CTRL -0.150 -0.166 -0.156 -0.135 
 (0.210) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210) 
     
MONF -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
TRADEF 0.011* 0.010* 0.011* 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
FINF -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
GNIg 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
INF -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
INT -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
212 
D-INTR 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
     
DCTPS 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
New  -0.286**   
  (0.101)   
     
Young   0.045  
   (0.072)  
     
Mature    0.179 
    (0.097) 
     
_cons 3.563*** 4.269*** 3.573*** 3.790*** 
 (0.829) (0.864) (0.829) (0.837) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.029 0.034 0.029 0.031 
adj. R2 -0.374 -0.367 -0.375 -0.371 
F 2.370 2.693 2.259 2.431 
rmse 0.940 0.938 0.940 0.939 
df_r 1363 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 




ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of 
Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule 
of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF 
(Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Real Interest Rate), D-
INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector) 
 
Control Variables:  
MFI Age: New, Young, Mature 
Study Period: 2004 – 2016. 






This study set out to examine three central themes within the MF sector. Firstly, in view of the 
current efforts by governments in SSA to improve institutional governance quality, and 
consequently implementing Microfinance as a blanket development policy tool. We set out to 
establish the role of institutions on the funding structure of MFIs. Secondly, we identified MFI 
performance and its perceived importance within the continent, whilst also identified capital 
structure as a tool for enabling performance; we therefore set out to determine the impact of 
capital structure on MFI sustainability, risk, efficiency and outreach (MFI performance). 
Finally, within the context of the financially excluded in SSA, we question just how much 
important MFIs are in influencing MFIs are in the drive towards financial inclusion on the 
continent. 
 
Key findings for the first enquiry reveal that observed institutional measures largely 
influence leverage of MFIs positively, in particular, the measure for investor protection. This 
is a new finding within the Microfinance literature. This confirms the importance of a strong 
institutional environment in attracting funding for the sector. This measure was positive in all 
models and significant in our leverage model, donated equity and deposit models. For policy 
makers, the option is clear. Creating an enabling environment for funders to come into the 
sector and feel protected should be apriority. Policies that strengthen financial reporting 
practices, transparency in government, and embracing the absolute power of the rule of law are 
important for the continent in the short and longer term. From a macro-environment standpoint 
improving national income via increased productivity of local institutions, is a positive signal 
to international funders. For instance, a look at the donated equity model (which forms the bulk 
of MFI long-term financing in SSA), suggest that improving productive capacity to increase 
national income amongst countries in SSA is an attractive approach to lure in long-term 
institutional investors into the MF sector. 
 
More importantly, in order for MFIs to stand any chance of being relevant, and achieving 
its objectives in the continent, the long-term funding of these institutions have to be addressed. 
Whilst donated equity forms the bulk of MFI long-term financing, as seen in our second 
empirical analysis of sustainability -long term financing hinders overall MFI sustainability-. 
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Therefore, continual use of this, will be detrimental to the long-term sustainability of the sector 
in SSA. A  preferred longer term strategy could well aim to transition these longer-dated 
donated-equity financing into local currency generated and  managed markets accessible for 
MFIs. 
 
Whilst the ideal long-term financing option would be local deposits, utilised in a transparent 
framework of governance. However, it is clear that, creating and implementing major policy 
practices in much of the continent moves at a snail pace. Within this context, the local apex 
banks can take the lead and implement an ecosystem such that, MFIs are able to directly access 
local denominated currency in a longer dated funding pool supported by international funders 
and the prevailing apex bank. Special Deposit money banks could act as intermediaries. Local 
savers should be incentivised to save via intermediaries such as; deposit money banks (savers 
funds are protected through an apex bank), deposit money banks then pool savers funds and 
lend at attractive local rates to MFIs. International funders could then invest directly (during 
times of liquidity constraints) in deposit money banks. In essence, deposit money banks could 
borrow at a discounted rate from international funders if needed, to cover shortfalls in liquidity 
management. This would be as a last resort, as MFI loan books have been shown to be resilient 
sources of capital repayment. An initiative like this will provide not only long-term sources of 
finance to MFIs, it will also create deeper financial systems in many of the countries in SSA. 
 
A slight variation of the above would be a scenario which works in the form of guarantees. 
With respect to the deposit money banks as an intermediary, international funders could 
support the local intermediary (or a handful of local intermediaries in an ecosystem) with direct 
investments via equity holdings, bond issuances, or market debt. These local intermediaries 
could then be guaranteed by an apex bank, thereby providing assurance to international funders 
and also guaranteeing the efficiency of the local financial ecosystem. This would also deepen 
already established local financial markets, creating a boon for sustainable development and 
local businesses. More importantly, local solutions for unique challenges that plague the 
African continent.
215 
Chapter 7 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS:  
Introduction 
The aim  of this empirical chapter is to interrogate the impact of capital structure on financial and social performance of MFIs.  
Objective: To identify the influence of MFI funding structure on MFI performance.  
Objective: To identify the role of Institutional quality on MFI performance. 
Summary Statistics Variables and Dummy Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dep Variables      
 
Macro Indicators     
OSS 2902 1.067 0.876 -0.92 31.96 
 
GNIg 3,161 5.027 3.727 -4.53 19.40 
ROA 2555 -0.017 0.137 -2.47 0.8429 
 
INF 3,160 7.9726 5.592 0.234 19.25 
PAR30 2649 0.081 0.187 0 6.843 
 
REALINT 3,124 4.9067 7.153 -6.00 22.69 
CPB 2904 222 476 0 12185 
       
PFB 2900 0.584 0.286 0 6.689 
       
ALPB 2901 802 5337 0 267710 
       
NAB 2902 28038 91411 0 2561000 
       
Capital Structure V's           
 
Financial Sector 
V's         
STLEV 2,903 0.008 0.039 -0.011 0.954 
 
DEPINTR 3,154 7.41 3.64 0 13.63 
LTLEV 2,903 0.049 0.092 -0.652 1.242 
 
DCTPS 3,207 17.66 16.10 -6.85 160.12 
TLEV 2,903 0.671 0.866 0.000 40.41 
       
Firm Variables           
 
MFI Age Dummy 
V's         
Size 2,903 15.05 2.186 2.936 22.176 
 
New 3,228 0.207 0.405 0 1 
Age 3,228 2.3 0.895 0 3.000 
 
Young 3,228 0.208 0.406 0 1 
AT 2,903 0.069 0.084 0 1.000 
 
Mature 3,228 0.555 0.497 0 1 
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Ease of Doing Biz Index            MFI Type Dummy         
SOIP 3,022 3.55 2.12 0 8.00 
 
NonReg 3,228 0.214 0.411 0 1 
ENFCON 3,225 48.83 11.67 0 66.17 
 
Reg 3,228 0.787 0.411 0 1 
       
NonP 3,228 0.207 0.405 0 1 
WGI Indicators            Prof 3,228 0.208 0.406 0 1 
GOVEFF 3,145 -0.68 0.46 -2.17 0.66 
 
Bank 3,228 0.141 0.348 0 1 
ROL 3,145 -0.68 0.45 -1.84 0.37 
 
CreditU 3,228 0.293 0.455 0 1 
CORRPTNCTRL 3,145 -0.65 0.46 -1.71 0.83 
 
MNO 3,228 0.287 0.452 0 1 
       
NBFI 3,228 0.227 0.419 0 1 
Heritage Indicators            NGO 3,228 0.007 0.080 0 1 
MONF 3,208 72.38 13.43 0 90.4 
 
RuralB 3,228 0.038 0.191 0 1 
TRADEF 3,208 65.00 11.99 0 89 
       
FINF 3,208 43.28 13.41 0 70   N 3228         
 
OSS (Operational Self-Sufficiency), ROA (Return on Assets), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), CPB (Cost Per Borrower), PFB (Percent of 
Female Borrowers), ALPB (Average Loan Balance Per Borrower), NAB (Number of Active Borrowers). 
STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV (Total Leverage). AT (Asset Tangibility), SOIP (Strength of Investor 
Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), CORRPTNCTRL (Corruption Control), 
MONF (Monetary Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), 
REALINT (Interest Rate), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). Non-Reg (Non Regulated MFIs), Reg 
(Regulated MFIs), NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). CreditU (Credit Union), MNO (Mobile Network Operator), NBFI (Non Bank 
Financial Institution), NGO (Non Governmental Organisation), RuralB (Rural Bank). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
             
Table 7.1: Summary Statistics for Performance Study. 
As can be seen in Table 7.1, in the first sample (SSA), MF Performance measures indicates an observation of 3228 across the country sampled in 




7.1.1 Results and Discussions of the Panel Data Regression Approach 
The first set of regressions tests the financial performance indicators against a set of 
independent variables. This takes into consideration a regression model which regresses the 
performance Y variables on the independent variables, in addition to other vector of variables 
(Capital structure measures, Institutional factors, Macro-economic factors, Financial 
Development indicators, control variables and the error term), the analysis thus reveal some 
interesting findings. Results suggest that on average, MFIs in SSA tend to favour the use of 
short-term leverage in their operations. Results further suggest that close to 74% of MFI 
sustainability can be explained by the short-term leverage of MFIs (see Table 7.2 below: OSS 
Regression model output). 
 
There is harmony on the need for MFIs to be sustainable, to navigate liquidity shocks 
associated with donor failure (Christen, et al. 2004). For MFIs in Africa this is a priority; recent 
data suggest that donor funding as a share of capital structure for MFIs have been unsteady in 
recent years, in addition this often makes MFIs inefficient and  non-resilient (Haque et al., 
2016). For MFIs sustainability, the ability to cover their costs of operation is essential to 
maintaining stability in the long run. In addition, prudent efficiency management by MFIs 
could signal a readiness for commercial capital, which further allows MFIs to increase and 
grow their loan portfolio and clientele outreach (Olivares-Polanco 2005). 
 
The regression output of the chosen econometric model (with OSS as the dependent 
variable) confirms that the impact of short-term leverage on the sustainability of MFIs is 
positive and significant at the below the 10% % level, in line with previous studies such as 
(Michaelas et, al 1999; Kyereboah 2007; Bogan 2012). This is in direct contrast with research 
from Caesar and Holmes (2003), Esperance et al, (2003), and Hall et al (2004). 
 
7.2 MFI FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
7.2.1 MFI Sustainability Results 
Leverage measures for long term and total leverage largely appear insignificant in explaining 
the sustainability of MFIs in SSA. Both measures appear to inversely influence the dependent 
variable (sustainability of MFIs). This could be as a result of the cost of funding for capital in 
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these time frames (interest paid to investors, and dividend payments, and interest on deposits). 
Cost of capital as relates to long-term and total leverage, are usually at commercial rates or 
subsidised (soft loans). The use of debt therefore increases the financial expenses and therefore 
have negative implications on the net income of MFIs (Meyer et al., 1996; Zeller and Meyer, 
2002). When we contrast the results with the sustainability measure this could reveal that MFIs 
in SSA do not earn enough income and/or revenue to cover their total costs of operations when 
commercial capital is utilized as a long-term financing option. Calls for the commercialisation 
of MFIs further puts this finding into serious questions. For instance, if MFIs are unable to 
generate enough revenue to cover cost, borrowing at higher commercial rates could further 
drive these institutions into perpetual delinquencies around the region. Furthermore, MFI 
borrowing are mostly constituted in foreign currency denominations (primary US dollar). This 
creates a negative cascading effect, as long-term financing in dollar denominated currency, 
whilst generating revenue in local currency, leaves MFIs susceptible to loss of currency value, 
as these institutions often operate on the margins and often cannot afford adequate risk hedging 
consultation on their loan portfolio and repayment quality. 
 
This implies that MFIs would then have to rely on savings and deposit financing. This is an 
attractive avenue for MFIs, as this presents a more sustainable long-term financing option for 
MFIs. However, the quality of the institutional environment (for instance government quality, 
regulatory quality, and ensuring a total reliance on the rule of law for legal and contractual 
disputes) for guaranteeing savers income becomes vital, in order to transition into a reliance on 
savings and deposits. The implications of the negative influence on long-term financing on 
MFI sustainability suggests that MFIs perhaps need to re-evaluate the source of funding of their 
longer-term tenure financing to more suitable and sustainable modes of financing, in 
comparison to current practices. 
 
When the measure of sustainability (OSS), is examined against institutional indicators, we 
discover that, within the observed sample, no institutional variable appear to be significant in 
influencing the sustainability of MFIs in SSA. Although a host of these measures appear to 
have a negative bias towards sustainability, some measures appear to be positive. For instance, 
measures such as; corruption control, and monetary freedom, although insignificant, both 
influence MFI sustainability positively. However, the measure for financial development 
indicates a positive impact on OSS, confirming the complimentary role of the financial sector 
in the MFI sector development. This is in line with findings from (Chikalipah 2017) who find 
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some positive impact of the institutional environment (significantly Freedom index) on the 
performance of MFIs. 
 
The negative relationship between some of the selected institutional environment indicators 
and MFIs  could possibly suggest the infancy of institutions (or the non-existence) of it, in 
forming the businesses environment that MFIs operate in. this implies that various measures 
implemented in improving the institutional environment, although favourable for the long-term 
development prospects of countries in SSA, appears less important in the direct performance 
of MFIs in SSA when compared with capital structure measures. 
 
Macroeconomic factors show a positive however insignificant impact. For instance, 
inflation, and gross national income all appear to impact positively on the performance of 
MFIs, albeit insignificant. MFI firm-specific indicators reveal a positive impact on MFI 
sustainability. For instance, the measure of MFI asset tangibility is negative and significant, 
suggesting that MFIs with substantial tangible assets are less likely to utilise leverage, and are 
more likely to rely on financing their operations through internal revenue  as a result of their 
relative bigger size. This finding is in line with previous research. The measure of Asset 
tangibility is also in line with previous research and the theory of capital structure, in signalling 
a negative relationship with sustainability. This relationship is negative and highly significant. 
The more tangible assets MFIs possess, the less they are able to be agile in reaching the bottom 
of the pyramid, as costs of landed properties impact on the bottom line thereby increasing the 
cost of operations and therefore limiting MFI reach. 
 
Finally MFI size reveals a positive and significant relationship with sustainability. This 
confirms capital structure theory which asserts that the bigger the MFIs (size), the bigger 
likelihood that an MFI will be sustainable in comparison to smaller MFIs, as a result of scale 
economics. 
 
When the dummy for MFI Age is introduced to the equation, the analysis suggest that MFI 
financing follows a life-cycle theory of performance, which suggests that for new MFIs (those 
aged between 0-3 years) sustainability is less attainable in comparison to the younger MFIs (3-
7 years). The output therefore confirms that younger MFIs are more likely to be sustainable in 
their operations in comparison to New MFIs. This suggests that experience of operating in a 
market is a comparative advantage for Young MFIs.  
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MFI Sustainability Fixed Effect model regression results with MFI Age and profit status dummy. 
MFI         
SUSTAINABILITY OSS OSS OSS OSS OSS OSS OSS OSS 
Size 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
         
AT -0.669* -0.671* -0.671* -0.669* -0.671* -0.671* -0.669* -0.669* 
 (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) 
         
STLEV 0.749* 0.750* 0.753* 0.750* 0.750* 0.753* 0.749* 0.749* 
 (0.371) (0.371) (0.372) (0.372) (0.371) (0.372) (0.371) (0.371) 
         
LTLEV -0.093 -0.095 -0.093 -0.093 -0.095 -0.093 -0.093 -0.093 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) 
         
TLEV -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
         
SOIP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
         
ENFCON -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
GOVEFF -0.047 -0.048 -0.047 -0.047 -0.048 -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
         
ROL -0.080 -0.079 -0.080 -0.080 -0.079 -0.080 -0.080 -0.080 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) 
         
C-CTRL 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.150 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
         
MONF 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
TRADEF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
FINF -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
GNIg 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
INF 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
INT -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
D-INTR -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
         
DCTPS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
New  -0.014       
  (0.051)       
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Young   0.008      
   (0.036)      
         
Mature    -0.003     
    (0.050)     
         
NonP     -0.014    
     (0.051)    
         
Prof      0.0084   
      (0.036)   
         
NonReg       0  
       (.)  
         
Reg        0 
        (.) 
         
_cons -0.131 -0.0918 -0.124 -0.134 -0.0918 -0.124 -0.131 -0.131 
 (0.383) (0.410) (0.384) (0.387) (0.410) (0.384) (0.383) (0.383) 
N 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 
R2 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
adj. R2 -0.339 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340 -0.339 -0.339 
F 1.971 1.870 1.869 1.866 1.870 1.869 1.971 1.971 
rmse 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 
df_r 1681 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1681 1681 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
OSS (MFI Operational Self-Sufficiency) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV (Total 
Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF 
(Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income growth), 
INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated MFIs), Reg (Regulated 
MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.2: OSS Fixed Effect model regression results with MFI Age and profit status dummy. 
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7.2.2 MFI Profitability 
Profitability, is captured by ROA, and it measures the return on MFI assets employed. The 
ROA model provides some interesting results. Firm specific MFI characteristics such as SIZE 
and Asset Tangibility (AT) significantly influence MFI profitability. Whilst size shows a 
significant positive relationship, the measure for AT is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
 
As regarding the impact of capital structure on MFI profitability, both the measures of short-
term and long-term leverage are significant. Short term leverage is positive at the 5% level in 
influencing ROA for MFIs in SSA. Results further reveal that up to 20% of the explained 
measure of the ROA can be attributed to the STLEV of MFIs in SSA. Surprisingly, LTLEV 
reveals a negative and significant relationship between ROA and LTLEV. On the coefficient 
of TLEV, this is positive albeit insignificant. 
 
Selected macro-economic variables reveal a positive influence on MFI profitability. 
Although insignificant, Real interest rate (REALINTR), Inflation and GNIg all reveal positive 
influence on MFI profitability. Financial development indicators measured by domestic credit 
to private sector reveals a negative relationship with MFI ROA. This suggest that financial 
development thought to be a compliment to MFI performance (Vanroose and D’Espellier 2009) 
is not the case for MFIs in SSA. This could suggest that the financial development sector is 
still at an infancy stage in most countries within the sample (Lafourcade et al. 2006). Income 
indicator (GNIg) shows positive but insignificant relationship with ROA. 
 
Indicators measuring the institutional environment reveal mixed evidence. Whilst the rule 
of law (ROL) negatively explains the ROA, corruption control (CRRPTNCTRL) is positive. 
Corruption control conversely reveals that the perception, of the appearance of controlling 
corruption the beneficial for MFI financial performance. Finally the measure of enforcing 
contract (ENFCON) is negative. Enforcing contracts could be seen in similar light to ROL, this 
should ensure a level of institutional fairness between contract holders, and hence a positive 
for performance, however, in this case the relationship is negative. 
 
MFI firm characteristics (age -dummy variable-) measured by new, young and mature 
dummy variables MFI appear to be positive and highly significant in explaining the ROA of 
MFIs. The dummy variable for New and Young MFI is significant at the 1% level. This result 
strongly support the profit-incentive theory of MFI, which suggest that young MFIs are less 
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likely to be profitable in comparison to Older MFIs. New MFIs often lack adequate experience 
and less operational nous, and are often thought to be less effective in improving asset returns, 
the results for the sample from SSA supports this theory. 
 
MFI Profitability Fixed Effect Result. 
MFI         
ROA FE Model ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Size 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         








 (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
         
STLEV 0.194** 0.200** 0.207** 0.193** 0.200** 0.207** 0.194** 0.194** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
         
LTLEV -0.076* -0.079* -0.074* -0.076* -0.079* -0.074* -0.076* -0.076* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
         
TLEV 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
SOIP -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
ENFCON -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
GOVEF -0.025 -0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
         
ROL -0.037 -0.033 -0.035 -0.037 -0.033 -0.035 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
         
C-CTRL 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.040 0.040 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
         
MONF 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
TRADEF 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
FINF -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
GNIg 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
INF -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
INT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
D-INTR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
224 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
DCTPS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
New  -0.055***       
  (0.010)       
         
Young   0.026***      
   (0.007)      
         
Mature    0.002     
    (0.010)     
         
NonP     -
0.055*** 
   
     (0.010)    
         
Prof      0.026***   
      (0.007)   
         
NonReg       0  
       (.)  
         
Reg        0 
        (.) 
         








 (0.083) (0.087) (0.083) (0.084) (0.087) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
N 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 
R2 0.074 0.091 0.081 0.074 0.091 0.081 0.074 0.074 
adj. R2 -0.286 -0.264 -0.276 -0.287 -0.264 -0.276 -0.286 -0.286 
F 6.768 8.033 7.153 6.410 8.033 7.153 6.768 6.768 
rmse 0.102 0.101 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.101 0.102 0.102 
df_r 1534 1533 1533 1533 1533 1533 1534 1534 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
ROA (Return on Asset) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV 
(Total Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF 
(Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income 
growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated 
MFIs), Reg (Regulated MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.3: MFI Profitability Result. 
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7.2.3 MFI Portfolio Quality 
The measure for portfolio quality; Portfolio at Risk (PAR30) falling due 30 days, was measured 
by identifying outstanding loans falling more than 30days within an MFI loan portfolio. The 
PAR30 measure signals the quality of the loan portfolio, in addition to the health of an MFIs 
lending operations. This is therefore a key measure of an MFI’s (loan) performance and 
repayment capacity. When regressed against capital, institutional, macro variables and firm-
specific variables we reveal that; PAR30 is largely positive however insignificant with the 
measures of leverage. LTLEV and TLEV are both positive and insignificant, whereas, STLEV 
is negative and also insignificant.  As the nature of short-term leverage is such that it is 
implemented heavily by New MFIs (negative relationship), this implies that with the nature of 
this type of financing, the repayment risk falling within a short period, will usually be sensitive 
to short-term financing. 
 
Short-term leverage exhibits a negative albeit insignificant relationship with MFI portfolio 
risk. As seen from the regression analysis, this is more pertinent with New MFIs whom often 
rely heavily on short-term financing (as they are just starting out with less reputation/goodwill 
of operations and experience), in comparison to younger and more mature MFIs who may have 
built the operational reputation (that comes with age and length of operation), and therefore are 
more likely to attract long-term favourable financing. This is further exacerbated by the often 
short loan repayment schedules implemented by MFIs (usually between 7-20 days). The 
regression results when the age dummies are introduced confirm this. The dummy variable for 
young and mature MFIs indicate that their operational experience (years of existence) appears 
to be positive with the risk associated with loan portfolio. 
 
This result is a new finding for MFIs in the literature, that although the measure of LTLEV 
is insignificant within this sample, we surmise that on average, the use of long-term leverage 
is more beneficial for the sustainment of the health of an MFIs loan portfolio, whilst short-term 
leverage is likely to be detrimental to improving the quality of an MFIs loan portfolio. This 
makes logical sense; because in the event of a delinquency, this first affects the short-term 
borrowing pool, before the long-term leverage. Moreover, with the use of LTLEV MFIs can 




This supports the age dummy variable for new MFIs, which indicates a negative relationship 
with portfolio quality. This could be explained by the indication that New MFIs are likely to 
heavily employ the use of STLEV in their operations. An infant MFI such as a New one would 
have limited experience required to command long-term capital at favourable terms. MFI firm 
specific factors such as SIZE is significant, and has a negative impact on MFI risk. 
 
Institutional indicators and macro-economic measures appear to have little or no significant 
impact on portfolio quality. From the, macro-environment, the observable measure of real 
interest rate appears to be significant and negative in its impact on the PAR30. This is expected, 
because the real-interest rate acts as an opportunity cost to lending activity of MFIs to clients 
at the bottom of the pyramid. Furthermore, the interest rates levied on the disbursed loans from 
MFIs could also be negatively sensitive to the real-interest rate such that; when there is a change 
in the real rate, MFIs are likely to adjust their rates to keep in step with real-rates. When there 
is an upward move on rates, the resultant increase in MFI lending rate could negatively impact 
on borrower’s repayment abilities. 
 
Another key finding is observed when we introduce the dummy for MFI profit status, adding 
to the evidence for the preference for commercially focused MFIs; the dummy for profit and 
non-profit oriented MFIs reveal that for-profit MFIs are more likely to be resilient from shocks 
to their loan portfolio. As indicated by the positive moderation on the measure of risk. On the 
other hand not-for-profit MFIs are more prone to be negatively impacted by a shock to their 
portfolio quality, as revealed by the negative influence of the dummy variable on the measure 
of risk.  Furthermore, the regulation dummy indicates that regulated MFIs are more likely to 
possess a healthy portfolio quality in comparison to non-regulated MFIs. This adds to the 
literature on the need for better regulation in the MFI sector especially in SSA, in order to avert 
widespread delinquencies amongst these institutions. 
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MFI Risk Fixed Effect Model. 
MFI RISK         
 PAR30 PAR30 PAR30 PAR30 PAR30 PAR30 PAR30 PAR30 
Size -0.008** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
AT -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.0010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
         
Age 0.008        
 (0.006)        
         
STLEV -0.0048 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
         
LTLEV 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
         
TLEV 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
SOIP 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
ENFCON -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
GOVEFF 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
         
ROL -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
         
C-CTRL 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
         
MONF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
TRADEF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
FINF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
GNIg -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
INF 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
REALINT -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
DEPINTR -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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DCTPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
New  -0.006       
  (0.012)       
         
Young   0.005      
   (0.010)      
         
Mature    0.006     
    (0.011)     
         
NonP     -0.006    
     (0.012)    
         
Prof      0.005   
      (0.010)   
         
NonReg       -0.011  
       (0.015)  
         
Reg        0.011 
        (0.015) 
         
_cons 0.270*** 0.277*** 0.268*** 0.272*** 0.277*** 0.268*** 0.272*** 0.261*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
N 2101 2101 2101 2101 2101 2101 2101 2101 
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
adj. R2 -0.219 -0.217 -0.219 -0.219 -0.218 -0.219 -0.219 -0.219 
rmse 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk falling due 30 days) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV 
(Total Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF 
(Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income 
growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated 
MFIs), Reg (Regulated MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.4: MFI Risk Fixed Effect Model.
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7.2.4 MFI Efficiency  
The indicator for efficiency: cost per borrower; measures the cost incurred per MFI for one 
client. This measure is regularly employed in efficiency studies within the MFI literature 
(CGAP 2013). This measure examines the cost to MFIs as relates to one borrower. Therefore, 
the bigger the MFI clientele, the higher the CPB. However large MFIs are able to lower the 
cost of operation due to scale, on the other hand, smaller MFIs with large borrower numbers 
with limited scale/size are likely to have a higher cost per borrower than their larger 
counterparts. 
 
Measures of leverage in this model appear to be highly significant. STLEV exerts a negative 
relationship, whilst LTLEV exerts a positive relationship on CPB. Total leverage on the other 
hand, although, has a negative influence on efficiency, is insignificant. This indicates that for 
MFIs to be efficient in managing its operations (reducing its CPB), long-term leverage is 
optimal. This is logical, as long-term debt matures at a longer-tenure in comparison to short-
term debt. Therefore, the number of clients serviced with long-term debt are more cost-
effective in comparison to those serviced on short-term debt. The firm-specific dummy control 
variable used to capture new and young MFIs seem to capture this reality. the measure of new 
MFIs show a positive and insignificant relationship with CPB, whilst the opposite is true for 
young MFIs. This suggests that new MFIs due to their nascency are more likely to be cost 
effective as a result of low client numbers (as a ratio to available loan officers), in comparison 
to young MFIs. 
 
Size variable is negative and highly significant to MFI cost borrower efficiency measure. 
Without deploring adequate technology which reduces tasks time and cuts out a lot of 
inefficiency, MFI size often acts as a deterrent. The idea being that without technological 
advances, the more clients MFIs adopt, the more loan officers it requires, leading to a more 
favourable cost coefficient in the regression for new MFIs when examined against cost per 
individual borrower. This is confirmed by the new and young dummy variables: the initial 
capture phase of the new MFIs are conditioned on a limited amount of staff required. However 
in order to increase the client capture and progress unto the young stage, new loan officers will 
be required. This therefore creates an inverse relationship. However this is only temporary, as 
the Mature MFI dummy indicates that, when a certain stage of maturity is attained by MFIs, 
the economies of scale take effect, creating a positive relationship with efficiency. The dummy 
variables for profit status reveal a negative and significant influences on MFI efficiency, whilst 
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Non-Profit MFIs reveal a positive and significant relationship with MFI efficiency. this 
indicates that -given identical staff numbers-, for-profit MFIs (due to pressure on performance 
targets and KPIs) are more likely to be aggressive in client acquisition, thereby leading to 
higher cost per borrower, in comparison to non-profit MFIs (who may not be under any 
pressure to repay investors funds). Institutional variables show some effects on efficiency. Of 
note, the measure of investor protection is positive and significant. Macro-economic indicators 
appear to be insignificant when observed against MFI efficiency. 
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MFI Efficiency Regression Result Fixed Effect Model 
EFFICI         
ENCY CPB CPB CPB CPB CPB CPB CPB CPB 
Size -72.63*** -58.30** -69.99*** -78.37*** -58.30** -69.99*** -72.63*** -72.63*** 
 (18.477) (19.573) (18.470) (19.027) (19.573) (18.470) (18.477) (18.477) 
         
AT 381.2 404.7 410.1 388.8 404.7 410.1 381.2 381.2 
 (220.68) (220.58) (220.52) (220.70) (220.58) (220.52) (220.68) (220.68) 
         
STLEV -1039*** -1052*** -1073*** -1055*** -1052*** -1073*** -1039*** -1039*** 
 (287.6) (287.2) (287.3) (287.8) (287.2) (287.3) (287.6) (287.6) 
         
LTLEV 1225.3*** 1242.1*** 1226.8*** 1217.5*** 1242.1*** 1226.8*** 1225.3*** 1225.3*** 
 (133.5) (133.6) (133.3) (133.7) (133.6) (133.3) (133.6) (133.6) 
         
TLEV -9.955 -8.338 -10.06 -10.88 -8.338 -10.06 -9.955 -9.955 
 (9.461) (9.474) (9.441) (9.487) (9.474) (9.441) (9.461) (9.461) 
         
SOIP 14.26* 13.81* 13.09* 13.69* 13.81* 13.09* 14.26* 14.26* 
 (6.456) (6.449) (6.460) (6.470) (6.449) (6.460) (6.456) (6.456) 
         
E-CON -1.614 -1.534 -1.712 -1.724 -1.534 -1.712 -1.614 -1.614 
 (3.855) (3.849) (3.847) (3.855) (3.849) (3.847) (3.855) (3.855) 
         
GOVEFF -19.68 -15.47 -18.66 -21.19 -15.47 -18.66 -19.68 -19.68 
 (111.5) (111.3) (111.2) (111.4) (111.3) (111.2) (111.5) (111.5) 
         
ROL 93.37 90.00 95.35 96.52 90.00 95.35 93.37 93.37 
 (105.5) (105.4) (105.3) (105.5) (105.4) (105.3) (105.5) (105.5) 
         
C-CTRL -152.9 -149.6 -148.7 -151.7 -149.6 -148.7 -152.9 -152.9 
 (82.9) (82.7) (82.7) (82.8) (82.7) (82.7) (82.9) (82.9) 
         
MONF -1.704 -1.289 -1.089 -1.498 -1.289 -1.089 -1.704 -1.704 
 (1.908) (1.914) (1.921) (1.915) (1.914) (1.921) (1.908) (1.908) 
         
TRADEF 3.430 3.305 2.858 3.100 3.305 2.858 3.430 3.430 
 (1.837) (1.835) (1.848) (1.855) (1.835) (1.848) (1.837) (1.837) 
         
FINF -1.250 -1.317 -1.146 -1.143 -1.317 -1.146 -1.250 -1.250 
 (1.747) (1.744) (1.744) (1.749) (1.744) (1.744) (1.747) (1.747) 
         
GNIg -4.182 -3.843 -4.079 -4.290 -3.843 -4.079 -4.182 -4.182 
 (3.355) (3.353) (3.348) (3.355) (3.353) (3.348) (3.355) (3.355) 
         
INF -2.288 -2.415 -2.736 -2.531 -2.415 -2.736 -2.288 -2.288 
 (3.073) (3.069) (3.072) (3.079) (3.069) (3.072) (3.073) (3.073) 
         
INT -1.829 -1.610 -1.690 -1.849 -1.610 -1.690 -1.829 -1.829 
 (2.287) (2.286) (2.283) (2.287) (2.286) (2.283) (2.287) (2.287) 
         
D-INTR 1.782 1.719 1.399 1.551 1.719 1.399 1.782 1.782 
 (4.999) (4.991) (4.991) (5.001) (4.991) (4.991) (4.999) (4.999) 
         
DCTPS 2.456 2.659 2.480 2.366 2.659 2.480 2.456 2.456 
 (2.570) (2.568) (2.565) (2.571) (2.568) (2.565) (2.570) (2.570) 
         
New  88.57*       
  (40.423)       
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Young   -67.59*      
   (27.680)      
         
Mature    46.72     
    (37.157)     
         
NonP     88.57*    
     (40.423)    
         
Prof      -67.59*   
      (27.680)   
         
NonReg       0  
       (.)  
         
Reg        0 
        (.) 
         
_cons 1177.7*** 917.8** 1158.7*** 1255.3*** 917.8** 1158.7*** 1177.7*** 1177.7*** 
 (319.667) (340.478) (319.081) (325.491) (340.478) (319.081) (319.667) (319.667
) 
N 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 
R2 0.099 0.103 0.104 0.100 0.103 0.104 0.099 0.099 
adj. R2 -0.256 -0.252 -0.251 -0.255 -0.252 -0.251 -0.256 -0.256 
F 7.106 7.007 7.075 6.819 7.007 7.075 7.106 7.106 
rmse 332.6 332.1 331.9 332.5 332.1 331.9 332.6 332.6 
df_r 1161 1160 1160 1160 1160 1160 1161 1161 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
CPB (MFI Cost Per Borrower) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV 
(Total Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF 
(Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income 
growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated 
MFIs), Reg (Regulated MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.5: Efficiency Regression Result Fixed Effect Model.
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7.3 MFI SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
7.3.1 MFI Outreach (Breadth and Depth) 
The hybrid nature of MFIs means that the social performance is measured by MFI outreach  
The measure of percentage of female borrowers (PFB) is an essential social indicator for 
evaluating MFI social performance. This is because female borrowers are less likely to access 
capital for entrepreneurial purposes in comparison to their male counterparts in many 
developing countries. Hence, MFIs often have lending mandates to prioritise female borrowers 
as a mission of social outreach. Therefore, the higher the PFB, the better MFIs are judged to 
achieve their social mandate. 
 
Outreach is further examined on two levels: the depth and breadth of outreach. Depth 
measures how close to the bottom of the pyramid MFIs reach, whilst breadth measures how 
extensive their coverage of operations are amongst their client base. Breadth of outreach is 
measured by the number of active borrowers (NAB), whilst depth is measures by average loan 
balance per borrower (ALPB). The rationale here being that, the lower the average loan balance 
per borrower, the less well-off the borrower profile. Hence, the closer to the bottom of the 
pyramid the MFI is able to reach. 
 
The tables below (7.6, 7.7, and 7.8), document the regression outputs for identified social 
performance of MFIs. 
 
MFI SOCIAL         
PER’MANCE PFB PFB PFB PFB PFB PFB PFB PFB 
Size 0.01 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
         
AT 0.161 0.167 0.160 0.158 0.167 0.160 0.161 0.161 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) 
         
STLEV -0.035 -0.039 -0.034 -0.018 -0.039 -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) 
         
LTLEV 0.084 0.091 0.083 0.086 0.091 0.083 0.084 0.084 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) 
         
TLEV -0.013* -0.012* -0.013* -0.012* -0.012* -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
         
SOIP -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
ENFCON 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
GOVEFF 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
         
ROL 0.142* 0.139* 0.142* 0.143* 0.139* 0.142* 0.142* 0.142* 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
         
C-CTRL -0.124* -0.121* -0.124* -0.124* -0.121* -0.124* -0.124* -0.124* 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
         
MONF 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
TRADEF -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
FINF 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
GNIg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
INF -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.004* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
INT -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
D-INTR 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
DCTPS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
New  0.024       
  (0.022)       
         
Young   0.003      
   (0.016)      
         
Mature    -0.029     
    (0.022)     
         
NonP     0.024    
     (0.022)    
         
Prof      0.003   
      (0.016)   
         
NonReg       0  
       (.)  
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Reg        0 
        (.) 
         
_cons 0.511** 0.442* 0.513** 0.479** 0.442* 0.513** 0.511** 0.511** 
 (0.167) (0.179) (0.168) (0.169) (0.179) (0.168) (0.167) (0.167) 
N 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 
R2 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 
adj. R2 -0.394 -0.394 -0.396 -0.394 -0.394 -0.396 -0.394 -0.394 
F 2.228 2.170 2.110 2.199 2.170 2.110 2.228 2.228 
rmse 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 
df_r 1179 1178 1178 1178 1178 1178 1179 1179 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
PFB (Percentage of Female Borrowers) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV 
(Total Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF 
(Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income 
growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated 
MFIs), Reg (Regulated MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.6: MFI Social Performance (Percentage of Female Borrowers) Fixed Effect Regression 
Results. 
 
When the social indicator for MFI outreach is regressed against selected observed independent 
variables, the measure of leverage (TLEV) reveals a negative and significant influence on MFI 
social performance (PFB). This results are similar for STLEV however the influence is 
insignificant. Conversely, the measure for LTLEV is positive and insignificant. Measures of 
institutional indicators observed by the ROL reveals a positive and significant effect on PFB at 
the 10% level. This could be interpreted that, as MFIs adhere to their mandate or operating 
mission, this has a positive impact on the number of female clients served. The age dummy 
supports this logic. When Age dummies are introduced to the model, new and young MFIs 
exhibits a positive effect on PFB, whilst mature MFIs have a negative influence. As new MFIs 
start out, they often stick to their social mission, however, as they get older and commercialise 
operations, the move away from their mandate. This is in line with the trade-off literature of 
microfinance (Hermes et al., 2011).
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MFI         
BREADTH NAB NAB NAB NAB NAB NAB NAB NAB 
Size 22488.4*** 25046.9*** 22934.7*** 22678.3*** 25046.9*** 22934.7*** 22488.4*** 22488.4*** 
 (2745.455) (2948.708) (2762.028) (2817.200) (2948.708) (2762.028) (2745.455) (2745.455) 
         
AT 3616.9 7725.1 5043.2 3716.0 7725.1 5043.2 3616.9 3616.9 
 (28522.261) (28535.660) (28530.105) (28532.123) (28535.660) (28530.105) (28522.261) (28522.261) 
         
STLEV -3110.5 -5630.8 -6659.8 -2395.4 -5630.8 -6659.8 -3110.5 -3110.5 
 (47107.5) (47053.7) (47156.5) (4718.0) (47053.7) (47156.5) (47107.5) (47107.5) 
         
LTLEV 1909.1 5124.2 2629.2 2101.5 5124.2 2629.2 1909.1 1909.1 
 (20163.558) (20181.516) (20163.137) (20179.248) (20181.516) (20163.137) (20163.558) (20163.558) 
         
TLEV 1184.7 1500.5 1196.3 1220.7 1500.5 1196.3 1184.7 1184.7 
 (1705.878) (1708.754) (1705.336) (1710.522) (1708.754) (1705.336) (1705.878) (1705.878) 
         
SOIP -381.1 -433.8 -502.7 -352.5 -433.8 -502.7 -381.1 -381.1 
 (1012.097) (1010.928) (1015.284) (1016.819) (1010.928) (1015.284) (1012.097) (1012.097) 
         
ENFCON 364.3 402.5 369.5 367.6 402.5 369.5 364.3 364.3 
 (525.853) (525.367) (525.692) (526.110) (525.367) (525.692) (525.853) (525.853) 
         
GOVEFF 15021.2 16248.1 15059.8 15163.2 16248.1 15059.8 15021.2 15021.2 
 (17554.990) (17538.165) (17549.233) (17566.181) (17538.165) (17549.233) (17554.990) (17554.990) 
         
ROL 10990.3 10420.0 11140.9 10875.4 10420.0 11140.9 10990.3 10990.3 
 (17283.255) (17260.780) (17277.885) (17292.268) (17260.780) (17277.885) (17283.255) (17283.255) 
         
C-CTRL -22436.1 -21853.5 -21989.3 -22492.9 -21853.5 -21989.3 -22436.1 -22436.1 
 (13528.037) (13511.379) (13527.150) (13533.129) (13511.379) (13527.150) (13528.037) (13528.037) 
         
MONF -144.5 -104.2 -103.9 -151.3 -104.2 -103.9 -144.5 -144.5 
 (302.204) (302.267) (303.423) (303.115) (302.267) (303.423) (302.204) (302.204) 
         
TRADEF 33.82 30.58 -7.631 45.45 30.58 -7.631 33.82 33.82 
 (280.447) (280.058) (281.832) (283.148) (280.058) (281.832) (280.447) (280.447) 
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FINF 50.34 41.37 58.69 46.79 41.37 58.69 50.34 50.34 
 (273.578) (273.222) (273.550) (273.905) (273.222) (273.550) (273.578) (273.578) 
         
GNIg -759.3 -739.3 -773.8 -752.6 -739.3 -773.8 -759.3 -759.3 
 (516.349) (515.696) (516.277) (516.968) (515.696) (516.277) (516.349) (516.349) 
         
INF 1019.5* 978.7* 965.7* 1030.0* 978.7* 965.7* 1019.5* 1019.5* 
 (477.364) (477.012) (478.669) (478.761) (477.012) (478.669) (477.364) (477.364) 
         
INT 1156.4*** 1188.4*** 1154.7*** 1160.9*** 1188.4*** 1154.7*** 1156.4*** 1156.4*** 
 (334.045) (333.853) (333.937) (334.467) (333.853) (333.937) (334.045) (334.045) 
         
D-INTR -1010.6 -1026.1 -1029.3 -1007.1 -1026.1 -1029.3 -1010.6 -1010.6 
 (811.053) (809.945) (810.890) (811.362) (809.945) (810.890) (811.053) (811.053) 
         
DCTPS -219.8 -206.3 -212.3 -220.3 -206.3 -212.3 -219.8 -219.8 
 (357.504) (357.049) (357.424) (357.608) (357.049) (357.424) (357.504) (357.504) 
         
New  14886.7*       
  (6316.304)       
         
Young   -6406.1      
   (4452.533)      
         
Mature    -1858.5     
    (6149.094)     
         
NonP     14886.7*    
     (6316.304)    
         
Prof      -6406.1   
      (4452.533)   
         
NonReg       0  
       (.)  
         
Reg        0 
        (.) 
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_cons -315443.4*** -360757.7*** -320306.0*** -317851.4*** -360757.7*** -320306.0*** -315443.4*** -315443.4*** 
 (47631.864) (51304.109) (47735.984) (48306.766) (51304.109) (47735.984) (47631.864) (47631.864) 
N 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 
R2 0.070 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.070 
adj. R2 -0.270 -0.266 -0.269 -0.271 -0.266 -0.269 -0.270 -0.270 
F 6.763 6.718 6.520 6.409 6.718 6.520 6.763 6.763 
rmse 62856.3 62768.4 62835.6 62873.9 62768.4 62835.6 62856.3 62856.3 
df_r 1625 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1625 1625 
         
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
NAB (Number of Active Borrowers) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV (Total Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), 
ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary Freedom), 
TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest 
Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated MFIs), Reg (Regulated MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.7: NAB Fixed Effect Regression Model Results (Number of Active Borrower).
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7.3.2 MFI Breadth of Outreach 
For the measure of MFI Breadth (NAB), STLEV indicates a negative but insignificant 
influence on the breadth of MFI outreach, whilst both the LTLEV and TLEV, are positive 
however insignificant. The results reveal that the use of short-term financing, is detrimental to, 
and is less likely to spur MFIs into aggressively reaching out to new clients, in comparison to 
the use of long-term leverage. The implications of the results suggest that in order to improve 
social outreach (and thereby social performance), MFIs should be financed with favourable 
long-term capital funding. Although the coefficient appear insignificant, the use of long-term 
favourable financing adds credence to the efforts and calls for MFIs to be sustainable. In 
addition to strengthening the institutional environment to create an environment that can act to 
intensely protect depositors and savers funds, such measures could lead to cheap and sustained 
level of MFI long-term financing in order to reach more of the unbanked within SSA. We see 
this from the negative relationship between the measure of corruption control, and positive 
influence from enforcing contracts, government effectiveness and rule of law.  Macro 
indicators of real interest rate further positively strengthens the outreach of MFIs. 
 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (ALPB) Fixed Effect Regression Results. 
MFI         
DEPTH ALPB ALPB ALPB ALPB ALPB ALPB ALPB ALPB 
Size 113.9*** 115.5*** 115.1*** 111.7*** 115.5*** 115.1*** 113.9*** 113.9*** 
 (31.383) (33.758) (31.604) (32.174) (33.758) (31.604) (31.383) (31.383) 
         
AT -58.08 -55.40 -53.76 -58.89 -55.40 -53.76 -58.08 -58.08 
 (328.8) (329.7) (329.3) (328.9) (329.7) (329.3) (328.9) (328.9) 
         
STLEV -42.80 -44.25 -51.92 -51.81 -44.25 -51.92 -42.80 -42.80 
 (538.0) (538.3) (538.9) (538.9) (538.3) (539.0) (538.0) (538.0) 
         
LTLEV -42.55 -40.51 -40.54 -44.97 -40.51 -40.54 -42.55 -42.55 
 (236.2) (236.8) (236.4) (236.3) (236.8) (236.4) (236.2) (236.2) 
         
TLEV -4.251 -4.064 -4.223 -4.689 -4.064 -4.223 -4.251 -4.251 
 (19.4) (19.5) (19.4) (19.5) (19.5) (19.5) (19.4) (19.4) 
         
SOIP 18.35 18.32 18.03 17.98 18.32 18.03 18.35 18.35 
 (11.6) (11.6) (11.6) (11.6) (11.6) (11.6) (11.6) (11.6) 
         
ENFCON 7.942 7.962 7.948 7.899 7.962 7.948 7.942 7.942 
 (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) 
         
GOVEFF -39.75 -39.01 -39.52 -41.34 -39.01 -39.52 -39.75 -39.75 
 (200.6) (200.7) (200.7) (200.7) (200.7) (200.7) (200.6) (200.6) 
         
ROL 595.1** 594.8** 595.3** 596.3** 594.8** 595.3** 595.1** 595.1** 
 (197.8) (197.9) (197.9) (197.9) (197.9) (197.9) (197.8) (197.9) 
         
C-CTRL 17.44 17.78 18.54 18.09 17.78 18.54 17.44 17.44 
 (154.9) (154.9) (154.9) (154.9) (154.9) (154.9) (154.9) (154.9) 
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MONF 1.466 1.491 1.572 1.552 1.491 1.572 1.466 1.466 
 (3.462) (3.468) (3.479) (3.473) (3.468) (3.479) (3.462) (3.462) 
         
TRADEF 1.399 1.397 1.295 1.260 1.397 1.295 1.399 1.399 
 (3.221) (3.222) (3.238) (3.251) (3.222) (3.238) (3.221) (3.221) 
         
FINF -6.190* -6.196* -6.167* -6.144* -6.196* -6.167* -6.190* -6.190* 
 (3.122) (3.124) (3.124) (3.126) (3.124) (3.124) (3.122) (3.122) 
         
GNIg -3.286 -3.273 -3.320 -3.366 -3.273 -3.320 -3.286 -3.286 
 (5.918) (5.920) (5.920) (5.925) (5.920) (5.920) (5.918) (5.918) 
         
INF -6.866 -6.891 -7.005 -6.995 -6.891 -7.005 -6.866 -6.866 
 (5.452) (5.458) (5.471) (5.469) (5.458) (5.471) (5.452) (5.452) 
         
INT -6.714 -6.693 -6.714 -6.767 -6.693 -6.714 -6.714 -6.714 
 (3.844) (3.849) (3.845) (3.849) (3.849) (3.845) (3.844) (3.844) 
         
D-INTR 14.46 14.45 14.40 14.41 14.45 14.40 14.46 14.46 
 (9.281) (9.284) (9.285) (9.285) (9.284) (9.285) (9.281) (9.281) 
         
DCTPS 7.178 7.186 7.202 7.191 7.186 7.202 7.178 7.178 
 (4.111) (4.113) (4.113) (4.112) (4.113) (4.113) (4.111) (4.111) 
         
New  8.887       
  (72.069)       
         
Young   -16.28      
   (50.876)      
         
Mature    22.67     
    (70.370)     
         
NonP     8.887    
     (72.069)    
         
Prof      -16.28   
      (50.876)   
         
NonReg       0  
       (.)  
         
Reg        0 
        (.) 
         
_cons -1140.1* -1167.0* -1153.0* -1111.7* -1167.0* -1153.0* -1140.1* -1140.1* 
 (544.198) (586.624) (545.855) (551.396) (586.624) (545.855) (544.198) (544.198) 
N 2185 2185 2185 2185 2185 2185 2185 2185 
R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
adj. R2 -0.302 -0.302 -0.302 -0.302 -0.302 -0.302 -0.302 -0.302 
F 4.661 4.414 4.419 4.419 4.414 4.419 4.661 4.661 
rmse 714.6 714.8 714.8 714.8 714.8 714.8 714.6 714.6 
df_r 1594 1593 1593 1593 1593 1593 1594 1594 
         
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
ALPB (Average Loan Balance Per Borrower) 
 
AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV 
(Total Leverage). SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF 
(Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income 
growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic 
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Credit to Private Sector). NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). Non-Reg (Non Regulated 
MFIs), Reg (Regulated MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
Table 7.8: Average Loan Balance per Borrower (ALPB) Fixed Effect Regression Results. 
 
7.3.3 MFI Depth of Outreach 
For the measure of MFI depth, all measures (STLEV, LTLEV, and TLEV) appear to influence 
depth of outreach negatively. However the coefficient appears insignificant in influencing MFI 
depth of outreach. The negative influence of all measures of MFI leverage on depth of outreach 
further questions the commercialisation debate, as the leverage measures are largely inversely 
influenced by MFI depth. This could suggest that at the bottom of the pyramid, standardised 
capital structure funding is less likely to influence the ability of MFIs to reach further depth in 
the pyramid. This could therefore imply that creative ways of funding MFI capital structure 
could positively compliments MFIs drive towards the bottom of the pyramid. For instance, 
MFIs could implement a graduated model of financing, as such that the lower it extends deeper 
to the bottom of the pyramid, the less obligation attached to funding repayments by MFIs. 
Subsequently, as clients hereafter graduate into higher levels of the pyramid, an ordered 
funding structure could then be implemented. The dummy for MFI age in this model 
corroborates this. When MFI age dummy is introduced, it is evident that new MFIs are more 
likely to go towards the bottom of the pyramid (as evident from the positive moderating 
influence), as MFIs become experienced, they become less likely to lend towards the bottom 
of the pyramid (as evident from the negative relationship), finally, as MFIs become larger 
institutions, the economies of scale enables MFIs to comfortably lend towards the bottom of 
the pyramid. For profit and non-profit MFIs, non-profits are more likely to be favourable 
towards lending to the bottom of the pyramid in comparison to for-profit MFIs. Firm 
characteristics such as MFI size, reveal appositive and highly significant relationship with MFI 
depth of outreach. Which seems to confirm that the size of an MFI creates a positive enabler 
for lending to those below the pyramid. The institutional measure of ROL shows a positive and 
significant influence on depth of outreach, suggesting that the perception of an equal legal 
opportunity creates an enabler for opportunity, whilst the measure for financial freedom is 




The rationale behind the sustainability and performance of MFIS have become a point of debate 
within the MFI literature ((Nurmakhanova et al., 2015; Churchill, 2018). A summary of the 
literature and the evidence indicates clearly that whilst MF performance is often analysed in 
silos, the practice in Africa needs more scrutiny. Especially at a time these institutions are 
needed to drive financial inclusion and fight against the swell of poverty. Fortunately, the 
policy implications are somewhat evident. Governments in SSA and policy makers, are 
required to create suitable local capital markets and healthy ways of providing long-term 
favourable financing to MFIs within the SSA region. It is clear from the various models of 
analysis that long-term leverage on favourable terms on average is crucial for the long-term  
performance of MFIs within the SSA region. In addition, the institutional environment could 
be further strengthened to create the right conditions for MFI optimum operations. For instance 
strengthening the institutional environment, to enable deposit taking and encourage savings as 
a longer term solution for MFI funding. This should then feed through to a shift away from the 
current practice of the directed use of short-term leverage as its currently applied within the 
current context to enhance the operational sustainability of MFIs in SSA. 
 
Implementing a long-term funding strategy via affordable local currency denominated 
markets could tremendously improve the sector in SSA. The rationale being that with long-
term funding MFIs are able to operate with more scope to expand operations without the 
pressure of meeting foreign denominated funding repayment obligations. Furthermore, this 
creates viability and a local humdrum of market funds readily available for MFIs to tap into. 
Viability could further improve MFIs capacity for organic growth by expanding its outreach 
and social capabilities. It is also clear that from a macro standpoint, a favourable and conducive 
legal environment without regulative interest rate ceilings is beneficial for MFI performance, 
this is in line with Dichter, (2007). Additionally, from a firm-specific stand-point, MFI Size, 
improved assets, and efficient market infrastructure are all beneficial for MFIs in meeting their 
dual objectives. 
 
However, in order for MFIs to have capacity that is more penetrative and fulfil the financial 
inclusion promise effectively, problems of governance need addressing at the MFI level. Very 
often, MFIs start off as NGOs or cooperatives with unclear governance structures, regularly 
depending on a single person, who simultaneously plays the role of founder, general manager 
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and president of the board. This poses an acute risk factor, especially amongst economies in 
SSA. Furthermore, weak infrastructural networks connecting clients in rural areas to MFIs 
remain a key limitation barrier for the transmission of financial services. Weak infrastructural 
framework often increases the transactional exchange (cost) between providers of micro-
financial services and end-users. This often translates into high operating expenses for MFIs, 
often limiting the geographical expansion of MFIs in less cost-efficient geographical areas, in 
addition to high rates of interests charged to end users. Therefore, an MFI lending low amounts 
-and truly targeting the bottom of the pyramid- will have very high operating costs, which often 
translates into a higher interest rate levy to micro-borrowers.  
 
Secondly, sub-Saharan Africa is a region in dire need of sufficiently mobilising deposits, 
and efficiently utilising this form of capital within the capital structure. This has several 
advantages for microfinance institutions: first, savings are usually cheaper than borrowings, 
especially in Africa where currency hedging costs are often on the high end, making costs of 
funding through international providers expensive; another advantage is that offering savings 
provides strong roots into local communities, and as such helping developing a strong market 
positioning. However harnessing this potential remains a key issue of challenge for MFIs in 
the region. The role of the regulatory institutions in creating an enabling environment to allow 
MFIs access and deploy deposits is key. For instance, data shows that, of the MFIs in SSA, 
only a fraction are fully licensed to accept deposits. For policy purposes therefore, the findings 
present opportunities to proscribe efficient policy solutions in improving both the financial and 
social performance of MFIs in SSA.
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In order to examine the scope of this research project, the main lines of enquiry for the final part of this 
three-part analysis asks the question: how does MFIs (through MFI penetration rate) influence the 
financial inclusion rate amongst countries in SSA? 
 
The aim of this empirical chapter is to establish the influence of Microfinance on Financial Inclusion, 
specifically:  
a) identify the Impact of MFI on financial inclusion levels in SSA.  
b). identify other unique institutional, firm level and macro-economic enablers of financial inclusion in 
SSA. 
c) Establish the role of technology as an enabler of financial inclusion in SSA. 
 
8.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
8.1.1 Summary Statistics 
This project utilizes a sample size for the period 2004-2011. MIX data is available for 120 countries. 
Of the 120 countries in the MIX sample, 7 do not have the necessary information to calculate the MF 
Penetration Rate. Although at this stage, the researcher concentrates on countries located in SSA as 
stipulated by official WB information. However, for the relevant sample population (SSA), some 
countries with little or no data availability for deriving the MF penetration rate, were dropped. A sum 
of thirteen countries in total from the SSA region
84
. This leaves the researcher with data from 35 
countries in SSA. Specifically, the omitted countries show no microfinance penetration during some of 
the years under examination. This variable of interest MF Penetration Rate can be seen in table 8.4 for 
all the countries in the data sample. 
 
Summary of Financial Inclusion Index. 
Summary of Finclusion Index Sub-Saharan Africa 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
2004 0.027 0.030 43 
2005 0.026 0.028 43 
2006 0.027 0.030 43 




 These countries in SSA include; Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Lesotho, Mauritania, Mauritius, Sao-Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia and South-Sudan. 
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2008 0.032 0.036 43 
2009 0.033 0.033 43 
2010 0.034 0.035 43 
2011 0.038 0.037 43 
Total 0.031 0.033 344 
Study Period: 2004-2011 
Table 8.1: Summary of Financial Inclusion Index Scores in SSA by Year. 
The dependent variable identified as financial inclusion index is a multidimensional-set of measures, 
consisting of commercial banking indicators often employed for use in financial inclusion studies.  
 
Summary of Financial Inclusion Composite Index  
Outreach 
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1000 sq. km 
Private Credit by 
Deposit Money 
Banks and other 
Financial 
Institutions / GDP 
Number of ATM's 
per 1000 sq. km 
Life Insurance 
Premium Volume / 
GDP 
Deposit Accounts 
per 1000 Adults  
Credit Accounts 
per 1000 Adults  
    
ATM (Automated Teller Machines.  
Source: Yorulmaz (2016). 
Table 8.2: Summary of Financial Inclusion Composite Index 2004 - 2011. 
 
Summary of Financial Inclusion Score SSA. 










Angola 0.010 0.003 8 
     
Benin 0.015 0.003 8 
 
Madagascar 0.005 0.001 8 
Botswana 0.046 0.008 8 
 
Malawi 0.017 0.003 8 
Burkina Faso 0.016 0.003 8 
 
Mali 0.018 0.002 8 
Burundi 0.020 0.002 8 
 
Mauritania 0.102 0.015 8 
Cameroon 0.018 0.004 8 
 
Mauritius 0.094 0.015 8 
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Cape Verde 0.078 0.011 8 
 
Mozambique 0.030 0.003 8 
CAR 0.011 0.003 8 
 
Namibia 0.097 0.014 8 
Chad 0.006 0.001 8 
 
Niger 0.013 0.003 8 
Comoros 0.009 0.002 8 
 
Nigeria 0.023 0.005 8 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.004 0.001 8 
 
Rwanda 0.007 0.002 8 
Congo, Rep. 0.007 0.004 8 
 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.038 0.007 8 
Djibouti 0.047 0.007 8 
 
Sierra Leone 0.015 0.003 8 
Equatorial Guinea 0.019 0.002 8 
 
South Africa 0.169 0.014 8 
Ethiopia 0.026 0.002 8 
 
South Sudan 0.007 0.001 8 
Gabon 0.019 0.002 8 
 
Sudan 0.021 0.005 8 
Gambia, The 0.022 0.001 8 
 
Swaziland 0.033 0.006 8 
Ghana 0.032 0.006 8 
 
Tanzania 0.010 0.002 8 
Guinea 0.018 0.003 8 
 
Togo 0.019 0.002 8 
Kenya 0.036 0.004 8 
 
Uganda 0.011 0.003 8 
Lesotho 0.015 0.005 8 
 
Zambia 0.027 0.007 8 
Liberia 0.042 0.006 8 
 
Zimbabwe 0.047 0.011 8 
     
Total 0.031 0.033 344 
Study Period: 2004-2011 
Table 8.3: Summary of Financial Inclusion Score SSA. 
 
Summary of MFI Penetration Rates in SSA. 










Angola 0.273 0.116 8 
     
Benin 9.605 3.421 8 
 
Madagascar 0.825 0.265 8 
Botswana 0.000 0.000 8 
 
Malawi 4.348 1.599 8 
Burkina Faso 3.816 0.739 7 
 
Mali 6.499 1.389 8 
Burundi 0.749 0.890 8 
 
Mauritania 0.000 0.000 8 
Cameroon 3.562 1.083 8 
 
Mauritius 0.000 0.000 8 
Cape Verde 0.000 0.000 8 
 
Mozambique 0.931 0.291 8 
CAR 0.151 0.063 8 
 
Namibia 0.372 0.327 8 
Chad 0.580 0.105 8 
 
Niger 1.502 0.657 8 
Comoros 0.000 0.000 7 
 
Nigeria 1.072 0.815 7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.306 0.161 8 
 
Rwanda 1.751 0.785 8 
Congo, Rep. 0.295 0.182 6 
 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.000 0.000 8 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.621 0.650 8 
 
Senegal 7.460 1.927 8 
Djibouti 0.000 0.000 8 
 
Seychelles 0.000 0.000 8 
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Equatorial Guinea 0.000 0.000 8 
 
Sierra Leone 1.933 0.682 8 
Eritrea 0.000 0.000 8 
 
Somalia 0.000 0.000 8 
Ethiopia 10.423 2.239 6 
 
South Africa 5.466 4.100 8 
Gabon 0.062 0.120 8 
 
Sudan 0.134 0.228 8 
Gambia, The 2.709 2.354 8 
 
Swaziland 1.525 0.927 8 
Ghana 6.872 2.614 8 
 
Tanzania 3.995 0.936 8 
Guinea 4.116 1.525 7 
 
Togo 4.259 1.230 8 
Guinea-Bissau 0.166 0.254 8 
 
Uganda 6.771 2.439 8 
Kenya 9.238 4.090 8 
 
Zambia 0.645 0.243 8 
Lesotho 0.000 0.000 8 
 
Zimbabwe 0.138 0.154 8 
Liberia 0.895 1.009 8 
 
Total 2.133 3.132 376 
Study Period: 2004-2011 
Table 8.4: Summary of MFI Penetration Rates in SSA. 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.4, in the first sample (SSA), MF Penetration Index indicates an observation 
of 376 across the country sampled in SSA for 2004-2011. This displays a mean value of 2.13, and 1 
standard deviation points away from the mean at 3.13, and 0 minimum and 17.37 maximum value. A 
look at a detailed description reveals that the sample deviation from the 25% quantiles and 75% 
quantiles is 3.14. On the other hand, the FINDEX measure exhibits a value of 344 observation with 
mean of 0.0306, with a standard deviation of 0.326 away from the mean value. A look at the detailed 
information reveals a positive value in the 75th quantile of 0.04, in comparison to the max value of 
0.19. The FINDEX indicator reveals a mean value of 0.08 and standard deviation of 0.04, with and 
values at the 75% quantile of 0.12, with a maximum value of 0.15.  
 
In comparison to countries in LAC, the differences are quite stark. For instance the MF Penetration 
Index indicates a mean value of 6.19 and 10.81 standard-deviation points away from the mean value. 
The 75% quantiles show a value of 8.9 and a maximum value of 74.48 (appendix figure 2, 3, and 4). 
This indicates that the permeability of microfinance is more visible in LAC than it is in SSA, with a 
mean value difference of (6.19 LAC – 2.13 SSA) 4.06. Also, the maximum penetration rate for LAC 
occurs at 74.49%, in comparison to a value of 17.38%. This indicates that MF activities are more 
efficient in delivering its objectives in LAC in comparison to SSA.  
 
Consequently, the FINDEX value shows a mean difference of (0.08 LAC – 0.03 SSA) 0.05 and 
maximum values of 0.15 in LAC in comparison to 0.19 in SSA).  Although the maximum FINDEX 
value is at 0.19 for SSA (South Africa) the next country following is 0.11 for Namibia and Mauritius. 
This is in comparison to a number of countries in LAC; with maximum sample value of 0.15, for 
Barbados, and The Bahamas. This reveals that on average, financial inclusion levels are higher in LAC 
than is obtainable in SSA (appendix figure 2, 3, and 4). 
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The median in all countries in the basic model sample (SSA) is 0.59%, this in comparison to a value 
of 0.67% in LAC. For the FINDEX measure, the median value for the sample SSA is 0.02, with a 
corresponding value of 0.08 for LAC (appendix figure 4 and 5). For the observed sample, South Africa 
possesses the highest FINDEX value of 0.19, followed by Namibia 0.115, Mauritius 0.113, Mauritania 
0.112, Cape-Verde 0.092, and Botswana at 0.058. 
 
8.1.2 Recent Trends of MF Penetration Rate 
Table 8.3 below presents the MF Penetration Rate index between 2004 and 2011. We exclude outlier 
countries identified in the previous section. 
 
Summary of MFI Penetration Rate in SSA by Year. 
Summary of Microfinance Penetration Rate 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
2004 1.394 2.234 48 
2005 1.825 2.557 48 
2006 2.130 2.849 48 
2007 2.155 3.167 48 
2008 2.519 3.450 48 
2009 2.768 3.987 46 
2010 2.041 2.966 46 
2011 2.267 3.594 44 
Total 2.133 3.132 376 
    
Study Period: 2004-2011 
Table 8.5: Summary of MFI Penetration Rate in SSA by Year. 
The picture in Africa, points to interesting issues/points. According to obtained data- Africa has the 
least penetration rates of Microfinance, whilst LAC have on average the highest amount of penetration, 
followed by the EEC region (appendix figure 4 and 5). 
 
Specifically, within the SSA sample, Ethiopia, Benin, Kenya, Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, Mali, and 
South Africa possess the highest average MF Penetration levels within SSA. These range  between 10.4 
and 5.4 from the highest to the lowest. In comparison to their counterparts in LAC (see Appendix: table 
2, 3 and 3); Peru, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile and Colombia possess highest levels of MF 
penetration rates. These range from the highest of 38.2 to 13.5. 
 
Countries in LAC have had a very high and stable microfinance market penetration in the last years 
(see Appendix: table 17 and 18). Consequently, the SSA market has had below-par and unsustainable 
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microfinance market, muddled with failure (bankruptcies), indebtedness and poor corporate governance 
measures. This is evident in the sample, for instance; the average MF penetration rate for LAC in 2003 
is 2.29, in 2004 this is at 3.02. This then increases to 4.12 and 4.99 from 2005 – 2006, and then at 2007 
this value is 5.9, this steadily increases until the last sample collection of 2012 at which this value is 
10.42 (a range of 2.29 – 10.42 from 2003 – 2012). However when the data from the sample is observed 
we see a stark contrast, for instance; the average MF penetration rate data point at the earliest collection 
period of 2004 is at 1.39, followed by 1.82 in 2005. This value then increases to 2.13 in 2006, and 2.15 
in 2007. However the measure remains at this value as at last reading of 2011, at 2.67 (hence, a range 
of 1.39 in 2004 to 2.26 in 2011).  
 
The statistic is also similar for the average FINDEX measure, for SSA (see appendix Table 0.26), 
this ranges from 0.026 in 2004 and steadily increases to 0.037 in 2011, indicating little or no growth in 
financial inclusion within the continent. On the other hand, the values for LAC show that, on average, 
financial inclusion measure commences at 0.073 in 2004 to 0.09 in 2011. This indicates that various 
strides taken amongst government parastatals to tackle financial inclusion especially in SSA is having 
little or no effect, in comparison to countries in LAC. The policy application of microfinance looks to 
be –so far- ineffective in SSA in comparison to LAC. Furthermore governments in SSA need to do 
more in order to increase MF penetration rate within the continent, so as to improve financial inclusion 
levels. 
 
8.1.3 Summary of Study Variables 
Table 11 includes the descriptions and summary statistics of the variables that we consider in the model 
specifications. These summary statistics are presented for the sample in which our MF Penetration 
Index is available between 2004 and 2011. 
 
MFI and Financial inclusion Summary Statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FINDEX 344 0.031 0.033 0.002 0.190 
MFPENRATE 376 2.133 3.132 0.000 17.377 
MOBSUBP100 374 32.19 29.04 0.208 141.38 
POPDENS 376 89.23 116.57 2.441 616.95 
PUBCREDREG 350 1.735 5.432 0.000 49.800 
CORRCTRL 386 -0.638 0.611 -1.869 1.160 
LENDr 270 15.592 8.348 4.752 36.500 
INF 360 7.781 5.817 0.234 22.112 
DEPINTR 290 7.343 3.160 3.033 13.698 
GNIk 300 2.944 10.255 -27.63 136.56 
DCTPS 359 19.359 23.634 0.443 160.12 
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FINDEX (Financial Inclusion Index), MFPENRATE (Microfinance 
Penetration Rate), MOBSUBP100 (Mobile Subscription per 100,00 
adults), POPDENS (Population density), PUBCRREDREG (Public 
Credit Registry), CORRCTRL (Corruption Control), LENDr (Lending 
Rate), INF (Inflation), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), GNIk (Gross 
National Income per Capita), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector). 
 
Study Period 2004-2011 
Table 8.6: MFI and Financial inclusion Summary Statistics. 
 
8.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The first model of regression entails a regression model which regresses the Y variable (FINDEX) on 
the independent variable Microfinance penetration rate (MFPENRATE), in addition to other vector of 
X variables (Institutional factors, Macro-economic factors, Financial Development indicators, control 
variables and the error term), the analysis thus reveal some interesting findings.
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Financial Inclusion Fixed Effect Model Result. 
Financial (FE model) (Robust) 
Inclusion FINDEX FINDEX 
MFPENRATE -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
MOBSUBP100 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
POPDENS -0.0001* -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
PUBCREDREG 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
CORRCTRL 0.0055 0.0055 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
   
LENDr 0.00004 0.00004 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
INF 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
GNIk -0.0000 -0.0000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
DEPINTR -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
DCTPS -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
_cons 0.0413*** 0.0413*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
N 171 171 
R2 0.656 0.656 
adj. R2 0.556 0.634 
F 25.13 214.4 
rmse 0.00335 0.00305 
df_r 132 28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
   
FINDEX (Financial Inclusion Index), MFPENRATE (Microfinance Penetration Rate), 
MOBSUBP100 (Mobile Subscription per 100,00 adults), POPDENS (Population density), 
PUBCRREDREG (Public Credit Registry), CORRCTRL (Corruption Control), LENDr (Lending 
Rate), INF (Inflation), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), GNIk (Gross National Income per Capita), 
DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). 
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Study Period 2004-2011 
Table 8.7: Financial Inclusion Fixed Effect Model Result. 
 
8.2.1 Results of the Panel Data Regression Approach 
Following the aim of this study, The results from the first estimation are discussed below. 
The fixed effect regression result reveal that the indicator for MF (in this case MFPENRATE) exhibits 
a negative relationship with the dependent variable (FINDEX). As a result of the generally low financial 
inclusion rates in SSA, it appears that MF exacerbates this phenomenon in SSA. When the penetration 
measure is observed closely, we observe that current practice of universally adopting MFI (especially 
in SAS) as a policy measure in order to combat financial inclusion lacks considerable merit as a result 
of the method of  application of MF within the continent. 
 
This is particularly relevant, when we observe the data on MF operations in SSA.in particular, MFIs 
often operate in urban areas and therefore their services are mostly pitched towards clients above the 
poverty line (This can be observed by the average loan size disbursed). This therefore implies that–for 
MFIs- within the continent, the delivery cost associated with operating in rural areas might be too 
exorbitant to bear. This could then have a knock-on effect on the cost to service ratio for rural operations 
in comparison to lower cost of operating in large cosmopolitan urban areas (bigger scale and volume). 
This failure and inability to reach the poorest of the poor, further questions the efficacy of MFIs as a 
policy tool for sustainable development in SSA. 
 
Current Interventions such as delivery of services through mobile channels Could help to reduce this 
gap, enabling MFIs to reach the last mile without establishing physical locations (which is known to 
come with heavy capital outlay). However, the infrastructure needed is still not available for a number 
of countries in the sample. The majority of markets with a strong distribution of financial services 
disbursement through mobile phones are predominantly in East Africa; where mobile money 
penetration are amongst the highest in the world. In these markets, it is therefore easier to reach remote 
areas without –so much as- having a physical operation, thereby limiting the cost involved in delivering 
financial services to these hard-to-reach rural areas. The measure of mobile subscription per 100 adults 
within the regression model, confirms this line of logical reasoning. As observed, this measure is 
positive and highly significant at the 0.01% level within the model regression. 
 
As indicated in the review of the existing literature, only a few researchers examine this 
phenomenon. Of the few that examine this, there has been some consensus of the importance of MFIs, 
albeit using simplistic measurement metrics and indicators. For instance, one study by Adeola and 
Evans (2017) examined the impact of MF on financial inclusion using an MFI measure of number of 
microfinance banks as the predictor variable. Whilst financial inclusion was a measure of total 
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commercial banks loans and advances. This study found a positive albeit insignificant impact of MF on 
financial inclusion in the short-run (whilst long-run estimates indicates a positive and significant 
impact). However, this study was only carried out with a sample of MFIs from Nigeria, and a relatively 
small set of regressor variables. This unwittingly excludes key variables which could influence the 
predicted variable (financial inclusion). Such as; mobile phone subscriptions, geographical and 
financial sector indicators. Furthermore, a closer look at the data, the significance of the results come 
under some questions.  Firstly, the location of MFIs in Nigeria are mostly situated in urban areas, 
resulting in extremely poor usage in rural areas. This can be evident from the MF penetration rate in 
Nigeria as seen by the data. Measures such as number of MFBs therefore skews the results towards 
significance of MFIs. A simple measure such as this, does little to really explain the extent of the 
usefulness of MF, especially within the SSA region. For instance, simply increasing the number of 
MFBs (especially in urban areas) could result in improving the value of the dependent variable (within 
a model), whilst poverty and exclusion levels remain the same, meaning that nothing really changes at 
the base level of the financial inclusion pyramid. 
 
Secondly only implementing a single commercial banking measure for financial inclusion, means 
that a comprehensive scope of financial inclusion is not measured by one indicator. Therefore, drawing 
policy conclusions from this study requires a rethink. Other such studies which examine this 
phenomenon include Chakrabarti and Sanyal (2015). Elzahi and Ali (2015). However, these projects 
are mostly descriptors in nature, and offer no empirical analysis for reference pointing. 
 
8.2.2 Income 
The estimation model employed reveals that income appears to be insignificant and conversely related 
with financial inclusion. This could be as a result of the low MFI penetration levels amongst the sample. 
This could also indicate that as the income -on average- increases financial inclusion levels generally 
improves. In addition to higher MFI penetration, ease of access to financial services increases. 
 
Previous studies such as Martinez and krauss (2015) establish that the effect of GDP per capita is 
stronger in countries with stronger microfinance market development. This heterogeneous effect across 
different stages of microfinance market development show that; as markets develop, MFIs may already 
have the tools to allow rapid response to unmet needs, in comparison to MFIs in less developed markets, 
where more barriers to reach the poor may be in place. As observed in the data sample, the market 
development of MF in SSA is below par, therefore the effect of income estimates such as GNIk is less 
impactful on the financial inclusion levels of the population in SSA. In addition it is often seen that 
there is less of a trickledown effect of growth in less developed economies, this could be responsible 
for the inverse relationships observed in the sample. Furthermore, in developing countries, the high 
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growth rates are no longer perceived as a differentiating factor for countries where microfinance has a 
high penetration. These findings corroborate with those of Ahlin et al. (2011), who do not find 
significant effects of real GDP growth on a MFI-level measure of borrower growth. 
 
8.2.3 Enabling Institutions 
Our measure for financial development; Domestic Credit to Private Sector (DCTPS) has a negative and 
insignificant effect on financial inclusion. On the other hand, the measure of Public credit registry 
reveals a positive and significant (at the 1% level) impact on the financial inclusion index. This suggests 
that Enabling Institutions are increasingly more important as relates to the levels of financial inclusion 
within the sample. This may be due to increasing density of microfinance services, which may require 
better support from the existing range of enabling institutions. This is in line with the findings of Assefa 
et al. (2013) suggesting that credit information sharing among lenders could have a positive effect on 
the implementation of microfinance. 
 
Similar to our Income indicators, Domestic Credit to Private Sector is not significant in the full 
sample, however, Public Credit registry coverage is significant in the sample regression distribution. 
This is an interesting finding as it confirms the perception that quality enabling Institutions are important 
both for financial inclusion and crucial MFI decision making in already penetrated markets. For instance 
the availability of a public credit registory enables MFIs to make better loan disbursement and client 
onboarding decisions (improves information asymmetry), whilst reducing instances of potential client 
indebtedness. 
 
Public credit registries are more important than Private Bureaus amongst countries aiming to 
increase the level of financial participation in the continent. The rationale being, public credit registries, 
development finance institutions like MFIs are able to enforce credit information sharing. Indeed, this 
may not be possible in the case of private credit information agencies. This suggests that in more 
complex credit markets in SSA (for instance in South Africa), MFIs should have access to all relevant 
credit information in order to improve general financial inclusion levels. 
 
The institutional quality as observed by the measure for corruption control reveal some interesting 
results. As expected amongst the sample, the measure for corruption control influences the measure of 
financial inclusion  positively. Although this measure is not significant, this might suggest the relatively 
low development placement of the countries within the sample. 
 
8.2.4 Formal Financial Development 
The financial development measures (DEPINTR, DCTPS) suggests an inverse relationship with the 
dependent variable financial inclusion. Quite interestingly the measure of DCTPS appears to have an 
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inverse influence, some studies highlight the role of the financial sector as complimentary towards 
financial inclusion. A possible explanation for this within the SSA context could be that the informal 
sector, uncaptured by the private sector is often larger or similar in size to the observable private sector. 
Hence, credit to the private sector will have an effect of widening the schism between the formal and 
the informal sector, leading to an inverse relationship with financial inclusion. 
 
On the contrary, increasing access to financial services through mediums such as mobile phones 
could improve the level of inclusive financial services available for access by those in need of these 
services. This is evident when we examine the coefficient and significance of the variable for 
technological advances (MOBSUBP100). This variable captures the recent emergence and seemingly 
importance of mobile phones in the seamless delivery of cost-effective financial services in SSA. 
 
Mobile Phones subscriptions (per 100 people) exhibits a positive and significant effect on financial 
inclusion across the sample. In particular, MOBSUBP100 is significant at the 1% level. This suggests 
that in SSA, an information technology is playing a more important role in advancing/enabling financial 
inclusion amongst countries in SSA. Furthermore, it is very interesting to see that Mobile subscriptions 
have a highly significant effect in the sample. This relates with the developments in e-money solutions 
which implements mobile technologies to increase financial inclusion at the bottom of the pyramid. It 
suggest that these technologies can be important enablers in the early stages of market development, as 
they can help countries overcome potential geographical constraints and transaction costs that may limit 
their ability to reach the poor with affordable services.   
 
The geographical measure of population density as expected, exerts a negative influence on financial 
inclusion. This relationship is significant at the 10% level. suggesting that at current conditions, as more 
people come into workforce age, without a commensurate increase in financial inclusion efforts, this 
friction will naturally create a position of regressive financial inclusion. 
 
8.2.5 Macroeconomic Environment 
The measures of macroeconomic environment employed within the sample include; lending rate, and r 
inflation. These measures –although all positive-, appear to be insignificant in explaining the financial 
inclusion measure of the SSA sample. This could be as a result of the remedial roles these measures 
play in the development of much of the countries in SSA. For example lending rates are high on average 
at 21.5%, and inflation levels on average at 80.2%. These estimates are simply volatile in comparison 
to other developing regions, therefore, the impact on the ability for ordinary people to access and use 
financial services is less reliant on the above factors. However, it impacts the financial sectors 
development, funding and efficiency in delivering services to end users (supply side). 
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We also examine the role of different Interest Rates on financial inclusion. In particular, we 
considered the role of the lending rate (LendingRate), and deposit rate (DepositRate). Interestingly, we 
find no significant relationship between financial inclusion and any of the observed rate, although these 
relationships appear to be positive. This may be because MFIs need some human capital in order to 




Fixed Effect with Time and Year Dummy Variables. 
Financial (FE Model) (FE Model) (FE Model) (FE Model) (FE Model) (FE Model) (FE Model) (FE Model) 
Inclusion FINDEX FINDEX FINDEX FINDEX FINDEX FINDEX FINDEX FINDEX 
MFPENRATE -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
MOBSUBP100 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
POPDENS -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
PUBCREDREG 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
CORRCTRL 0.0058* 0.0054 0.0057* 0.0056 0.0050 0.0055 0.0052 0.0064* 
 (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
         
LENDr 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
INF 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
GNIk -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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DEPINTR -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
DCTPS -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Y2004 0.0008        
 -0.001        
         
Y2005  -0.0004       
  -0.001       
         
Y2006   -0.0012      
   -0.001      
         
Y2007    -0.00016     
    -0.001     
         
Y2008     0.0011    
     -0.001    
         
Y2009      -0.0003   
      -0.001   
         
Y2010       -0.0017  
       -0.001  
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Y2011        0.0027
** 
        -0.001 
         
_cons 0.0414*** 0.0414*** 0.0432*** 0.0416*** 0.0404*** 0.0413*** 0.0395*** 0.0454*** 
 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
N 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R2 0.657 0.656 0.661 0.656 0.66 0.656 0.665 0.676 
adj. R2 0.555 0.554 0.56 0.553 0.559 0.553 0.566 0.58 
F 22.79 22.71 23.21 22.68 23.11 22.7 23.67 24.85 
rmse 0.0034 0.0034 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0033 0.0033 
df_r 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
FINDEX (Financial Inclusion Index) 
 
MFPENRATE (Microfinance Penetration Rate), MOBSUBP100 (Mobile Subscription per 100,00 adults), POPDENS (Population density), 
PUBCRREDREG (Public Credit Registry), CORRCTRL (Corruption Control), LENDr (Lending Rate), INF (Inflation), DEPINTR (Deposit 
Interest Rate), GNIk (Gross National Income per Capita), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). Y2004 – Y2011 (Year Dummies). 
 
Study Period 2004-2011 
        
       





Over one-third of the young population of Africa remains unbanked. This lack of financial inclusion 
affects disproportionately the bottom of the pyramid, mostly situated in rural communities in countries 
in SSA. So far, the data to understand how to include the poorer segments of the population in financial 
services within SSA has been lacking, however, this research employs a financial index measurement 
developed by Sarma (2008), and Yorulmaz (2016), in addition to microfinance data to begin this 
examination. 
 
In particular, the use of OECD development index methodology was used to calculate an index of 
commercial banking, demand and supply side measures of financial access by users in SSA. These 
measures included cost, usage, and outreach. The microfinance market penetration (MF Penetration 
Rate), considering the total number of microfinance borrowers as a share of working age population 
below the national poverty line. This measure is provided by (Martinez and Krauss 2015) for 109 
countries around the world, together with a detailed comparison with the best proxies from the currently 
available Findex and FAS datasets. We use fixed effects panel-data model (with robust option for 
heteroscedasticity, and absorbed predicted values for correlation correction. see appendix results) to 
understand the dynamics of our financial inclusion data and the key variable for observation 
(MFPENRATE). 
 
This methodology has several advantages: It accounts for the dynamic and heterogeneous impacts 
that key drivers of microfinance market penetration have across different regions of the observed 
sample. Secondly, It correctly acknowledges the non-normality of our variable of interest and helps to 
better understand the outliers in the sample. Thirdly, It allows us to address potential endogeneity 
concerns. By using our panel dataset on microfinance market penetration and other capital structure 
variables, we are able to contribute to the literature with a more precise and robust understanding on: 
1) the key institutional drivers of the capital structure of MFIs; 2) MFI performance as influenced by 
the capital structure, and finally, 3) the dynamics of microfinance penetration across different stages on 
financial inclusion in SSA. 
 
Our findings indicate that the penetration of MFIs in SSA is still below standards obtainable in other 
regions of the world, despite being implemented as a policy tool to combat financial inclusion and 
improve poverty levels in SSA. Broader results indicates that MF as measured by the MF penetration 
rate, is less impactful on financial inclusion. Possible explanation of this could be that  as microfinance 
penetration increases, the MF sector almost forms an existing embryonic financial ecosystem, totally 
removed from the formal financial system entirely (as viewed from the negative influence of DCTPS), 
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such that MFIs do not improve financial access to the level of promoting users into the formal financial 
system in SSA. Where previous research have alleged that the formal financial system acts as a 
complimentary function of the MF sector in bringing financial inclusion to the poor. Our research 
suggests otherwise, elaborating on the divergence between current MFI penetration levels in SSA and 
the drive towards increased financial inclusion. At current state of MFIs in SSA the goal of financial 
inclusion for the continent remains a fleeting vision. 
 
This is not difficult to see why, with the current operations of MFIs in SSA (microfinance activities 
are largely concentrated in urban areas), there remains a large risk of indebtedness. In addition, MFI 
coverage in rural areas (areas with the most need) is still largely poor in comparison to its potential 
reach. This seems to be the failure of implementation and a fractured approach. The current client profile 
of MFIs in SSA are largely not identified as “poor. According to Dominicé and Dufresne, (2011), their 
clients are not poor, neither are they businesses as led to believe. Rather, they are mainly above-the-
poverty-line; these include individuals who are facing cash shortages and need cash for consumption 
smoothing. This therefore creates a competition with commercial banks for clients in urban areas. This 
could further explain the diametrical relationship between MFIs and Financial inclusion. 
 
Where previously it has been thought that microfinance penetration institutions (MFIs) are more 
responsive to the needs of the bottom of the pyramid (Maritnez and Krauss (2015), the opposite is the 
case in SSA, where the operations of MFIs are predominantly in Urban areas. Hence, microfinance 
penetration institutions (MFIs) are more responsive to the needs of clients not below the poverty line. 
In addition, where previous research indicates the complimentary nature of MFIs and formal financial 
sector, our research suggest that in fact, MFIs in SSA are often in direct competition with the formal 
financial sector as a result of competition in urban areas. This therefore asserts that the MF sector is not 
effective in its role as an enabler of financial inclusion, therefore the linkages between this sector and 
the formal financial sector at least at a certain mature level is non-existing within the markets of SSA. 
 
8.3.1 Limitations 
Where this research appears to make an important contribution to the literature, some limitations are 
identified. Firstly, the data collected for use with this research project deserves a mention. The data 
collected was obtained from MIX Market database. Although this is the premier source of data available 
for evaluation of MFIs and usage of MFI data, the method of reporting to The MIX is specific to 
reporting MFIs. Whilst The Mix verify financial statements and balance sheet reports submitted by 
MFIs, and although MFIs often are subject to strict reporting requirements, there is always a possibility 
of errors in reporting within information reported to The MIX. Whilst these levels are ignorable, these 
flaws do not affect the materiality of the quality of data and result output reported in this research 
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project. Furthermore, the dataset has been used extensively within the literature and peer reviewed in 
Microfinance studies and does present very credible analysis (see Tingbani et al., 2019). 
 
Second the study period coincided from 2004-2016, however, for the third study the data for the 
explanatory variable (financial inclusion -the key variable of choice for explaining the financial 
inclusion levels for countries in SSA-), did not match the full length of study period above. This could 
be because of the relatively nascent nature of the interest in financial inclusion, in addition to the 
resources needed to map out this information and quantify it. This data was only available for the period 
(2004-2011). This was also the case for the variable of interest (explanatory variable) Microfinance 
Penetration Rate (MPR). Although the variables for the other variables identified for the model of this 
study incorporated data from 2004-2016. Whilst the researcher would have preferred a commensurate 
dataset length to the two previous empirical studies (2004-2016), the results nonetheless provide 
impactable insight into the relationship between MFIs, Institutional Environment, Technology, and their 
impacts on Financial Inclusion in Africa. The results confirm compliance with research in this field. 
 
Finally, the study is presented in 2020, with data up to 2016. This is due to two factors,: firstly, the 
availability of data, and the legitimacy of data. On the first issue, on commencing this research project 
(2016), the data identified with the maximum usability and coverage, coincided with the period ending 
2016. Secondly, when data is collected by The MIX, this data is then audited and further verified by the 
data vendor (The MIX), this process often requires one to two year period. Further research could 
incorporate new data for confirmation. Furthermore, global events which could have impacted the 
funding of MFIs globally (during the period) such as; the global financial crisis of 2008, and the current 
covid-19 impacts could be insightful for the MF literature. 
 
8.3.2 Practice Implications 
For MFIs, the practice of financial services delivery is a responsible task. Whilst strides are being made 
to improve financial inclusion amongst countries in SSA, key chasms still exist. MFIs must radically 
change the operational activities to reflect the realities of the rural population to which they serve. For 
instance, a key finding for this study is observed in the measure of technology and its power in 
translating financial inclusion. Our result indicates that technologies can help to overcome market entry 
barriers, in particular, Mobile Phones subscriptions. This suggests that e-money solutions can be 
important enablers in the stages and levels of financial inclusion, as they can help users and in particular 
MFIs overcome potential geographical constraints and transaction costs that may limit their ability to 
reach the poor with affordable services. Mobile Phones subscriptions are significantly important in 
determining the financial inclusion amongst the sample. This suggests that technologies enable MFIs 
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to have a more timely relationship with their customers, which may be crucial as markets mature and 
become more complex.  
 
Consequently, for MFI capital structure and performance operations, improved governance within 
the institutional environment can go a long way in helping MFIs attract better funding (or improve 
domestic capital environment so as to access local currency funding, thereby moving away from the 
use of expensive $USD funding. A move to local currency debt, could reduce the pressure of repayment 
at higher repayment rate, in addition to eliminating/reduction in the foreign exchange risk to loan 
repayments. The move towards local funding affords MFIs access to longer-term capital, which then 
enables MFIs to improve their performance and outreach to the bottom of the pyramid. 
 
8.3.3 Policy Implications 
Fortunately, the policy implications are somewhat evident. Creating an enabling environment 
for funders to come into the sector and feel protected should be apriority. Policies that 
strengthen financial reporting practices, transparency in government, and embracing the 
absolute power of the rule of law are important for the continent in the short and longer term. 
This finding corroborates the findings of (Okafor et al. 2015, Webster and Piesse 2018) who 
conclude that improving efficiency in areas such as corruption control and human development, 
could improve the level and quality of FDI inflow to a destination country. From a macro-
environment standpoint improving national income via increased productivity of local 
institutions, is a positive signal to international funders. Governments in SSA and policy 
makers, are required to create suitable local capital markets and healthy ways of providing 
long-term favourable financing to MFIs within the SSA region. It is clear from the various 
models of analysis that long-term leverage on favourable terms on average is crucial for the 
long-term sustainability and performance of MFIs within the SSA region. Therefore, 
Implementing a long-term funding strategy via affordable local currency denominated markets 
will tremendously improve the sector in SSA, and hence, should be the priority for policy 
makers. The rationale being that with long-term funding MFIs are able to operate with more 
scope to expand operations without the pressure of meeting foreign denominated funding 
repayment obligations. 
 
A key finding for this research is the revelation that MFIs are less impactful in helping the 
efforts to attaining financial inclusion through. Conversely, we find that the measure for mobile 
penetration is highly significant in influencing financial inclusion in SSA. Despite the findings 
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for MFIs, the use of MFIs to achieve this goal could indeed still be attainable, however in their 
current capacity this is not possible. Therefore, re-tooling MFIs to meet such demands is 
crucial, and should be of high priority for policy makers and funders of the MFI sector. One of 
such ways to achieve deeper rural coverage could be an implementation of mobile banking 
technology in executing financial services. Some of the more important findings indicate that 
–with some hope- the implementation of financial technology such as mobile money could be 
of benefit to countries in SSA. Policy makers are therefore better off putting in place sound 
institutional framework such as strengthening and localising public credit registries. This 
research analysis indicates that this is significant in aiding/impacting financial inclusion in 
SSA. Establishment of functional and efficient public credit registries, will greatly improve the 
processing of financial information and aid information asymmetry. In addition to this MFIs 
can then be trimmed down in their operative capacities, so as to aid agility in their operations, 
to better enable them reach the bottom of the pyramid competently. 
 
8.3.4 Study Conclusions and Contributions 
The detailed insights provided in this paper are specific for the effects of MF and other control 
variables on the measure of financial inclusion in SSA, and can better guide policymakers and investors 
to prioritize their efforts in a particular context to increase financial inclusion at the bottom of the 
pyramid. Our findings are also important for other industries reaching the poor with products, services 
and opportunities in commercially viable ways. Using the rich and widely available microfinance data, 
our results can guide industries for which less comparable information is available. In particular, our 
findings can shed light on which are the most important barriers to scale-up other inclusive innovations. 
 
Our results further indicate that, overall indicators of credit information quality are very important. 
For a higher level of market participation and influence (penetration), a more refined institutional setting 
must be in place to help MFIs deal with increasing levels of complexity, and therefore better refine 
delivery practices of financial services, adding value to their clients at the bottom of the pyramid. These 
findings also presents a unique insight for policymakers with targets for increasing financial inclusion 
and ensuring the sustainability of MFIs in developing policy for the SSA region. 
 
Key findings reveal that observed institutional measures such as; corruption control 
(CORRPCTRL), appear to be positive in influencing financial inclusion, reiterating the need for good 
governance and strong institutions. The macroeconomic environment largely reveals a positive 
relationship. For instance, the measure of lending rate (DEPINTR), and inflation (INF) measures are 
positive influences on financial inclusion.  However, these measures are insignificant in impacting 
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financial inclusion. The  measures of income (GNIk) indicates a negative and insignificant influence on 
financial inclusion. 
 
Worthy of note however is the measure for the information environment as measured by public 
credit registry (PUBCRED). For instance, the results of the analysis showed that the presence of a public 
credit registry is significantly a role player in influencing the financial inclusion in SSA. In SSA, there 
is still a great deal of work to be accomplished in the area of harmonising a quality centralized credit 
data. This is a crucial element on the road to deepening the penetration of MFIs and enabling the 
seamless information flow between lenders and borrowers of credit. According to Krauss (2015), a 
well-functioning and compulsory credit bureau is a key success factor in the microfinance sector. This 
is because, loans offered by MFIs (microloans) are largely unsecured. Therefore, knowing and 
evaluating the liability structure and the repayment capacity of micro-entrepreneurs is crucial in 
avoiding the possibility of indebtedness, often associated with the non-existence of adequate 
information and credit record keeping infrastructure. 
 
Secondly, within the SSA context, there is a distinct lack of governance within the MFI sector. The 
MFI sector in SSA particularly suffers from the prevalence of weak governance structure at the level of 
micro-lenders. Although in comparison to MFIs in LAC and Asia, the MF sector in SSA is in a younger 
position, this can be seen as teething problems. However, in order for MFIs to have more penetrative 
capacity and fulfil the financial inclusion promise effectively, problems of governance need addressing 
at the MFI level. Very often, MFIs start off as NGOs or cooperatives with unclear governance structures, 
regularly depending on a single person, who simultaneously plays the role of founder, general manager 
and president of the board. This poses an acute risk factor, especially amongst economies in SSA. 
Furthermore, weak infrastructural networks connecting clients in rural areas to MFIs remain a key 
limitation barrier for the transmission of financial services. Weak infrastructural framework often 
increases the transactional exchange (cost) between providers of micro-financial services and end-users. 
This often translates into high operating expenses for MFIs, often limiting the geographical expansion 
of MFIs in less cost-efficient geographical areas, in addition to high rates of interests charged to end 
users. For example, the operating cost of providing a USD 2,000 loan is similar for an amount of USD 
500 loan. Therefore, an MFI lending low amounts -and truly targeting the bottom of the pyramid- will 
have very high operating costs, which often translates into a higher interest rate levy to micro-borrowers. 
 
With an average loan size in Africa, amounting to USD 425 (Microfinance Barometer 2017) (the 
second lowest after South Asia with USD 220), this is well above the average portfolio yield of a typical 
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MFI portfolio in SSA85. Despite the highs yield, MFIs in SSA are lagging behind in terms of 
profitability86. This illustrates one of the main operational challenges faced by MFIs in SSA: achieving 
financial inclusion whilst being efficient. As such, MFIs in Africa often serve a mix of poor but more 
often middle class clients in order to achieve better cost coverage. Hence, sampled data suggests that 
coverage rate of financial services to the poor (as measured by the MF penetration rate) in Africa is 
only 2.23%, the lowest in the developing world. When compared to the LAC region, the penetration 
rate doubles to 4.26%. This suggests that Africa still has a long way to go before it bridges the gap 
between demand by poor households for financial services and supply. Furthermore, there are an 
average of 2.5 branches for 100,000 adults in SSA, this is in comparison to 15 in the rest of the world, 
and an average 6 branches per 1,000 square kilometres compared to 34 in the rest of the world. The 
challenge then for governments in SSA is how to bring into the financial ecosystem those in need of 
financial services in rural areas. This holds the key for deliverance of a universal financially included 
society target as set by the WB development committee- for 2020. 
 
One of such ways to achieve deeper rural coverage could be the full implementation of mobile 
banking technology in implementing financial services. Some of the more important findings indicate 
that –with some hope- the use and implication of financial technology such as mobile money in the 
drive towards universal financial inclusion could be of benefit to countries in SSA. This is because the 
delivery cost and efficiency, robustness in introducing programs and services to its end users present a 
truly lean and nimble opportunity for MFIs in SSA. The data further suggest that a mobile phone 
subscription is a positive enabler of financial inclusion in SSA. This should not be surprising; when we 
examine the penetration of mobiles phones in SSA, and the current impacts of mobile money 
transactions in countries east of the Nile, this possibilities have to be harnessed en-masse in SSA, in 
order to be relevant in delivering financial services to the hard to reach areas in SSA. 
 
Africa is clearly ahead of other regions in this field, trying to bank on the fast growing mobile 
networks and avoid dependency on poor transportation systems. Kenya has led the way so far in mobile 
banking, as illustrated by the success story of the M-Pesa system launched in 2007 and which has now 
over 17 million registered accounts, making it by far the biggest branchless banking system in emerging 




85 Symvest, a market leading analytics firm for microfinance investments and portfolio characteristics reveal the 
portfolio yield of their benchmark SYM50 (this is the Symbiotics worldwide microfinance index). This index 
reveals an aggregate yield of MFIs at 45% vs. 30% in SYM50)(www.symvest.com) 
86 Symvest further reports on the roe yields of MFIs, placing an average ROE of 7.3% in SSA vs. 16.4% in the 
SYM50) 
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Many aspects of the microfinance business are quite promising in Africa such as its ability to offer 
a rich variety of services owing to the rich diversity within the continent. For instance in a country like 
Nigeria where there exists over 230 ethnicities, the scope of designing products to cater to different 
groups along the demand chain should be latched upon as an opportunity to expand MF services to key 
end-users, whilst improving lives. Research indicates that when products are designed for a particular 
group in society, the long-standing benefits are evident. Secondly, with sub-Saharan Africa being the 
only place in the world where there are more savers than borrowers. This has several advantages for 
microfinance institutions: first, savings are usually cheaper than borrowings, especially in Africa where 
currency hedging costs are often on the high end, making costs of funding through international 
providers expensive; another advantage is that offering savings provides strong roots into local 
communities, and as such helping developing a strong market positioning. However harnessing this 
potential still remains a key issue of challenge for MFIs in the region. The role of the regulatory 
institutions in creating an enabling environment so as to allow MFIs access and deploy deposits is key. 
For instance, data shows that, of the MFIs in SSA, only a fraction are fully licensed to accept deposits. 
This is in comparison to more than three quarters in LAC. This has to change in order to enable MFIs 
get to the bottom of the pyramid. 
 
Financial sector measures of the lending rate (LENDr), positively influencer financial inclusion, 
with the often high levels of lending rates in SSA, this suggests that factors such as rate is less important 
in determining the appetite for usage of financial services in SSA. Although the above measures 
(lending rate) indicate a positive influence on financial inclusion, these are not significant in explaining 
financial inclusion in SSA. The main measure of financial sector development; domestic credit to the 
private sector (DCTPS), presents an inverse relationship with financial inclusion. We find that financial 
development, both informal and formal, acts as a direct competition to MFIs in promoting financial 
inclusion. Therefore the financial development indicators in this case play an inverse role in comparison 
to MF penetration, such that; for increased financial inclusion, and an increase in private credit levels, 
this does not trickle down to the bottom of the pyramid, thereby creating a negative relationship. 
 
A key finding for this study is observed in the measure of technology and its power in translating 
financial inclusion. Our result indicates that technologies can help to overcome market entry barriers, 
in particular, Mobile Phones subscriptions. This suggests that e-money solutions can be important 
enablers in the stages and levels of financial inclusion, as they can help users and in particular MFIs 
overcome potential geographical constraints and transaction costs that may limit their ability to reach 
the poor with affordable services. Mobile Phones subscriptions are significantly important in 
determining the financial inclusion amongst the sample. This suggests that technologies enable MFIs 
to have a more timely relationship with their customers, which may be crucial as markets mature and 
become more complex. 
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Leavy and White (2000), suggest that there is no complete set of competitive markets in 
rural areas, of developing countries, but a broad variety of spot markets exist and operate 
competitively, in addition to some informal mechanisms which may fill at least some of the 
same functions as a competitive market. however, labour (productive capacity) in rural areas 
are characterised under four areas namely; smallholder production, commercial agriculture, 
nonfarm activities, and migration. 
 
In view of the evident distinctions between the urban and rural dweller, it is therefore 
important for policy makers to direct development capacity to better/efficiently cater for both 
the needs of urban and rural dwellers, according to identified needs. For instance, higher 
productive capacity of urban dwellers in comparison to their rural counterparts, suggest a 
possible development win for MFIs through coherent policy making. Applying the Lewis 
model of development, a better direction for these institutions lies in refocusing on a graduated 
model of MFI funding. In this scenario, the rural subsistence agriculturist is funded until able 
to move towards a more sustainable and predictable source of income in the urban areas, 
thereby affording MFIs the ability to both capture scale, and in so doing, help the overall 
development (in the ecosystem) of communities to higher productive capacity via a shift 
towards inclusive industrialisation activities.  
 
This could be in the form of re-organising MFIs activities (an ecosystem within the financial 
system) as multi-purpose institutions; the multiplicity of purpose could both serve rural 
dwellers and urban dwellers efficiently. With distinct policy direction, MFIs could have several 
distinctions. For instance, a segment of MFIs could focus solely on rural markets, and a 
‘graduated’87 MFI will offer more productive capacity, focusing solely on urban markets 
consisting of graduated rural subsistence labour. This distinction could further streamline the 
sector in Africa, and provide a more seamless operational nous within the African continent, 




87 A higher capitalised MFI with deeper capital buffers for increased operational capability. 
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The acronyms at the top of the table indicate common observed indicators which have been examined by 
previous studies. They include: P (Profitability), S (Size), A (Age), AT (Asset Tangibility), R (Risk), L 
(Liquidity), r (Interest Rate), i (Inflation) G (Growth), NDTS (non-debt Tax Shields). Under the columns 
are tick marks for studies that have employed these measures in their analysis. 
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8.5 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES  
8.5.1 Capital Structure Theoretical Developments 
This section of this report is devoted to the review of theoretical and empirical studies conducted on the 
capital structure of firms, its determinants, and effects on performance, with a view of addressing a 
portion of gaps identified from the literature. A detailed critical review of empirical studies is carried 
out on studies in the capital structure literature that have examined firm specific and country factors as 
determinants of capital structure. Amongst these, the key studies identified have been represented in a 
mapping matrix (See Table above for the summary of selected studies, some reviewed literature, and 
employed variables for the individual studies).  
 
8.5.2 The Traditional View of Capital Structure 
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Before the intervention by Miller and Modigliani, the prevailing theory on capital structure was known 
as the ‘Traditional’ view/approach to Capital structure (Frentzel, 2013). This view of capital structure 
assumes that there exist, a specific level of optimal gearing, which eventually minimizes the cost of 
capital and maximizes the value of the firm and hence shareholder wealth (Frentzel 2013); Watson and 
Head 2013) p. 297). Hence, the proposition of the traditional approach to capital structure posits that an 
optimal capital structure does exist, one that aims to increase firm value with the use of financial 
leverage within its capital structure (Wrightsman 1978). Firms should therefore use the combination of 
debt and equity that minimizes its overall cost of capital in order to maximise shareholder wealth. 
 
Like other theories of finance this proposition is based on underlying assumptions of; non-existence 
of taxes, companies possess two choices of finance (perpetual debt finance or ordinary equity shares), 
companies can change their capital structure without incurring issue or redemption costs; increase in 
debt finance is accompanied by a simultaneous decrease in equity finance of the same amount; all 
distributable earnings are paid out as dividends; business risk associated with firms are constant over 
time; and company earnings and hence dividends do not grow over time. 
 
8.5.3 Miller Modigliani ‘The Irrelevance Position88 
The capital structure irrelevance position postulated by Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their seminal 
publication, assumes that in perfect capital markets, leverage financing is irrelevant to the value of a 
firm. 
 
Given the assumptions of perfect capital markets and no taxes on corporate income, an equilibrium 
in the capital market requires that firm value !", should be independent of any proportions of debt and 
equity in the firm’s capital structure. As represented in eqn.1 below. 
!" = 	!%." +	!(."     (Equation 9.1) 
Where; 
!% = market value of debt 
!( = market value of equity 
 
8.5.4 M&M and Other Theories 
Miller & Modigliani (1958) first proposition, starts on the assumption that firms have a particular set 
of expected cash-flows, hence when the firm chooses a certain proportion of debt and equity to finance 
its operation; it merely divides up the cash-flows among investors. Investors and firms are also 
presumed to have equal access to capital markets (this, allowing for an investor to create own leverage), 
 
 
88 For a full review of the arguments on the irrelevance theory, in addition to subsequent MM theories, see 
appendix 1. 
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hence as a result, the leverage of the firm has no effect on the market/shareholder value and performance 
of the firm. Two fundamental strings of thought underpins the irrelevance theory; Arbitrage and so-
called ‘home-made’ alternatives for Investors. Much of the subsequent discussion following the 
propositions by MM focused on the realism of particular assumptions. 
 
Following MM’s propositions on the irrelevance of capital structure theory, various capital structure 
theories emerge to relax the unrealistic assumptions stipulated by the irrelevance theory, namely; Jensen 
(1986), introduced the trade-off theory of capital structure and argues that debt is an efficient means by 
which to reduce the agency costs associated with equity, whilst Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) show 
that as a result of the tax advantages of debt, the optimal capital structure includes debt financing. Ross 
(1977) Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that debt can be valuable as signalling device for firm value, while 
Jensen (1986) indicates that debt can be employed as a disciplining device to deter managers from 
empire building. Myers (1984), advocates the need to balance gains and costs of debt financing. This 
theory values a company as the value of the firm if unlevered, plus the present value of the tax shield 
minus the present value of bankruptcy and agency costs, formulating the static trade-off theory. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) posits that outside investors rationally discount the firm’s stock price when 
managers issue equity as opposed to riskless debt. Hence, to avoid this discount, managers avoid the 
use of equity finance wherever possible in preference to internal sources of funds, second in order of 
preference Is issuance of low risk debt finance, and then, equity issuance as a last resort. Thereby, 
formulating the pecking order theory. Finally, the market timing theory of capital structure argues that 
firms time their equity issues so as to maximise the issuance of equity, by issuing new stock when the 
stock price is perceived to be overvalued, and in addition, buy-back firm own stock when the stock 
price is undervalued. For a robust review of the above capital structure theories, refer to the appendix 
1. 
 
8.5.5 M&M Proposition I 
Miller & Modigliani (1958) proposition I, starts on the assumption that firms have a particular set of 
expected cash-flows, hence when the firm chooses a certain proportion of debt and equity to finance its 
operation; it merely divides up the cash-flows among investors. Investors and firms are also presumed 
to have equal access to capital markets (this, allowing for an investor to create own leverage), hence as 
a result, the leverage of the firm has no effect on the market/shareholder value and performance of the 
firm. Two fundamental strings of thought underpin/underlies the irrelevance theory; Arbitrage and so-
called ‘home-made’ alternatives for Investors. Much of the subsequent discussion following the 
propositions by MM focused on the realism of particular assumptions. For example, Durand (1959), 
and Brewer and Jacob (1965). 
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Nonetheless, the ground breaking work of MM highlights two important moments in corporate 
financial theory. Firstly, the implementation of the arbitrage theory. Secondly, the application of 
homemade leverage by individual investors, with an assumptions of equal access to capital and rates by 
investors and firms. However, Durand (1959), identifies two factors that renders the arbitrage position 
improbable; The un-peculiarity between firms (a central assumption to MMs irrelevance theory), and 
the unlikelihood of identical assets, yielding similar income streams (in a levered and un-levered firm). 
Lintner (1962) examines the viability of rationality amongst investors. He points to the purely 
competitive nature of markets, maximizing behaviour, absence of issue costs and taxes, and identical 
interest rates to personal and corporate debtors remain insufficient to make investors indifferent to 
substitutions between retained earnings and debt in financing fixed budgets, or to validate the entity 
theory, when uncertainty is admitted even under the constraints of identical subjective probability 
distributions and information. Brewer and Jacob (1965), and Hirshleifer (1966), highlight crucial 
limitations of MMs irrelevance position, both suggesting the unrealistic/contradicting nature of the 
assumptions employed by MM in developing an irrelevance position. 
 
On the other hand, by employing two key assumptions, Stiglitz (1969) demonstrate that under 
general equilibrium conditions, the MM theorem holds its validity. Namely; individuals and firms can 
borrow at the same market rates and the non-existence of bankruptcy cost. However, Stiglitz falls short 
in failing to recognise the costs associated with bankruptcy in supporting the proposition of irrelevance 
originally drummed-up by MM. the unrecognition of distress costs, in addition to the difference in 
borrowing costs between individuals and firms call his findings to question. Other researchers highlight 
anomalies –like the higher probability of default in individuals compared to firms- in rates treatment 
amongst individuals, and firms, as well as the costs associated with financial distress as having an 
impact on a firm. 
 
8.5.6 MM proposition II 
The second proposition by Modigliani and Miller (1963), concerns the nature of the relationship 
between the cost of equity89 and its relationship with leverage (leverage ratio, or debt-equity ratio). 
According to this proposition, the cost of equity is a linear function of the company’s debt/equity ratio. 
Hence, as a firm employs more debt in its capital structure, the cost of equity increases because of the 
seniority of debt.  
)* = 	 )+ + ()+ −	).)	(0()      (9.2) 
Where )+ is the cost of equity if there is no debt financing. 
 
 
89 Cost of equity is the overall price accrued to firms in raising equity for firm financing**.  
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At the heart of MM argument is the relatively unaffected nature of the WACC as a result of a leverage 
position. The assumption of the rationality of investors implies that the expected return of equity (Ke) 
is directly proportional to the increase in gearing levels (D/E). The expected return of equity (Ke) is 
compensated by the benefit of cheaper debt finance. Therefore, as more of the cheaper source of capital 
is employed, the cost of equity increases, but the WACC remains constant and unchanged, hence firm 
value remains unaffected by the capital structure. 
 
MMs proposition II come under some basic criticisms, borne from the simplistic nature of its 
accompanying assumptions, such as the absence of taxation, bankruptcy costs, problems associated with 
agency costs, the existence of transaction costs, and the inequality in the ability of corporations and 
individuals to obtain access to markets (debt and equity markets) at a level playing field. 
 
In an attempt to bequeath more reality (realistic) to their proposition, MM introduce the effect of 
taxation to the irrelevance theory postulated by proposition two. The revised postulation by Miller and 
Modigliani (1963) argue that the tax benefits of the use of leverage within the capital structure lowers 
the cost of debt, reduces the WACC, and increases the value of the firm by the marginal tax rate 
multiplied by debt. The result of which implies that –as a result of the tax-shields associated with the 
use of debt-, firms can decrease their WACC by increasing the level of debt employed within the capital 
structure, the direct result of which is an increase in firm value. 
 
This interjection by MM (introducing the tax effect), subtly accede/highlight the flaws associated 
with their original postulation. Despite the experimental of their original postulations, market 
imperfections create a situation of unpredictability especially within financial models created in 
exclusivity of real life realities. The adjustment to proposition II suggests that indeed an optimal capital 
structure level exists, and in order for firms to attain this level, firms can employ 99.99% debt (in order 
to fully maximise shareholder value). This fails to also reflect reality, as firms rarely employ 99% level 
of debt (bankruptcy costs). This anomaly further suggests that, other factors play a role in determining 
the optimal capital structure. 
 
8.5.7 MM proposition III (Net Present Value) 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposition III (often referred to as the net present value) focus on the 
relationship between dividend policy, firm growth and valuation of firm shares/shareholder-wealth. 
This proposition further postulates a relationship of irrelevance. According to the third proposition by 
MM, a firms total market value is unaffected by its dividend pay-out policy. MM argue that in a perfect 
market, the value of a firm remains unaffected by its dividend policy, but rather, a firm’s value is 
determined by its earning power, and the risk of its underlying assets. 
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Attempts to bring the above theory in line with the realities and imperfections of markets and its 
agents have been embarked on by researchers. Some of which systematically relax the stringent 
assumption of MM in arriving at their capital structure irrelevance theory (see (Hirshleifer, 1966) 
(Hirshleifer 1966) all lend weight in support of the irrelevance proposition by MM. 
 
Over the years, various theories of capital structure have emerged with the aim of disproving 
irrelevance as a matter of theory or as an empirical matter. General consensus of which argue that the 
MM theorem fails to provide a realistic description of how firms finance their operations (Hamada 
1969, Stiglitz 1969, 1974). However, this theory influenced the early development of both the trade-off 
theory, and the pecking order theory. 
 
On observation of the theoretical literature, two central lines of enquiry emerge; Does capital 
structure matter? Can the total market value of firm’s securities be increased or decreased by changing 
the mix of debt and equity financing? Secondly, if capital structure does matter, what factors determine 
the optimal mix of debt and equity that will maximize the firm’s market value and thus maximize its 
cost of capital? And finally, what are the key determinants of the capital structure choices of firms? 
Although the overriding theme (postulation) of the MM theorems, suggest that the capital structure of 
firms is irrelevant (in determining) to firm value, under certain conditionss of perfect capital markets. 
However, as often criticized, this position fails to reflect real-world position of imperfection in markets, 
several theories have been introduced in order to relax some of the above assumptions, so as to present 
a realistic view of the application of capital structure theories to modern finance. 
 
The next section reviews the theoretical literature on the alternative capital structure theories and 
contributions to the MM capital structure irrelevance theory. Some of the most commonly laid out 
criticisms of the irrelevance position postulated by MM include; consideration of taxes, transaction 
costs, bankruptcy costs, agency conflicts, adverse selection, lack of separate-ability between financing 
and operations, time varying financial market opportunities, and investor clientele effects. Models have 
also sought to pare back some of the simplistic assumptions employed by MM in obtaining the 
irrelevance theory (see (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973, Baxter 1976, Leland and Pyle 1977, Bradley et 
al. 1984). These alternative models use differing elements in order to present a more realistic view on 
the relevance of capital structure to firm performance. 
 
8.5.8 Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure 
Financial literature often suggests that debt has a central role in financing firm’s activities. Jensen 
(1986) argues that debt is an efficient means by which to reduce the agency costs associated with equity, 
whilst Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) show that as a result of the tax advantages of debt, the optimal 
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capital structure includes debt financing. Ross (1977) Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that debt can be 
valuable as signalling device for firm value, while Jensen (1986) indicates that debt can be employed 
as a disciplining device to deter managers from empire building (or pursuing own interests). (Hence), 
the trade-off theory postulates that indeed there exists an optimal capital structure for firms, and this 
optimal mix of debt and equity is determined by balancing the losses (accrued to debt) and gains (benefit 
of debt) of debt (Myers, 1977). 
 
While debt may have advantages as well as disadvantages90 the trade-off theory recognises the gains 
and the losses of burrowing. The gains of debt are primarily the tax-shelter effect, which arises when 
paid interest on debt is deductible on the profit and loss account (Myers 1977). On the other hand, 
(Frydenberg 2004) considers the costs of debt to be the direct or indirect effects of bankruptcy costs, 
associated with the use of leverage.  Unlike the general theory of capital structure, two assumptions are 
broken under the trade-off theory. Which are; the no tax incentive, and the no bankruptcy assumptions. 
 
Thus, the trade-off theory predicts a unique individual capital structure for each/every firm where 
the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of debt and changes in debt should thus be dictated by the 
difference between current level and optimal debt level (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Hence, 
according to this theory, the firm substitute’s debt for equity, or equity for debt until the value of the 
firm is maximized. 
 
Trade-off literature further suggests that debt has a central role in firm financing; this theory also 
builds on arguments on the advantages and disadvantages of debt. First, debt is a factor of the ownership 
structure that disciplines managers. Secondly; debt as a useful signalling device, third debt as used to 
reduce excessive consumption of perquisite. Debt disadvantages; first agency cost problem of debt (this 
includes risk substitution and under investment), secondly, debt increases bankruptcy possibility by 
increasing the financial risk of the firm. Therefore, a value-maximizing firm facing low probability of 
bankruptcy should employ the use of debt to its full capacity. Thus, a key prediction of the trade-off 
theory of capital structure is the positive correlation/association between profitability and leverage (-
and a negative correlation between debt and monitoring costs (Harris and Raviv 1991). (DeAngelo and 
Masulis 1980), further notes that old firms with long history of credits, will have a relatively low 
 
 
90 Frydenberg (2004), highlight some advantages of debt as; a factor of the ownership structure that disciplines 
managers, limiting control to a few agents that control the common stock, while the rest of the capital is raised 
through a common sale. This can reduce the agency cost of management. Secondly, debt can be employed as a 
useful signaling device, to inform investors of a firm’s excellence. Thirdly, debt can reduce excessive 
consumption of perquisites, as a result of repayment obligations. Conversely, disadvantages of debt centers 
around the problems of agency costs associated with the use of debt. Firstly, risk substitution and under 
investment, and secondly, debt increases possibility of bankruptcy costs by increasing the financial risk 
associated with the use of debt.  
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probability of default and lower agency costs using debt financing in comparison to newly established 
firms. 
 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) argues that a high profitability suggests that the firm can yield higher tax 
savings in addition to a lower possibility of bankruptcy. Different variations of the trade-off theory of 
capital structure have been proposed within the literature, these have been shown to take on more factors 
into account. For example, Auerbach (1985) proposed an adjusted trade-off model, on testing 
empirically, the findings from this study posits that risky and fast growing firms should aim to borrow 
less. In addition, Fisher (1989) conducted a study with a variety of specifications arguing that capital 
structure also depends on restrictions in the debt contracts, takeover possibilities and the reputation of 
management. But further developments in theoretical and empirical thought have succeeded in 
replacing the traditional trade-off theory of capital structure.  
 
8.5.9 Static trade-off Theory 
The static trade-off theory began with work from Myers (1984), who advocates the need to balance 
gains and costs of debt financing. This theory values a company as the value of the firm if unlevered, 
plus the present value of the tax shield minus the present value of bankruptcy and agency costs (Abor, 
2005). 
 
The tax advantages of debt and the costs associated with debt leads to a trade-off between the tax 
benefits and the disadvantages of higher risk of financial distress. One of such consists of costs 
associated with agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) associate these costs 
to conflicts of interest between the different stakeholders of the firm and also as a result of ex-post 
asymmetric information. Hence, in order to incorporate agency costs into the static trade-off theory, 
means that firms determines its optimal capital structure by trading off the tax advantage of debt against 
the costs of financial distress of too much debt, and the agency cost of debt, against the agency cost of 
equity. Therefore an important stipulation of the static trade-off theory is the notion/assertion of a target 
leverage level within the capital structure of firms (i.e. if the actual leverage ratio deviates from the 
optimal one, the firm will adapt its financing behaviour in a way that brings the leverage ratio back to 
the optimal level. 
 
8.5.10 Dynamic Trade-off Theory  
This theory (an offshoot of the trade-off theory) considers the element of time, which is ignored in other 
single period models of capital structure. Amongst the first to establish/present this model was (Abor 
2005) and Brennan and Schwartz (1984). Both models presented by the above authors incorporate the 




8.5.11 Pecking order Theory  
Unlike other capital structure theories (where there tends to be a notionally defined debt-to-value ratio), 
the pecking order creates a distinction between internal and external equity (thereby does not take an 
optimal capital structure as a starting point). Therefore, central to the pecking order theory are two 
assumptions. Firstly, managers act in the interest of firms, and secondly, an existence of asymmetric 
information between agents and shareholders. Hence, under this theory, sources of firm financing are 
ranked in order of preference as a result of the problems associated with asymmetrical nature of 
information between agents and shareholders. 
 
When firms are faced with investment opportunities, firms show a distinct preference for using 
internal finance over external finance, thereby creating a hierarchical order of preference, commencing 
with the use of retained earnings, and if these are insufficient in financing investment opportunities, 
managers will choose amongst the various external finance sources in such a way as to minimise 
additional costs of asymmetric information, referred to by Akerlof (1970) as the “lemon premium”.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) posits that outside investors rationally discount the firm’s stock price when 
managers issue equity as opposed to riskless debt. Hence, to avoid this discount managers avoid the use 
of equity finance wherever possible in preference to internal sources of funds, second in order of 
preference Is issuance of low risk debt finance, and then, equity issuance as a last resort.  
 
8.5.12 Market timing Theory 
The market timing theory of capital structure argues that firms time their equity issues so as to maximise 
the issuance of equity, by issuing new stock when the stock price is perceived to be overvalued, and in 
addition, buy-back firm own stock when the stock price is undervalued. The market timing theory 
consists of two versions; the first is established on the assumption of rational economic agents, as 
companies are assumed to issue equity directly after a positive information release, which reduces the 
asymmetry problem between the firm’s management and stockholders. The decrease in information 
asymmetry therefore coincides with an increase in the stock price, thereby allowing firms to create their 
own timing opportunities. The second theory assumes economic agents to be irrational (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). Managers issue equity when they believe its cost is irrationally low and repurchase 
equity when they believe its cost is irrationally high. Whilst other capital structure theories incorporate 
several operating assumptions, at the core of the market timing theory however, is the sole assumption 
that managers believe that they can time the market, issuing equity offerings where favourable, and 
buying back stock where favourable. Interestingly, Baker and Wurgler (2002) provide evidence that 
asserts that the equity market timing has a persistent effect on the capital structure of the firm. They 
find that leverage changes are strongly and positively related to their market timing measure, hence 
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conclude that the capital structure of a firm is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity 
market. 
 
8.6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A review of the early empirical literature on capital structure reveals that earlier studies on capital 
structure focus on empirical data from developed economies. For example, Sheridan and Wessels 
(1998), use a sample of US firms, Rajan and Zingales (1995), perform an analysis on G-7 economies; 
Bevan and Danbolt (2000, 2002) employ a sample of UK non-financial firms; Chen (2004), and Huang 
and Song (2006) focus on Chinese firms, and Antoniou et al. (2008), concentrate on capital market-
based systems (USA and UK), in addition to bank-grounded financial systems (France, Germany and 
Japan). The above reviewed studies reveal that firms lean towards holding fewer short-term debt, whilst 
preferring to employ long-term debts and equity, especially in countries with adequate/ample legal 
protection for shareholders and investors. However, for developing countries, capital market depth is 
dissimilar to that in developed economies. Hence, MFIs (and corporate firms) could employ more short-
term debt than long-term. This requires a variable that captures this phenomenon for MFIs, in order to 
carry-out a robust analysis of the sector. Hence, it is within this vacuum that this research aims to fill. 
 
Employing the use of debt and equity (to an optimal level advocated by MM’s proposition III) within 
a firm’s capital structure requires an adjustment process to attain the required level of optimal mix. 
Whilst the above studies do not take the adjustment process into consideration, Taggart (1977), Marsh 
(1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Kremp et al (1999), employ advancement in econometric analysis 
to address the adjustment process in the leverage ratio to required levels. The above studies appear to 
be consistent with the position of the trade-off theory, which posits a negative relationship between 
leverage and profitability as a result of the transaction costs acting as a preventative measure for firms 
(willing to) adjusting their leverage ratios towards an optimal level. This adjustment process further 
depends on the position of the firm on the ratio (below or above), as well as other factors such as; firm 
size, and interest rates. 
 
King and Levine (1993) and Zervos (1998) provide evidence observed from research carried out on 
a sample of firms within the financial sector. Evidence gleaned from both studies suggest that firms 
tend to rely on external funds for their expansion, and also grow faster in economies with a strong 
financial system. This study further unveils a strong relationship between the financial system and 
economic growth. This suggests that the economic environment plays a role in determining the capital 
structure of firms, whilst also impacting on their ability to perform at optimal levels. Results of this 
study show consistency with research conducted by Rajan and Zingales (1998a), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999). On Banks, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
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(2000) consider the impacts of capital structure on the performance of banks in developed and 
developing economies from 1990-1997, focusing on bank’s profitability and bank interest margins. 
Result of their study confirm a positive relationship between greater bank development and lower 
profitability and interest margins, supporting the pecking order theory of capital structure. Findings of 
this study further confirm a strong determining role of financial development on the performance of 
banks, thereby influencing banks capital structure financing. This suggest that lower profitability and 
lower interest margins are reflections of increased efficiency as a result of a highly competitive banking 
sector enabled by ample financial development levels. Furthermore, Athanasoglou et al. (2006), Ruiz-
porras (2009) and Flamini et al. (2013) suggest the importance of financial development in determining 
the capital structure of firms, and thereby influencing performance. 
 
Hutchison and Cox (2006), examine the causal relationship between bank capital and profitability 
employing data from US banks observing two different time periods: one of which was less regulated 
1983-1989, and a period of substantial regulation 1996-2002. This study finds that leverage is positively 
related to measures of profitability such as return on equity (ROE) and return on asset (ROA), 
suggesting support for the trade-off theory of capital structure. Giradone et al (2006) on the other hand, 
investigate the cost X-efficiency levels of European banks through the differences in ownership, bank 
type and financial structure from the period 1998 – 2003. Results of this study appear to be mixed in 
compliance with established capital structure theories. Whist the hypothesis employed hold for a sub-
sample of firms employed, the employed hypothesis failed to confirm capital structure theories on the 
majority of sample employed for the empirical study. The difference in characteristics of bank-based 
economies versus market-based economies suggest that various firm characteristics in addition to its 
operating macro-economic environment both have an important role to play in explaining the 
differences in cost efficiency across financial systems, bank performance, and thereby play a role in 
determining the capital structure of banks in developed and developing market economies. 
 
Finally (Aburime, 2008), examines the impact of ownership structure on bank profitability using a 
sample of banks in Nigeria from 1989 – 2004. This study finds no significant impact on bank 
profitability. However this is in stark contrast 6to the findings of La-Porta et al (2002) and (Aburime 
2008), who carry out an empirical investigation on state-owned banks in developing economies. 
Findings form this research suggest that state-owned banks operating in developing economies tend to 
have lower profitability than privately owned banks due to lower interest margins, higher overhead 
costs, and higher non-performing loans, suggesting that ownership concentration could improve 
performance by decreasing monitoring costs. However (Micco 2004), observe that concentrated 




The above empirical evidence reveal mixed results, suggesting that capital structure theories do not 
always explain variations in capital structure determinants, as well as performance of firms, as expected 
by established capital structure theories. Furthermore, there exist a vacuum of evidence on the 
applicability of established capital structure theories on performance of development finance 
institutions; including MFIs in developing market economies, who increasingly operate like banking 
institutions. 
 
Evidence for MFI remains scant. For example, a few studies attempt to examine this relationship, 
but fall short as a result of various limitations. (Zeitun and Tian 2007) attempt to examine the effects of 
asymmetric information on lending and reductions of this issue based on the assumptions of (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). The key findings indicate that efficient MFI performance is strongly linked to the 
ability of MFIs to obtain vital investment funding. Furthermore, positive relationship between 
evaluation and financing reveal that evaluations lead MFIs to provide more loans to the poor, thereby 
positively affecting performance. The above empirical study provides clear evidence of the impacts of 
financing and investment in MFIs and lending. 
 
Kyereboah (2007), observes the impact of financial structure on the performance of MFIs using a 
sample of MFIs from Ghana. The findings confirm that MFIs employ high leverage and finance their 
operations with long-term rather than short-term debt. Furthermore, this study finds that highly 
leveraged MFIs perform better than less leveraged MFIs by expanding their outreach to a broader client 
base (reach). Bogan (2012), examines the relationship between the financial structure of MFIs and its 
sustainability, by testing the Life-cycle theory of financing in explaining performance on a sample of 
MFIs. Results reveal that life-cycle stage variables are significantly related to sustainability (OSS and 
FSS) of MFIs. However, the above studies suffer from basic inconsistencies. For example Kyereboah 
(2007), employ a small sample size, comprising approximately less than 10% of MFIs in SSA, whilst 
Bogan (2012), employ data from earlier years. This reasons, establish the need to perform a robust 
analysis within the SSA region, using a broader sample, and most recent data to examine the 
determinants of the capital structure of MFIs, and to establish its impacts on the performance of MFIs.
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EMPIRICAL CHAPTER 1 APPENDICES 
8.7 REGRESSION TABLES 
Table 0.3: Capital Structure all Models (Fixed Effects) with Age Breakdown. 
 Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Size -0.295*** -0.360*** -0.0350*** 0.0649*** -0.258*** -0.332*** -0.0345*** 0.0732*** -0.272*** -0.341*** -0.0282*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.008) (0.008) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.008) (0.044) (0.044) (0.008) (0.008) 
             
ROA 0.051 0.164 -0.154** -0.113* 0.150 0.239 -0.159*** -0.0893 0.154 0.246 -0.144** -0.092* 
 (0.265) (0.267) (0.048) (0.046) (0.264) (0.265) (0.047) (0.046) (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) 
             
AT -0.105 -0.841 0.240* 0.736*** -0.010 -0.769 0.235* 0.759*** -0.009 -0.764 0.250* 0.756*** 
 (0.543) (0.546) (0.098) (0.094) (0.543) (0.546) (0.097) (0.094) (0.542) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) 
             
PAR30 0.262 0.205 0.0672 0.0566 0.290 0.227 0.0675 0.0630 0.280 0.221 0.072 0.060 
 (0.285) (0.287) (0.051) (0.049) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) 
             
SOIP 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 0.037* 0.027 0.010** 0.010*** 0.033* 0.024 0.010*** 0.009** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) 
             
ENFCON 0.014 0.014 -0.0032 0.000 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.013 0.013 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
GOVEFF -0.012 -0.023 -0.127* 0.011 0.004 -0.010 -0.128* 0.015 0.0013 -0.012 -0.125* 0.013 
 (0.284) (0.286) (0.051) (0.049) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.049) 
             
ROL 0.271 0.302 0.072 -0.031 0.251 0.287 0.075 -0.037 0.240 0.278 0.072 -0.039 
 (0.267) (0.269) (0.048) (0.046) (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) (0.267) (0.269) (0.048) (0.046) 
             
C-CTRL -0.166 -0.149 -0.053 -0.017 -0.156 -0.142 -0.057 -0.014 -0.135 -0.126 -0.056 -0.009 
 (0.209) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.211) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.211) (0.038) (0.036) 
             
MONF -0.007 -0.006 -0.002* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003** -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
TRADEF 0.010* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 0.011* 0.010* -0.002** 0.0003 0.009 0.009 -0.002** -0.000 
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 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
FINF -0.002 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
GNIg 0.001 0.000 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
             
INF -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004** -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004** -0.011 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
REALINT -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
DEPINTR 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.010 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
DCTPS 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.004*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
New -0.286** -0.224* -0.017 -0.062***         
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.018) (0.018)         
             
Young     0.045 0.043 0.036** 0.002     
     (0.072) (0.072) (0.013) (0.012)     
             
Mature         0.179 0.126 -0.051** 0.053** 
         (0.097) (0.097) (0.017) (0.017) 
             
_cons 4.269*** 5.067*** 0.848*** -0.797*** 3.573*** 4.522*** 0.814*** -0.949*** 3.790*** 4.672*** 0.742*** -0.882*** 
 (0.864) (0.868) (0.155) (0.150) (0.829) (0.832) (0.148) (0.144) (0.837) (0.841) (0.150) (0.145) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.034 0.048 0.086 0.235 0.029 0.045 0.091 0.228 0.031 0.045 0.091 0.234 
adj. R2 -0.367 -0.348 -0.293 -0.083 -0.375 -0.352 -0.287 -0.093 -0.371 -0.351 -0.286 -0.085 
F 2.693 3.791 7.145 23.22 2.259 3.530 7.572 22.33 2.431 3.606 7.606 23.05 
rmse 0.938 0.942 0.169 0.163 0.940 0.944 0.168 0.163 0.939 0.943 0.168 0.163 
df_r 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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D.Equity (Donated Equity), BORWG (Borrowing) 
 
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), REALINT 
(Interest Rate), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). 
 
 




Table 0.4: MFI Capital Structure with MFI-Type Dummies. 
 Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Size -0.256*** -0.330*** -0.033*** 0.073*** -0.256*** -0.330*** -0.033*** 0.073*** -0.256*** -0.330*** -0.033*** 0.073*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007) 
             
ROA 0.165 0.254 -0.147** -0.089 0.165 0.254 -0.147** -0.089 0.165 0.254 -0.147** -0.089 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) 
             
AT 0.004 -0.755 0.247* 0.759*** 0.004 -0.755 0.247* 0.759*** 0.004 -0.755 0.247* 0.759*** 
 (0.543) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) (0.543) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) (0.543) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) 
             
PAR30 0.292 0.229 0.069 0.063 0.292 0.229 0.069 0.063 0.292 0.229 0.069 0.063 
 (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) 
             
SOIP 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) 
             
ENFCON 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.014 0.013 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
GOVEFF 0.006 -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 0.006 -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 0.006 -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) 
             
ROL 0.245 0.282 0.070 -0.037 0.245 0.282 0.070 -0.037 0.245 0.282 0.070 -0.037 
 (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) 
             
C-CTRL -0.150 -0.136 -0.052 -0.014 -0.150 -0.136 -0.052 -0.014 -0.150 -0.136 -0.052 -0.014 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) 
             
MONF -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
TRADEF 0.011* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 0.011* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 0.011* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
FINF -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
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GNIg 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
             
INF -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004** -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004** -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
INT -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
D-INTR 0.011 0.0042 -0.0024 0.006** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
DCTPS 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
Bank 0 0 0 0         
 (.) (.) (.) (.)         
             
CreditU     0 0 0 0     
     (.) (.) (.) (.)     
             
MNO         0 0 0 0 
         (.) (.) (.) (.) 
             
_cons 3.563*** 4.513*** 0.806*** -0.950*** 3.563*** 4.513*** 0.806*** -0.950*** 3.563*** 4.513*** 0.806*** -0.950*** 
 (0.829) (0.832) (0.149) (0.144) (0.829) (0.832) (0.149) (0.144) (0.829) (0.832) (0.149) (0.144) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.029 0.044 0.086 0.228 0.029 0.044 0.086 0.228 0.029 0.044 0.086 0.228 
adj. R2 -0.374 -0.352 -0.293 -0.092 -0.374 -0.352 -0.293 -0.092 -0.374 -0.352 -0.293 -0.092 
F 2.370 3.718 7.515 23.66 2.370 3.718 7.515 23.66 2.370 3.718 7.515 23.66 
rmse 0.940 0.944 0.169 0.163 0.940 0.944 0.169 0.163 0.940 0.944 0.169 0.163 
df_r 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
             
D.Equity (Donated Equity), BORWG (Borrowing) 
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ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), CreditU (Credit Union), MNO (Mobile Network 
Operator). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
 
Continued… 
 Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Size -0.256*** -0.330*** -0.033*** 0.073*** -0.256*** -0.330*** -0.033*** 0.073*** -0.256*** -0.330*** -0.033*** 0.073*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007) 
             
ROA 0.165 0.254 -0.147** -0.089 0.165 0.254 -0.147** -0.089 0.165 0.254 -0.147** -0.089 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) (0.263) (0.264) (0.047) (0.046) 
             
AT 0.004 -0.755 0.247* 0.759*** 0.004 -0.755 0.247* 0.759*** 0.004 -0.755 0.247* 0.759*** 
 (0.543) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) (0.543) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) (0.543) (0.545) (0.097) (0.094) 
             
PAR30 0.292 0.229 0.069 0.063 0.292 0.229 0.069 0.063 0.292 0.229 0.069 0.063 
 (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) 
             
SOIP 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) 
             
ENFCON 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
GOVEFF 0.060 -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 0.060 -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 0.060 -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) 
             
ROL 0.245 0.282 0.070 -0.037 0.245 0.282 0.070 -0.037 0.245 0.282 0.070 -0.037 
 (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) 
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C-CTRL -0.150 -0.136 -0.052 -0.014 -0.150 -0.136 -0.052 -0.014 -0.150 -0.136 -0.052 -0.014 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) 
             
MONF -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
TRADEF 0.011* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 0.011* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 0.011* 0.010* -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
FINF -0.001 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
GNIg 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
             
INF -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004** -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004** -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
INT -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
D-INTR 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
DCTPS 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
NBFI 0 0 0 0         
 (.) (.) (.) (.)         
             
NGO     0 0 0 0     
     (.) (.) (.) (.)     
             
RuralB         0 0 0 0 
         (.) (.) (.) (.) 
             
_cons 3.563*** 4.513*** 0.806*** -0.950*** 3.563*** 4.513*** 0.806*** -0.950*** 3.563*** 4.513*** 0.806*** -0.950*** 
 (0.829) (0.832) (0.149) (0.144) (0.829) (0.832) (0.149) (0.144) (0.829) (0.832) (0.149) (0.144) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
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R2 0.029 0.044 0.086 0.228 0.029 0.044 0.086 0.228 0.029 0.044 0.086 0.228 
adj. R2 -0.374 -0.352 -0.293 -0.092 -0.374 -0.352 -0.293 -0.092 -0.374 -0.352 -0.293 -0.092 
F 2.370 3.718 7.515 23.66 2.370 3.718 7.515 23.66 2.370 3.718 7.515 23.66 
rmse 0.940 0.944 0.169 0.163 0.940 0.944 0.169 0.163 0.940 0.944 0.169 0.163 
df_r 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
             
D.Equity (Donated Equity), BORWG (Borrowing) 
 
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), ), NBFI (Non Bank Financial Institution), NGO (Non 
Governmental Organisation), RuralB (Rural Bank). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
326 
8.7.1 MFI Capital Structure with MFI Profit Status Types 
Table 0.5: MFI Capital Structure with MFI Profit Status Types 
 Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit Leverage BORWG D.Equity Deposit 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Size -0.295*** -0.360*** -0.035*** 0.065*** -0.258*** -0.332*** -0.035*** 0.073*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.008) (0.008) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.008) 
         
ROA 0.051 0.164 -0.154** -0.113* 0.150 0.239 -0.159*** -0.089 
 (0.265) (0.267) (0.048) (0.046) (0.264) (0.265) (0.047) (0.046) 
         
AT -0.105 -0.841 0.240* 0.736*** -0.010 -0.769 0.235* 0.759*** 
 (0.543) (0.546) (0.098) (0.094) (0.543) (0.546) (0.097) (0.094) 
         
PAR30 0.262 0.205 0.067 0.057 0.290 0.227 0.068 0.063 
 (0.285) (0.287) (0.051) (0.049) (0.286) (0.287) (0.051) (0.050) 
         
SOIP 0.036* 0.026 0.009** 0.010*** 0.037* 0.027 0.010** 0.010*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
ENFCON 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.000 0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
GOVEFF -0.012 -0.023 -0.127* 0.011 0.004 -0.010 -0.128* 0.011 
 (0.284) (0.286) (0.051) (0.049) (0.285) (0.286) (0.051) (0.050) 
         
ROL 0.271 0.302 0.072 -0.031 0.251 0.287 0.075 -0.037 
 (0.267) (0.269) (0.048) (0.046) (0.268) (0.269) (0.048) (0.047) 
         
C-CTRL -0.166 -0.149 -0.053 -0.017 -0.156 -0.142 -0.057 -0.014 
 (0.209) (0.210) (0.038) (0.036) (0.210) (0.211) (0.038) (0.036) 
         
MONF -0.007 -0.006 -0.002* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
TRADEF 0.010* 0.010* -0.003** 0.000 0.011* 0.010* -0.002** 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
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FINF -0.002 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
GNIg 0.001 0.000 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
         
INF -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004** -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
INT -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003* -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
D-INTR 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.006** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
DCTPS 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
NonP -0.286** -0.224* -0.017 -0.062***     
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.018) (0.018)     
         
Prof     0.045 0.043 0.036** 0.002 
     (0.072) (0.072) (0.013) (0.012) 
         
_cons 4.269*** 5.067*** 0.848*** -0.797*** 3.573*** 4.522*** 0.814*** -0.949*** 
 (0.864) (0.868) (0.155) (0.150) (0.829) (0.832) (0.148) (0.144) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.034 0.048 0.086 0.235 0.029 0.045 0.091 0.228 
adj. R2 -0.367 -0.348 -0.293 -0.083 -0.375 -0.352 -0.287 -0.093 
F 2.693 3.791 7.145 23.22 2.259 3.530 7.572 22.33 
rmse 0.938 0.942 0.169 0.163 0.940 0.944 0.168 0.163 
df_r 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00 
         
D.Equity (Donated Equity), BORWG (Borrowing) 
 
328 
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), NonP (Non Profit MFIs), Prof (For Profit MFIs). 
 
Study Period 2004-2016 
329 
 
8.7.2 MFI Leverage Result with year Dummies 
Table 0.6: MFI Leverage Result with year Dummies. 
 LEVERAGE MODEL RESULTS WITH YEAR DUMMIES (FIXED EFFECT) 
 
Size -0.263*** -0.257*** -0.289*** -0.246*** -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.257*** -0.260*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.259*** -0.267*** -0.262*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
              
ROA 0.152 0.170 0.211 0.159 0.149 0.150 0.166 0.164 0.157 0.161 0.165 0.153 0.171 
 (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) 
              
AT -0.027 0.003 -0.077 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.000 0.041 -0.002 -0.017 -0.013 -0.028 -0.015 
 (0.544) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.544) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) (0.543) 
              
PAR30 0.292 0.293 0.296 0.307 0.295 0.302 0.293 0.290 0.295 0.297 0.293 0.294 0.272 
 (0.286) (0.286) (0.285) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.287) 
              
SOIP 0.029 0.033 0.058** 0.032 0.038* 0.038* 0.0360 0.037* 0.035* 0.035* 0.0363 0.046** 0.040* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
              
ENCON 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
              
GOVEFF 0.052 -0.015 -0.031 -0.006 0.041 -0.001 0.014 0.003 -0.005 -0.015 0.018 -0.004 0.026 
 (0.289) (0.291) (0.285) (0.285) (0.288) (0.285) (0.287) (0.285) (0.285) (0.286) (0.285) (0.285) (0.286) 
              
ROL 0.220 0.246 0.383 0.235 0.228 0.229 0.250 0.281 0.246 0.255 0.212 0.214 0.187 
 (0.269) (0.268) (0.272) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.270) (0.268) (0.268) (0.272) (0.268) (0.275) 
              
C-CTRL -0.165 -0.145 -0.196 -0.167 -0.145 -0.135 -0.156 -0.165 -0.131 -0.126 -0.128 -0.110 -0.222 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.211) (0.210) (0.211) (0.212) (0.212) (0.211) (0.223) 
              
MONF -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
              
TRADEF 0.010* 0.011* 0.007 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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FINF -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
              
GNIg 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
              
INF -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
              
INT -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
              
D-INTR 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
              
DCTPS 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
              
Y2004 -0.118             
 (0.115)             
              
Y2005  -0.036            
  (0.105)            
              
Y2006   -0.235**           
   (0.089)           
              
Y2007    0.109          
    (0.077)          
              
Y2008     -0.077         
     (0.085)         
              
Y2009      -0.073        
      (0.083)        
              
Y2010       0.021       
       (0.088)       
331 
              
Y2011        0.095      
        (0.099)      
              
Y2012         0.092     
         (0.102)     
              
Y2013          0.090    
          (0.104)    
              
Y2014           0.084   
           (0.116)   
              
Y2015            0.331  
            (0.227)  
              
Y2016             0.374 
             (0.398) 
              
_cons 3.691*** 3.607*** 4.134*** 3.367*** 3.487*** 3.519*** 3.567*** 3.616*** 3.676*** 3.621*** 3.633*** 3.735*** 3.553*** 
 (0.838) (0.839) (0.855) (0.840) (0.833) (0.830) (0.829) (0.830) (0.838) (0.831) (0.834) (0.837) (0.829) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.029 
adj. R2 -0.374 -0.375 -0.368 -0.373 -0.374 -0.374 -0.375 -0.374 -0.374 -0.374 -0.374 -0.373 -0.374 
F 2.297 2.243 2.637 2.351 2.283 2.280 2.240 2.290 2.283 2.279 2.266 2.358 2.287 
rmse 0.940 0.940 0.938 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 
df_r 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
              
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), Y2004-Y2016 (Year Dummies). 
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8.7.3 Borrowing Model with Year Dummies 
Table 0.7: Borrowing Model with Year Dummies. 




-0.330*** -0.361*** -0.318*** -0.328*** -0.327*** -0.331*** -0.333*** -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.332*** -0.336*** -0.334*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
              
ROA 0.245 0.255 0.299 0.247 0.235 0.235 0.256 0.253 0.246 0.250 0.253 0.246 0.259 
 (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) 
              
AT -0.776 -0.755 -0.834 -0.735 -0.740 -0.738 -0.764 -0.728 -0.761 -0.774 -0.772 -0.775 -0.770 
 (0.546) (0.545) (0.545) (0.545) (0.545) (0.545) (0.545) (0.546) (0.545) (0.546) (0.546) (0.545) (0.545) 
              
PAR30 0.229 0.229 0.233 0.246 0.232 0.242 0.231 0.227 0.231 0.234 0.230 0.230 0.213 
 (0.287) (0.287) (0.286) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.288) 
              
SOIP 0.022 0.026 0.047* 0.022 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.029 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
              
ENFCON 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
              
GOVEFF 0.022 -0.012 -0.045 -0.022 0.033 -0.018 0.008 -0.011 -0.019 -0.028 0.0032 -0.015 0.007 
 (0.290) (0.292) (0.286) (0.286) (0.289) (0.286) (0.288) (0.286) (0.286) (0.287) (0.287) (0.286) (0.287) 
              
ROL 0.266 0.282 0.416 0.270 0.261 0.262 0.292 0.309 0.282 0.291 0.248 0.263 0.237 
 (0.270) (0.269) (0.273) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.271) (0.269) (0.269) (0.273) (0.270) (0.276) 
              
C-CTRL -0.146 -0.136 -0.181 -0.155 -0.131 -0.117 -0.148 -0.147 -0.119 -0.115 -0.113 -0.111 -0.193 
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.212) (0.212) (0.213) (0.212) (0.224) 
              
MONF -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
              
TRADEF 0.010* 0.010* 0.007 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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FINF -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
              
GNIg 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
              
INF -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
              
REALINT 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
              
DEPINTR 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
              
DCTPS 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
              
Y2004 -0.078             
 (0.115)             
              
Y2005  -0.0062            
  (0.105)            
              
Y2006   -0.228*           
   (0.089)           
              
Y2007    0.123          
    (0.077)          
              
Y2008     -0.091         
     (0.085)         
              
Y2009      -0.094        
      (0.083)        
              
Y2010       0.045       
       (0.088)       
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Y2011        0.071      
        (0.099)      
              
Y2012         0.083     
         (0.103)     
              
Y2013          0.081    
          (0.104)    
              
Y2014           0.085   
           (0.116)   
              
Y2015            0.208  
            (0.228)  
              
Y2016             0.296 
             (0.400) 
              
_cons 4.597*** 4.520*** 5.067*** 4.292*** 4.422*** 4.455*** 4.520*** 4.552*** 4.614*** 4.565*** 4.584*** 4.621*** 4.505*** 
 (0.841) (0.842) (0.858) (0.843) (0.836) (0.833) (0.832) (0.834) (0.841) (0.835) (0.838) (0.840) (0.832) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.045 0.044 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
adj. R2 -0.352 -0.353 -0.346 -0.350 -0.352 -0.352 -0.353 -0.352 -0.352 -0.352 -0.352 -0.352 -0.352 
F 3.536 3.509 3.890 3.655 3.575 3.582 3.524 3.539 3.547 3.543 3.540 3.557 3.541 
rmse 0.944 0.944 0.942 0.943 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 
df_r 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
              
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), Y2004-Y2016 (Year Dummies). 
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8.7.4 MFI Capital Structure: Deposit Model  
Table 0.8: MFI Capital Structure: Deposit Model. 
 DEPOSIT MODEL WITH YEAR DUMMIES (FIXED EFFECT) 
 
Size 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.0723** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
              
ROA -0.093* -0.085 -0.087 -0.088 -0.086 -0.085 -0.090* -0.089 -0.090 -0.089 -0.089 -0.093* -0.087 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
              
AT 0.749*** 0.758*** 0.757*** 0.757*** 0.757*** 0.755*** 0.764*** 0.769*** 0.759*** 0.757*** 0.760*** 0.747*** 0.755*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
              
PAR30 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.063 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.060 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
              
SOIP 0.008* 0.007* 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
              
ENFCON 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
              
GOVEFF 0.030 -0.002 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.017 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.019 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
              
ROL -0.045 -0.036 -0.033 -0.036 -0.034 -0.032 -0.042 -0.028 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 -0.049 -0.049 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
              
C-CTRL -0.019 -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.018 -0.007 -0.018 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 0.0013 -0.029 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
              
MONF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
TRADEF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
FINF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
GNIg 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
              
INF -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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INT -0.002* -0.003* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
D-INTR 0.006* 0.006** 0.006** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
              
DCTPS 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
Y2004 -0.040*             
 (0.020)             
              
Y2005  -0.030            
  (0.018)            
              
Y2006   -0.007           
   (0.015)           
              
Y2007    -0.014          
    (0.013)          
              
Y2008     0.014         
     (0.015)         
              
Y2009      0.021        
      (0.014)        
              
Y2010       -0.024       
       (0.015)       
              
Y2011        0.024      
        (0.017)      
              
Y2012         0.090     
         (0.018)     
              
Y2013          0.009    
          (0.018)    
              
Y2014           -0.001   
           (0.020)   
              
Y2015            0.123**  
            (0.039)  
              
Y2016             0.08 
             (0.069) 
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_cons -0.907*** -0.913*** -0.933*** -0.925*** -0.936*** -0.937*** -0.954*** -0.936*** -0.939*** -0.944*** -0.951*** -0.886*** -0.952*** 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.149) (0.146) (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.230 0.229 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.233 0.229 
adj. R2 -0.090 -0.091 -0.093 -0.092 -0.092 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.093 -0.093 -0.093 -0.085 -0.092 
F 22.61 22.53 22.34 22.40 22.40 22.48 22.51 22.48 22.35 22.35 22.33 23.03 22.42 
rmse 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 
df_r 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
              
ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENFCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), Y2004-Y2016 (Year Dummies). 
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8.7.5 MFI Capital structure: Donated Equity Model with Year Dummies 
Table 0.9: Donated Equity Model with Year Dummies. 
 DONATED EQUITY MODEL WITH YEAR DUMMIES FIXED EFFECT 
 
Size -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.025** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.036*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
              
ROA -0.149** -0.146** -0.158*** -0.147** -0.143** -0.152** -0.148** -0.147** -0.146** -0.146** -0.147** -0.148** -0.143** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
              
AT 0.242* 0.246* 0.266** 0.247* 0.243* 0.251* 0.252** 0.251* 0.247* 0.253** 0.250* 0.243* 0.234* 
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
              
PAR30 0.069 0.069 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.072 0.068 0.069 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.069 0.057 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
              
SOIP 0.008* 0.008* 0.004 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
              
ENCON -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
              
GOVEFF -0.119* -0.130* -0.117* -0.127* -0.135** -0.129* -0.137** -0.127* -0.125* -0.120* -0.128* -0.127* -0.113* 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
              
ROL 0.067 0.071 0.037 0.070 0.075 0.065 0.064 0.074 0.070 0.068 0.076 0.067 0.033 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) 
              
C-CTRL -0.054 -0.051 -0.041 -0.053 -0.053 -0.047 -0.044 -0.054 -0.054 -0.059 -0.056 -0.048 -0.099* 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) 
              
MONF -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
TRADEF -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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FINF 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
GNIg 0.004* 0.004* 0.004** 0.004* 0.004* 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
              
INF -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
INT 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
D-INT -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
              
DCTPS 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
Y2004 -0.018             
 (0.021)             
              
Y2005  -0.007            
  (0.019)            
              
Y2006   0.057***           
   (0.016)           
              
Y2007    0.004          
    (0.014)          
              
Y2008     0.020         
     (0.015)         
              
Y2009      -0.023        
      (0.015)        
              
Y2010       -0.031       
       (0.016)       
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Y2011        0.011      
        (0.018)      
              
Y2012         -0.010     
         (0.018)     
              
Y2013          -0.026    
          (0.019)    
              
Y2014           -0.015   
           (0.021)   
              
Y2015            0.032  
            (0.041)  
              
Y2016             0.241*** 
             (0.071) 
              
_cons 0.825*** 0.814*** 0.668*** 0.799*** 0.825*** 0.792*** 0.801*** 0.812*** 0.793*** 0.789*** 0.793*** 0.823*** 0.800*** 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.153) (0.151) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) (0.148) 
N 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 
R2 0.086 0.086 0.094 0.086 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.086 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.093 
adj. R2 -0.294 -0.294 -0.282 -0.294 -0.293 -0.292 -0.291 -0.294 -0.294 -0.292 -0.294 -0.294 -0.283 
F 7.138 7.100 7.869 7.097 7.194 7.242 7.326 7.116 7.111 7.208 7.123 7.130 7.788 
rmse 0.169 0.169 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.168 
df_r 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Standard errors in parentheses 




ROA (Return on Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days), SOIP (Strength of Investor Protection), ENCON 
(Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), C-CTRL (Corruption Control), MONF (Monetary 
Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom), GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), INT (Interest 
Rate), D-INTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), Y2004-Y2016 (Year Dummies). 
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8.8 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
8.8.1 MFI Summary of Donated Equity (SSA). 
Table 0.10: SSA MFI Summary of Donated Equity. 
Summary of *DONEQ 
Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq.  Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq. 
Angola 0.001 0.005 15      
Benin 0.050 0.083 145  Madagascar 0.056 0.099 108 
Burkina Faso 0.051 0.125 114  Malawi 0.174 0.411 59 
Burundi 0.071 0.135 98  Mali 0.055 0.122 119 
Cameroon 0.021 0.076 132  Mozambique 0.245 0.715 71 
CAR 0.031 0.031 8  Namibia 0.140 0.099 8 
Chad 0.044 0.058 14  Niger 0.034 0.106 93 
Comoros 0.057 0.021 4  Nigeria 0.011 0.069 232 
Congo Democratic 0.130 0.396 98  Rwanda 0.073 0.160 100 
Congo Republic 0.132 0.240 26  Senegal 0.043 0.085 169 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.028 0.174 68  Sierra Leone 0.175 0.280 52 
Ethiopia 0.199 0.283 135  South Africa 0.072 0.224 37 
Gabon 0.093 0.064 2  Sudan 0.368 0.416 13 
The Gambia 0.049 0.097 15  Swaziland 0.000 0.000 9 
Ghana 0.064 0.197 269  Tanzania 0.082 0.174 117 
Guinea 0.085 0.194 34  Togo 0.059 0.184 114 
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 0.000 11  Uganda 0.109 0.244 128 
Kenya 0.027 0.106 207  Zambia 0.113 0.355 49 
Liberia 0.148 0.177 17  Zimbabwe 0.037 0.135 13 
     Total 0.073 0.222 2,903 
*DONEQ (Donated Equity). Period: 2004-2016 
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8.8.2 MFI Summary of Leverage 
Table 0.11: MFI Summary of Leverage SSA. 
Summary of LEVERAGE 
Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq.  Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq. 
Angola 0.585 0.220 15      
Benin 0.713 0.310 145  Madagascar 0.653 0.230 108 
Burkina Faso 0.684 0.501 114  Malawi 0.559 0.456 59 
Burundi 0.659 0.351 98  Mali 0.723 0.213 119 
Cameroon 0.749 0.270 132  Mozambique 0.494 0.222 71 
CAR 0.958 0.050 8  Namibia 0.713 0.153 8 
Chad 0.665 0.117 14  Niger 0.568 0.258 93 
Comoros 0.790 0.047 4  Nigeria 0.500 0.413 232 
Congo Democratic 0.601 0.330 98  Rwanda 1.034 3.982 100 
Congo Republic 0.780 0.235 26  Senegal 0.807 1.208 169 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.097 0.912 68  Sierra Leone 0.417 0.275 52 
Ethiopia 0.563 0.189 135  South Africa 0.546 0.296 37 
Gabon 0.265 0.268 2  Sudan 0.250 0.236 13 
The Gambia 0.622 0.312 15  Swaziland 0.602 0.112 9 
Ghana 0.684 0.308 269  Tanzania 0.615 0.324 117 
Guinea 0.707 0.350 34  Togo 0.833 0.315 114 
Guinea-Bissau 0.910 0.124 11  Uganda 0.670 0.254 128 
Kenya 0.645 0.289 207  Zambia 0.476 0.289 49 
Liberia 0.463 0.239 17  Zimbabwe 0.641 0.301 13 
     Total 0.671 0.866 2,903 




8.8.3 MFI Summary of Borrowings to Total Asset 
Table 0.12: MFI Summary of Borrowings to Book Value of Total Asset. 
Summary of *BRWNGTBVA 
Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq.  Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq. 
Angola 0.444 0.229 15      
Benin 0.362 0.354 145  Madagascar 0.332 0.271 108 
Burkina Faso 0.223 0.511 114  Malawi 0.371 0.385 59 
Burundi 0.235 0.240 98  Mali 0.447 0.296 119 
Cameroon 0.307 0.345 132  Mozambique 0.264 0.182 71 
CAR 0.278 0.429 8  Namibia 0.550 0.119 8 
Chad 0.411 0.342 14  Niger 0.281 0.271 93 
Comoros 0.075 0.053 4  Nigeria -0.056 0.736 232 
Congo Democratic 0.321 0.361 98  Rwanda 0.653 4.023 100 
Congo Republic 0.242 0.285 26  Senegal 0.419 1.209 169 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.325 0.540 68  Sierra Leone 0.338 0.270 52 
Ethiopia 0.327 0.173 135  South Africa 0.460 0.315 37 
Gabon 0.039 0.033 2  Sudan 0.188 0.208 13 
The Gambia 0.243 0.215 15  Swaziland 0.546 0.198 9 
Ghana 0.239 0.315 269  Tanzania 0.248 0.387 117 
Guinea 0.477 0.448 34  Togo 0.281 0.406 114 
Guinea-Bissau 0.910 0.124 11  Uganda 0.405 0.271 128 
Kenya 0.313 0.302 207  Zambia 0.408 0.277 49 
Liberia 0.308 0.204 17  Zimbabwe 0.641 0.301 13 
     Total 0.307 0.889 2,903 
         
*BRWNGTBVA (Borrowing to Book Value of Asset). Study Period 2004-2016. 
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8.9 EMPIRICAL CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES 
8.9.1 Figures and Results Tables 
 
Table 0.13: MFI Yearly Statistics - SSA. 
 Overall Between Within 
Fiscal Year Freq Percent Freq Percent Percent 
2004 201 6.23 201 27.84 21.08 
2005 253 7.84 253 35.04 20.06 
2006 265 8.21 265 36.7 19.71 
2007 269 8.33 269 37.26 19.21 
2008 288 8.92 288 39.89 19.5 
2009 342 10.59 342 47.37 21.91 
2010 324 10.04 324 44.88 21.4 
2011 312 9.67 312 43.21 26.52 
2012 307 9.51 307 42.52 32.94 
2013 204 6.32 204 28.25 22.32 
2014 171 5.3 171 23.68 22.32 
2015 174 5.39 174 24.1 20.91 
2016 118 3.66 118 16.34 17.47 
Total 3228 100 3228 447.09 22.37 




Table 0.14: MFI by Country Statistics. 
   
Country Freq. Percent Cum.  Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Angola 16 0.5 0.5      
Benin 166 5.14 5.64  Madagascar 111 3.44 51.8 
Burkina Faso 123 3.81 9.45  Malawi 62 1.92 53.72 
Burundi 113 3.5 12.95  Mali 123 3.81 57.53 
Cameroon 148 4.58 17.53  Mozambique 77 2.39 59.91 
CAR 8 0.25 17.78  Namibia 8 0.25 60.16 
Chad 14 0.43 18.22  Niger 99 3.07 63.23 
Comoros 4 0.12 18.34  Nigeria 271 8.4 71.62 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 106 3.28 21.62  Rwanda 156 4.83 76.46 
Congo, Republic of the 28 0.87 22.49  Senegal 176 5.45 81.91 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 78 2.42 24.91  Sierra Leone 52 1.61 83.52 
Ethiopia 144 4.46 29.37  South Africa 37 1.15 84.67 
Gabon 4 0.12 29.49  South Sudan 17 0.53 85.19 
Gambia, The 16 0.5 29.99  Sudan 13 0.4 85.59 
Ghana 301 9.32 39.31  Swaziland 9 0.28 85.87 
Guinea 38 1.18 40.49  Tanzania 133 4.12 89.99 
Guinea-Bissau 12 0.37 40.86  Togo 120 3.72 93.71 
Kenya 224 6.94 47.8  Uganda 138 4.28 97.99 
Liberia 18 0.56 48.36  Zambia 51 1.58 99.57 
    Zimbabwe 14 0.43 100 
    Total 3,228 100   
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Table 0.15: Variable Summary and Description. 
Variable Description Measure Source 
Operational self-
sufficiency 
MFIs ability to cover its cost through operating revenues 
Measured as the ratio of operating 
revenue to expenses (CGAP, 2003) 
*The MIX 
Profitability 
Measures MFI ability to utilise shareholder resources and obtain a return on these 
resources 
Return on Asset (ROA) The MIX 
Efficiency Indicates MFI ability to efficiently utilise resources in its core mission Cost Per Borrower (CPB) The MIX 
Portfolio Quality Indicates the health of an MFIs loan books PAR>30 days The MIX 
Social  
Measures the Social performance of MFIs. In particular, MFIs ability to lend to 
female borrowers  
Percentage of Female Borrowers (PFB) The MIX 
Depth  
Measures the depth of MFI borrowing. Specifically, their reach down the poverty 
ladder (down the pyramid) 




Measures MFIs breadth of reach. Specifically, how far along the poverty spectrum 
can the MFIs reach 
Number of Active Borrowers (NAB) The MIX 
FIRM SPECIFIC MEASURES  
Asset Tangibility Measures the total tangible assets of MFIs as relates to MFI Total Asset Ratio of Net Total Fixed Asset to TA The MIX 
Size Measures the Size of MFI Natural Log of TA The MIX 
Age Captures MFI Age MFI Age The MIX 
Capital Structure Variables 
STLEV Short-term Leverage STLEV/TLEV The MIX 
LTLEV Long-term Leverage LTLEV/TLEV The MIX 
TLEV Total Leverage TLEV The MIX 
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
Strength of Investor 
Protection (SOIP) 
Measures the strength of investor protection by existing governance frameworks Index score between 1 and 10 
WB Creditor 
Rights Index 
WORLD GOVERNANCE INDEX 
Enforcing Contracts 
(ENFCON) 






Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures 





The quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of 
governments commitment to such policies   
Rule of Law (ROL) 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have  confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular  




particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.   
Corruption Control 
(CRRPTNCTRL) 
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand  
Percentile rank 1 to 100 
WB WGI 
Index 
 forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.    
ECONOMIC FREEDOMS INDEX  
Monetary Freedom 
(MONF) 






Quantifies the extent to which tariff and nontariff barriers affect imports and 
exports of goods and services into and out of the country 






Indicates banking efficiency as well as how independent from the government is 
the financial sector 




FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
Deposit Interest Rate Measures Deposit rate for sample countries Deposit Interest rate annualised 
WB WGI 
Index 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector 
Captures Credit to Private Sector by other financial institutions including banks 





Real Interest rate 
(nominal) 
Normalized (duration and rolling over method) rate of interest without adjusting 
for inflation, opportunity and transaction costs 
Real interest rate (annualised) 
WB WGI 
Index 
Inflation Captures annualised inflation in sample countries  Inflation rate  
WB WGI 
Index 




Measures National Income growth for sample countries GNI growth 
WB WGI 
Index 
*The MIX (Mix Market), WB (World Bank), WGI (World Governance Indicators) 
    
Source: Authors Own
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Table 0.16: Correlation Table: MFI Performance. 
 
LnA (Log of Assets), AT (Asset Tangibility), STLEV (Short-Term Leverage), LTLEV (Long-Term Leverage), TLEV (Total Leverage), SOIP (Strength of Investor 
Protection), ENFCON (Enforcing Contracts), GOVEFF (Government Effectiveness), ROL (Rule of Law), CORRPTNCTRL (Corruption Control), MONF 
(Monetary Freedom), TRADEF (Trade Freedom), FINF (Financial Freedom). GNIg (Gross National Income growth), INF (Inflation), REALINT (Interest Rate), 
DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). OSS (Operational Self-Sufficiency), ROA (Return on Assets), PAR30 (Portfolio at 
Risk > 30 days), CPB (Cost Per Borrower), PFB (Percent of Female Borrowers), ALPB (Average Loan Balance Per Borrower), NAB (Number of Active Borrowers).  
LnA Age AT STLEV LTLEV TLEV SOIP ENFCON GOVEFF ROL CORRPT MONF TRADEF FINF GNIg INF REALIN DEPINT DCTPS OSS ROA PAR30 CPB PFB ALPB NAB
LnA 1
Age 0.34 1.00
AT 0.06 0.05 1.00
STLEV 0.01 0.01 0.17 1.00
LTLEV 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.30 1.00
TLEV 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.03 1.00
SOIP 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.01 1.00
ENFCON 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.15 1.00
GOVEFF 0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.57 1.00
ROL 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.19 0.46 0.82 1.00
CORRPTNCTR -0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.22 0.44 0.77 0.82 1.00
MONF 0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.30 0.20 1.00
TRADEF 0.21 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.66 1.00
FINF 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.27 0.28 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.46 0.49 1.00
GNIg -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.20 -0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.18 1.00
INF -0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.21 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.45 -0.15 -0.12 0.02 1.00
REALINT 0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.09 -0.27 -0.24 -0.18 -0.23 -0.20 -0.04 0.03 0.23 -0.07 1.00
DEPINTR -0.04 -0.01 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.32 1.00
DCTPS 0.17 -0.04 0.06 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.16 0.22 0.35 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.13 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 1.00
OSS 0.07 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 1.00
ROA 0.22 0.19 -0.10 0.04 -0.17 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.49 1.00
PAR30 -0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.15 1.00
CPB 0.11 -0.12 0.10 0.01 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.19 0.03 1.00
PFB -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.14 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 1.00
ALPB 0.35 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.17 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.43 -0.25 1.00




Table 0.17: Summary of Total Leverage by Country. 
Summary of Total Leverage by Country 
Summary of Total Leverage (2004-2016) 
Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq.  Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq. 
Angola 0.585 0.220 15      
Benin 0.714 0.310 145  Madagascar 0.653 0.230 108 
Burkina Faso 0.684 0.501 114  Malawi 0.559 0.456 59 
Burundi 0.659 0.351 98  Mali 0.723 0.214 119 
Cameroon 0.749 0.270 132  Mozambique 0.494 0.222 71 
CAR 0.959 0.050 8  Namibia 0.714 0.154 8 
Chad 0.665 0.117 14  Niger 0.568 0.258 93 
Comoros 0.790 0.047 4  Nigeria 0.500 0.413 232 
Congo Democratic 0.602 0.330 98  Rwanda 1.034 3.982 100 
Congo Republic 0.780 0.235 26  Senegal 0.807 1.208 169 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 1.097 0.912 68  Sierra Leone 0.417 0.275 52 
Ethiopia 0.563 0.189 135  South Africa 0.547 0.297 37 
Gabon 0.265 0.268 2  Sudan 0.250 0.236 13 
The Gambia 0.622 0.312 15  Swaziland 0.602 0.112 9 
Ghana 0.684 0.308 269  Tanzania 0.615 0.324 117 
Guinea 0.707 0.350 34  Togo 0.833 0.315 114 
Guinea-Bissau 0.910 0.124 11  Uganda 0.670 0.254 128 
Kenya 0.645 0.289 207  Zambia 0.476 0.289 49 
Liberia 0.463 0.239 17  Zimbabwe 0.641 0.301 13 





Table 0.18: Summary of Long-term Leverage by Country. 
Summary of Long-Term Leverage (2004-2016) 
Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq.   Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq. 
Angola 0.038 0.041 15      
Benin 0.043 0.085 145  Madagascar 0.062 0.096 108 
Burkina Faso 0.048 0.098 114  Malawi 0.119 0.201 59 
Burundi 0.058 0.089 98  Mali 0.028 0.045 119 
Cameroon 0.046 0.064 132  Mozambique 0.094 0.103 71 
CAR 0.021 0.023 8  Namibia 0.018 0.016 8 
Chad 0.017 0.024 14  Niger 0.021 0.036 93 
Comoros 0.010 0.013 4  Nigeria 0.042 0.083 232 
Congo Democratic 0.036 0.078 98  Rwanda 0.040 0.057 100 
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Congo Republic 0.040 0.071 26  Senegal 0.028 0.093 169 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.076 0.145 68  Sierra Leone 0.063 0.122 52 
Ethiopia 0.033 0.060 135  South Africa 0.043 0.062 37 
Gabon 0.039 0.032 2  Sudan 0.013 0.018 13 
The Gambia 0.046 0.079 15  Swaziland 0.073 0.032 9 
Ghana 0.071 0.084 269  Tanzania 0.046 0.074 117 
Guinea 0.046 0.094 34  Togo 0.025 0.036 114 
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 0.000 11  Uganda 0.061 0.074 128 
Kenya 0.037 0.119 207  Zambia 0.105 0.150 49 
Liberia 0.160 0.151 17  Zimbabwe 0.063 0.110 13 





Table 0.19: Summary of MFI Short-term Leverage. 
Summary of Short-Term Leverage (2004-2016) 
Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq.  Country Mean Std.Dev. Freq. 
Angola 0.016 0.025 15      
Benin 0.005 0.027 145  Madagascar 0.011 0.043 108 
Burkina Faso 0.003 0.021 114  Malawi 0.028 0.131 59 
Burundi 0.003 0.021 98  Mali 0.002 0.007 119 
Cameroon 0.007 0.018 132  Mozambique 0.008 0.026 71 
CAR 0.000 0.000 8  Namibia 0.059 0.127 8 
Chad 0.045 0.141 14  Niger 0.002 0.010 93 
Comoros 0.000 0.000 4  Nigeria 0.008 0.035 232 
Congo Democratic 0.014 0.055 98  Rwanda 0.007 0.034 100 
Congo Republic 0.003 0.006 26  Senegal 0.002 0.007 169 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.002 0.010 68  Sierra Leone 0.002 0.006 52 
Ethiopia 0.004 0.022 135  South Africa 0.062 0.104 37 
Gabon 0.000 0.000 2  Sudan 0.016 0.031 13 
The Gambia 0.011 0.031 15  Swaziland 0.005 0.015 9 
Ghana 0.009 0.039 269  Tanzania 0.007 0.034 117 
Guinea 0.005 0.027 34  Togo 0.000 0.002 114 
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 0.000 11  Uganda 0.013 0.045 128 
Kenya 0.009 0.030 207  Zambia 0.015 0.054 49 
Liberia 0.018 0.044 17  Zimbabwe 0.015 0.033 13 
     Total 0.008 0.039 2,903 
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8.10 EMPIRICAL CHAPTER 3 APPENDICES 
8.10.1 Figures and Results Tables 
 
Figure 19: MFI Penetration rate and growth from 2007-2012. 
 
Source (Krauss and Martinez 2015); Centre for MicroFinance studies Zurich. 
 
8.11 SELECTED SUMMARY TABLES 
Summary statistics for MF Penetration rate, and FINDEX, for LAC countries. 
 
Figure 20: Summary of MFI Penetration Rates and Financial Inclusion Index for LAC. 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial Index 240 0.083 0.0376 0.022 0.155 
Microfinance Penetration Rate 379 6.192 10.814 0.000 74.476 
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Table 0.20: Detailed Summary Statistics of MFI Penetration Rates and Financial Inclusion Index for 
LAC. 
    ---------------------Quantiles --------------------- 
Variable obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
FINDEX 240 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.16 
MFPENRATE 379 6.19 10.81 0.00 0.00 0.67 8.90 74.48 















2003 . 2.295 . 0 
2004 0.732 3.029 0.065 0.792 
2005 0.071 4.129 0.064 0.200 
2006 0.075 4.994 0.068 0.254 
2007 0.081 5.972 0.076 0.337 
2008 0.088 6.423 0.082 0.958 
2009 0.089 6.977 0.083 0.443 
2010 0.091 8.177 0.088 3.872 
2011 0.097 9.396 0.097 4.092 
2012 . 10.427 . 3.436 
     




Country Summary of MFI Penetration Rates and Financial Inclusion Index for LAC. 
Table 0.22: Mean and Median table (categorized by year) for MF Penetration rate, and FINDEX, for LAC countries. 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Country 
 
FINDEX MFPR FINDEX MFPR Country  FINDEX MFPR FINDEX MFPR 
Antigua 0.108 0.000 0.109 0.000 Guyana 0.088 1.413 0.090 0.000 
Argentina 0.054 4.023 0.055 2.570 Haiti 0.024 2.581 0.024 2.666 
Aruba 0.123 0.000 0.123 0.000 Honduras 0.066 6.225 0.067 6.458 
Bahamas 0.136 0.000 0.139 0.000 Jamaica 0.084 3.004 0.085 0.000 
Barbados 0.142 0.000 0.145 0.000 Mexico 0.047 10.038 0.048 11.978 
Belize 0.098 4.040 0.099 0.000 Nicaragua 0.000 23.812 0.000 24.048 
Bolivia 0.049 23.994 0.048 23.989 Panama 0.135 2.186 0.134 1.899 
Brazil 0.096 6.534 0.100 4.471 Paraguay 0.035 27.479 0.035 21.337 
Cayman Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Peru 0.032 38.219 0.032 36.411 
Chile 0.115 13.925 0.119 14.167 Puerto Rico 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Colombia 0.067 13.546 0.070 15.195 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.146 0.000 0.148 0.000 
Costa Rica 0.071 2.272 0.071 2.205 St Lucia 0.123 0.437 0.124 0.000 
Cuba 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Sent Vincent and 
Grenadines 
0.091 0.000 0.094 0.000 
Dominica 0.093 0.000 0.096 0.000 Suriname 0.060 1.860 0.062 0.000 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.045 7.972 0.045 6.929 Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 1.803 0.000 1.719 
Ecuador 0.000 19.897 0.000 19.731 Turks and Caicos  0.000 0.000 0.000 
El Salvador 0.070 11.264 0.073 11.932 Uruguay 0.070 1.561 0.070 0.706 
Grenada 0.138 0.000 0.139 0.000 Venezuela 0.039 0.473 0.040 0.559 
Guatemala 0.048 6.120 0.047 6.602 Virgin Islands US 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
FINDEX (Financial Index), MFPR (Microfinance Penetration Rate). 
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Mean and Median table for MF Penetration rate, and FINDEX, for SSA countries. 
 
Table 0.23: Summary of MFI Penetration Rates and Financial Inclusion Index for SSA. 
   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FINDEX 344 0.307 0.327 0.0002 0.19 
MFPENRATE 376 2.133 3.132 0 17.38 
      




Table 0.24: Detailed Summary of MFI Penetration Rates and Financial Inclusion Index for SSA. 
    
---------------------Quantiles ------------
---- 
Variable obs Mean S. Dev. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
FINDEX 344 0.03 0.03 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.19 
MFPENRATE 376 2.13 3.13 0 0.00 0.59 3.14 17.38 
         
SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), FINDEX (Financial Index), MFPENRATE 
(Microfinance Penetration Rate). 
 
 
Mean and Median table (categorized by year) for MF Penetration rate, and FINDEX, for SSA 
countries.  










2004 0.269 1.394 0.017 0.239 
2005 0.026 1.825 0.016 0.402 
2006 0.027 2.130 0.017 0.554 
2007 0.029 2.155 0.019 0.378 
2008 0.032 2.519 0.020 0.759 
2009 0.033 2.768 0.020 0.817 
2010 0.034 2.041 0.021 0.600 
2011 0.038 2.267 0.024 0.705 
2012         
     
SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), FINDEX (Financial Index), MFPENRATE 





Table 0.26: Country-level MFI Penetration Rates and Financial Inclusion Index for SSA. 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Country 
 
FINDEX MFPR FINDEX MFPR Country  FINDEX MFPR FINDEX MFPR 
Angola 0.010 0.273 0.009 0.307 Liberia 0.042 0.899 0.042 0.475 
Benin 0.015 9.605 0.014 9.313 Madagascar 0.005 0.825 0.005 0.780 
Botswana 0.046 0.000 0.046 0.000 Malawi 0.017 4.348 0.017 4.465 
Burkina Faso 0.016 3.816 0.016 3.864 Mali 0.018 6.499 0.018 5.800 
Burundi 0.020 0.749 0.021 0.401 Mauritania 0.102 0.000 0.101 0.000 
Cameroon 0.018 3.562 0.019 3.263 Mauritius 0.094 0.000 0.098 0.000 
Cape Verde 0.078 0.000 0.083 0.000 Mozambique 0.301 0.931 0.030 1.011 
Central African 
Republic 
0.011 0.151 0.010 0.170 
Namibia 
0.097 0.372 0.102 0.352 
Chad 0.006 0.580 0.006 0.573 Niger 0.013 1.502 0.013 1.411 
Comoros 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.000 Nigeria 0.023 1.072 0.025 0.999 
Congo. Dem. Rep. 0.004 0.306 0.004 0.294 Rwanda 0.007 1.757 0.007 1.654 
Congo Republic 
0.007 0.295 0.007 0.350 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
0.038 0.000 0.037 0.000 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.000 0.621 0.000 0.595 Senegal 0.000 7.460 0.000 7.389 
Djibouti 0.047 0.000 0.047 0.000 Seychelles 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Equatorial Guinea 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000 Sierra Leone 0.151 1.933 0.155 1.941 
Eritrea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Somalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ethiopia 0.026 10.423 0.026 10.692 South Africa 0.169 5.466 0.168 4.505 
Gabon 0.019 0.062 0.019 0.000 South Sudan 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 
Gambia 0.022 2.709 0.022 2.495 Sudan 0.021 0.134 0.022 0.047 
Ghana 0.032 6.872 0.032 7.546 Swaziland 0.033 1.525 0.034 1.460 
Guinea 0.018 4.116 0.018 3.403 Tanzania 0.010 3.995 0.009 3.982 
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Guinea-Bissau 0.000 0.166 0.000 0.070 Togo 0.019 4.259 0.020 4.618 
Kenya 0.036 9.238 0.037 10.272 Uganda 0.011 6.771 0.010 6.107 
Lesotho 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 Zambia 0.027 0.645 0.027 0.744 
     Zimbabwe 0.047 0.138 0.046 0.796 
          






Table 0.27: Correlation Output Financial Inclusion and MFI Study. 
 FINDEX MFPR MOBSUB100 POPDENS PUBCREDREG CORRCTRL LENDr INF DEPINTR GNIk DCTPS 
FINDEX 1.000           
MFPR -0.086 1.000          
MOBSUB100 0.658 -0.002 1.000         
POPDENS 0.102 -0.096 0.095 1.000        
PUBCREDREG 0.386 -0.180 0.342 0.488 1.000       
CORRCTRL 0.585 -0.224 0.510 0.219 0.334 1.000      
LENDr -0.222 -0.154 -0.206 0.034 -0.183 -0.294 1.000     
INF -0.061 0.008 -0.106 -0.058 -0.140 -0.131 0.479 1.000    
DEPINTR -0.096 0.134 -0.038 0.030 -0.044 -0.101 0.482 0.279 1.000   
GNIk -0.029 -0.103 -0.098 -0.020 0.008 -0.136 0.059 0.065 -0.057 1.000  
DCTPS 0.936 0.016 0.628 0.238 0.427 0.522 -0.254 -0.083 -0.034 -0.069 1.000 
 
FINDEX (Financial Inclusion Index), MFPR (Microfinance Penetration Rate), MOBSUB100 (Mobile Subscription per 100,00 adults), 
POPDENS (Population density), PUBCRREDREG (Public Credit Registry), CORRCTRL (Corruption Control), LENDr (Lending Rate), INF 
(Inflation), DEPINTR (Deposit Interest Rate), GNIk (Gross National Income per Capita), DCTPS (Domestic Credit to Private Sector). 
 
Source: Authors Own. 
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Variable Description Measure Source 
Capital 
Structure 
Variables    
Leverage 
MFI Leverage (Leverage is indicated by the MIX 
as comprising deposits as well as borrowings) 




MFI Leverage excluding deposits Total MFI non-
deposit liabilities 
ratio of non-deposit 
liabilities, to BV of 
assets 
The MIX 
DEPOSIT MFI timed deposit liabilities (excluding grants) 




   
 -Proportion Measures MFI total grants  
Proportion of Donated 




or Donations  (Donated Equity) 
ratio of donated equity 
by TE 
The MIX 
STLEV Short-term Leverage STLEV/TLEV The MIX 
LTLEV Long-term Leverage LTLEV/TLEV The MIX 
TLEV Total Leverage TLEV The MIX 
FIRM 
SPECIFIC 
MEASURES    
Profitability 
Measures MFI ability to utilise shareholder 
resources and obtain a return on these resources 




Indicates MFI ability to efficiently utilise resources 
in its core mission 
Cost Per Borrower 
(CPB) 
The MIX 
Portfolio Quality Indicates the health of an MFIs loan books PAR>30 days The MIX 
Social  
Measures the Social performance of MFIs. In 
particular, MFIs ability to lend to female 
borrowers  




Measures the depth of MFI borrowing. 
Specifically, their reach down the poverty ladder 
(down the pyramid) 
Average Loan Balance 
Per Borrower (ALPB) 
The MIX 
Breadth 
Measures MFIs breadth of reach. Specifically, how 
far along the poverty spectrum can the MFIs reach 




Measures the total tangible assets of MFIs as 
relates to MFI Total Asset 
Ratio of Net Total 
Fixed Asset to TA 
The MIX 
Size Measures the Size of MFI Natural Log of TA The MIX 
Age Captures MFI Age MFI Age The MIX 
INSTITUTION
AL 




Measures the strength of investor protection by 
existing governance frameworks 










Measures the strength of contract enforcement by 
countries in the sample 







Political Stability and absence of violence 
measures perceptions of the likelihood 






of political instability and/or politically motivated 





Captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures 






The quality of policy formulation and 
implementation and the credibility of governments 
commitment to such policies   
Rule of Law 
(ROL) 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have  confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular  






particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 




Control of corruption captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand  






forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests.    
ECONOMIC 
FREEDOMS 




Captures price stability and the intervention of the 
micro-economy. 







Quantifies the extent to which tariff and nontariff 
barriers affect imports and exports of goods and 
services into and out of the country 







Analyses how free or constrained is the flow of 
investment capital of individuals and firms. 








INDICATORS    
Deposit Interest 
Rate Measures Deposit rate for sample countries 






to Private Sector 
Captures Credit to Private Sector by other financial 
institutions including banks 
Credit to Private 






INDICATORS    
Real Interest rate 
(nominal) 
Normalized (duration and rolling over method) 
rate of interest without adjusting for inflation, 
opportunity and transaction costs 














Measures National Income growth for sample 




    
THE MIX (Mix Market Database), WB (World Bank), WGI (World Governance Indicators). 
 
 
